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This thesis examines the legal framework in Ireland for specialist palliative care. End-
of-life care has become increasingly medicalised and this has given rise to substantial 
legal and ethical issues. On this basis, it is necessary to examine how we protect people 
during this vulnerable stage. This thesis argues that the legal framework in Ireland for 
specialist palliative care is inadequate and consequently a more appropriate legal 
framework must be identified. This research is guided by three central research 
questions. The first central research question examines the legitimacy of the 
distinction between specialist palliative care and euthanasia. The second central 
research question asks what legal framework currently exists in Ireland for specialist 
palliative care. The third central research question examines an alternative legal 
framework for specialist palliative. This thesis utilises doctrinal and comparative legal 
research to address these central research questions.  
 
This thesis is composed of seven chapters. The first Chapter is an introduction to the 
thesis and defines the terminology and the central research questions. Chapter Two 
explores the development and practice of palliative care in Ireland. Chapter Three 
examines the distinction in criminal law between specialist palliative care practices 
and euthanasia. Chapter Four examines the human rights framework for specialist 
palliative care. Chapter Five critiques the regulatory framework in Ireland for 
specialist palliative care. Having gained a thorough understanding of the provision of 
palliative care and the related legal framework, this thesis then engages in comparative 
analysis of the Netherlands which is used as a source of ideas for reform in Ireland. 
Chapter Seven is the concluding chapter and, in it, the main findings of this thesis are 
summarised. The main findings being that: the distinction between specialist palliative 
care and euthanasia is not sufficiently supported by justifications such as a double 
effect or the acts and omissions distinction, there is no clear decision-making 
framework in Ireland for specialist palliative care, and the current legal framework 
lacks clarity and does not promote consistency between providers of specialist 
palliative care. This Chapter also proposes that detailed professional standards and 
guidelines are likely to be the most appropriate way to effect individual and 
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In ‘Aubade’ the poet Philip Larkin wrote ‘[m]ost things may never happen: this one 
will’.1 This set out that death is something which cannot be avoided and is a reality 
which is to be accepted. It is a reality which is bundled with much philosophical 
analysis as well as religious and social mores.2 Our understanding of death and the 
ability to treat pain experienced at the end of life by the patient has developed in line 
with advancements in science and technology.3 As such, technology now has a 
substantial impact on the way people both live and die. This leads to a degree of 
friction between the treatment of the patient and the philosophical, religious and social 
mores associated with death and dying. Hanafin suggests that, as a result of death 
becoming increasingly medicalised, this signals the first move towards ‘the need for 
legal intervention in this area.’4 In this regard, end-of-life care raises important legal 
and ethical issues about the treatment and care available to patients. End-of-life care 
may take a variety of forms5 but this thesis concentrates on specialist palliative care 
practices and the legal framework in Ireland in respect of these practices. This thesis 
will advance the argument that the current legal framework in Ireland for specialist 
palliative care is inadequate. Consequently, a more appropriate legal framework which 
addresses the challenges raised in practice must and will be identified in this thesis. 
Three central research questions will be addressed in this thesis in order to advance 
the main argument.  
   
The central research questions are structured in such a manner so as to build upon each 
other and provide a logical progression for this thesis. They address key issues raised 
                                                          
1 Philip Larkin, ‘Aubade’ in Harold Pinter, Geoffrey Godbert and Anthony Astbury (eds), 100 Poems 
by 100 Poets (Methuen 1986) 93. 
2 Phillipe Ariès, Western Attitudes toward Death: From the Middle Ages to the Present (Patricia Ranum 
tr, John Hopkins University Press 1975); Phillipe Ariès, The Hour of Our Death (Random House 1991); 
Bryan S Turner, The Body and Society (Sage 1996) cited by Jane E Seymour, Rien Janssens and Bert 
Broaeckaert, ‘Relieving suffering at the end of life: Practitioners’ perspectives on palliative sedation 
from three European countries’ (2007) 64 Social Science & Medicine 1679, 1679 ‘Questions about how 
to manage the dying process are now matters of intense clinical and societal debate, alerting us to how 
death is both a socially organised and profoundly physical transition and related to beliefs and values 
at an individual, social and societal level.’; John Lombard, ‘The Definition of Death’ (2012) 11 
Hibernian Law Journal 63. 
3 Lombard (n2). 
4 Patrick Hanafin, Last Rights: Death, Dying and the Law in Ireland (Cork University Press 1997) 7. 
5 See p6. 
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by the provision of specialist palliative care and underline the necessity of examining 
the current legal framework for this form of care. The aim of this chapter is to 
introduce the subject and structure of this thesis. This not only includes setting out the 
central research questions but also setting out why these questions are relevant and 
how they will be answered in order to develop the central argument of this thesis. As 
such, the first step in achieving this is to outline the central research questions for this 
thesis. This will be a concise introduction to the questions as they are drawn out in 
detail over the course of this Chapter. Second, the main terms used in this thesis will 
be defined. The terms are defined at an early stage in order to provide clarity in the 
subsequent use of these terms and to highlight similarities and differences that may go 
beyond the purely semantic. 
 
The parameters of this thesis will be outlined and justified in the third section. This 
discussion will locate the central research questions in relation to existing literature on 
end-of-life care, and will identify gaps in the current state of knowledge about the legal 
framework for specialist palliative care. This section will demonstrate the importance 
of examining the legal framework in Ireland for specialist palliative care. Furthermore, 
in this section the issues outside the scope of this thesis will be explained and justified.   
 
The theoretical framework and methodological approach utilised in this thesis will be 
outlined in the fourth section. Their selection will be justified based on their suitability 
to examine, develop, and respond to the three central research questions. In the fifth 
section the chapter structure for this thesis will be set out. This will detail the key 
arguments made in each chapter and demonstrate how the central argument is 
developed and advanced over the course of the thesis. This section will also set out the 
manner in which the three central research questions in this thesis are resolved.      
 
Central Research Questions 
The first central research question examines the legitimacy of the distinction between 
specialist palliative care practices and euthanasia. This analysis clarifies the legality 
of practices such as palliative sedation and the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and 
hydration in Ireland. This will be achieved by examining the legal status of euthanasia 
in Ireland and comparing it against a jurisdiction, the Netherlands, where this practice 
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is legislated for. This approach allows for a practical distinction between specialist 
palliative care practices and euthanasia to be identified. Responding to this central 
research question also requires legal justifications such as double effect and the acts 
and omissions distinction to be examined. These justifications may be relied upon in 
cases where the actions of a healthcare professional suggest an intention other than 
providing appropriate palliative care and/or pain management. This central research 
question is a necessary first step to take before analysing the existing legal framework 
for specialist palliative care, and consequently, before making any suggestions for 
reform. In effect, this central research question allows for the legal status of palliative 
sedation and the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration to be clarified as well 
as identifying potential failings in this part of the legal framework.  
 
The second central research question asks what legal framework currently exists in 
Ireland for specialist palliative care. This thesis focuses on the legal framework 
applicable to specialist palliative care for adults and not paediatric palliative care. This 
distinction is made due to the differences between paediatric and adult palliative care 
as well as the additional challenges raised in providing palliative care to children such 
as issues of patient autonomy.6 At present, there is no legislation drafted in Ireland 
with specialist palliative care as its central concern. Therefore, it is necessary to take 
a broad approach to this question and consider constitutional provisions, common law, 
domestic legislation, international legal instruments, and professional standards and 
guidelines applicable to doctors and nurses in Ireland. These are examined over the 
course of several chapters and build to ensure that a comprehensive picture of the 
current legal framework is identified.  
 
The third central research question examines an alternative legal framework for 
specialist palliative care which could address the legal and ethical challenges posed by 
specialist palliative care in this jurisdiction. In order to adequately address this 
research question it is necessary to engage in comparative legal research. This 
methodology will assist in the identification of suggestions for reform through analysis 
                                                          
6 Department of Health and Children and the Irish Hospice Foundation, ‘A Palliative Care Needs 
Assessment for Children’ (2005); Department of Health and Children, ‘Palliative Care for Children 




of and comparison with another jurisdiction. Overall, these three central research 
questions are closely linked and, when combined, address the central argument of this 
thesis that the current legal framework in Ireland for specialist palliative care is 
inadequate and consequently a more appropriate legal framework must and will be 
identified.      
  
Terminology 
The terms ‘palliative care’, ‘specialist palliative care’, ‘palliative medicine’, and 
‘euthanasia’ are used throughout this thesis. As such, it is necessary to define these 
terms at an early stage to provide for a clearer discussion. Defining these terms begins 
to illustrate the complexity of distinguishing between several of these practices from 
a legal and ethical perspective. Legal and ethical concerns are closely aligned in 
specialist palliative care given the condition of the patient and they often serve to 
complicate discussion.  
 
Palliative Care 
In the case of Fleming v Ireland & Ors,7 Dr. Tony O’Brien8 described palliative care 
as:   
 
a medical intervention which is concerned with quality of life. It involves 
pain and symptom management where the patient is also given 
psychological, social, emotional and spiritual support so that they can live 
a life of their choosing in the place where they choose to live it to the 
greatest possible extent.9 
 
This description encompasses many of the characteristics of palliative care. For 
instance, this explanation of palliative care highlights the focus placed on the ‘quality 
of life’10 as well as the wide range of care it includes, e.g. ‘psychological, social, 
emotional and spiritual support’.11 These forms of care demonstrate the multi-
                                                          
7 Fleming v Ireland & Ors [2013] IEHC 2. 
8 Fleming v Ireland & Ors [2013] IEHC 2, [34] ‘Dr. Tony O’Brien is a consultant physician in palliative 
medicine and former chair of the Council of Europe Expert Committee on Palliative Care.’ 
9 Fleming v Ireland & Ors [2013] IEHC 2, [35].  
10 Fleming v Ireland & Ors [2013] IEHC 2, [35]. 
11 Fleming v Ireland & Ors [2013] IEHC 2, [35]; Deirdre Madden, ‘Is There a Right to a “Good 
Death”?’ (2013) 19(2) Medico-Legal Journal of Ireland 58, 61 ‘In recent years, palliative care has 
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disciplinary nature of palliative care. The description also serves to illustrate that 
palliative care may be provided in a variety of locations. Hence, several characteristics 
of palliative care begin to emerge in this description.  
 
A more formal definition of ‘palliative care’ has been set out by the World Health 
Organization [hereinafter ‘WHO’]. The WHO defines palliative care as:   
 
an approach that improves the quality of life of patients and their families 
facing the problems associated with life-threatening illness, through the 
prevention and relief of suffering by means of early identification and 
impeccable assessment and treatment of pain and other problems, physical, 
psychosocial and spiritual.12 
 
This is the definition of palliative care which will be used throughout this thesis. It is 
broadly similar to the description set out by Dr. Tony O’Brien and has often been cited 
by journal articles13 and reports such as that of the National Advisory Committee on 
Palliative Care.14 On this basis, the WHO definition of palliative care is well 
established and the international acceptance of this definition facilitates use of 
comparative legal research. It is notable that for a form of care so closely associated 
with death and dying that neither the description of Dr. Tony O’Brien nor the WHO 
definition of palliative care referred to the death of a patient. Instead the focus is placed 
on the ‘quality of life’ and appropriate pain management for the patient.  
  
The ‘Report of the National Advisory Committee on Palliative Care’ outlined the 
characteristics of palliative care. This report highlighted that palliative care ‘affirms 
                                                          
encouraged medicine to be gentler in its acceptance of death, yet some medical services continue to 
regard death as something to be resisted, postponed or avoided.’ 
12 Cecilia Sepúlveda and others, ‘Palliative Care: The World Health Organization’s Global Perspective’ 
(2002) 24(2) Journal of Pain and Symptom Management 91, 94; See also Health Service Executive, 
‘Palliative Care Services – Five Year/Medium Term Development Framework’ (Health Service 
Executive 2009) 12; Mary McCarron and others, ‘Evaluation of the Programme to Support Palliative 
and Hospice Care in the Republic of Ireland’ (Atlantic Philanthropies 2013) 5.   
13 FEM Murtagh, ‘Patterns of dying: palliative care for non-malignant disease’ (2004) 4(1) Clinical 
Medicine 39; Harvey Max Chochinov, ‘Dying, Dignity, and New Horizons in Palliative End-of-Life 
Care’ (2006) 56(2) A Cancer Journal for Clinicians 84; Tiny Jaarsma and others, ‘Palliative care in 
heart failure: a position statement from the palliative care workshop of the Heart Failure Association of 
the European Society of Cardiology’ (2009) 11(5) European Journal of Heart Failure 433. 
14 Department of Health and Children, ‘Report of the National Advisory Committee on Palliative Care’ 
(Department of Health and Children 2001); Text to n45 in Chapter Two for discussion of the National 
Advisory Committee on Palliative Care.  
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life and regards dying as a normal process’,15 ‘neither hastens nor postpones death’,16 
and ‘provides relief from pain and other distressing symptoms’.17 Overall, the role of 
palliative care can be summarised as aiming ‘to reduce and, if possible, eliminate 
suffering, and improve the quality of living and dying.’18 However, palliative care is 
not a single type of care. Rather, it has different levels of provision. This is reflected 
in the WHO description of palliative care as an ‘approach’.19 In this regard, palliative 
care can be provided by way of the palliative care approach, general palliative care or 
specialist palliative care.    
 
The palliative care approach is the application of the principles of palliative care by 
‘all health care professionals.’20 This type of care is not limited by location and 
concentrates largely on the provision of care based on palliative care principles such 
as focussing on the quality of life.21 General palliative care is an ‘intermediate level’ 
of palliative care.22 This level of care is provided by a healthcare professional who has 
‘additional training and experience in palliative care’23 but does not specialise in 




                                                          
15 Department of Health and Children (n14) 20; McCarron (n12) 5.  
16 Department of Health and Children (n14) 20; McCarron (n12) 5.  
17 Department of Health and Children (n14) 20; McCarron (n12) 5.  
18 Kieran McKeown and others, ‘Dying in Hospital in Ireland: An Assessment of the Quality of Care 
in the Last Week of Life, Report 5’ (Irish Hospice Foundation 2010) 100; Robin Cohen and others, 
‘Changes in quality of life following admission to palliative care units’ (2001) 15(5) Palliative Medicine 
363; Annette S Strömgren and others, ‘A longitudinal study of palliative care’ (2005) 103(8) Cancer 
1747; David Casarett and others, ‘A nationwide VA palliative care quality measure: the family 
assessment of treatment at the end of life’ (2008) 11(1) Journal of Palliative Medicine 68; Edouard 
Ferrand and others, ‘Circumstances of Death in Hospitalized Patients and Nurses’ Perceptions: French 
Multicenter Mort-a-l’Hôpital Survey’ (2008) 168(8) Archives of Internal Medicine 867. 
19 Sepúlveda (n12) 94.  
20 Department of Health and Children (n14) 10; McCarron (n12) 5 ‘Palliative care principles should be 
practiced by all healthcare professionals. The palliative care approach should be a core skill of every 
clinician at hospital and community level. Many patients with progressive and advanced disease will 
have their care needs met comprehensively and satisfactorily without referral to specialist palliative 
care units or personnel.’ 
21 Department of Health and Children (n14) 31 ‘The key principles of the palliative care approach 
include a focus on quality of life, which includes good symptom control; a holistic approach that takes 
into account the person’s life experience and current situation; care that encompasses both the dying 
person and those who matter to that person; and an emphasis on open and sensitive communication, 
which extends to patients, carers and professional colleagues.’ 
22 Department of Health and Children (n14) 32; McCarron (n12) 5.   
23 Department of Health and Children (n14) 32; McCarron (n12) 5.   
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Specialist Palliative Care 
The National Advisory Committee on Palliative Care describe specialist palliative care 
as ‘services whose core activity is limited to the provision of palliative care.’24 This 
level of care is provided in settings such as ‘specialist palliative care units, hospitals 
and the community.’25 Specialist palliative care units refer to healthcare facilities such 
as hospices, although this is not the only level of palliative care which hospices 
provide.26  
 
The pain management and broader practices associated with specialist palliative care 
raise the legal and ethical difficulties which this thesis will address.27 For example, the 
issue of what constitutes appropriate pain management is a key concern for the first 
and second central research questions in this thesis. This relates to the provision of 
palliative sedation and the associated practice of withdrawing artificial nutrition and 
hydration. The absence of an appropriate legal framework for these practices lends 




An additional term which arises in the context of end-of-life care is ‘palliative 
medicine’. This has been described as ‘the medical component of what has become 
known as palliative care.’28 Palliative medicine is a particular aspect of the end-of-life 
care provided to a terminally ill patient. For the purposes of this thesis, the term 
palliative medicine will only be used when referring to a report or article which uses 
this term. In general, the term ‘palliative care’ or ‘specialist palliative care’ will be 




                                                          
24 Department of Health and Children (n14) 32; McCarron (n12) 5. 
25 Department of Health and Children (n14) 44.  
26 See pp43-49. 
27 See p44. 
28 Max Watson and others, Oxford Handbook of Palliative Care (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2009) 
xxviii; McCarron (n12) 5 ‘Palliative medicine is the appropriate medical care of patients with active, 
progressive and advanced disease, for whom the prognosis is limited, and the focus of care is the quality 





The term ‘euthanasia’ has its origins in the Greek term ‘eu thanatos’ which means 
‘good or easy death.’29 The interpretation of this term has become much more complex 
and may take several forms. On this point, Keane has noted that ‘Euthanasia is another 
ambiguous term which is often misused.’30 This may be due to the various ways in 
which euthanasia can be categorised. For example, euthanasia may be active31 or 
passive,32 and may be voluntary,33 involuntary34 or non-voluntary,35 as well as direct36 
or indirect37 in nature. The combination of these terms can serve to confuse the 
discussion in this area.  
 
Black’s Medical Dictionary defines ‘euthanasia’ as ‘a deliberate act or omission 
whose primary intention is to end another person’s life.’38 This simple definition does 
not discuss the role capacity has in categorising the form of euthanasia or what such 
an act or omission may entail. For instance, euthanasia may be by way of a lethal 
                                                          
29 Tony Hope, Medical Ethics: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press 2004) 11; Margaret 
Otlowski, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Common Law (Oxford University Press 1997) 4. 
30 Emma Keane, ‘Withdrawal of Life Support for Patients in PVS’ (2011) 17(2) Medico-Legal Journal 
of Ireland 83, 92; Sonya Donnelly and Sophia Purcell, ‘The evolution of the law on assisted suicide in 
the United Kingdom and the possible implications for Ireland’ (2009) 15(2) Medico-Legal Journal of 
Ireland 82, 83 ‘it is necessary to understand the difference between the two concepts of euthanasia and 
physician assisted suicide which are often mistakenly used interchangeably.’ 
31 Otlowski (n29) 5 ‘a deliberate act to end the life of a terminal or incurable patient, which in fact 
results in the patient’s death.’   
32 ibid ‘deliberate withholding or withdrawing of life-prolonging medical treatment or incurable patient, 
with the object of hastening the patient’s death, and as a result dies at an earlier time than he or she 
would have died, had the treatment been carried out.’ 
33 ibid 7 ‘euthanasia which is performed at the request of the patient. This, in turn, involves an 
assumption about patient competence and decision-making capacity.’; John Keown, Euthanasia, Ethics 
and Public Policy (Cambridge University Press 2002) 9 ‘VAE is generally understood to mean 
euthanasia at the request of the patient’. 
34 Otlowski (n29) 7 ‘performed without the consent or against the will of a competent patient.’ 
35 ibid ‘Euthanasia is ‘non-voluntary’ where it is performed on persons who are incompetent and 
therefore not capable of giving a consent.’  
36 ibid 8 ‘direct euthanasia implies that the intended effect of an act, such as the administration of a dose 
of narcotic, is to cause the patient’s death’. 
37 ibid ‘the same dose may be administered with the same effect, but the intention is to relieve the 
patient’s suffering rather than to kill the patient.’  
38 Harvey Marcovitch (ed), Black’s Medical Dictionary (41st edn, A & C Black Publishers 2005) 252; 
Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 1993) 175 ‘the killing of those who 
are incurably ill and in great pain or distress for the sake of those killed, and in order to spare them 
further suffering or distress.’; Lars Johan Materstvedt and others, ‘Euthanasia and physician-assisted 
suicide: a view from an EAPC Ethics Task Force’ (2003) 17(2) Palliative Medicine 97, 98 ‘A doctor 




injection, the withdrawal of treatment in certain circumstances, or the provision of 
drugs which would have the effect of hastening the death of the person.39  
 
Physician Assisted Suicide  
Physician assisted suicide involves the doctor providing the patient with ‘the means to 
terminate his or her own life but does not act positively to terminate the life of the 
patient.’40 In cases of physician assisted suicide the patient is competent to request 
death and retains the physical ability necessary to commit suicide. As such, it is not 
the doctor who performs the act which actually ends the patient’s life, although, they 
do assist the patient in committing suicide.  
 
The Objective of Identifying an Appropriate Legal Framework for 
Specialist Palliative Care in Ireland: Justifications and Limitations 
This section will outline why it is necessary to identify an appropriate legal framework 
for specialist palliative care. First, it will be shown that palliative care is an 
increasingly prevalent form of care provided to patients in Ireland and it is likely that 
the number of patients receiving palliative care will continue to increase in the coming 
years. Second, this section will demonstrate that there is a significant gap in the 
knowledge in this area as the legal framework in Ireland for specialist palliative care 
practices has not yet been comprehensively examined in academic material. 
Discussion of specialist palliative care has largely been from a medical perspective 
with little discussion of patient rights or the decision-making framework needed for 
these practices. Third, examining the legal framework and identifying areas of reform 
is needed to promote certainty for healthcare professionals. This approach also 
benefits patient care by ensuring that all healthcare professionals are provided with a 
clear legal and ethical framework in which to practise. The fourth factor to be 
considered is that in recent years an audit culture has emerged in Irish healthcare but 
palliative care has only been briefly referred to and many providers of specialist 
palliative care are excluded from review. However, it is likely that a greater focus will 
                                                          
39 Bryan A Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary (9th edn, Thompson/West 2009) 1571 ‘providing a person 
with the medical means or the medical knowledge to commit suicide.’  
40 Rosanne O’Connor, ‘Physician-Assisted Suicide: The Way Forward?’ (2004) 22 Irish Law Times 
182, 183; Brian Hunt, Murdoch's Dictionary of Irish Law (5th edn, Tottel Publishing 2009) 76-77 
[assisted suicide] ‘… the practice of providing a person with the means of ending their own life, and 
may include the physical assistance of another person.’ 
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be placed on the legal framework for specialist palliative care practices in the future, 
particularly given the increase in its use. The final factor to be discussed for 
undertaking this thesis is the need to distinguish between specialist palliative care 
practices and euthanasia. The legitimacy of this distinction has often been questioned 
and is an issue which needs to be addressed in detail as part of identifying an 
appropriate legal framework.  
 
Palliative care has an increasingly important role in Irish healthcare owing to a variety 
of factors.41 Palliative care is a relatively recent development42 and is being provided 
to an increasing number of patients near the end of life. In 2006, 4% of deaths occurred 
in hospices43 and based on the rise in the number of people dying in hospitals and other 
healthcare facilities instead of at home,44 it is likely that the numbers who receive 
palliative care in the future will continue to rise.45 This signals the greater 
medicalisation of the dying process and demonstrates that the legal framework in this 
area will become increasingly important over the coming years. The National 
Advisory Committee on Palliative Care suggested that factors such as an ageing 
population and expected rise in cancer rates would result in an increased use of 
palliative care services.46 This underlines the importance of examining the legal 
                                                          
41 McKeown (n18) 105 ‘A number of studies have documented how palliative care improves the quality 
of living and dying for patients with advanced disease.’; Patricia Classens and others, ‘Palliative 
Sedation, Not Slow Euthanasia: A Prospective, Longitudinal Study of Sedation in Flemish Palliative 
Care Units’ (2010) Journal of Pain and Symptom Management 1, 2 ‘Given that care for patients with 
life threatening illnesses will become even more important because of an aging population and the 
subsequent increase in cancer and nonmalignant but chronic incurable disorders … there is a pressing 
need for reliable information concerning palliative sedation.’ 
42 Text to n42 in Chapter Two. 
43 McKeown (n18) 35.   
44 ibid 37; A Eve, AM Smith and P Tebbit, ‘Hospice and Palliative Care in the UK 1994-1995, including 
a summary of trends 1990-1995’ (1997) 11 Palliative Medicine 31 cited by David Field and Julia 
Addington-Hall, ‘Extending specialist palliative care to all?’(1999) 48 Social Science and Medicine 
1271, 1271 ‘Nearly one-fifth (17.5%) of cancer patients in the UK now die in a hospice or specialist 
palliative care unit, and a further 39% die whilst in the care of a palliative home-care team or Macmillan 
community nurse.’; Ciara McGlade, William Molloy and Suzanne Timmons, ‘Decision-Making in 
Incompetent Older Adults: Clinical, Social and Legal Issues’ (2011) 11(2) Medico-Legal Journal of 
Ireland 70, 74 ‘The location of death has switched from the home to hospitals and Nursing Homes, with 
about 20 per cent of deaths in older people occurring in long term care facilities. Dying has become 
more public, and involves healthcare workers in the decision-making process at the end of life.’ 
45 Department of Health and Children (n14) 23-24 Increased use of palliative care is based on an ageing 
population in Ireland, expected increase in cancer rates, earlier provision of palliative care and greater 
availability of specialist palliative care services; S Whelan, ‘Recent Trends in Mortality and Morbidity 
in Ireland: Projecting Population Mortality for Ireland’ (2008) XXXVII Journal of the Statistical and 
Social Inquiry Society of Ireland 135. 
46 Department of Health and Children (n14) 11; International Agency for Research on Cancer, ‘World 
Cancer Report 2014’ (Bernard Stewart and Christopher P Wild eds, World Health Organization 2014).   
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framework for specialist palliative care at this time as stresses on the healthcare system 
will only increase in the future.  
  
Despite the role of palliative care and the legal and ethical issues which are raised by 
end-of-life care, there has been no substantial legal engagement with specialist 
palliative care practices in this jurisdiction. This is demonstrated in two ways. First, 
there are very few cases which have examined specialist palliative care practices. In 
Re a Ward of Court,47 the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration was 
discussed but the patient at the centre of this case was in a near persistent vegetative 
state rather than terminally ill. On this basis, the provision of artificial nutrition and 
hydration was not a part of specialist palliative care. Nevertheless, Re a Ward of Court 
will be discussed in this thesis as it can provide a degree of clarity as to the legality of 
this practice. In Fleming v Ireland & Ors,48 the role of palliative care was referred to 
but the focus of this case was the law against assisted suicide. Furthermore, the 
discussion of palliative care in Fleming v Ireland & Ors highlighted the need for 
clarity on the legitimacy of and legal framework for specialist palliative care 
practices.49 The second factor which demonstrates the gap in knowledge is the absence 
of academic material addressing the legal framework for specialist palliative care in 
this jurisdiction. Consequently, the standard of the legal framework remains to be 
examined and suggestions for reform may need to be advanced. This thesis can 
therefore contribute significantly to discussion on the legal framework in Ireland for 
specialist palliative care due to this gap in knowledge. It is from this gap in the 
knowledge that the research questions stem.  
  
The third justification for identifying an appropriate legal framework for specialist 
palliative care is the importance that the framework has for healthcare professionals 
as well as the patient. This thesis argues that the legal framework for specialist 
palliative care has a considerable impact on the standard of palliative care provided. 
The value and role of a clear legal framework has been demonstrated by other areas 
                                                          
47 Ward of Court (withholding medical treatment) (No 2), Re, [1996] 2 IR 73, [1996] 2 IR 79, [1995] 2 
ILRM 401. 
48 Fleming v Ireland & Ors [2013] IEHC 2, [2013] IESC 19. 
49 Fleming v Ireland & Ors [2013] IEHC 2, [37] Dr. Tony O’Brien commented that ‘Professor Battin’s 
view of terminal sedation, involving necessarily the withdrawal of food and hydration, was inconsistent 
with his experience of the practice of sedation in this jurisdiction.’ 
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of medicine such as the use of genetic materials,50 and abortion.51 The background and 
development of these areas in medicine underlines the importance of having a well-
defined legal framework in place which allows healthcare professionals an 
unambiguous understanding of the type of care which can be provided to the patient. 
As such, a legal framework should not function to unnecessarily constrain the 
decision-making autonomy of doctors. Instead, it should provide clarity as to what 
objects may be pursued and how this can be achieved for the benefit of the terminally 
ill patient. The challenge of achieving this has been recognised by Quill et al who 
noted that:   
 
Similar professional safeguards should be considered for TS (terminal 
sedation) and VSED (voluntary stopping eating and drinking), even if 
these practices are already sanctioned by the law. The challenge of 
safeguards is to be flexible enough to be responsive to individual patient 
dilemmas and rigorous enough to protect vulnerable persons.52 
 
Such an approach may result in a harmonisation of minimum standards of care across 
healthcare providers. This would be of considerable benefit as over the course of an 
illness a person will interact with a wide range of healthcare professionals and it is 
important that the care provided to the patient is at a consistent level and meets clearly 
identifiable standards. This demonstrates not only how a clear legal framework can be 
beneficial for healthcare professionals but how it can also benefit the care of the 
patient.  
 
A high standard of patient care can also be achieved by ensuring that human rights are 
given effective protection. It is widely accepted in case law that patients have rights 
which must be protected.53 This is further evidenced by protection offered by the Irish 
                                                          
50 The Madden Report on Post Mortem Practice and Procedures (Department of Health and Children 
2006); Draft Proposals for General Scheme of the Human Tissue Bill 2009. 
51 Health Information and Quality Authority, ‘Investigation into the safety, quality and standards of 
services provided by the Health Service Executive to patients, including pregnant women, at risk of 
clinical deterioration, including those provided in University Hospital Galway, and as reflected in the 
care and treatment provided to Savita Halappanavar’ (Health Information and Quality Authority 2013); 
Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013. 
52 Timothy E Quill, Bernard Lo and Dan W Brock, ‘Palliative Options of Last Resort: A Comparison 
of voluntary Stopping Eating and Drinking, Terminal Sedation, Physician-Assisted Suicide, and 
Voluntary Active Euthanasia’ in Torbjőrn Tännsjő (ed), Terminal Sedation: Euthanasia in Disguise? 
(Springer 2004) 10. 
53 See Chapter Four. 
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Constitution, domestic legislation, and international legal instruments such as the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Relevant rights 
include the right to life, right of autonomy, right to bodily integrity, and the protection 
from inhuman and degrading treatment. In addition, the issue of dignity will also be 
discussed. It is necessary to examine how these rights along with the principle of 
dignity are protected and promoted in the context of specialist palliative care. Patient 
rights should be to the fore in providing effective and appropriate palliative care. This 
view also has a significant impact on the theoretical framework being utilised in this 
thesis.54   
 
The fourth justification for examining the legal framework in Ireland for specialist 
palliative care is the audit culture which has emerged in Irish healthcare in recent 
years. There has been a move towards clearly defined and measurable standards in 
many areas of patient care. The Health Information and Quality Authority [hereinafter 
‘HIQA’]55 has responsibility for the audit of hospitals in Ireland and has published 
standards which healthcare providers are required to meet. However, HIQA has only 
published one standard in relation to end-of-life care56 and this is not applicable to 
hospices.57 As a result, a significant provider of specialist palliative care in Ireland is 
excluded from the audit process. Nevertheless, specialist palliative care is provided in 
a variety of locations other than hospices. This form of care is provided in hospitals, 
nursing homes, and in community settings. As the audit culture expands it is likely 
that standards for end-of-life care will be introduced which will place a greater focus 
on the legal framework for specialist palliative care. As it stands, the Department of 
Health and Children have recently published a number of reports aimed at addressing 
and improving paediatric palliative care.58 This reflects the fact that palliative care for 
children raises a number of additional issues. However, it was noted earlier that this 
thesis will not focus on paediatric palliative care due to the additional challenges it 
                                                          
54 Text to n94. 
55 Text to n192 in Chapter Five. 
56 Health Information Quality Authority, ‘National Quality Standards for Residential Care Settings for 
Older People in Ireland’ (Health Information Quality Authority 2008) standard 16. 
57 ibid 5-6; Select Committee on Health and Children Deb 7 March 2007, 
<http://debates.oireachtas.ie/HES/2007/03/07/00004.asp> accessed 8 June 2014. Minister for Health, 
Mary Harney, stated ‘We are not providing for an inspectorate of the acute and palliative care sectors 
for the very good reason that these areas require a different form of expertise.’ 
58 Department of Health and Children and the Irish Hospice Foundation (n6); Department of Health and 
Children (n6).  
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raises but will instead concentrate on the legal framework for specialist palliative care 
for adults.59 
 
The fifth justification for undertaking this thesis is the need to clearly distinguish 
specialist palliative care practices from euthanasia. The majority of palliative care 
practices do not raise significant legal or ethical considerations. This is not the case 
for the provision of palliative sedation and the practice of withdrawing artificial 
nutrition and hydration from the patient. The regulation and standard of professional 
guidance in this area is particularly important due to the combination of different 
palliative care providers and the legally, ethically, and medically complex decisions 
which have to be made in relation to these palliative care practices by doctors and 
nurses. Consequently, it is necessary to have a complete picture of the current legal 
framework. The legitimacy of the distinction between specialist palliative care 
practices and euthanasia has often been called in to question, for example, it has been 
argued that palliative sedation is euthanasia in disguise.60 In a similar vein, Boyle 
commented that ‘some may accept terminal sedation but regard efforts to distinguish 
it from euthanasia to be sleight of hand’.61 The basis for such suggestions will be 
outlined in Chapter Two and Chapter Three. This chapter structure ensures the legality 
of specialist palliative care practices is firmly established prior to discussing 
professional standards and guidelines for specialist palliative care.  
 
The importance of examining specialist palliative care practices has been recognised 
by Quill et al. who commented that ‘hidden, ambiguous practices, inconsistent 
justifications, and failure to acknowledge the risks of accepted practices may also 
undermine the quality of terminal care and put patients at unwarranted risk.’62 This 
thesis will unpack the criticism of these practices. It will also identify and examine the 
impact of the current legal framework. It is necessary to highlight that this thesis does 
not examine the morality of specialist palliative care practices but focuses upon the 
legal framework for these practices. Therefore, this thesis does not examine arguments 
                                                          
59 See p3. 
60 Magna Andreen Sachs, ‘Sedation – Unconsciousness – Anaesthesia! What are we Talking About?’ 
in Tännsjő (n52) 31; Emily Jackson and John Keown, Debating Euthanasia (Hart Publishing 2012). 
61 Joseph Boyle, ‘Medical Ethics and Double Effect: The Case of Terminal Sedation’ (2004) 25 
Theoretical Medicine 51, 55. 
62 Quill (n52) 11.   
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raised around palliative sedation such as the effect this practice may have on the 
patient-doctor relationship.63 While identifying an appropriate legal framework for 
specialist palliative care is the central objective in this thesis, an accompanying goal 
is to ensure that the proposed legal framework is workable in practice. This thesis has 
adopted strategies to ensure that the reforms which are proposed here hold a real 
prospect of yielding practical improvements in specialist palliative care. First, this 
thesis remains cognisant of patient rights. Rights serve as a foundation for the legal 
framework and, at a minimum, must be protected by the healthcare professional. 
Second, it adopts a multi-faceted methodology in order to fully assess the legal 
framework for specialist palliative care. 
 
Theoretical Framework and Methodological Approach 
The theoretical framework adopted in this thesis is based on biomedical ethics. In 
particular, the four principles approach as advanced by Beauchamp and Childress will 
be utilised.64 Ethics have a substantial role in the practice of medicine and are often 
relied on by healthcare professionals in guiding day-to-day practice. The use of the 
four principles set out by Beauchamp and Childress also informs the methodology 
employed in this thesis. The methodological approach involves doctrinal and 
comparative legal research. Both of these approaches provide insight into the way a 
legal framework impacts on the provision of specialist palliative care. The 
combination of this theoretical framework and methodological approach will provide 
an effective approach to answering the central research questions posed in this thesis.    
 
Theoretical Framework: Biomedical Ethics  
The legal framework in Ireland for specialist palliative care will be examined through 
the lens of biomedical ethics. Madden describes biomedical ethics as ‘the application 
of ethical principles to the biological sciences, medicine and health care.’65 This 
underlines the utility of biomedical ethics for this thesis. This is due in part to the 
practical nature of identifying an appropriate legal framework which protects human 
rights and provides clarity and consistency for healthcare professionals. For example, 
                                                          
63 Alisdair MacLean, ‘Autonomy, Consent and Persuasion’ (2006) 13 European Journal of Health Law 
321. 
64 Tom L Beauchamp and James F Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (7th edn, Oxford 
University Press 2013). 
65 Deirdre Madden, Medicine, Ethics and the Law (2nd edn, Bloomsbury 2011) 42. 
16 
 
a central research question of this thesis seeks to distinguish between specialist 
palliative care practices and physician assisted suicide and euthanasia primarily on a 
practical level rather than basing a distinction on abstract moral reasoning alone. 
Furthermore, Madden outlined three reasons which support the role of medical ethics 
in ‘the practice of medicine, and … to any understanding of medical law’.66  
 
The first reason set out by Madden is that many healthcare professionals consult ethics 
instead of law when looking for guidance in making a decision.67 The second reason 
is that ‘some legal principles have been influenced by the evolution of ethical 
principles’.68 The third reason in support of the role of medical ethics is that in Ireland 
the development of medical law is at an early stage ‘with relatively sparse legislation 
and few judicial precedents.’69 These points underline the significant role which ethics 
have in examining the current legal framework for specialist palliative care. 
Nonetheless, the examination of bioethics is not the primary focus of this thesis.  
Biomedical ethics can be interpreted in a variety of ways. For example, alternate 
approaches to biomedical ethics have been set out by Downie and Calnan,70 
Engelhardt,71 Veatch,72 and Macer.73 However, in considering the application of 
biomedical ethics to issues in specialist palliative care this thesis will utilise the 
principles-based approach as espoused by Beauchamp and Childress.74  
 
The interpretation developed by Beauchamp and Childress is based on respect for 
autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice. This is known as the four 
principles approach and ‘is generally regarded as the origin of the principles-orientated 
                                                          




70 Robert Silcock Downie and Kenneth Charles Calman, Healthy Respect: Ethics in Health Care (2nd 
edn, Oxford University Press 1994); Madden (n65) 44 The approach advanced by Downie and Calman 
is based on ‘utility, justice, non-maleficence, compassion (benevolence) and self-development’, 
governed by the principle of ‘respect for the autonomous individual’ as the consensus principles’. 
71 H Tristram Engelhardt, The Foundations of Bioethics (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 1996) The 
relevant principles according to Engelhardt are principles of ‘permission’ and ‘beneficence’.   
72 Robert M Veatch, ‘Theories of Bioethics’ (4th World Congress of Bioethics, Japan 1998) Principles 
of right actions recognized by Veatch are utility, veracity, fidelity to promises, avoid killing, justice and 
autonomy. 
73 Madden (n65) 44 ‘Macer argued that love should be foundation of bioethics in the form of “self-live 
[sic] (autonomy), love of others (justice), loving life (do no harm), and loving good (beneficence).’ 
74 Beauchamp (n64). 
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bioethics method in Western societies.’75 Beauchamp and Childress have suggested 
that the purpose of these principles is to ‘function as general guidelines for the 
formulation of the more specific rules.’76 In this regard, the principles outlined by 
Beauchamp and Childress have been utilised by the Irish Association of Palliative 
Care in their discussion paper on palliative sedation.77 In the discussion paper, the Irish 
Association of Palliative Care cited the principles of beneficence, nonmaleficence, and 
autonomy as the ‘Ethical Principles Involved’78 in palliative sedation. This discussion 
paper provides an example of how these principles can be expanded on for the 
formulation of more specific guidance. This is an example of specification which is ‘a 
methodological tool that adds content to abstract principles, ridding them of their 
indeterminateness and providing action-guiding content for the purpose of coping with 
complex cases.’79 The process of specification is necessary ‘in order to achieve more 
concrete guidance’,80 and to develop ‘rules with action-guiding content.’81 As such, 
when the four principles are correctly applied they serve as much more than ‘names, 
checklists, or headings for values worth remembering’.82  
 
The specification of the four principles may be ‘shaped by empirical data and by 
information available in fields such as medicine, nursing, public health, … law’.83 
Therefore, this thesis draws on doctrinal and comparative legal research as a means by 
which to examine and specify the application of the four principles to specialist 
palliative care. This approach takes account of the challenges facing healthcare 
professionals and identifies the human rights of most relevance for this form of care.  
 
Criticism of the principles-based approach has stemmed from the suggestion that there 
is a lack of clear guidance from the four principles which means that moral agents are 
                                                          
75 Madden (n65) 44. 
76 Tom L Beauchamp and James F Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (6th edn, Oxford 
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81 ibid 17. 
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free to address problems in whatever way they choose. 84 Based on this view, moral 
agents assign principles ‘whatever weight they wish, or even no weight at all.’85 In 
responding to this criticism, Beauchamp and Childress note that ‘Any norm, principle, 
or rule will have this problem if it is underspecified for the task at hand.’86 This 
highlights the need for the four principles to be comprehensively specified so as to 
minimise subjective specification and balancing.87  
 
A further criticism of the four principles is that they are regularly in conflict and that 
the approach outlined by Beauchamp and Childress ‘is too indeterminate to provide a 
decision procedure to adjudicate the conflicts.’88 Moreover, it was argued by Holm 
that methods to specify and balance the four principles are ‘inadequate.’89 This 
criticism stems from the lack of ‘an organizing meta-principle … that decides which 
of the four principles or particular specifications should prevail when people are faced 
with a deep moral conflict’.90 However, Vollmann suggests that reference to the 
common morality is a way by which the specifications can be organised.91 Common 
morality is composed of rules of obligation,92 virtues,93 and human rights.94 These are 
to be drawn on as part of the specification and balancing of the four principles.95 In 
particular, the positive and negative obligations required under human rights will be 
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(3) integrity, (4) conscientiousness, (5) trustworthiness, (6) fidelity, (7) gratitude, (8) truthfulness, (9) 
lovingness, and (10) kindness.’ 
94 ibid 4. 
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analysed in Chapter Four. These human rights will serve as the foundation for 
suggestions for reform later in this thesis. Overall, this highlights how the four 
principles require careful analysis and development in order to establish more specific 
guidance.  
 
Despite the existence of such criticism, the four principles are a suitable theoretical 
framework for this thesis. For example, the principles-based approach can and has 
been applied in the context of double effect,96 the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and 
hydration,97 and can be specified for specialist palliative care practices.98 Gillon 
argued that the four principles ‘help us bring more order, consistency and 
understanding to our medico-moral judgments’.99 This underlines the impact which 
this theoretical framework can have on the legal framework for specialist palliative 
care. The four principles will be referred to throughout the thesis but they will be 
briefly outlined at this point. This will demonstrate their meaning and relevance for 
examining the legal framework in Ireland for specialist palliative care and, at a later 
stage, in formulating suggestions for reform.  
 
Nonmaleficence establishes an obligation ‘to abstain from causing harm to others.’100 
This principle provides guidance on justifications such as double effect and the acts 
and omissions distinction. These are important factors in distinguishing between 
specialist palliative care practices and euthanasia. A closely related principle is that of 
beneficence. This requires a person to ‘act for the benefit of others.’101 The principle 
of beneficence establishes an ‘obligation to help others further their important and 
legitimate interests.’102 In the context of specialist palliative care the principle of 
beneficence requires attentive monitoring of the patient’s condition as well as ensuring 
effective pain management and symptom control is provided. Beauchamp and 
Childress have noted several ways in which rules of beneficence are different from 
rules of nonmaleficence. In this regard, they comment that rules of nonmaleficence 
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are ‘negative prohibitions of actions’,103 ‘must be followed impartially’,104 and lastly 
they ‘provide moral reasons for legal prohibitions of certain forms of conduct.’105 In 
contrast to this, rules of beneficence set out ‘positive requirements of action’,106 ‘need 
not always be followed impartially’,107 and in general they ‘do not provide reasons for 
legal punishment when agents fail to abide by them.’108 The meaning of 
nonmaleficence and beneficence will be outlined fully as part of the examination of 
specialist palliative care practices.  
 
The principle of justice as advanced by Beauchamp and Childress is based on 
‘recognition of global rights to health and enforceable rights to a decent minimum of 
health care within a framework for allocation that incorporates both utilitarian and 
egalitarian standards.’109 This position may lead to conflict between the principles of 
beneficence and justice. As such, there is a degree of balancing between these 
principles in practice. The principle of beneficence also comes into conflict with the 
principle of autonomy in certain circumstances due to paternalistic elements present 
in beneficence.  
 
The principle of autonomy relates to ‘self-rule that is free from both controlling 
interference by others and limitations that prevent meaningful choice, such as 
inadequate understanding.’110 Respect for autonomy is a significant issue in this thesis 
as it impacts on the decision-making framework for specialist palliative care along 
with the respect given to advance care directives and do not resuscitate orders. The 
principle of autonomy is essential for ensuring that a patient is allowed to make 
decisions in relation to their medical treatment. However, this principle may result in 
conflict between the autonomy of the healthcare professional and the autonomy of the 
patient. Specialist palliative care raises complex legal and ethical issues in relation to 
the care of a patient and it is important that an appropriate balance is identified and 
                                                          






109 ibid 293. 
110 ibid 101; Raanan Gillon, ‘Medical ethics: four principles plus attention to scope’ (1994) 309(6948) 
British Medical Journal 184, 185 ‘the moral obligation to respect the autonomy of others in so far as 
such respect is compatible with equal respect for the autonomy of all potentially affected.’ 
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established for this form of healthcare. The current legal framework in place for 
specialist palliative care and possibilities for reform will be recognised through a 
combination of the theoretical framework and methodology utilised in this thesis. 
 
Methodology 
The research methodologies employed in this thesis will be set out and their selection 
will be justified in this section. The potential strengths and weaknesses of each 
approach will be outlined, as will the way in which each advances the understanding 
of the current legal framework for specialist palliative care. This thesis will utilise 
doctrinal and comparative legal research. The use of these methodologies will be 
informed by the theoretical framework set out above. The types of methodology used 
combine to identify the existing legal framework in Ireland as well as the framework 
which has developed in jurisdictions such as the Netherlands. Furthermore, their use 
also assists in identifying suggestions for reform.   
 
Doctrinal Analysis  
Doctrinal analysis will serve to identify and examine the current legal framework for 
specialist palliative care. This will be achieved by using both an internal and an 
external approach to doctrinal research. The internal approach to doctrinal research 
concentrates on ‘statutes and decided cases, supplemented where possible with 
lawyers’ literature expounding the rules and occasionally reflecting on them.’111 This 
type of analysis is not merely descriptive of the law but also has the effect of 
demonstrating ‘the multiple possible readings and contradictions of existing “law”’.112 
The benefit of this is demonstrated by later chapters when the legitimacy of the 
distinction between specialist palliative care practices and euthanasia and physician 
assisted suicide is considered. In addition to case law and legislation, the internal 
approach to doctrinal research also focuses on the use of authoritative texts. The 
advantage of this is that a broader range of sources can be drawn on. Nevertheless, the 
internal approach offers a narrow view of the law and in order to appreciate the 
complexity of the legal framework for specialist palliative care it is necessary to couple 
this internal viewpoint with the external approach.  
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The external approach to doctrinal research provides a study of ‘the law in practice, of 
legal institutions at work in society rather than legal rules existing in a social, 
economic and political vacuum’.113 This approach to doctrinal analysis is especially 
important in the context of specialist palliative care due to the lack of legislation and 
case law in Ireland on this form of care. Consequently, the coupling of an internal and 
external approach to doctrinal research has the potential to offer a rounded approach 
to the examination of the legal framework in Ireland for specialist palliative care. The 
success of this depends on understanding how the internal and external approaches 
merge to form the legal framework for specialist palliative care. 
  
The interpretation of the combined internal and external approaches to doctrinal 
research has been described as an ‘attempt to draw out the patterns of normative 
understanding that enable us to see the wood and the trees together as constituting a 
working whole.’114 In undertaking such an approach to doctrinal research it is 
important to be aware of any bias towards a particular viewpoint which may begin to 
emerge from primary, secondary or other resources. It is also necessary to take account 
of the theoretical framework when utilising doctrinal analysis. For example, Morris 
and Murphy suggest that in certain cases doctrinal analysis is ‘based on the idea that 
the law is underpinned (or should be) by a particular moral or political philosophy and 
therefore needs to be analysed in light of its closeness to the ideal situation.’115 In this 
thesis, the legal framework will be examined for how it satisfies the principles of 
autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice as outlined by Beauchamp and 
Childress. A thesis with a significant doctrinal element ‘would not argue that the law 
needs reform because it is inconsistent with wider social values or is unfair to a sector 
of society, but because it is vague, or is inconsistent, and thus leads to uncertainty in 
its application.’116 In any case, the use of doctrinal research allows for the clear 
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Comparative Legal Research 
Comparative legal research is the second research methodology used in this thesis. 
Kamba defined comparative legal research as ‘the study of, and research in, law by 
the systematic comparison of two or more legal systems; or of parts, branches, or 
aspects of two or more legal systems.’117 The use of comparative legal research 
provides a tool for identifying the advantages and disadvantages of an approach taken 
in another jurisdiction. The benefit of drawing on comparative legal research is well 
summarised by Zweigert who wrote:   
 
the different systems of the world can offer a greater variety of solutions 
than could be thought up in a lifetime by even the most imaginative jurist 
who was corralled in his own system. Comparative law is an ‘école de 
vérité’ which extends and enriches the ‘supply of solutions’ and offers the 
scholar of critical capacity the opportunity of finding the ‘better solution’ 
for his time and place.118  
 
This underscores the significant benefits of drawing on comparative research. 
However, this methodology will not be used until specialist palliative care practices 
have been fully outlined. This ensures a focussed approach to comparative legal 
research. As Valcke commented, ‘comparatists cannot begin their work without first 
circumscribing that which is to be compared, the distinct wholes between which the 
comparison is to take place.’119 Furthermore, in order to make effective use of this 
methodology this thesis will follow the steps set out by Kamba. These include the 
‘descriptive phase’,120 ‘identification phase’,121 and ‘explanatory phase’.122  
 
Kamba suggests that the ‘descriptive phase’ may involve ‘a description of the norms, 
concepts and institutions of the systems concerned or it may consist in the examination 
of the socio-economic problems and the legal solutions provided by the systems in 
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question.’123 This thesis will set out both the institutions involved as well as the legal 
solutions identified due to their close relationship in specialist palliative care. Such an 
approach is necessary in order to achieve a holistic analysis of other jurisdictions. The 
‘identification phase’ focuses on the ‘identification or discernment of differences and 
similarities between the systems under comparative consideration.’124 It is important 
to go further than just outlining another legal system and for this reason it is necessary 
to explain the ‘differences and similarities’ which are highlighted.125 Accordingly, the 
third stage is the ‘explanatory phase’ in which ‘the divergences and resemblances are 
accounted for.’126 This ensures that comparison is not undertaken at a purely surface 
level. On this basis, the broader elements and influences on the legal framework in 
each jurisdiction will be taken into account. These are the steps which will be followed 
in this thesis but there are other considerations to be factored in for effective 
comparative research.             
 
Kamba sets out a number of questions to evaluate the effectiveness of engaging in 
comparative research. These included whether the research served to ‘promote the 
better understanding of one’s own law, the formulation of reliable theories of law, the 
promotion of law reform’127 and whether the comparative legal research can be ‘safely 
depended on as accurate’.128 The careful selection of jurisdictions for comparative 
research and an awareness of the problems which may arise mean that comparative 
research can be conducted effectively for the purposes of the thesis.  
 
Comparison will mainly be made with the legal framework for specialist palliative 
care in the Netherlands. Among the reasons for considering the Dutch approach is that 
they have established clear and comprehensive professional standards for the 
provision of specialist palliative care rather than introducing legislation. These are 
standards which have been reviewed, revised and published in English which greatly 
assists a comparative law approach. In addition to this, the Netherlands publishes 
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reports on end-of-life care which provide information on the impact of palliative care 
guidelines and the wider healthcare system. Furthermore, exceptions allowing for 
voluntary active euthanasia exist in very few countries and of these the Netherlands is 
the most appropriate jurisdiction to examine. This is due to the legislation on 
euthanasia in the Netherlands and the case law which allows for a greater 
understanding of what the limits of the legislation are. An examination of this 
jurisprudence demonstrates the impetus behind the introduction of the legislation. The 
combination of legislation and case law provides a rounded picture of this practice and 
is necessary in order to accurately examine the legitimacy of the distinction between 
specialist palliative care practices and euthanasia. 
 
The challenges presented by engaging in comparative legal research need to be 
highlighted to ensure that they are avoided in this thesis. Potential failings include 
comparison of widely different legal systems and a lack of consideration for the 
differing political, social, economic and cultural differences between the countries.129 
These are significant factors to bear in mind given the social and ethical issues raised 
by specialist palliative care. A further problem when engaging in comparative research 
is a potential over-emphasis on the positive aspects of another jurisdiction. This 
challenge could be linked to the potential for ‘legocentric’ bias130 when identifying 
suggestions for reform. Legocentric bias means that ‘law is treated as a given and a 
necessity, as the natural path to ideal, rational or optimal conflict resolutions and 
ultimately to a social order guaranteeing peace and harmony.’131 This thesis avoids the 
issue of legocentrism as it does not presuppose that legislation is the solution. Instead, 
it first identifies whether there are weaknesses in the current legal framework and this 
thesis is open to considering solutions for reform beyond the introduction of 
legislation. A further challenge in utilising comparative legal research is the need to 
recognise that certain functions may be achieved not through a particular legal rule but 
by way of an extra-legal norm of practice. These factors will be kept in mind when 
utilising comparative legal research and will be referred to as a benchmark for Chapter 
Six. 
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Structure of Thesis 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. These chapters utilise the theoretical 
framework and methodologies outlined in the previous section to build a cohesive 
argument and to draw out the reforms which are necessary to ensure appropriate 
specialist palliative care can be provided in this jurisdiction. This section will outline 
the evolution of the argument in this thesis and demonstrate how chapters build to 
examine the current legal framework and identify an appropriate legal framework for 
specialist palliative care.   
  
Chapter two of the thesis provides an introduction to palliative care. The purpose of 
this Chapter is to outline the challenges which arise in the provision of specialist 
palliative care. In effect, this Chapter will provide a roadmap for the discussion to take 
place in later chapters of the thesis. The first point this Chapter will address is the 
development of palliative care, which requires discussion of the historical origins of 
palliative care. It is also necessary to identify the illnesses and symptoms for which 
palliative care may be provided. The identification of palliative care patients assists in 
highlighting issues which will be addressed in later chapters such as challenges of 
respecting patient autonomy, access to appropriate palliative care, and the need to 
respect the dignity of the patient. Additionally, this Chapter will set out the main 
providers of palliative care. In particular, issues of consistency and the relationship 
between providers of palliative care will be considered. The final issue this Chapter 
will address is the practices associated with specialist palliative care. In particular, this 
chapter will focus on palliative sedation and artificial nutrition and hydration due to 
the legal and ethical issues they raise. In short, the second Chapter provides an 
overview of palliative care and establishes the importance of this topic.   
   
Chapter Three examines the legitimacy of the distinction between specialist palliative 
care practices and physician assisted suicide, and euthanasia. This will be achieved by 
focussing on the distinction first from the doctors’ perspective. The reason for 
focussing on the potential role of the doctor is due to comparison with palliative care 
practices which emphasised the role of the doctor. In taking this approach it is 
necessary to set out what physician assisted suicide and euthanasia entail, thereby 
clarifying the role of the doctor in such practices. The Chapter does this by drawing, 
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in particular, on the Dutch experience in order to provide a practical example of 
euthanasia in operation and to help identify points of similarity and points of departure 
between this practice and specialist palliative care practices. 
 
The forms of sedation administered by the healthcare professional along with the 
possible withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration in palliative care has led to 
suggestions that it is a form of euthanasia.132 A necessary step in addressing this 
criticism is to consider the Criminal Law (Suicide) Act 1993 and Criminal Justice Act 
1964. This will demonstrate the illegality of assisted suicide and euthanasia and 
provides another way in which to examine the legitimacy of the distinction between 
these practices and specialist palliative care. Following this, it is necessary to examine 
the justification provided by the doctrine of double effect as well as the acts and 
omissions dichotomy. These concepts relate to the form and level of treatment which 
may be administered by the healthcare professional. Overall, this ensures a rounded 
approach to examining the legitimacy of the distinction between assisted suicide, 
euthanasia, and specialist palliative care practices. 
 
Chapter Four examines the rights of the patient which are particularly pertinent for the 
provision of specialist palliative care. Considering the rights of the patient and how 
these rights have been interpreted allows for a greater appreciation of the legal issues 
in specialist palliative care practices. In particular, the right to bodily integrity, 
protection from inhuman or degrading treatment, the right of autonomy, and the 
concept of dignity will be discussed. The focus is placed on these rights as they have 
formed the central arguments in cases which address end-of-life care such as Re a 
Ward of Court133 and Fleming v Ireland & Ors.134 There are several reasons for 
concentrating on the rights of the patient. First, human rights are fundamental under 
the Irish Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights and are 
therefore a central part in providing an appropriate legal framework for specialist 
palliative care. Second, it allows for the examination of the legitimacy of the 
distinction between euthanasia and specialist palliative care practices from the 
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patient’s perspective. The Chapter achieves this by drawing on the case law and 
legislation discussed in Chapter Three. This method also demonstrates a third reason 
for concentrating on the rights of the patient in that it assists in identifying the legal 
framework which currently exists for specialist palliative care practices in Ireland. 
Therefore, discussion of human rights also serves to define the common morality as 
set out by Beauchamp and Childress.135 The common morality is an important element 
in guiding the specification and balancing of the four principles. In addition to this, 
identifying the current legal framework for specialist palliative care allows for any 
failure to adequately protect patient rights to be highlighted. It also serves to identify 
the limits of what a patient may request in terms of their medical treatment and care. 
These limits impact on the provision and withdrawal of specialist palliative care 
practices such as palliative sedation and artificial nutrition and hydration. 
Consequently, it will be demonstrated that the rights of the patient occupy a central 
role in the provision of palliative care and it is vital that the appropriate respect be 
given to these rights.   
 
Chapter Five addresses the existing regulatory framework in place for specialist 
palliative care. The aim of this Chapter is to examine the legislation and guidance that 
currently exists in Ireland for specialist palliative care. In so doing, the Chapter will 
demonstrate the lack of national, detailed, and clearly applicable guidance. It will 
highlight that guidance in respect of specialist palliative care is being drawn from a 
range of different sources. This results in a piecemeal approach and fails to provide a 
suitable framework for consistent decision making. Chapter Five is divided into three 
main sections. The first and second section set out legislation relevant to palliative 
care. There is no legislation which directly addresses its provision and for this reason 
it is necessary to consider a broad range of legislation which may have an impact on 
palliative care. This includes legislation establishing HIQA as well as legislation 
establishing the Irish Medical Council and An Bord Altranais (Nursing and Midwifery 
Board of Ireland). The guidance issued by these bodies will also be considered as they 
serve to establish a base line for the practice of palliative care by doctors and nurses 
in Ireland. The third section will discuss the guidance issued by organisations involved 
in the promotion of palliative care. Guidance developed by the Irish Association of 
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Palliative Care and the European Association of Palliative Care will be considered for 
their potential to impact on the development of local policy by Irish palliative care 
providers.  
 
Chapter Six will examine the regulation of palliative care in the Netherlands. The aim 
of this is to assist in identifying an appropriate legal framework for specialist palliative 
care. The development of palliative care in the Netherlands will be outlined so as to 
provide greater context for the use of comparative legal research. This not only 
establishes the motivation behind the current system of regulation but also highlights 
the range and structure of palliative care provided in the Netherlands. This Chapter 
will also examine the Dutch guidelines for palliative care. In particular, the guidelines 
of the Koninklijke Nederlandsche Maatschappij tot bevordering der Geneeskunst 
(Royal Dutch Medical Association) and Vereniging Integrale Kankercentra 
(Association of Comprehensive Cancer Centres) will be discussed in detail. 
  
Chapter Seven provides the conclusion to this thesis. This Chapter reviews the main 
arguments raised in the course of the thesis and makes recommendations for possible 
future directions for the law in this area.  
Conclusion 
This thesis addresses a complicated and important issue which has, up to this point, 
been largely overlooked in the Irish legal system. Over the course of several chapters 
this thesis will uncover the legal and ethical issues raised by specialist palliative care 
practices and, in doing so, will provide much needed clarity on the legal framework 
for these practices. As part of this, it is necessary to not only recognise the strengths 
but also the failings in the current legal framework and propose suggestions for reform 
accordingly. Although it raises many legal and ethical issues, it is submitted that 
palliative care is a legitimate facet of medical care and thus requires regulation. As 
Francis Bacon wrote, ‘I esteem it the office of a physician not only to restore health, 
but to mitigate pains and dours; and not only when such mitigation may conduce to 
recovery, but when it may serve to make a fair and easy passage.’136   
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This Chapter outlines the practice of palliative care and highlights the challenging and 
controversial aspects of palliative care which will be examined over the course of this 
thesis. This Chapter is composed of three main sections which will discuss the 
development and practice of palliative care in general and as it is currently provided 
in Ireland. The historical development of palliative care will be discussed in the first 
section. This discussion will consider the origins of palliative care and the 
organisations which have led to the promotion and provision of palliative care. It will 
be demonstrated that representative bodies and non-governmental organisations have 
made a significant contribution to the development of palliative care in Ireland. 
Representative bodies in palliative care aim to promote palliative care and are 
generally composed of people who work, research, or have an interest in the provision 
of palliative care. This section will therefore draw attention to the fragmented state 
involvement in the development and regulation of this area of healthcare. 
 
The development of palliative care will be further outlined by reference to reports on 
palliative care in Ireland, namely the ‘Report of the National Advisory Committee on 
Palliative Care’1 and the ‘Programme to Support Palliative and Hospice Care in the 
Republic of Ireland’.2 Examining the content of these reports reveals the manner in 
which the provision of palliative care has evolved over the years. These reports also 
draw attention to some of the main challenges facing palliative care in Ireland. A 
significant shift in the development of palliative care is that this form of care is no 
longer limited to the cancer patient. Instead, it is now of broad applicability and has a 
correspondingly important role in the Irish healthcare system. On this point, it is 
necessary to outline the types of illness for which palliative care may be provided. 
Different illnesses raise certain unique problems but over the course of this section 
key overlapping challenges to the provision of palliative care will be identified.   
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31 
 
The main providers of palliative care in Ireland are considered in the second section 
of this Chapter. Hospices, acute general hospitals and the provision of palliative care 
in a community setting will be discussed. The discussion of these providers will 
demonstrate the growth in palliative care and it raises the question of whether the 
current legal framework in Ireland for specialist palliative care is appropriate given 
the breadth of palliative care providers and the practices which occur. This section 
also lends further weight to the argument that palliative care has largely developed 
through the actions of representative bodies and non-governmental organisations 
rather than being driven by state led initiatives. 
 
The third section provides an introduction to specialist palliative care practices. The 
focus here is on palliative sedation and artificial nutrition and hydration given the legal 
and ethical issues which they raise. This section will highlight the controversy 
surrounding these practices and will demonstrate the importance of examining the 
legal framework for their provision. For instance, these practices represent a 
substantial part of specialist palliative care and it is important for both the patient and 
the healthcare professional that the legal framework is clear, consistent, and protects 
the patient’s human rights. The combination of these three sections provides a rounded 
introduction to the development and practice of palliative care in Ireland as well as 
highlighting the legal and ethical issues which later chapters will address.   
   
The Development of Palliative Care  
The development of palliative care as a distinct form of care was closely linked to care 
of the cancer patient.3 This becomes clear in considering the background to the early 
providers of end-of-life care such as hospices. The word ‘hospice’ is derived from the 
Latin word ‘hospes’ which translates as host, guest or stranger.4 Accordingly, between 
the 11th and 18th Century the term hospice referred to ‘a place of shelter for pilgrims 
                                                          
3 David Clark, ‘From margins to centre: a review of the history of palliative care in cancer’ (2007) 8 
Lancet Oncology 430, 430 ‘This worldwide development of palliative care is deeply rooted in the 
specialty of oncology, which has shaped the conceptual model of palliative care, produced some of its 
major leaders and innovators, and provided a population of patients with the obvious potential to benefit 
from a new approach to the management of those with advanced disease.’ 
4 JRV Marchant and Joseph F Charles, Cassell’s Latin Dictionary (Latin-English and English-Latin) 
(Cassell and Company 1948) [hospes] 254; Michael de Vaan, Etymological Dictionary of Latin and the 
other Italic Languages (Brill 2008) [hospes] 291. 
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and travellers.’5 This understanding of the term began to change when in 1842 Mme 
Jeanne Garnier founded the Dames de Calaire in Lyon which provided end-of-life 
care.6 In Ireland, hospices were opened in Cork and Dublin in the 19th century. 
Marymount Hospice in Cork opened in 1870 and originally cared for cancer and 
tuberculosis patients.7 In 1879, the Congregation of the Religious Sisters of Charity 
opened Our Lady’s Hospice in Dublin.8 This hospice originally concentrated on the 
care of patients with tuberculosis but near the end of the 1950’s more and more cancer 
patients were admitted.9 These hospices cared for patients who were not admitted to 
hospital. An inability to pay for care, lack of appropriate facilities or the worry that 
the infection would be passed to other patients were among the reasons for a patient 
being refused care in a hospital.10 Consequently, hospices began to take on a distinct 
role in the care of the terminally ill patient; a role which hospitals were unwilling 
and/or unable to provide at the time. Nevertheless, there were limits to what could be 
achieved by this early form of palliative care.  
 
Initially, the standard of end-of-life care had been restricted by the level of medical 
knowledge on pain management,11 and the lack of appropriate medicines.12 A culture 
of research into end-of-life care and pain management began to emerge in the 1950’s, 
                                                          
5 Recommendation Rec(2003)24 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the organisation 
of palliative care, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 12 November 2003, 19. 
6 Sandra L Regan and others, Communication as Comfort: Multiple Voices in Palliative Care (Taylor 
& Francis 2008) 22 ‘The term was first used by Madame Jeanne Gernier [sic] who founded the Dames 
de Calaire in Lyon, France in 1842.’; Cicely Saunders, ‘The evolution of palliative care’ (2000) 41 
Patient Education and Counseling 7 ‘The first use once again of the word ‘hospice’ in the UK was by 
the Irish Sisters of Charity at St. Joseph’s Hospice in Hackney, East London, which opened in 1905 
following the opening of their founding hospice outside Dublin in 1879. There was no connection with 
Mme. Garnier’s seven homes. Other homes without such a link – Catholic, Protestant and Jewish – 
were founded in the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia around the turn of the century. 
There were doubtless other similar institutions in Europe, such as Kaiserwerth in Germany which 
opened in 1836.’ 
7 Kieran McCarthy, A Dream Unfolding: Portrait of St Patrick’s Hospital & Marymount Hospice (St. 
Patrick’s Hospital/Marymount Hospice 2004) 43. 
8 Our Lady’s Hospice & Care Services, ‘Our Heritage’ <http://www.olh.ie/6-about-us/38-our-
heritage/> accessed 8 June 2014; Religious involvement did not limit who can be cared for in these 
hospices. See James Gilbert, ‘Palliative medicine: a new specialty changes an old debate’ (1996) 52(2) 
British Medical Bulletin 296, 299. ‘Even the most overtly religious hospices are at pains to make clear 
that those of any faith, and those of none, are welcomed.’ 
9 Our Lady’s Hospice & Care Services (n8).  
10 ibid. 
11 Recommendation Rec(2003)24 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the organisation 




as signaled by research on cancer carried out by Bailey,13 Aitken-Swan14 and, in 
particular, Dame Cicely Saunders.15 This led to a greater understanding of the care 
required for cancer patients and, ultimately, resulted in infrastructural changes which 
were a sea change in the practice of palliative medicine. In this regard, it was the 
opening of St. Christopher’s Hospice in London in 1967 which marked the beginning 
of modern palliative care.16 St. Christopher’s Hospice was developed for the sole 
purpose of providing end-of-life care and signaled a more focused attempt to manage 
pain experienced by the patient. Additionally, St. Christopher’s Hospice proved a 
suitable location to conduct research specific to palliative care practices.17 This 
research was valuable in understanding the effect and role of medication for pain 
relief, as evidenced by subsequent World Health Organization engagement on this 
subject.18 This included the publication of ‘Cancer Pain Relief’19 which set out a three-
step analgesic ladder; the third step being the use of strong opioids. The availability of 
opioids for pain relief was among the early concerns of the World Health Organization 
in relation to palliative care but another significant issue to emerge was the appropriate 





                                                          
13 M Bailey, ‘A survey of the social needs of patients with incurable lung cancer’ (1959) 11 The Almoner 
379. 
14 Ralston Paterson and Jean Aitken-Swan, ‘Public opinion on cancer; a survey among women in the 
Manchester area’ (1954) 23 Lancet 857; Jean Aitken-Swan and Ralston Paterson, ‘The cancer patient: 
delay in seeking advice’ (1955) 1 British Medical Journal 623.  
15 Cicely Saunders, ‘Drug treatment of patients in the terminal stages of cancer’ (1960) 1(1) Current 
Medicine and Drugs 16; Cicely Saunders, ‘The symptomatic treatment of incurable malignant disease’ 
(1964) 4 Prescriber’s Journal 68; Cicely Saunders, ‘The care of the terminal stages of cancer’ (1967) 
41 Annals of the Royal College of Surgeons 162.  
16 St. Christopher’s Hospice, ‘History’ <http://www.stchristophers.org.uk/about/history> accessed 8 
June 2014. St. Christopher’s Hospice was founded by Dame Cicely Saunders.  
17 Robert Twycross, a Clinical Research Fellow in St. Christopher’s Hospice, conducted research into 
methods of pain relief such as the Brompton Cocktail. Robert G Twycross ‘Choice of strong analgesic 
in terminal cancer: diamorphine or morphine?’ (1977) 3 Pain 93; Robert G Twycross, ‘The Brompton 
cocktail’ in JJ Bonica and V Ventafridda (eds), International symposium on pain of advanced cancer 
(Vol. 2, Raven Press 1979). 
18 World Health Organization, ‘The Solid Facts: Palliative Care’ (World Health Organization 2004) 7 
‘One powerful element of the work that developed into the whole spectrum of palliative care was a 
breakthrough in the attitude to pain, as it became recognized in all its complexity in the 1960s. It began 
with a concentration on cancer pain. This focus made possible the early research that led to the booklet 
Cancer pain relief, published by WHO in 1986.’ 
19 World Health Organization, ‘Cancer Pain Relief’ (World Health Organization 1986). 
20 ibid 16. 
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Modern Palliative Care 
Modern palliative care began to emerge in Ireland in the 1980s.21 This evolution in 
care can be demonstrated through changes in medical practice, new support 
organisations, and the creation of consultant positions in palliative medicine. For 
example, it was not until 1980 that a specialist palliative care unit was established in 
Marymount Hospice in Cork.22 The position of consultant physician in palliative 
medicine was first created in 1989,23 and in 1986 the Irish Hospice Foundation 
[hereinafter ‘IHF’] was established.24  
 
The purpose of the IHF is to act ‘as a voluntary support organization for the 
development and improvement of hospice services.’25 The early work of the IHF 
included raising money for research and training,26 developing hospice home-care 
services27 and eventually the opening of a number of hospices.28 In recent years, the 
IHF has established several programmes aimed at improving the provision of 
palliative care such as ‘Hospice Friendly Hospitals’,29 the ‘Palliative Care for All’ 
programme30 and the ‘Primary Palliative Care’ programme.31 These programmes 
                                                          
21 Department of Health and Children (n1) 21 ‘The modern palliative care movement in Ireland began 
to gather momentum in the early 1980’s.’  
22 McCarthy (n7).   
23 Deirdre Rowe, Ann Keating and Eithne Walsh, ‘Palliative care teamwork in the Republic of Ireland 
– the key to physical and psychological function’ in Julie Ling and Liam O’Síoraín (eds), Palliative 
Care in Ireland (Open University Press 2005) 85.      
24 Irish Hospice Foundation, ‘About Us’ <http://hospicefoundation.ie/about-us/> accessed 8 June 2014. 
25 Department of Health and Children (n1) 21. 
26 Padraig O’Morain, ‘The Irish Hospice Foundation 1986-2006: The First 20 Years’ (Irish Hospice 
Foundation 2006) 10 ‘For the IHF to set out, as it did, to raise the bulk of the £2 million cost of an 
Education and Research Centre at Our Lady’s Hospice, Harold’s Cross, was daring, almost audacious, 
in the late 1980s.’   
27 ibid 11. 
28 ibid 16. 
29 Irish Hospice Foundation, ‘Hospice Friendly Hospitals Programme’ 
<http://hospicefoundation.ie/what-we-do/hospice-friendly-hospitals/> accessed 8 June 2014. 
30 Irish Hospice Foundation, ‘Palliative Care for All’ <http://hospicefoundation.ie/what-we-
do/palliative-care-for-all/> accessed 8 June 2014 ‘The Irish Hospice Foundation’s Palliative Care for 
All Programme seeks to provide support, direction and guidance to those who work with these patients, 
in order to facilitate the incorporation of appropriate palliative care principles in their care.’; Irish 
Hospice Foundation, ‘Palliative Care for All: Integrating Palliative Care into Disease Management 
Frameworks’ (Irish Hospice Foundation 2008). 
31 Irish Hospice Foundation, ‘Primary Palliative Care’ <http://hospicefoundation.ie/what-we-
do/primary-palliative-care/> accessed 8 June 2014 ‘The initial aim of this programme was to identify 
specific areas where steps might be taken to enhance the care of those with palliative care needs.’ This 
report was motived by worry that ‘the absence of a formalised approach to this type of care may result 
in the palliative care needs of people with life limiting disease going unrecognised, and in these cases 
they will not receive the holistic approach to care that is associated with those in receipt of specialist 




along with the investment in research, training, and hospice development demonstrate 
the influence of the IHF in developing modern palliative care in Ireland.  
 
Despite the considerable impact of the IHF, they were not the only body which 
contributed to the development of palliative care in Ireland. Palliative care continued 
to develop in Ireland in the 1990’s as demonstrated by the establishment of the Irish 
Association of Palliative Care [hereinafter ‘IAPC’] in 1993. The IAPC is ‘an all island 
body with the purpose of promoting palliative care nationally and internationally’32 
and its members come from a range of disciplines.33 The work of the IAPC has 
included publishing position and discussion papers on artificial hydration,34 voluntary 
euthanasia,35 and palliative sedation.36 These will be discussed later in this Chapter 
when outlining specialist palliative care practices.  
 
Bodies such as the IHF and the IAPC had led the development of palliative care in 
Ireland up to this point. There was no single national strategy to influence or guide the 
development of palliative care. The first government engagement with palliative care 
was seen in the publication of the national health strategy in 1994.37 This strategy 
acknowledged the importance of palliative care services in improving quality of life 
and set the goal of promoting ‘the continued development of such services in a 
structured manner.’38 However, this strategy provided no additional details on how 
this was to be achieved and the services referred to were largely provided by voluntary 
organisations such as the Irish Cancer Society and hospices established by the IHF.   
 
In 1995, the Irish Medical Council recognised palliative medicine as a medical 
specialty. As a result, Ireland was only the ‘second country in Europe’39 to do so. The 
recognition of palliative medicine as a medical specialty demonstrates that it ‘has a 
                                                          
32 Irish Association of Palliative Care, ‘What does the Irish Association of Palliative Care do?’  
<http://www.iapc.ie/what-we-do.php> accessed 8 June 2014. 
33 ibid. 
34 Irish Association of Palliative Care, ‘Artificial Hydration in Terminally Ill Patients’ (Irish Association 
of Palliative Care 2011). 
35 Irish Association of Palliative Care, ‘Voluntary Euthanasia’ (Irish Association of Palliative Care 
2011). 
36 Irish Association of Palliative Care, ‘Palliative Sedation’ (Irish Association of Palliative Care 2011). 
37 Department of Health, ‘Shaping a Healthier Future: A strategy for effective healthcare in the 1990's’ 
(Stationery Office 1994). 
38 ibid 68. 
39 European Association of Palliative Care, ‘Atlas of Palliative Care in Europe’ (EAPC 2006) 94.  
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clearly defined patient population, clearly defined disease processes, and clearly 
defined research interests.’40 This categorisation also underlines the importance of an 
appropriate legal framework which supports both the doctor and patient as specialist 
palliative care raises issues unique to it. These issues will be demonstrated in the third 
section of this Chapter.    
 
National Advisory Committee on Palliative Care 
Government involvement in the development of palliative care was again seen from 
the mid-1990’s to the early 2000’s. This was demonstrated with the launch of the 
‘National Cancer Strategy’41 in 1996, the ‘Report of the Commission on Nursing’42 in 
1998, the ‘Action Programme for the Millennium’,43 and the establishment of the 
National Advisory Committee on Palliative Care in 1999.44 The National Advisory 
Committee on Palliative Care is a milestone in the development of palliative care in 
Ireland. The Committee reported in 2001 and highlighted many of the challenges 
facing the provision of palliative care.45  
 
Under the terms of reference, the National Advisory Committee on Palliative Care was 
to consider and issue recommendations on issues such as: ‘[t]he principles underlying 
the development of specialist and non-specialist palliative care services nationally and 
regionally’,46 ‘[t]he organisation and development of an integrated palliative care 
service involving both statutory and voluntary providers’,47 and ‘[a]ny other matters 
relating to palliative care which the National Advisory Committee considers 
appropriate’.48 In making recommendations on these points the National Advisory 
                                                          
40 Randall C Wetzel and Carol E Nicholson, ‘Research in Prediatric Critical Care’ in Bradley P Fuhrman 
and others (eds), Pediatric Critical Care (4th edn, Elsevier 2011) 41. 
41 Department of Health and Children, ‘Cancer Services in Ireland: A National Strategy’ (Stationery 
Office 1996); Department of Health and Children (n1) 22 ‘The Cancer Strategy sought to promote 
appropriate models of care that would best address the palliative care needs of patients and their 
families. It gave an undertaking that there would be a programme of phased development of specialist 
palliative care in regional cancer services, in consultation with health boards and others involved in 
palliative care.’ 
42 Department of Health and Children, ‘Report of The Commission on Nursing: A blueprint for the 
future’ (Stationery Office 2008). 
43 Department of the Taoiseach, ‘Action Programme for the Millennium’ (Stationery Office 2008) 7 A 
key priority was the development of a ‘National hospice plan’. 
44 Department of Health and Children (n1). 
45 Department of Health and Children (n1) 23 ‘Issues of responsibility, reporting structures and funding 
may be of an ad-hoc nature, leading to unsatisfactory and often divisive arrangements.’ 
46 ibid 26. 
47 ibid. 
48 ibid.  
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Committee on Palliative Care was to have regard to factors such as ‘the best interests 
of patients and their families’,49 ‘relevant national and international research, analysis 
and standards’,50 and ‘the palliative care requirements of persons with non-malignant 
diseases.’51 It has been suggested that as the terms of reference recognised the 
importance of considering the ‘best interests of patients and their families’ that this 
‘set the tone and context for the discussions.’52 In effect, the focus was placed on the 
patient and how optimum care should be provided. The patient should occupy a central 
role when examining the legal framework for the provision of specialist palliative care 
but it is important to also bear in mind the role of the healthcare professional. In a 
situation where legal and ethical uncertainty around practices is shown to exist then 
guidance greater than ‘best interests’ is needed to ensure appropriate specialist 
palliative care is provided.  
 
The National Advisory Committee on Palliative Care issued recommendations on 
issues such as specialist palliative care services, specialist palliative care units, and the 
standards in palliative care. These included recommendations that ‘[e]ach health board 
area should have a comprehensive specialist palliative care service to meet the needs 
of patients and families in the area’,53 ‘[s]pecialist palliative care services should be 
available to all patients wherever and whenever they require them’,54 and that 
‘[s]uitable performance indicators and outcome measures should be identified and 
utilised in specialist palliative care services in order to evaluate and maintain quality 
standards’.55 These recommendations are aimed at improving the availability of 
specialist palliative care and ensuring that a high standard of specialist palliative care 
is provided. However, achieving these aims requires consistency across providers of 
palliative care and needs a clear legal framework to support specialist palliative care 
practices. The absence of such a framework would result in a variety of problems such 
as ad-hoc decision-making structures and inconsistency between healthcare 
                                                          
49 ibid 25.   
50 ibid. 
51 ibid. 
52 Tony O’Brien and David Clark, ‘A national plan for palliative care – the Irish experience’ in Ling 
(n23) 9. 
53 Department of Health and Children (n1) 58.   
54 ibid 119. 
55 ibid 121. 
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professionals, and would undermine attempts to ameliorate the provision of specialist 
palliative care in Ireland.  
 
In order to draw these recommendations together, it was suggested that a National 
Council for Specialist Palliative Care be established.56 The purpose of this Council 
would be to advise the Minister for Health and Children on ‘national policy’.57 This 
Council was seen as a necessary step in developing the provision of palliative care in 
Ireland. The National Advisory Committee on Palliative Care made this 
recommendation based on previous reports on palliative care in Ireland58 and a World 
Health Organization report59 which set out that ‘one of the major obstacles to the 
implementation of palliative care appears to be the absence of national policies on 
cancer pain relief and other aspects of palliative care.’60 However, a National Council 
for Specialist Palliative Care has not yet been established. As a result, palliative care 
has continued to develop through the work of bodies such as the IHF, the IAPC, and 
the Irish Cancer Society. Many of the reports and papers issued by these bodies will 
be discussed in the course of this thesis. These reports will further demonstrate how 
the development of palliative care in Ireland has largely been led by voluntary groups 
rather than developed through clear and consistent national policy. This fragmented 
approach to developing palliative care is likely to impact negatively on the standard 
of patient care, particularly if the legal framework is vague on the legality and limits 
of specialist palliative care practices. In this regard, a point yet to be clarified in this 





                                                          
56 ibid 132 ‘The Minister for Health and Children should establish a National Council for Specialist 
Palliative Care to offer advice on the ongoing development and implementation of national policy on 
palliative care services in Ireland, having regard to this Committee’s report.’ 
57 ibid 17. 
58 Irish Hospice Foundation and Irish Association for Palliative Care, ‘Position Paper on the 
Development of Hospice and Specialist Palliative Care Services in Ireland’ (1996); D Haslett, ‘A Study 
of Partnership between Voluntary and Statutory Sectors in Palliative Care in Ireland’ (Irish Hospice 
Foundation 1998); Department of Public Health, Eastern Health Board, ‘Needs Assessment for 
Specialist Palliative Care Services in the Eastern Health Board Area’ (1999). 
59 World Health Organization, ‘Cancer Pain Relief and Palliative Care: Report of a WHO Expert 
Committee’ (WHO 1990). 
60 Department of Health and Children (n1) 132. 
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The Expansion in Categories of Palliative Care Patients 
The close link between the development of palliative care and oncology was 
highlighted in the previous section.61 Palliative care is no longer limited to patients 
with a cancer diagnosis. It has expanded to provide care for people suffering from a 
wide range of serious illnesses.62 Palliative care may be provided to patients suffering 
from motor neurone disease,63 AIDS,64 chronic obstructive pulmonary disease,65 
chronic kidney disease66 dementia,67 or it may be provided to older people based on 
their medical condition.68   
 
The variety of illnesses for which palliative care may be provided raises a number of 
challenges. Among these challenges is the need to assess the patient’s disease 
trajectory. This is a relevant concern for all illnesses as it impacts on the decision to 
begin palliative care and, subsequently, the level of palliative care which is to be 
provided. It has previously been set out that specialist palliative care is of most 
relevance near the end of the patient’s life however ‘[a] hard and fast objective clinical 
                                                          
61 David Field and Julia Addington-Hall, ‘Extending specialist palliative care to all?’ (1999) 48 Social 
Science and Medicine 1271, 1272-1273 ‘alleviating the physical, psychological and spiritual distress 
associated with dying from cancer, on enabling cancer patients to continue living full lives until they 
died’ citing Cicely Saunders, ‘On dying well’ (1984) Feb Cambridge Review 49; Department of Health 
and Children (n1) 42 ‘Over 95% of all patients currently availing of specialist palliative care services 
suffer from cancer.’ 
62 ibid. The value of expanding palliative care was recognised at an early stage in its development, see 
Cicely Saunders, The Management of Terminal Disease (Edward Arnold 1978); Eric Wilkes, ‘Terminal 
Care: Report of a Working Party’ (HMSO 1980); Bronwen Biswas, ‘The Medicalisation of Dying: A 
Nurse’s View’ in David Clark (ed), The Future for Palliative Care: Issues of Policy and Practice (Open 
University Press 1993); Irene Higginson, ‘Palliative Care: A Review of Past Changes and Future 
Trends’ (1993) 15 Journal of Public Health Medicine 308; David Field, ‘Palliative Medicine and the 
Medicalisation of Death’ (1994) 3 European Journal of Cancer Care 58; Cicely Saunders, Mary Baines 
and Robert Dunlop, Living with Dying: A Guide to Palliative Care (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 
1995); Sam Ahmedzai, ‘Making a success out of life’s failures’ (1996) Progress in Palliative Care 4, 1-
3. 
63 David Oliver, ‘Palliative Care for Motor Neurone Disease’ (2002) 2 Practical Neurology 68. 
64 Department of Health and Children (n1) 24; Department of Health (n37) 68 ‘Proper recognition will 
be given to the importance of palliative care for terminally ill patients, and the continued development 
of these services will be promoted in a structured manner.’   
65 CM Roberts and others, ‘Clinician perceived good practice in end-of-life care for patients with 
COPD’ (2008) 22 Palliative Medicine 855; Sarah J Goodlin, ‘Why should palliative care clinicians 
learn about heart failure?’ (2008) 16 Progress in Palliative Care 215; Richard Harding and others, 
‘Provision of palliative care for chronic heart failure inpatients: how much do we need?’ (2009) BMC 
Palliative Care 8. 
66 Sara N Davison and Charles J Ferro, ‘Management of pain in chronic kidney disease’ (2009) 17(4) 
Progress in Palliative Care 186. 
67 Elizabeth L Sampson and others, ‘Palliative care in advanced dementia; A mixed methods approach 
for the development of a complex intervention’ (2008) BMC Palliative Care 8. 
68 National Council on Ageing and Older People, ‘End-of-Life Care for Older People in Acute and 
Long-Stay Care Settings in Ireland’ (National Council on Ageing and Older People 2008). 
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distinction as to when the dying process commences is not always possible’.69 This 
lack of a ‘“brightline” test’70 is particularly difficult in relation to non-cancer 
patients.71 As a consequence of this, it is often a more difficult task to identify a non-
cancer patient as being close to the end of life.72 This may limit the number of patients 
receiving specialist palliative care and it demonstrates the wider difficulty in making 
decisions in relation to this form of care. As palliative care continues to expand there 
is a need for greater support and clarity in the decision-making framework for patient 
care. This not only relates to the decision to begin palliative care but extends 
throughout the continuum of decisions on end-of-life care.  
 
Ongoing Challenges in Specialist Palliative Care  
The challenge of providing specialist palliative care in Ireland is well demonstrated in 
a study conducted by O’Leary and Tiernan.73 This study concentrated on the provision 
of ‘specialist palliative care services for noncancer patients in Ireland and perceived 
barriers’.74 This was a comprehensive study due to a 100% response rate from surveys 
which had been sent to ‘clinical managers of all SPC services listed in the directory of 
                                                          
69 Michael Ashby and Brian Stoffell, ‘Artificial Hydration and Alimentation at the End of Life: A Reply 
to Craig’ (1995) 21(3) Journal of Medical Ethics 135, 137; Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical 
School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death, “A Definition of Irreversible Coma: Report of the 
Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death” (1968) 
205(6) Journal of the American Medical Association 337; Irish Working Party on Brain Death, 
“Memorandum on Brain Death” (1988) 81(1) Irish Medical Journal 42; John Lombard, ‘The Definition 
of Death’ (2012) 11 Hibernian Law Journal 63; Lee v State of Oregon 891 F. Supp. 1429 ‘The problem 
of inadequate mental evaluation is compounded by imprecision in defining “terminal disease.” Even 
for physicians who specialize in treating a terminal disease, no precise definition is medically or legally 
possible, since only in hindsight is it known with certainty when someone is going to die. As the Ninth 
Circuit noted, the terminally ill category is “inherently unstable.” Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 
590.’ 
70 R(Burke) v General Medical Council [2005] QB 424, [2006] QB 273 [46]. 
71 Field (n61) 1275.   
72 ibid 1274 ‘The limited available evidence therefore strongly suggest that about a fifth of people who 
die from non-malignant disease have unmet needs for symptom control, psychological support, family 
care and open communication with health professionals, which are comparable to (although not 
identical to) those of cancer patients who currently receive specialist palliative care services.’; CM 
Roberts, and others, ‘Clinician perceived good practice in end-of-life care for patients with COPD’ 
(2008) 22(8) Palliative Medicine 855, 855 ‘There is evidence from recent studies that patients with 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) are less able to access or be offered appropriate 
palliative care at the end-of-life compared with patients suffering from cancer.’; Norma O’Leary and 
Eoin Tiernan, ‘Survey of specialist palliative care services for noncancer patients in Ireland and 
perceived barriers’ (2008) Palliative Medicine 77, 77 ‘Twenty four percent of services limited 
availability for noncancer patients in some way. Of those services available for noncancer patients, the 
type of care provided to them was the same as for cancer patients in 81% of services.’ 




SPC services in Ireland’.75 The results of this survey revealed that 24% of specialist 
palliative care services restricted care for noncancer patients in some manner.76 In 
instances where care was available to noncancer patients, the type of care was ‘the 
same as for cancer patients in 81% of services.’77 In 2004, 7.21% of patients cared for 
by specialist palliative care services had an illness other than cancer.78 On the basis of 
this survey, it appears that there are considerable barriers to the expansion of palliative 
care. Among the barriers recognised by O’Leary and Tiernan were ‘the unpredictable 
non-cancer disease trajectory, the resultant difficulties with developing referral criteria 
and the lack of noncancer disease specific expertise.’79 In effect, the role of the general 
practitioner in referring a patient to specialist palliative care services may be 
inconsistent due to the lack of clear referral criteria.80 This further highlights the lack 
of clear national guidance on the provision of palliative care and, in particular, 
specialist palliative care.   
 
One respondent to O’Leary and Tiernan’s study, a nurse manager, suggested that 
‘Clear national guidelines need to be put in place to ensure uniformity when dealing 
with nonmalignant patients requiring palliative care.’81 The reality of the situation is 
that policy on end-of-life care has developed at a local level.82 These policies may be 
influenced by various reports and recommendations on palliative care issued by bodies 
such as the IHF, IAPC, and the European Association of Palliative Care among others. 
The reliance on local policy means that ‘uniformity’ across providers of palliative care 
is not readily achievable. The lack of clear national guidance undermines consistency 
in specialist palliative care and could hamper the care of the patient. This highlights 
the need for a clear legal framework which allows healthcare professionals to practise 
under consistent and well defined legal and ethical guidelines. Any such framework 
will also have to take account of the variety of palliative care providers if a harmonious 
standard of specialist palliative care is to be achieved.      





79 ibid 79-80. 
80 ibid 81 ‘The lack of explicit written referral policies in 31% of services in Ireland in 2005 is 
surprisingly high. Only 22 services (35%) have a written referral policy that made explicit reference to 
noncancer patients.’ 
81 ibid 79. 
82 Text to n196 in Chapter Five. 
42 
 
Palliative Care Providers 
Palliative care in Ireland is provided by hospices, acute general hospitals, or in a 
community setting such as nursing homes. Discussing these palliative care providers 
facilitates the later identification of the existing legal framework in Ireland for 
specialist palliative care. As there is no distinct legal framework in Ireland for 
specialist palliative care it is necessary to consider how this form of care falls within 
the broader ambit of regulation. As a result, the legislation and guidance applicable to 
healthcare facilities forms a substantial part of the legal framework in Ireland for 
specialist palliative care. Second, it ensures that any suggestions for reform of the legal 
framework made in this thesis can take account of the variety of palliative care 
providers which exist. It is important that a holistic view be taken in relation to reform 
so as to ensure that suggestions are workable and appropriate in reality.  
 
Hospice Care 
Hospices in Cork and Dublin were established by religious congregations and there 
was no central plan for the development and expansion of this type of care to other 
parts of Ireland. As a result, the provision of hospice care in Ireland can be seen as 
sporadic and has resulted in certain ‘geographical regions without an inpatient hospice 
to serve as the hub around which comprehensive community services can develop.’83 
This has been highlighted by the IHF as a key challenge to the development of 
palliative care.84 At present, there are nine inpatient hospices in Ireland.85 Hospices in 
Ireland provide a broad range of palliative care services including home care, day care, 
respite care, and inpatient care.  
 
Admission to a hospice may be organised through a patient’s general practitioner. 
Patients who are already receiving care in a hospital may be referred by the consultant 
in charge. This is standard practice for all nine inpatient hospices but in order for this 
to be effective there must be a common understanding of palliative care shared among 
healthcare professionals. In this regard, O’Leary and Tiernan highlighted that barriers 
to the greater provision of specialist palliative care included the ‘difficulties with 
                                                          
83 Irish Hospice Foundation, ‘Strategic Plan: 2012-2015’ (Irish Hospice Foundation 2012) 8. 
84 ibid. 
85 Our Lady’s Hospice & Care Services, Dublin; Blackrock Hospice, Dublin; St. Francis Hospice, 
Dublin; St. Brigid’s Hospice, Kildare; Marymount Hospice, Cork; Milford Care Centre, Limerick; 
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developing referral criteria’.86 As such, the potential exists that the patient would not 
be referred to the appropriate palliative care service in a timely manner. Unfortunately, 
this may also undermine a patient’s involvement in later decisions relating to their 
healthcare depending on the disease trajectory. Nonetheless, the range of services 
offered by hospices in Ireland means that patients may come into contact with staff at 
an early stage in the disease trajectory. Despite this, inpatient hospices are mainly 
associated with the provision of specialist palliative care.   
 
Acute General Hospitals   
In 2001 the ‘Report of the National Advisory Committee on Palliative Care’ noted that 
specialist palliative care services in hospitals are ‘currently at an early stage of 
development in Ireland.’87 In general, hospitals are less associated with the provision 
of specialist palliative care. Part of the reason for this is that hospitals are seen as 
focusing on curative treatments whereas specialist palliative care signals a serious 
change in the condition of the patient to a point where curative treatment is no longer 
a reality.88 This view tends to neglect the fact that approximately 48% of deaths in the 
Republic of Ireland occur in acute hospitals.89 Recently, there have been moves 
towards increasing the role hospitals have in the provision of various forms of 
palliative care including specialist palliative care. This has been demonstrated by the 
work of the ‘Hospice Friendly Hospitals Programme’. 
 
Hospice Friendly Hospitals is a programme which was launched in 2007 by the IHF. 
The programme focuses on ensuring that ‘end-of-life care is central’90 in hospital care, 
on bringing it ‘from the margins to the mainstream’,91 and on altering the culture of 
end-of-life care in hospitals.92 At present, there are a total of 31 acute hospitals which 
seek to implement the ‘Hospice Friendly Hospitals Programme’.93 Again, this 
                                                          
86 O’Leary (n72) 79-80. 
87 Department of Health and Children (n1) 13. 
88 Task Force on Palliative Care, Last Acts Campaign, and Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, ‘Precepts 
of Palliative Care’ (1998) 1(2) Journal of Palliative Medicine 109, 110. 
89 Irish Hospice Foundation, ‘Hospital Friendly Hospitals Programme’ 
<http://hospicefoundation.ie/what-we-do/hospice-friendly-hospitals/> accessed 8 June 2014. 
90 ibid. 
91 Hospice Friendly Hospitals, ‘Quality Standards for End-of-Life Care in Hospitals: Making end-of-
life care central to hospital care’ (Irish Hospice Foundation 2010) 15.  
92 Irish Hospice Foundation (n89). 
93 Irish Hospice Foundation, ‘Acute Hospital Network’ <http://hospicefoundation.ie/what-we-
do/hospice-friendly-hospitals/acute/> accessed 8 June 2014.  
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demonstrates that the provision of palliative care in hospitals is still in the early stages. 
Incorporating palliative care into hospitals might be difficult if professional standards 
are vague about end-of-life care. This could also give rise to disagreement between 
doctors and nurses who practice under different professional standards. On this basis, 
it is possible that there is some confusion among healthcare professionals as to what 
constitutes palliative care. This is a problem which has been shown to exist by a 
Hospice Friendly Hospitals report titled ‘Dying in Hospital in Ireland: Nurse and 
Doctor Perspectives’.94  
 
The Hospice Friendly Hospitals report examined the decisions made about the 
patient’s care in the last weeks of their life. This report demonstrated differences in 
how doctors and nurses perceived end-of-life care. The difference was demonstrated 
by a ‘48% response agreement on whether a patient was in pain all or most of the 
time’95 while a similar level of agreement was seen in relation to symptom 
management.96 Decisions on palliative care and specialist palliative care were 
examined separately in the report. It was shown that palliative care is of a high 
standard,97 but there is a lack of clarity about ‘what palliative care decisions were made 
and documented, and substantially more disagreement on the frequency and 
management of the patient’s symptoms.’98 This suggests an ad-hoc approach to 
palliative care which fails to provide healthcare professionals with legal certainty on 
the type of care to be provided. In particular, healthcare professionals appeared 
reluctant to ‘withhold or withdraw treatment, even when death is expected.’99 The 
Hospice Friendly Hospitals report suggested that this may be caused by ‘the absence 
of clear practice guidelines.’100 This situation hampers the consistent protection of 
patients’ human rights as there are likely to be different approaches to palliative care 
adopted by different healthcare providers. In any case, the provision of treatment 
                                                          
94 Kieran McKeown, Trutz Haase and Shelagh Twomey, ‘Dying in Hospital in Ireland: Nurse and 
Doctor Perspectives, Report 2’ (Irish Hospice Foundation 2010). 
95 ibid 28.  
96 ibid 29 ‘The level of agreement between the responses of nurses and doctors on symptom 
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on whether the patient was kept comfortable.’ 
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98 ibid 30-31. 
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which may be invasive, painful, and of questionable value is unlikely to be in the 
patient’s best interests. This further underlines the importance of a clear legal 
framework which provides guidance on the legal and ethically complex decisions 
made in relation to the care of a terminally ill patient.  
  
There were notable differences in the perception of doctors and nurses as to whether 
a patient had actually received specialist palliative care. Doctors believed 22% of 
patients had received specialist palliative care compared to the nurses’ response of 
32%.101 The knowledge of specialist palliative care practices can also be questioned 
as a result of a response that ‘in over a quarter of cases (26% according to nurses and 
29% according to doctors)’102 it is not clear whether specialist palliative care would 
have been of benefit to the patient.103 These professions work closely in the provision 
of specialist palliative care and it is important that they share a common understanding 
of palliative care practices. Inconsistency between these professions ultimately 
impacts on the care of the patient. Nonetheless, it is difficult to accurately explain the 
basis for this difference in opinion but it could also be attributed to the lack of ‘clear 
practice guidelines’.104  
 
The Hospice Friendly Hospitals report does not provide a categorical explanation for 
differences but suggests that each hospital must reflect on their practice. Nevertheless, 
several interpretations of this data were put forward in the report. For instance, it was 
suggested that:   
  
there is not a common understanding of what specialist palliative care 
actually means; that there is lack of information about the role of specialist 
palliative care; that the palliative care needs of these patients were not been 
properly assessed; that nurses and doctors have different perceptions of 
when a patient requires a specialist palliative care service; that there is no 
systematic procedure for calling upon the expertise of the specialist 
palliative care team when a diagnosis of dying is made.105 
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There is no single solution to address all of these issues but professional standards and 
guidance can have a considerable bearing on the type of care offered. This influence 
is due to their role in defining the conduct and standards expected from healthcare 
professionals regardless of the type of setting in which they are practising. 
Furthermore, the difference in opinion between doctors and nurses in the Hospice 
Friendly Hospitals report demonstrates the need to examine how the current 
professional standards impact on specialist palliative care and, as part of this, how they 
address co-operation with other healthcare professionals. This extends beyond 
specialist palliative care in hospices or hospitals and includes other locations where 
this form of care is provided such as in a community setting.   
 
Community Setting 
The general practitioner and public health nurse are the main providers of palliative 
care in a community setting.106 Other disciplines involved in the provision of palliative 
care in the community include the specialist palliative care nurse, ‘the physiotherapist, 
the occupational therapist, the speech and language therapist and social workers.’107 
Locations where palliative care may be provided in the community include ‘the 
patient’s own home, in a local community hospital, in a nursing home or any other 
setting in the community.’108 The practice of providing palliative care in the 
community began shortly after the opening of St Christopher’s Hospice in 1967.109 
This service was ‘based on the needs of patients at home, after consultation with 
general practitioners and district nurses who were already working in the 
community.’110 Dame Cicely Saunders encouraged the development of this service 
and set out that ‘The hospice will provide continuity of care for those able to return 
home.’111 This service has continued to develop over the years and in 2008 there were 
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314 such teams in the United Kingdom.112 Similar developments have also taken place 
in Ireland.  
 
The Irish Cancer Society113 has been involved in the ‘development of home-care 
nursing services in the community’114 since 1985.115 Services include ‘Night Nursing’ 
which provides ‘end of life care for cancer patients and their families in their own 
home.’116 This care not only focuses on physical pain but also provides emotional care 
of the patient. In 2011, 2,015 patients availed of this service.117   
 
Palliative care in the nursing home is generally provided by the patient’s general 
practitioner with support provided by the nursing staff. The provision of specialist 
palliative care may involve ‘consultation with the staff of the specialist palliative care 
unit, or may involve visits to the nursing home by the specialist palliative care team in 
the community.’118 As such, the provision of specialist palliative care does not have a 
central role in nursing home care. Nonetheless, it is important to bear in mind when 
examining the existing legal framework and in advancing suggestions for reform. 
   
Specialist palliative care has evolved from hospices to become a more central part of 
the healthcare system. It is a practice which is still developing as evidenced by the 
emergence of programmes such as Hospice Friendly Hospitals and the growth in home 
care. Regardless of location, doctors and nurses are to the fore in providing specialist 
palliative care. In order to provide effective palliative care it is necessary that these 
professions share a common understanding of the nature of this type of care and are 
supported by a clear legal framework when providing specialist palliative care. In this 
regard, guidelines and standards must directly address the provision of specialist 
palliative care practices. Consequently, it is necessary to highlight the legal and ethical 
issues raised by these specialist palliative care practices.   
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Palliative Care Practices 
There are a broad range of palliative care practices such as medication management,119 
prevention of bed sores,120 and treating elimination problems experienced by 
patients.121 These practices are relatively uncontroversial and raise few legal issues 
other than providing respect for patient autonomy and ensuring that the patient is 
treated with dignity. However, the specialist palliative care practices of palliative 
sedation and the decision to withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration are more 
challenging. This section will outline these practices and, in doing so, will illustrate 
the complicated decisions faced by the healthcare professional in providing specialist 
palliative care. In addition to this, it provides an introduction to many of the difficult 
legal and ethical issues which will be discussed in the course of this thesis.  
 
Sedation in Palliative Care 
Sedation in palliative care has been described as a ‘contested practice’.122 Seymour et 
al. neatly summarised this position in commenting that:  
 
Contemporary debates focus on how its use relates to euthanasia, issues of 
informed or advance consent, its role in ‘death with dignity’ and its 
relationship to the withholding or withdrawing of life prolonging medical 
treatments, particularly artificial feeding and hydration.123  
 
This section will set out the background to several of these issues and will highlight 
the importance of examining the legal framework in Ireland for these specialist 
palliative care practices.  
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The use of sedation in palliative care developed due to the greater focus placed on pain 
management by palliative care providers124 as well as developments in the provision 
of medication.125 Levels of sedation include mild sedation, respite sedation and deep 
sedation.126 Mild sedation involves lowering the consciousness of the patient but the 
patient is awake. Respite sedation involves sedating the patient for ‘a predetermined 
interval, such as 24 to 48 hours, then downwardly titrating the sedative until 
consciousness reappears.’127 The benefit of this form of sedation is that it may assist 
in easing the anxiety and distress experienced by the patient.128 However, it is the 
practice of deep sedation which is the most controversial.  
 
There are a number of terms for this form of sedation, including: continuous 
sedation,129 deep sedation,130 sedation for intractable distress in the dying,131 total 
pharmacological sedation,132 sedation-induced sleep,133 and terminal sedation.134 This 
thesis will use the most commonly used term of ‘palliative sedation’. Previously, 
‘terminal sedation’ was the most commonly used term to describe this level of 
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sedation.135 However, there is a lack of clarity as to whether the word ‘terminal’ means 
that the patient is terminally ill or that the sedation is aimed at allowing the patient to 
die. The words used are particularly important given the legally and ethically sensitive 
nature of specialist palliative care. For instance, it was suggested by Jackson that the 
‘words we use in medical discourse reveal much about our truest conceptions and (and 
subconscious assumptions) about the practice of the profession’.136 At present, the 
term ‘palliative sedation’ is the most prominent term used to describe this level of 
sedation.137 
 
Palliative sedation has been defined by the European Association for Palliative Care 
as:   
 
the monitored use of medications intended to induce a state of decreased 
or absent awareness (unconsciousness) in order to relieve the burden of 
otherwise intractable suffering, in a manner that is ethically acceptable to 
the patient, family and health-care providers.138  
 
The main indication for this type of sedation is the presence of a ‘refractory symptom’ 
which is a ‘symptom for which all possible treatment has failed or it is estimated that 
no methods are available for palliation within the time frame and the risk–benefit 
ratio’139 that is tolerable to the patient. Despite a change in terms, criticism persists 
that this form of sedation may have the effect of hastening the death of the patient.140 
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This would blur the distinction between specialist palliative care and euthanasia. The 
legitimacy of this distinction is a central issue which this thesis addresses and it will 
be drawn out through discussion of criminal law, human rights, and professional 
standards over the course of several chapters.  
  
Sedation may be administered for differing forms of distress such as delirium,141 
dyspnoea,142 pain,143 nausea,144 existential distress,145 restlessness,146 and vomiting.147 
Existential distress is the emotional or mental distress experienced by the patient. The 
administration of palliative sedation for suffering such as existential distress and 
restlessness alone is controversial148 as it involves treating psychological distress 
rather than physical pain experienced by the patient. In this respect, existential distress 
may occur earlier in the disease trajectory at a time when the patient is not 
experiencing refractory symptoms. In effect, it is possible for existential distress or 
anxiety to occur at times other than the end of life. Consequently, if palliative sedation 
is administered for existential distress in circumstances where a patient is not 
experiencing a refractory symptom then this would blur the purpose of palliative 
sedation. It also begins to blur the time at which palliative sedation can legitimately 
be provided. For example, the administration of palliative sedation to a young and 
physically healthy person who happens to be experiencing existential distress could in 
no way be considered an aspect of specialist palliative care. Instead it may be viewed 
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as a practice more closely aligned with euthanasia.149 Nonetheless, a person 
experiencing existential distress alone near the end of life may benefit from lower 
forms of sedation such as respite sedation and should receive an appropriate level of 
palliative care.150               
    
In short, the administration of palliative sedation for existential distress alone would 
be outside the usual criteria for the practice of palliative sedation, and would blur the 
distinction between specialist palliative care and euthanasia. In an examination of the 
literature in this area de Graeff suggests that sedation for ‘psychological or existential 
distress should be initiated only under exceptional circumstances and only after 
consultations with experts in this area.’151 In effect, the symptoms which may require 
palliative sedation should be clearly set out to ensure that patients can receive 
appropriate care regardless of location. Nevertheless, the identification of symptoms 
giving rise to palliative sedation is only one aspect of this practice.  
 
It is necessary to recognise that while doctors regularly commence the sedation of a 
patient this is a practice which nurses may also perform.152 Benzodiazepines, opioids 
and barbiturates are commonly used forms of palliative medication.153 An opiate such 
as morphine functions primarily as a painkiller, whereas benzodiazepines serve to 
sedate the patient so they do not feel the same level of pain. Opiates therefore are ‘not 
reliable sleep-inducing agents by themselves.’154 Consequently, benzodiazepines or 
barbiturates155 are increasingly used for palliative sedation.      
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Strong opioids used in palliative care include oxycodone, fentanyl, morphine, and 
hydromorphone. Morphine is the the drug of choice for pain management when the 
pain is moderate to severe.156 Fears about addiction, respiratory depression, and 
excessive sedation have been shown to be largely unfounded.157 The use of opioids in 
palliative care has been recommended by the World Health Organisation. For 
example, the early work of the World Health Organisation on this topic emphasised 
the importance of opioid products being available for pain management.158 
 
There is considerable support for the argument that opioids and sedatives do not hasten 
the death of the patient. For example, Sykes and Thorns demonstrated that ‘there is no 
evidence that initiation of treatment, or increases in dose of opioids or sedatives, is 
associated with precipitation of death.’159 Furthermore, Sykes and Thorns concluded 
that ‘[s]edation is generally used over a short period and most of the evidence suggests 
that in the context of specialist palliative care it is not associated with shortening of 
life.’160 This research drew on the seventeen studies which ‘addressed the use of 
sedatives in the care of cancer patients in the final stages of life.’161 It also included a 
systematic review which examined three studies published in Spanish. These studies 
were retrospective and prospective. They included sedation administered in the home, 
as part of hospital care, in palliative care units, and in a combination of these locations. 
Consequently, these studies reflect the various ways and locations in which specialist 
palliative care practices may be provided. Research published in 2009 by Maltoni et 
al. also serves to underline the fact that appropriate use of palliative sedation does not 
hasten the death of the patient.162 This point was again demonstrated by a subsequent 
literature review conducted by Maltoni et al.163 The cumulative effect of these studies 
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is to demonstrate that the primary purpose of administering opioids and sedatives is 
that of pain relief, and this is not achieved through hastening the death of the patient.              
 
Palliative medication may be administered in a number of different ways including 
injection, oral, suppository or through intrathecal pump. The intrathecal pump 
functions by delivering ‘small doses of medication directly to the spinal fluid.’164 This 
has the effect of increasing the ‘relative strength of the drug compared to its oral or 
intravenous equivalent.’165 This approach can minimise potential side effects of 
sedative drugs. The control exercised over the administration of sedative drugs is 
particularly important due to the harmful consequences associated with an excessive 
dose. Naturally, it follows that sedation should be the ‘lowest necessary to provide 
adequate relief of suffering.’166 In the context of morphine it appears that when it is 
administered at such a level there is ‘little data to support the belief that appropriate 
use of opioids hastens death in patients dying from cancer and other chronic 
diseases.’167 The challenge which this presents is the identification of what constitutes 
an appropriate level of sedative. This level will vary over the course of a patient’s care, 
for example, after the initial sedation the risk of hastening death decreases. This is 
based on the fact that the ‘risk of respiratory depression is greatest when opioids are 
                                                          
new findings on different areas of palliative sedation, that is prevalence, indications, monitoring, 
duration and choice of drugs. In particular, a clear definition of palliative sedation and of its more 
pronounced form, deep continuous sedation (DCS), has emerged. It has been confirmed that, when 
performed in the correct way and with the right aims, palliative sedation does not have a detrimental 
impact on survival.’  
164 Belverud (n125). 
165 ibid. 
166 Cherny (n130) 586; de Graeff (n126) 67 ‘The initial dose of sedatives should usually be small enough 
to maintain the patients’ ability to communicate periodically.’; Rousseau (n149) 153 ‘Finally, once PS 
is initiated, the dosage of the sedative agent should not be increased unless the patient awakens, is 
restless or grimaces, withdraws from touch and other stimuli, or has any other findings that could 
reasonably be interpreted as evidence of suffering, including tachypnea or tachycardia.’ 
167 Susan Anderson Fohr, ‘The Double Effect of Pain Medication: Separating Myth from Reality’ 
(1998) 1(4) Journal of Palliative Medicine 315, 318; Nigel Sykes and Andrew Thorns, ‘The use of 
opioids and sedatives at the end of life’ (2003) 4 The Lancet Oncology 312, 312 ‘there is no evidence 
that initiation of treatment, or increases in dose of opioids or sedatives, is associated with precipitation 
of death.’; de Graeff (n126) 77 ‘Retrospective studies strongly suggest that appropriately used PST does 
not shorten life.’; Richard Huxtable, Euthanasia, Ethics and the Law: From Conflict to Compromise 
(Routledge-Cavendish 2007) 88-91; Johan Legemaate and others, ‘Palliative Sedation in the 
Netherlands: Starting-points and Contents of a National Guideline’ (2007) 14 European Journal of 
Health Law 61, 64 ‘The committee has taken the view that palliative sedation is a normal medical 
procedure and must be clearly distinguished from termination of life, because there is no evidence that 
palliative sedation — if administered carefully — hastens death.’; B Barathi and Prabha S Chandra, 
‘Palliative Sedation in Advanced Cancer Patients: Does it Shorten Survival Time? - A Systematic 
Review’ (2013) 19(1) Indian Journal of Palliative Care 40.  
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first begun.’168 As treatment progresses, the ability of a patient to cope with respiratory 
side effects increases,169 but over time toxicity may occur. 
 
The level of sedation which results in toxicity varies among people.170 Toxicity 
depends on factors such as ‘the degree of responsiveness of the pain to opioid, prior 
exposure to opioids, rate of titration of the dose, concomitant medication, and renal 
function.’171 Similarly, patients may often develop a tolerance to benzodiazepines over 
the course of sedation. This should be factored in when commencing palliative 
sedation through the use of a benzodiazepine.172 The combination of these factors 
underlines the difficulty in accurately judging an appropriate level of the sedative drug. 
A patient experiencing toxicity may demonstrate agitation which could be seen as pain 
which is not being adequately controlled.173 Consequently, in demonstrating these 
symptoms further sedation may be given to control the presumed pain.174 This has 
been described as a ‘vicious cycle’175 and results in even greater toxicity.176 The 
potential effect of this is that an excessive dose may be administered.  
 
It has been mentioned by some that palliative care needs to ‘accept that there are some 
occasions when the process of death is hastened, either unknowingly or knowingly.’177 
This has led to suggestions that palliative sedation may amount to ‘slow euthanasia’178 
                                                          
168 Anderson Fohr (n167) 316 citing CS Hill, ‘The barriers to adequate pain management with opioid 
analgesics’ (1993) 20 Seminars in Oncology 1 Note that opioids are used far less frequently. 
169 Ann Alpers, ‘Criminal Act or Palliative Care? Prosecutions Involving the Care of the Dying’ (1998) 
26 Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 308, 310 ‘Significant respiratory depression rarely occurs in a 
patient whose opioid dose has been gradually adjusted against pain.’; Anderson Fohr (n157) 316.  
170 Bill O’Neill and Marie Fallon, ‘ABC of Palliative Care: Principles of Palliative Care and Pain 
Control’ (1997) 315(7111) British Medical Journal 801, 804. 
171 ibid. 
172 Josep Porta-Sales, ‘Palliative sedation: clinical, pharmacological and practical aspects’ in Sigrid 
Sterckx, Kasper Raus, and Freddy Mortier (eds), Continuous Sedation at the End of Life: Ethical, 
Clinical and Legal Perspectives (Cambridge University Press 2013) 70-71; Helga Kuhse, The Sanctity-
of-Life Doctrine in Medicine: A Critique (Clarendon Press 1987) 87 constant monitoring of the level of 
palliative medication administered is essential in avoiding what Kuhse describes as ‘pyramid’ pain-





177 Michael Ashby, ‘Death Causation in Palliative Medicine’ in Ian Freckelton and Danuta Mendelson 
(eds), Causation in Law and Medicine (Hampshire 2002) 228, 247.    
178 J Andrew Billings and Susan D Block, ‘Slow euthanasia’ (1996) 12 Journal of Palliative Care 21; 
BM Mount, ‘Morphine drips, terminal sedation, and slow euthanasia: definitions and facts, not 
anecdotes’ (1996) 12 Journal of Palliative Care 31; H Brody, ‘Commentary on Billings and Block’s 
‘Slow Euthanasia’’ (1996) 12 Journal of Palliative Care 38;  Russell K Portenoy, ‘Morphine Infusions 
at the End of Life: the Pitfalls in reasoning from anecdote’ (1996) 12 Journal of Palliative Care 44.  
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or ‘backdoor euthanasia’.179 Furthermore, Mason and Laurie describe the practice as 
‘euthanasia hiding under the emollient terminology which can do little other than still 
further confuse the taxonomy of assisted dying.’180 Such suggestions have resulted in 
an increased focus on the manner in which palliative sedation is used,181 and a need to 
accurately distinguish this practice from euthanasia. Consequently, it is vital that the 
legality of palliative sedation be demonstrated in this jurisdiction. However, any 
dividing line would be viewed as illusory if there is an inadequate legal framework to 
support this distinction.  
 
Further criticism of palliative sedation comes from the slippery slope argument.182 The 
slippery slope argument is based on the fear that palliative sedation would be abused 
and applied broadly.183 It has been noted that palliative care in the hospice ‘focuses on 
symptom control and support rather than cure or life prolongation’;184 a worry of this 
is that medical practitioners may begin to view their work in a fatalistic way. This 
leads to the slippery slope argument that medical practitioners may begin to focus on 
death alone.185 Linked with this argument is the concern that where sedation is readily 
accepted or available it may result in patients or doctors choosing sedation where ‘less 
drastic options are still available.’186 The validity of the slippery slope argument was 
                                                          
179 Gevers (n138) 360; Select Committee on Dying with Dignity (Québec, March 2012) 38 ‘For some 
physicians, continuous palliative sedation is very different from euthanasia. For others, it is simply 
euthanasia in disguise.’ 
180 J Kenyon Mason and Graeme T Laurie, Mason & McCall Smith’s Law & Medical Ethics (9th edn, 
Oxford University Press 2013) 615. 
181 Bert Gordijn and Rien Janssens, ‘Euthanasia and Palliative Care in the Netherlands: An Analysis of 
the Latest Developments’ (2004) 12(3) Health Care Analysis 195, 204 ‘The issue of terminal sedation 
has only recently attracted public attention in the Netherlands, whereas it has been more extensively 
under debate abroad.’ 
182 Eric Lode, ‘Slippery Slope Arguments and Legal Reasoning’ (1999) 87 California Law Review 
1469; Eugene Volokh, ‘The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope’ (2003) 116 Harvard Law Review 1026; 
Stephen W Smith, ‘Evidence for the practical slippery slope in the debate on physician-assisted suicide 
and euthanasia’ (2005) Medical Law Review 17; Stephen W Smith, ‘Fallacies of the logical slippery 
slope in the debate on physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia’ (2005) Medical Law Review 224. 
183 Nathan I Cherny, ‘The use of sedation to relieve cancer patients’ suffering at the end of life: 
addressing critical issues’ (2009) 20 Annals of Oncology 1153, 1154 ‘Abuse of palliative sedation 
occurs when clinicians sedate patients approaching the end of life with the primary goal of hastening 
the patient’s death.’ 
184 J Andrew Billings, ‘What is Palliative Care?’ (1998) 1(1) Journal of Palliative Medicine 73, 73. 
185 Gillian M Craig, ‘On Withholding Nutrition and Hydration in the Terminally Ill: Has Palliative 
Medicine Gone Too Far? (1994) 20(3) Journal of Medical Ethics 139, 139 ‘There is a risk that if all the 
staff in an institution are orientated towards death and dying and non-intervention, treatable illness may 
be overlooked. Not everyone who is referred for terminal care proves to be terminally ill, and no 
physician should accept such a diagnosis without reviewing the evidence personally.’ 
186 Timothy E Quill and others, ‘Last-Resort Options for Palliative Sedation’ (2009) 151(6) Annals of 
Internal Medicine 421, 422. 
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examined in detail by Volokh.187 This article demonstrated how the slippery slope 
argument must also rely on a judicial slippery slope for change to occur. The judiciary 
and the legislature provide valuable safeguards in demarcating the grounds of 
acceptable medical practice. Unfortunately, this also means that the slippery slope 
argument may gain greater traction if the legal framework is shown to be inadequate. 
The legitimacy of the distinction between palliative sedation and euthanasia will be 
drawn out over Chapters Three, Four, Five, and Six as will the existing legal 
framework for specialist palliative care. In any case, uncertainty does not benefit the 
level of care provided and it has been suggested that a lack of clarity on the sedation 
of a patient could be seen as ‘a major cause of under treatment of cancer pain.’188 
However, uncertainty is not limited to palliative sedation. It is important to recognise 
that the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration often accompanies the 
administration of palliative sedation and must be examined.189 
 
Artificial Nutrition and Hydration 
The withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration often accompanies palliative 
sedation but it is necessary to distinguish the two as they are ‘separate decisions 
supported by different legal and ethical principles.’190 Artificial nutrition involves the 
provision of nutrition through non oral methods such as nasogastric tube,191 
percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy tube,192 or the use of total parenteral 
nutrition.193 Artificial hydration refers to: 
 
the administration of fluids to patients who are unable to tolerate oral fluids 
by any of the following routes: intravenous, subcutaneous, nasogastric, 
gastrostomy or jejunostomy. A distinction is generally made between such 
                                                          
187 Volokh (n182).  
188 Anderson Fohr (n167) 319. 
189 Gevers (n138) 360.   
190 ibid 364; RJ Dunlop and others, ‘On withholding nutrition and hydration in the terminally ill: has 
palliative medicine gone too far?: A reply’ (1995) 21 Journal of Medical Ethics 141 cited in GM Craig, 
‘On Withholding Artificial Hydration and Nutrition from Terminally Ill Sedated Patients. The Debate 
Continues’ (1996) 22(3) Journal of Medical Ethics 147; Fleming v Ireland & Ors [2013] IEHC 2 [37]; 
Maltoni (n135) 365 ‘The decision-making processes to start palliative sedation and to stop nutrition and 
hydration are actually two different processes.’ 
191 ‘Nutritional support (artificial feeding)’ (Macmillan Cancer Support, 1 January 2013) 
<http://www.macmillan.org.uk/Cancerinformation/Livingwithandaftercancer/Eatingwell/Nutritionals





‘artificial’ means and ordinary means, as in the use of a cup or spoon to 
administer fluids orally to a patient.194 
 
Reasons given for withdrawing artificial nutrition and hydration include the 
suggestion that its provision would ‘lengthen the dying process’,195 it may be judged 
that the patient ‘has nothing to gain from it’,196 or the patient may have requested that 
artificial nutrition and hydration be stopped. It has been suggested that withdrawing 
hydration may be beneficial as it results in a reduction in coughing, vomiting, and 
interventions such as suctioning.197 However, such positions are to be questioned, 
particularly in light of a 2008 literature review by Good et al.198 and a 2011 literature 
review carried out by Raijmakers et al.199 which are discussed in turn below. 
 
The purpose of the review by Good et al. was to examine the impact of artificial 
hydration on the ‘quality and length of life’200 of patients receiving palliative care. 
This review identified five relevant studies. Three of these studies identified no 
‘significant differences in outcome’201 between patients who had received hydration 
and those who had not. Another study examined by Good et al. ‘found that sedation 
and myoclonus (involuntary contractions of muscles) were improved’202 in the group 
which had artificial hydration withdrawn. The final study showed that ‘some fluid 
retention symptoms were significantly higher in the hydration group’.203 As such, no 
clear position can be identified in relation to the withdrawal of artificial hydration. In 
this regard, the review by Good et al. set out that ‘There are insufficient good quality 
studies to make any recommendations for practice with regard to the use of medically 
assisted hydration in palliative care patients.’204 Furthermore, Good et al. noted that 
one of the main ethical controversies in artificial hydration is ‘whether medically 
                                                          
194 Irish Association of Palliative Care (n34). 
195 Gevers (n138) 361.  
196 ibid.  
197 de Graeff (n126) 76. 
198 Phillip Good and others, ‘Medically Assisted Hydration for Adult Palliative Care Patients’ (2008) 2 
Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews.   
199 NJH Raijmakers and others, ‘Artificial nutrition and hydration in the last week of life in cancer 
patients. A systematic literature review of practices and effects’ (2011) 22 Annals of Oncology 1478. 
200 Good (n198).  
201 ibid 1-2. 
202 ibid 1. 
203 ibid 1.  
204 ibid 2. 
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assisted hydration is a medical intervention or a basic provision of comfort.’205 This 
was among the issues addressed by the Court in Re a Ward of Court.206 
 
A literature review has also been carried out by Raijmakers et al. which focussed on 
the provision of artificial hydration as well as artificial nutrition. Two of the papers in 
this literature review identified positive effects stemming from the provision of 
artificial hydration207 while two recognised negative effects.208 In contrast to this, four 
papers did not identify any effect on ‘terminal delirium, thirst, chronic nausea, and 
fluid overload.’209 This literature review concludes that ‘little is known concerning the 
life-shortening or prolonging effect’210 of artificial nutrition or artificial hydration. In 
effect, the position of existing research is such that it makes it difficult to establish 
appropriate guidelines for practice and makes court decisions on these practices more 
challenging. On this basis, a lack of national guidance on the withdrawal of artificial 
nutrition and hydration combined with the prevalence of local policy would only serve 
to generate inconsistency between the providers of specialist palliative care in this 
jurisdiction. This is an issue which will be examined over the course of this thesis.  
      
Conclusion 
The aim of this Chapter was to introduce the subject of palliative care and highlight 
the issues which will be addressed in the course of this thesis. The expansion in 
palliative care providers, the breadth of illnesses which palliative care treats, and the 
challenges presented by specialist palliative care practices were examined. Several key 
points emerged over the three sections in this Chapter. First, the limited state 
involvement in the development of palliative care was clearly underlined. 
Representative bodies and non-governmental organisations have taken on much of the 
responsibility for developing what is now a recognised medical specialty. This has 
                                                          
205 Good (n198) 2.   
206 Ward of Court (withholding medical treatment) (No 2), Re, [1996] 2 IR 73, [1996] 2 IR 79, [1995] 
2 ILRM 401; Denis A Cusack, ‘Re A Ward of Court: Medical Law and Medical Ethics Diverge, a 
Medico-Legal Analysis’ (1995) 1(2) Medico-Legal Journal of Ireland 43; Kenneth Kearon, ‘Re A Ward 
of Court: Ethical Comment’ (1995) 1(2) Medico-Legal Journal of Ireland 58; John Harrington, 
‘Withdrawal of Treatment from an Incompetent Patient’ (1995) 2(1) Dublin University Law Journal 
120; John Keown, ‘Life and Death in Dublin’ (1996) 55(1) Cambridge Law Journal 6. 
207 Raijmakers (n199) 1478 Positive effects were ‘less chronic nausea, less physical dehydration signs’. 
208 ibid Negative effects were ‘more ascites, more intestinal drainage’.  
209 ibid.   
210 ibid 1485.   
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resulted in the fragmented provision of palliative care and a reliance on local policy to 
provide guidance on complex issues. Second, the value of national guidelines was 
especially clear in the second and third sections of this Chapter. Clear guidelines are 
required to support and protect both the healthcare professional and the patient. Third, 
the legitimacy of the distinction between specialist palliative care practices and 
euthanasia must be examined. This will clarify the legality of specialist palliative care 
practices and will also draw out the strengths and weaknesses in the current legal 
framework. This ensures that the legal framework for specialist palliative care is 
comprehensively examined and that appropriate suggestions for reform can be 
advanced in due course. 
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THE DISTINCTION IN CRIMINAL LAW BETWEEN SPECIALIST 
PALLIATIVE CARE PRACTICES AND EUTHANASIA 
 
Introduction 
The term ‘palliative’ comes from the Latin word ‘pallium’ which means ‘mask’ or 
‘cloak’.1 It was suggested by the Council of Europe that this demonstrates the true role 
of palliative care which is to hide ‘the effects of incurable disease, or providing a cloak 
for those who are left in the cold, because they cannot be helped by curative 
medicine.’2 However, there is another way in which palliative care may serve as a 
cloak. Suggestions have, for example, been made that ‘morphine drips in such cases 
are a form of “slow euthanasia”’3 and that ‘palliative care is an alternative to 
permitting euthanasia on grounds of compassion’.4 These comments suggest that 
specialist palliative care practices are not easily distinguished from euthanasia. The 
confusion over this distinction has the potential to hamper the care offered to patients 
if healthcare professionals do not have a clear legal framework in which to practise. 
The aim of this Chapter is to examine the legitimacy of the distinction between 
specialist palliative care practices and euthanasia. It will be shown that a distinction 
can be made and this will clarify the legality of palliative sedation and the withdrawal 
of artificial nutrition and hydration from the terminally ill patient. As such, this 
Chapter has a significant role in defining the current legal framework and, in 
particular, highlighting areas of ambiguity which need to be addressed. 
   
The legality of specialist palliative care practices will be drawn out over the course of 
three sections. In the first section, the practice of euthanasia in the Netherlands will be 
outlined. An examination of the Dutch system, as it operates in practice, provides 
                                                          
1 JRV Marchant and Joseph F Charles, Cassell’s Latin Dictionary (Latin-English and English-Latin) 
(Cassell and Company 1948) [pallium] 390; William Smith and John Lockwood, Chambers Murray 
Latin-English Dictionary (Chambers 1976) [pallium] 504. 
2 Recommendation Rec(2003)24 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the organisation 
of palliative care, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 12 November 2003 Explanatory 
Memorandum [43]. 
3 J Andrew Billings and Susan D Block, ‘Slow euthanasia’ (1996) 12 Journal of Palliative Care 21; B 
Mount, ‘Morphine drips, terminal sedation, and slow euthanasia: definitions and facts’ (1996) 12 
Journal of Palliative Care 31; H Brody, ‘Commentary on Billings and Blocks “Slow Euthanasia”’ 
(1996) 12 Journal of Palliative Care 38. 
4 James Gilbert, ‘Palliative medicine: a new specialty changes an old debate’ (1996) 52(2) British 
Medical Bulletin 296, 297. 
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greater insight into the practice of voluntary active euthanasia and physician assisted 
suicide than can be achieved from merely setting out the definition of these practices. 
Additionally, addressing the position in the Netherlands at an early point in the 
Chapter allows for the Irish legal framework to subsequently be compared and 
contrasted against the legal framework in the Netherlands for euthanasia. Voluntary 
active euthanasia rather than physician assisted suicide is of most relevance to this 
Chapter due to the similarities this practice shares with palliative sedation. For 
instance, it is the healthcare professional who ultimately administers the drug to the 
patient in both voluntary active euthanasia and palliative sedation. The patient does 
not act to administer or take the drug as would be the case in physician assisted suicide. 
Voluntary active euthanasia can be performed, subject to certain criteria, in 
jurisdictions including Belgium,5 Luxembourg,6 and the Netherlands.7 Of these, the 
Netherlands is the most appropriate jurisdiction to examine for the purposes of this 
thesis. This is due to the legislation on euthanasia and case law in the Netherlands 
which allows for a greater understanding of what the limits of the legislation are, as 
well as demonstrating the motivation behind the introduction of the legislation. The 
combination of legislation and case law provides a more detailed image of this practice 
and is necessary in order to accurately examine the basis of the distinction between 
specialist palliative care practices and euthanasia. 
   
In contrast to the position in the Netherlands, there are no exceptions to the illegality 
of voluntary active euthanasia and assisted suicide in Ireland.8 If a doctor provides 
voluntary active euthanasia in this jurisdiction it is likely to lead to a charge of murder 
or manslaughter. As a result of this, it is necessary to set out the law on homicide and 
assisted suicide in Ireland. This will be addressed in the second section of this Chapter 
and will begin to expose elements of uncertainty in the distinction between specialist 
palliative care practices and euthanasia. The offence of murder and the requisite 
elements which must be established in such a case will be discussed. The role of 
                                                          
5 The Belgian Act on Euthanasia of May, 28th 2002; John Griffiths, Heleen Weyers and Maurice Adams, 
Euthanasia and law in Europe (Hart Publishing 2008) 257.  
6 Legislation Reglementant les Soins Palliatifs ainsi que L’euthanasie et L’assistance au Suicide, 16 
mars 2009 Memorial Journal Officiel du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg 609.  
7 Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act 2001; Griffiths (n5) 
11. 
8 Criminal Law (Suicide) Act 1993, s 2. 
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intention will be given particular attention due to the challenges it poses in the context 
of specialist palliative care and its importance in the doctrine of double effect.  
 
The doctrine of double effect will be examined in the third section of this Chapter. It 
has a substantial role in distinguishing between specialist palliative care practices and 
euthanasia as it provides a justification for practices which begin to blur the lines of 
this distinction. The doctrine of double effect will be examined for its theoretical 
background and its application in case law. Again, this allows for a comprehensive 
approach by examining the legitimacy of the doctrine itself and considering how it is 
being applied and interpreted by the courts.  
 
In Chapter Two it was highlighted that palliative sedation is often accompanied by the 
withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration but they are distinct practices.9 The 
withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration is regularly justified based on slightly 
strained reasoning around the acts and omissions distinction.10 The third section of this 
Chapter will also examine the acts and omissions distinction in order to distinguish 
the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration from euthanasia. In particular, the 
cases of Airedale N.H.S. v Bland11 and Re a Ward of Court12 will be referred to when 
discussing the legality of withdrawing artificial nutrition and hydration. It will be 
highlighted in the third section that there is no single approach to the application of 
the doctrine of double effect or the acts and omissions distinction. The application of 
these justifications will vary based on factors such as the ethical lens through which 
these practices are viewed. The scope for differing interpretations undermines a 
consistent application of double effect and the acts and omissions distinction. 
Consequently, in this Chapter it will be shown that it is not sufficient to justify 
specialist palliative care practices based on double effect or the acts and omissions 
                                                          
9 Text to n187 in Chapter Two.  
10 Airedale N.H.S. v Bland [1993] AC 789, [1993] 2 WLR 350; W Healthcare NHS Trust v KH, [2004] 
WLR 834, patient not in a persistent vegetative state; Frenchay Healthcare NHS Trust v S [1994] 2 All 
ER 403; Swindon and Marlborough NHS Trust v S [1995] 3 Medical Law Review 84; An NHS Trust v 
M [2001] 2 FLR 367; An NHS Trust v H [2001] 2 FLR 501; In re M (Adult Patient) (Minimally 
Conscious State: Withdrawal of Treatment) [2011] EWHC 2443 (Fam), [2012] 1 WLR 1653; W(by her 
litigation friend B) v M(by her litigation friend, the Official Solicitor) and S and A NHS Primary Care 
Trust [2011] EWHC 2443 (Fam); Ward of Court (withholding medical treatment) (No 2), Re, [1996] 2 
IR 73, [1996] 2 IR 79, [1995] 2 ILRM 401.  
11 Airedale N.H.S. v Bland [1993] AC 789, [1993] 2 WLR 350. 




distinction alone. Therefore, a more substantial legal framework is needed to support 
specialist palliative care practices. Overall, the combination of the three sections in 
this Chapter allows for the legality of specialist palliative care practices to be drawn 
out over the course of the Chapter while highlighting issues which need to be 
addressed in subsequent chapters. 
 
Euthanasia in Practice: The Netherlands 
The introduction of legislation for voluntary active euthanasia and physician assisted 
suicide in the Netherlands was motivated by several cases which came before the 
Dutch courts. In 1973, a Dutch doctor was prosecuted for administering a fatal dose 
of morphine to her mother.13 The doctor’s mother was ‘partially paralyzed on one side, 
was incontinent, scarcely able to read any longer, and very hard of hearing’.14 As a 
result of this, the doctor’s mother repeatedly expressed a wish to die. The facts of this 
case suggest it is an example of voluntary active euthanasia. The court held the doctor 
to be guilty of taking the life of a patient by request but the doctor was given a 
suspended sentence of one week in prison.  
 
Subsequent cases such as Schoonheim,15 Chabot,16 and Brongersma17 developed the 
reasoning to a point where a doctor could act in a direct way subject to certain criteria. 
Eventually this reasoning was put on a legislative footing by the Termination of Life 
on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act 2001. This legislation has 
been described as establishing ‘A delicate balance … between statutory law that 
prohibits euthanasia, case law that stipulates conditions for non-prosecution, and 
controlled acceptance in practice.’18 This demonstrates that case law must be referred 
                                                          
13 Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1973, no. 183, District Court of Leeuwarden, 21, February 21, 1973; 
Walter Lagerway (tr), (1988) 3 Issues in Law and Medicine 439. 
14 ibid 441. 
15 Hoge Raad (Supreme Court of the Netherlands), 27 November 1984, NJ 1985, No. 106; Jurriaan De 
Haan, ‘The new Dutch law on euthanasia’ (2002) Medical Law Review 57, 59 ‘Schoonheim was a 
general practitioner who had administered euthanasia to a 95-year-old woman in a very bad medical 
condition on her explicit and repeated request. In the Schoonheim case, the Supreme Court opened up 
the possibility of a successful appeal to the general defence of necessity, i.e. to section 40 of the 
Criminal Code … In particular, Schoonheim may have faced a conflict of duties: on the one hand, the 
duty to obey the law which categorically forbids euthanasia; on the other hand, the duty to relieve 
suffering and to respect his patient's wishes. Where there exists such a dilemma of law and medical 
ethics, it is possibly justified to commit euthanasia.’ 
16 Hoge Raad (Supreme Court of the Netherlands), 21 June 1994, NJ 1994, 656.  
17 Hoge Raad (Supreme Court of the Netherlands), 24 December 2002, NJ 2003, 167. 




to alongside the legislation in order to provide greater detail on the circumstances in 
which euthanasia may be permitted.  
 
The Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act 
2001 amended Article 293 and Article 294 of the Dutch Criminal Code. Article 293 
addressed the practice of voluntary active euthanasia, while Article 294 amended the 
law on physician assisted suicide. Article 293 is of most relevance to this Chapter as 
its focus is on voluntary active euthanasia. Both palliative sedation and voluntary 
active euthanasia are largely doctor led practices and this similarity is central to 
distinguishing euthanasia from palliative sedation. It is the medical practitioner who 
normally administers the sedative drug or administers the drug for euthanasia.19 
Article 293(1) of the Dutch Criminal Code now sets out that ‘Any person who 
terminates another person’s life at that person’s express and earnest request shall be 
liable to a term of imprisonment not exceeding twelve years or a fifth category fine.’20 
On this basis, voluntary active euthanasia is not permitted in the Netherlands. 
However, an exception to this is provided by Article 293(2) of the Dutch Criminal 
Code which stipulates that the act will not be illegal in circumstances where ‘it is 
committed by a physician who fulfils the due care criteria set out in section 2 of the 
Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act’.21 In 
effect, if a doctor complies with Article 293(2) there would be ‘nothing legally 
wrong’22 with their conduct. Similarly, physician assisted suicide is illegal under 
Article 294 of the Dutch Criminal Code except in circumstances where the due care 
criteria have been complied with.23  
 
The due care criteria are set out in section 2 of the Termination of Life on Request and 
Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act 2001 and reflect the case law on euthanasia 
in the Netherlands prior to the introduction of this Act.24 The due care criteria are 
satisfied in cases where the doctor: 
                                                          
19 The nurse has an increasing role in this area as demonstrated by the role of the nurse prescriber in 
this jurisdiction. Text to n173 in Chapter Five. 
20 Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act 2001, Article 293(1). 
21 Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act 2001, Article 293(2). 
22 Jurriaan De Haan, ‘The new Dutch law on euthanasia’ (2002) Medical Law Review 57, 58. 
23 Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act 2001, Article 294(2). 
24 De Haan (n22) 58-59 ‘The new Act on euthanasia is the result of a process of public debate and legal 
change in the Netherlands which has taken place during the last thirty or so years.’; Carter v Canada 
(Attorney General) 2012 BCSC 886, [457] ‘The Dutch Act is in part the codification of a permissive 
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holds the conviction that the request by the patient was voluntary and well-
considered, 
holds the conviction that the patient’s suffering was lasting and unbearable, 
has informed the patient about the situation he was in and about his 
prospects, 
and the patient hold the conviction that there was no other reasonable 
solution for the situation he was in, 
has consulted at least one other, independent physician who has seen the 
patient and has given his written opinion on the requirements of due care, 
has terminated a life or assisted in a suicide with due care.25 
  
All of these criteria must be met in order to comply with the exemption provided by 
Article 293(2) of the Dutch Criminal Code. The most challenging of these criteria may 
be the need to recognise suffering which is ‘lasting and unbearable’. The challenges 
presented by this criterion can be demonstrated in the case law on euthanasia prior to 
and subsequent to the introduction of the Termination of Life on Request and Assisted 
Suicide (Review Procedures) Act 2001.  
 
Defining ‘Lasting and Unbearable Suffering’ 
Examining this criterion outlines the scope and availability of euthanasia in the 
Netherlands and further assists in distinguishing between specialist palliative care 
practices and euthanasia. In this regard, it is to be remembered that the main indication 
for palliative sedation is the presence of a ‘refractory symptom’.26 As such, the 
distinction between ‘lasting and unbearable’ suffering and a ‘refractory symptom’ is 
a significant element in distinguishing specialist palliative care from euthanasia.  
 
                                                          
regime that had developed through a series of judicial decisions and professional guidelines issued over 
the preceding three decades.’  
25 Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act 2001, Article 293(2). 
26 Nathan I Cherny and RK Portenoy ‘Sedation in the management of refractory symptoms: guidelines 
for evaluation and treatment’ (1994) 10 Journal of Palliative Care 31 quoted in Marco Maltoni, 
Emanuela Scarpib and Oriana Nannib, ‘Palliative sedation in end-of-life care’ (2013) 25(4) Current 
Opinion in Oncology 360, 362 ‘The milestone definition of ‘refractory symptom’ is ‘symptom for 
which all possible treatment has failed or it is estimated that no methods are available for palliation 
within the time frame and the risk–benefit ratio that the patient can tolerate’ 
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Article 293(2) of the Dutch Criminal Code requires Dutch physicians to be able to 
identify ‘suffering’ and to recognise when that suffering is ‘lasting’ and ‘unbearable’. 
The due care criteria clearly establishes a number of hurdles which doctors must 
overcome. The term ‘suffering’ is defined in a position paper on euthanasia published 
by the Koninklijke Nederlandsche Maatschappij tot bevordering der Geneeskunst 
(Royal Dutch Medical Association) [hereinafter ‘KNMG’] as ‘the experience of pain 
or distress.’27 This is a very broad definition and underlines the subjective nature of 
deciding what level of pain or distress is ‘unbearable’ and ‘lasting’. In relation to the 
identification of ‘lasting’ suffering, the KNMG position paper suggests that this will 
be significantly influenced by the ‘physician’s professional opinion about the 
treatment and care options still available to the patient’.28 Other concerns which can 
be factored in to a decision include the likely trajectory of the disease,29 whether there 
is ‘loss of function’,30 and the nebulous concept of whether the patient could still ‘lead 
a meaningful life’.31 The KNMG position paper and the corresponding legislation 
clearly provides a broad range of discretion to the physician in identifying ‘lasting’ 
suffering. Furthermore, the lack of a clearly defined timeframe in the legislation or in 
the KNMG position paper suggests that the doctor is to look beyond a timescale and 
consider the cumulative impact of an illness on a person’s life.  
   
The criterion that the suffering be ‘unbearable’ is equally difficult to accurately 
identify. The KNMG position paper sets out that ‘The question of whether suffering 
is unbearable is one that only the patient can answer.’32 Despite this quote emphasising 
the subjective nature of pain,33 it is the doctor who makes the final decision. The doctor 
must be satisfied as to the nature of the suffering as well as its duration. For a majority 
of patients the source of suffering is due to ‘somatic problems and ailments, with 80-
                                                          
27 KNMG, ‘The role of the physician in the voluntary termination of life’ (June 2001) 20; KNMG, ‘The 
role of the physician in the voluntary termination of life’ (June 2001) 13 ‘The purpose of this 
memorandum is to present the KNMG’s current standpoint on the role, responsibilities, possibilities 
and limitations that physicians have with regard to the issue of the voluntary termination of life.’ 
28 ibid 20. 
29 ibid ‘Is it likely that the patient’s condition will improve to a satisfactory degree? Or is it more likely 




33 ibid ‘Suffering is an expression of the whole being and is influenced by personal experiences and 
conceptions and by cultural values and standards.’ 
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90% of notified cases concerning malignancies.’34 However, this demonstrates that 
lasting and unbearable suffering may also have a non-somatic origin.35 The manner in 
which non-somatic suffering such as existential distress is treated is particularly 
challenging. This point was highlighted in Chapter Two in the context of palliative 
sedation36 but it has also posed challenges for the Dutch Criminal Code.  
 
The issue of non-somatic suffering arose in the Dutch cases of Chabot and 
Brongersma. The case of Office of Public Prosecutions v Chabot provided a degree of 
clarity about the type of suffering for which physician assisted suicide could be 
provided in the Netherlands.37 It is important to note that this case arose prior to the 
introduction of the Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review 
Procedures) Act 2001. However, this type of case influenced the drafting of the 2001 
Act.  
 
In Chabot, a psychiatrist assisted in the death of a 50 year old woman who was named 
as Mrs. B. Dr. Chabot had several meetings with Mrs. B which lasted 24 hours in all,38 
and also spoke with Mrs. B’s sister and brother-in-law. On a number of occasions, Dr. 
Chabot discussed the case with several consultants and provided them with a detailed 
account of the situation so as to encourage ‘suggestions concerning matters which he 
might have overlooked in the psychiatric investigation of Mrs B’.39 Dr. Chabot was of 
the opinion that Mrs. B was ‘experiencing intense, long-term psychic suffering that, 
for her, was unbearable and without prospect of improvement.’40 This again 
demonstrates the importance placed on the subjective experience of pain. Moreover, 
Dr. Chabot believed that the woman’s ‘request for assistance with suicide was well-
                                                          
34 ibid 21; Harvey Marcovitch (ed), Black’s Medical Dictionary (41st edn, A & C Black Publishers 
2005) 656. Defines somatic as ‘(1) A term describing tissues of the body that do not form any part of 
the reproductive process. (2) It is also used to refer to the body rather than the mind.’  
35 Marilyn Lewis Lanza, ‘Nurses as patient assault victims: An update, synthesis, and 
recommendations’ (1992) 6(3) Archives of Psychiatric Nursing 163 cited by Ian Needham and others, 
‘Non-somatic effects of patient aggression on nurses: a systematic review’ (2005) 49(3) Journal of 
Advanced Nursing 283, 284. Non-somatic effects were identified as ‘bio-physiological, emotional, 
cognitive, and social reactions.’ 
36 Text to n148 in Chapter Two. 
37 Hoge Raad (Supreme Court of the Netherlands), 21 June 1994, NJ 1994, 656. 
38 John Griffiths, ‘Assisted Suicide in the Netherlands: The Chabot Case’ (1995) 58(2) The Modern 
Law Review 232, 234. 
39 ibid. 
40 ibid 235. 
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considered … and showed that she understood her situation and the consequences of 
her decision.’41  
 
Dr. Chabot concluded that the only solution was a course of treatment which would 
bring about the death of the patient. Dr. Chabot was prosecuted and acquitted in the 
first instance and on appeal. The case came before the Supreme Court which ‘refused 
to distinguish between psychological and physical suffering, as proposed by the 
prosecution.’42 In effect, the Court interpreted the experience of pain and suffering in 
a broad manner. For example, the case demonstrated that the identification of suffering 
can be ‘abstracted from its cause.’43 However, adopting this line of reasoning in the 
provision of palliative sedation would have troublesome consequences for the 
legitimacy of the distinction between specialist palliative care and euthanasia. It was 
recognised in Chapter Two that the administration of sedation for existential distress 
and restlessness alone is controversial44 as it would be treating psychological distress 
rather than physical pain experienced by the patient. Furthermore, existential suffering 
may occur when a patient is not imminently dying. The provision of palliative sedation 
in such an instance would be outside the standard criteria for refractory symptoms and 
would therefore blur the distinction between specialist palliative care practices and 
euthanasia. Consequently, there exists the potential for confusing specialist palliative 
care and euthanasia if healthcare professionals do not have an appropriate legal 
framework in this respect. In short, ambiguity on this subject undermines clarity and 
consistency in specialist palliative care.  
  
The limits of physician assisted suicide in the Netherlands were again tested in the 
case of Brongersma.45 In contrast to Chabot, the case of Brongersma was heard during 
                                                          
41 ibid. 
42 Ubaldus De Vries, ‘Can a Legal Right to Euthanasia Exist? A Dutch Perspective on a Universal 
Medico-Ethical Dilemma’ (2003) 9(1) Medico-Legal Journal of Ireland 24, 25. 
43 ibid 26. 
44 Nathan I Cherny, ‘Sedation in response to refractory existential distress: Walking the fine line’ (1998) 
16 Journal of Pain Symptom Management 404; Tatsuya Morita and others, ‘Terminal sedation for 
existential distress’ (2000) 17 American Journal of Hospice Palliative Care 189; Paul C Rousseau, 
‘Existential suffering and palliative sedation: A brief commentary with a proposal for clinical 
guidelines’ (2001) 18 American Journal of Hospice Palliative Care 151; Tatsuya Morita, ‘Palliative 
sedation to relieve psycho-existential suffering of terminally ill cancer patients’ (2004) 28 Journal of 
Pain Symptom Management 445; Brigit R Taylor and Robert M McCann, ‘Controlled sedation for 
physical and existential suffering?’ (2005) 8(1) Journal of Palliative Medicine 144. 
45 Hoge Raad (Supreme Court of the Netherlands), 24 December 2002, NJ 2003, 167. Mr. Brongersma 
was a former lawyer and Senator in the Netherlands; Griffiths (n6) 35.  
70 
 
and after the introduction of the Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide 
(Review Procedures) Act 2001.46 Mr. Brongersma suffered from his physical 
deterioration and a feeling of senselessness in his existence. He was seen by a 
psychiatrist who concluded that the patient did not suffer from any psychiatric illness 
that would explain his desire to die. However, the sincerity of Mr Brongersma’s desire 
to die was confirmed by another doctor. In April 1998 Mr. Brongersma committed 
suicide with the assistance of his doctor, Philip Sutorius.  
 
The key issue in the case of Brongersma was the legality of assisted suicide for 
existential suffering. The District Court accepted the opinion that Mr. Brongersma’s 
suffering was unbearable and hopeless. This led to the acquittal of Dr. Sutorius. 
However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the District Court and Dr. 
Sutorius was convicted for ‘purposefully aiding another person to commit suicide and 
providing him with the means to do so, resulting in the suicide’.47 On appeal, the 
Supreme Court followed this ruling but did not impose any penalty on the doctor for 
his involvement. The approach taken by the Supreme Court demonstrated that the 
suffering of a patient ‘should have its principal basis in one or more medically 
classifiable somatic or psychological illnesses or conditions.’48 This suggests that 
euthanasia is legal in the Netherlands provided that the non-somatic condition is 
‘medically classifiable’.49 The result of this is that many patients may come within the 
due-care criteria for euthanasia based on how their mental suffering is classified. This 
has also been reflected in a broader interpretation by doctors as to what constitutes 
‘lasting and unbearable suffering’.  
 
The KNMG position paper suggests that a ‘less restrictive’50 approach began after the 
ruling in Brongersma. In this position paper it is also suggested that issues such as 
‘loss of function, loneliness and loss of autonomy’51 may form part of the discussion 
in considering a request for physician assisted suicide. This would be another 
                                                          
46 Stuart J Youngner and Gerrit K Kimsma, Physician-Assisted Death in Perspective: Assessing the 
Dutch Experience (Cambridge University Press 2012) 59 ‘The first trial took place in October 2000, on 
the same day as initial parliamentary deliberation on the government’s bill.’ 
47 Koninklijke Nederlandsche Maatschappij tot bevordering der Geneeskunst, ‘The role of the physician 
in the voluntary termination of life’ (June 2001) 10. 
48 ibid. 
49 ibid. 
50 ibid 26. 
51 ibid 40. 
71 
 
significant expansion in terms of access to physician assisted suicide but remains to 
be confirmed by the courts. Regardless of any future expansion, it is evident from the 
cases of Chabot and Brongersma that the treatment of mental suffering is a complex 
issue which is not easily addressed by the healthcare professional. These cases 
underline the need for a clear legal framework in Ireland which addresses the issue of 
sedation for patients experiencing non-somatic suffering such as existential distress.52 
This would provide clarity on the identification of a ‘refractory symptom’ and give 
healthcare professionals a coherent and consistent decision-making framework in 
which to provide specialist palliative care. The existence of gaps in the legal 
framework on this issue results in a lack of clarity and uncertainty around specialist 
palliative care practices and adds further weight to claims that these practices are a 
form of ‘slow euthanasia’.53 In order to avoid this perception around specialist 
palliative care it is essential that an appropriate legal framework is in place.  
 
Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide in Ireland: Law and Practice 
In Ireland, the Criminal Law (Suicide) Act 1993 removed the offence of suicide but 
made it illegal to assist in the suicide of another.54 Nonetheless, the illegality of 
euthanasia and assisted suicide in Ireland does not prevent suggestions that specialist 
palliative care practices resemble euthanasia.55 This section will examine the effect of 
the Criminal Law (Suicide) Act 1993 and case law on euthanasia and the right to life. 
The aim of this is to identify areas of the legal framework where specialist palliative 
care tends to blur the distinction with assisted suicide and euthanasia, and raises legally 
and ethically complex issues for healthcare professionals. These are the issues which 
should be addressed by an appropriate legal framework for specialist palliative care.  
 
                                                          
52 In Chapter Five it will be shown that the sedation of terminally ill patients experiencing existential 
distress has not been addressed adequately by professional standards or guidelines in Ireland. 
53 Andrew Billings (n3) 21; Mount (n3); Brody (n3). 
54 Criminal Law (Suicide) Act 1993 s2. 
(1) Suicide shall cease to be a crime. 
(2) A person who aids, abets, counsels or procures the suicide of another, or an attempt by another to 
commit suicide, shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction on indictment to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years. 
(3) If, on the trial of an indictment for murder, murder to which s. 3 of the Criminal Justice Act 1999 
applies or manslaughter, it is proved that the person charged aided, abetted, counselled or procured the 
suicide of the person alleged to have been killed, he may be found guilty of an offence under this section. 
(4) No proceedings shall be instituted for an offence under this section except by or with the consent of 
the Director of Public Prosecutions. 
55 Andrew Billings (n3) 21; Mount (n3); Brody (n3). 
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This section will first examine the manner in which the courts in Ireland have 
interpreted the right to life and the Criminal Law (Suicide) Act 1993. The cases of Re 
a Ward of Court56 and Fleming v Ireland & Ors57 will be discussed in this section. 
These cases demonstrate the legal limits of medical practice and, in certain respects, 
highlight the legal challenges posed by specialist palliative care. As noted earlier in 
this Chapter, euthanasia, if provided in this jurisdiction, is likely to result in a charge 
of murder or manslaughter. On this basis, the second part of this section will examine 
the requisite elements which must be established in such a case. Among the requisite 
elements to be established for a charge of murder is that of intention. The element of 
intention is of considerable significance in drawing out the distinction between 
specialist palliative care and euthanasia due to the central role of the medical 
practitioner in euthanasia and in providing palliative sedation. The main Irish cases 
which have discussed the meaning of intention will be discussed in order to provide 
greater elucidation on what is meant by intention in Irish criminal law. In effect, this 
section serves to define a significant proportion of the legal framework in Ireland for 
specialist palliative care as well as highlighting aspects of the framework which need 
greater clarity for the healthcare professional and patient. 
   
Legal Status of Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide in Ireland  
The fundamental nature of human rights in the Irish Constitution means that they 
should be a central element in end-of-life care. For instance, the manner in which the 
right to life has been interpreted is especially relevant to the distinction between 
specialist palliative care and euthanasia as it also raises questions about the existence 
of a right to die. The right to life is protected by Article 40.3.2° of Bunreacht na 
hÉireann which sets out that ‘The State shall, in particular, by its laws protect as best 
it may from unjust attack and, in the case of injustice done, vindicate the life, person, 
good name, and property rights of every citizen.’58 The constitutional right to life has 
                                                          
56 Ward of Court (withholding medical treatment) (No 2), Re, [1996] 2 IR 73, [1996] 2 IR 79, [1995] 2 
ILRM 401. 
57 Fleming v Ireland & Ors [2013] IEHC 2, [2013] IESC 19. 
58 Bunreacht na hÉireann, Article 40.3.2˚. 
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been examined in cases such as McGee v Attorney General,59 G v An Bord Uchtála,60 
Re a Ward of Court, and Fleming v Ireland & Ors. The two latter cases are of most 
relevance in the context of specialist palliative care due to the focus on the withdrawal 
of artificial nutrition and hydration displayed in Re a Ward of Court, and assisted 
suicide in Fleming v Ireland & Ors.  
 
The person at the centre of Re a Ward of Court was a middle aged woman who was in 
a near persistent vegetative state rather than a persistent vegetative state. This 
distinction was drawn on the basis that the woman never got used to the nasogastric 
tube through which she received artificial nutrition and hydration, as demonstrated by 
the fact that she pulled out this tube ‘over a thousand times’.61 This could not be 
attributed to a purely reflex action but may have been indicative of some cognitive 
function. In the first five to six months after the incident there were minimal signs of 
recovery but these did not continue and there was no prospect of recovery. The woman 
had been made a ward of court and an application was made by the family for the 
withdrawal of life support. The life support at the time consisted of medication as well 
as artificial nutrition and hydration. Initially, Lynch J in the High Court held that 
artificial nutrition and hydration could be withdrawn from the ward. This decision was 
appealed to the Supreme Court which upheld the High Court’s decision by a 4:1 
majority. It is to be noted that the Supreme Court did not order the withdrawal of 
treatment but permitted the medical practitioners to do so. In other words, the Supreme 
Court’s decision was permissive rather than mandatory.  
 
In Re a Ward of Court, one of the issues before the Court was whether a right to die 
existed in Ireland as a corollary of the constitutionally protected right to life. In 
considering the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration, Hamilton CJ and 
                                                          
59 McGee v Attorney General [1973] IESC 2, [1974] IR 284; Gerard Hogan and Gerry Whyte, Kelly: 
The Irish Constitution (4th edn, Butterworths 2003) 1395 ‘In McGee v Attorney General the 
constitutional right to life began for the first time to develop a profile independent of this, when Walsh 
J derived from it the right of a woman, whose condition of health made pregnancy hazardous for her, 
not to have her life put at risk in consequence of the laws of the State’ 
60 G v An Bord Uchtála [1980] IR 32; Hogan (n59) 1396 ‘[A child] has the right to life itself and the 
right to be guarded against all threats directed to its existence whether before or after birth … The right 
to life necessarily implies the right to be born, the right to preserve and defend, and to have preserved 
and defended, that life, and the right to maintain that life at a proper human standard in matters of food, 
clothing and habitation.’ 
61 Ward of Court (withholding medical treatment) (No 2), Re, [1996] 2 IR 79, 96.   
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Denham J based part of their reasoning on their interpretation of the right to life.62 
Hamilton CJ expanded on the reasoning of Walsh J in G v An Bord Uchtála to the 
point where he states: 
 
As the process of dying is part, and an ultimate, inevitable consequence, of 
life, the right to life necessarily implies the right to have nature take its 
course and to die a natural death and, unless the individual concerned so 
wishes, not to have life artificially maintained by the provision of 
nourishment by abnormal artificial means, which have no curative effect 
and which is intended merely to prolong life.63 
 
The use of the term ‘prolong’ instead of ‘sustain’ suggests that there is no prospect of 
recovery for a patient in such a condition and that if the medical technology did not 
exist then the patient would have died.64 This underlines the reference made by 
Hamilton CJ to the ‘right to have nature take its course’,65 ‘die a natural death’,66 and 
‘not to have life artificially maintained’.67 This reasoning would be particularly 
relevant for specialist palliative care where the patient is terminally rather than 
chronically ill as the patient would be close to death, thereby allowing nature to take 
its course. In following this line of reasoning, the right to life does not provide for ‘the 
right to have life terminated or death accelerated and is confined to the natural process 
of dying.’68  
 
Denham J also referred to the right to life in Re a Ward of Court and set out that: 
 
In respecting a person’s death we are also respecting their life - giving to 
it sanctity. That concept of sanctity is an inclusive view which recognises 
                                                          
62 Hogan (n59) 1398. 
63 Ward of Court (withholding medical treatment) (No 2), Re, [1996] 2 IR 79, 124.  
64 Ward of Court (withholding medical treatment) (No 2), Re, [1996] 2 IR 79, 131 O’Flaherty J ‘the 
advance of medical science may result in rendering a patient a prisoner in a ward from which there may 
be no release for many years without any enjoyment or quality of life: indeed without life in any 
acceptable meaning of that concept except in the sense that by means of various mechanisms life is kept 
in the body.’; Recommendation Rec(1976) 779 on the rights of the sick and dying, adopted by the 
Assembly on 29 January 1976 [6] ‘the prolongation of life should not in itself constitute the exclusive 
aim of medical practice, which must be concerned equally with the relief of suffering’. 
65 Ward of Court (withholding medical treatment) (No 2), Re, [1996] 2 IR 79, 124. 
66 Ward of Court (withholding medical treatment) (No 2), Re, [1996] 2 IR 79, 124. 
67 Ward of Court (withholding medical treatment) (No 2), Re, [1996] 2 IR 79, 124. 
68 Ward of Court (withholding medical treatment) (No 2), Re, [1996] 2 IR 79, 124. 
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that in our society persons, whether members of a religion or not, all under 
the Constitution are protected by respect for human life. A view that life 
must be preserved at all costs does not sanctify life.69      
 
The reference to the sanctity of life in this quote complicates the interpretation of the 
right to life as well as rights such as the right of autonomy.70 It was highlighted by 
Hogan and Whyte that different formulations of the sanctity of life could impact on 
the permissibility of euthanasia or the refusal of treatment for terminally ill patients. 
These are points which could have been clarified in Re a Ward of Court through more 
comprehensive discussion on the sanctity of life and the right to life. For instance, 
Hogan and White wrote that: 
 
this important philosophical debate is ignored in the majority judgments 
and no judge makes explicit his or her understanding of the principle of the 
sanctity of life in this context. Until this is clarified, the precise extent of 
the right to die and of society’s power to authorise a course of action 
leading to death will remain unclear.71  
 
This demonstrates certain shortcomings in the judgment of the Court. Additionally, 
the woman in this case was not in a full persistent vegetative state and ‘the majority 
judgments offer no useful assistance in determining at what point along the scale of 
consciousness this ruling ceases to apply.’72 As such, the woman was not terminally 
ill and this decision can therefore be interpreted as including people who are 
chronically ill.73 The nature of the right to life was discussed further in the case of 
Fleming v Ireland & Ors.   
 
The Criminal Law (Suicide) Act 1993 was central in the case of Fleming v Ireland & 
Ors. In this case, the plaintiff sought an order that section 2(2) of the Criminal Law 
(Suicide) Act 1993 is ‘invalid having regard to the provisions of the Constitution of 
                                                          
69 Ward of Court (withholding medical treatment) (No 2), Re, [1996] 2 IR 79, 161. 
70 Hogan (n59) 1400-1401 ‘[t]here are different philosophical understandings of the sanctity of life, 
resulting in different conclusions as to the extent of personal autonomy.’ 
71 Ibid; Helga Kuhse, The Sanctity-of-Life Doctrine in Medicine: A Critique (Oxford University Press 
1987) Kuhse argues in favour of adopting an approach based on the quality of life rather than the 
sanctity of life.; Helga Kuhse (ed), Unsanctifying Human Life: essays on ethics (Blackwell Publishers 
2002); John Keown, The Law and Ethics of Medicine (Oxford University Press 2012). 




Ireland’,74 and ‘is incompatible with the rights of the plaintiff pursuant to the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’.75 As an alternative, the 
plaintiff sought the introduction of guidelines which would set out the factors to be 
considered in deciding ‘whether to prosecute or to consent to the prosecution of any 
particular person in circumstances such as those that will affect a person who assists 
the plaintiff in ending her life.’76 The first and second claims are largely based on the 
interpretation of human rights.  
 
Assisted suicide is illegal in Ireland. Section 2(2) of the Criminal Law (Suicide) Act 
1993 provides that is an offence to aid, abet, counsel or procure the suicide of another 
individual, or an attempt by another individual to commit suicide. A person found 
guilty of this offence will face a maximum prison sentence of fourteen years. 
Nevertheless, it will be outlined later in this Chapter that a competent adult has the 
right to refuse medical treatment which would result in their death or even request that 
medical treatment keeping them alive be withdrawn. However, as will be 
demonstrated, this does not amount to a right to die by artificial means or a right to die 
with the assistance of a third party such as a healthcare professional.      
 
The plaintiff in Fleming v Ireland & Ors was a 59 year old woman who was diagnosed 
with multiple sclerosis in 1989. As a result of her illness she stopped working in 1995. 
At the time of bringing the claims the plaintiff was ‘unable to walk or to use her lower 
or upper limbs.’77 She was ‘confined to a wheelchair’,78 had ‘no bladder control’,79 
and was ‘almost physically helpless and requires assistance with all aspects of her 
daily living.’80 The illness made communication increasingly difficult, and resulted in 
choking episodes.  
 
The three-judge divisional High Court held that section 2(2) of the Criminal Law 
(Suicide) Act 1993 did not amount to a disproportionate interference with the 
plaintiff’s right of autonomy. The Court recognised a distinction between the refusal 
                                                          
74 Fleming v Ireland & Ors [2013] IESC 19, [3]. 
75 Fleming v Ireland & Ors [2013] IESC 19, [3]. 
76 Fleming v Ireland & Ors [2013] IESC 19, [3]. 
77 Fleming v Ireland & Ors [2013] IESC 19, [12]. 
78 Fleming v Ireland & Ors [2013] IESC 19, [12]. 
79 Fleming v Ireland & Ors [2013] IESC 19, [12]. 
80 Fleming v Ireland & Ors [2013] IESC 19, [12]. 
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of medical treatment which might lead to death and the taking of active steps by 
another party to bring about a person’s death. For example, ‘the Court believes there 
is a real and defining difference between a competent adult patient making the decision 
not to continue medical treatment … and the taking of active steps by another to bring 
about the end of that life of the other.’81 The Court was influenced by the possibility 
that allowing for assisted suicide could negatively impact on vulnerable members of 
society who might feel that they should avail of this practice so as not to be a burden 
to their family.82 Nonetheless, vulnerable patients could also potentially refuse 
medical treatment which would result in their death. This underlines the importance 
of the legal framework in place for specialist palliative care practices such as the 
withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration.  
  
Research by Ganzini et al. was cited by the Court in support of their position.83 This 
research suggested that ‘depression is missed or overlooked’84 in some cases of 
assisted suicide. The Court’s concern about assisted suicide in circumstances where a 
patient may be depressed highlights the importance of safeguards in this area for 
palliative sedation also. In Chapter Two and earlier in this Chapter, it was highlighted 
that palliative sedation for non-somatic suffering such as existential distress is a 
controversial practice and further blurs the distinction between specialist palliative 
care and euthanasia. This illustrates the importance of a clear legal framework in 
Ireland for specialist palliative care practices which would protect patients who are at 
a vulnerable point in their lives.   
  
In addition to rejecting the constitutional claim, the High Court also rejected the claim 
under the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court referred to the cases of 
R(Pretty) v Director of Public Prosecutions85 and Haas v Switzerland86 which 
                                                          
81 Fleming v Ireland & Ors [2013] IEHC 2, [53] (emphasis in original). 
82 Fleming v Ireland & Ors [2013] IEHC 2, [76]. 
83 Fleming v Ireland & Ors [2013] IEHC 2, [63]; Linda Ganzini, Elizabeth R Goy and Steven K 
Dobscha, ‘Prevalence of depression and anxiety in patients requesting physicians’ aid in dying: cross 
sectional survey’ (2008) 337 British Medical Journal 973.   
84 Ganzini (n83) 974. 
85 R(Pretty) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2001] UKHL 61, [2002] 1 AC 800. 
86 Haas v Switzerland (2011) 53 EHRR 33; Fleming v Ireland & Ors [2013] IEHC 2, [116] The High 
Court noted that in Haas v Switzerland ‘the applicant was a Swiss national who suffered from bi-polar 
disorder and who wished to commit suicide. For this purpose he sought sufficient quantities of a 
powerful barbiturate which he proposed to self-administer. This drug is only available on prescription 
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demonstrated that the State has considerable discretion in addressing issues such as 
assisted suicide due to Article 8(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights.87 
Consequently, the breadth of this discretion meant that there was no incompatibility 
between the human rights of the plaintiff and section 2(2) of the Criminal Law 
(Suicide) Act 1993. 
 
The final aspect of the High Court judgment to consider relates to the plaintiff seeking 
guidelines to be introduced which would set out the factors to be considered in 
deciding whether a person would be prosecuted for assisting in another person’s 
suicide. In response to this, the Court noted that the Prosecution of Offences Act 1974 
does not provide for this type of guideline to be developed. In this respect, it is only 
the Oireachtas that can alter the law on assisted suicide. However, the Court noted that 
the Director of Public Prosecutions could exercise discretion if there is compliance 
with specified factors which would be given to the Director ex post facto the event.88 
This approach means that a person who assists in the suicide of another person would 
not know if they would be charged by the Director of Public Prosecutions until after 
the event. This reflects a point which will be made later in this Chapter in the context 
of double effect and the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration that it is not 
sufficient to be guided by justifications which are of relevance after the fact. Instead, 
clear guidelines must be in place at an earlier stage which guide medical practice and 
can consistently promote the principles of autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, 
and justice. The plaintiff subsequently appealed the decision of the High Court.         
 
The Supreme Court in Fleming v Ireland & Ors held that there ‘is no explicit right to 
commit suicide, or to determine the time of one’s death, in the Constitution.’89 The 
appellant based her case on ‘the express right to life in Article 40.3.2.’90 Denham CJ 
referred to the case of Re a Ward of Court and stated that: 
  
                                                          
and the Swiss public health authorities refused to permit the applicant to acquire this drug without 
prescription.’ 
87 Fleming v Ireland & Ors [2013] IEHC 2, [119] ‘It will be seen, therefore, that the European Court of 
Human Rights has consistently taken the view that a ban on assisted suicide will always be justifiable 
by reference to Article 8(2) ECHR inasmuch as Contracting States are entitled to think that such is 
necessary to prevent abuse and the exploitation of the vulnerable.’ 
88 Fleming v Ireland & Ors [2013] IEHC 2, [157]. 
89 Fleming v Ireland & Ors [2013] IEHC 2, [99].  
90 Fleming v Ireland & Ors [2013] IEHC 2, [104]. 
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While the words of Hamilton C.J. stating positively that no person has a 
right to have his or her life terminated were strictly obiter, they are a 
persuasive authority on the analysis of a right to life under the 
Constitution.91 
 
This made it clear that the right to life does not currently allow for active steps to be 
taken which would result in the death of the patient. However, the Court questioned 
the extent of the obligation on the State to protect life. The Court in Fleming noted 
that:  
 
The precise extent of the State's obligation in any given circumstance is, 
however, a matter which may require careful analysis and, at least in some 
cases, require a careful balancing of other constitutional considerations.92 
 
These constitutional considerations include rights such as the right to bodily integrity93 
and the right to autonomy.94 The Court was clear in stating that the State had an 
‘obligation to vindicate the right to life’95 but also suggested that it was open to the 
Oireachtas to legislate to allow assisted suicide with appropriate safeguards.96 
Therefore, it was recognised by the Court that if the Oireachtas did enact such 
legislation then it would need to be drafted in a manner which did not breach the 
obligation on the State to protect the right to life.97 As such, the Oireachtas would have 
to engage in a difficult balancing of human rights and interests.  
 
The approach taken by the Court could be interpreted as suggesting that there are 
certain cases where a person’s life need not be sustained. In such circumstances, the 
act or omission leading to the person’s death would not be criminally liable and would 
therefore not constitute assisted suicide. These points will be explored in more detail 
later in this Chapter and will again refer to Re a Ward of Court and Fleming v Ireland 
& Ors.98 Nonetheless, the cases of Re a Ward of Court and Fleming v Ireland & Ors 
                                                          
91 Fleming v Ireland & Ors [2013] IEHC 2, [105]. 
92 Fleming v Ireland & Ors [2013] IEHC 2, [106]. 
93 See p117. 
94 See p137. 
95 Fleming v Ireland & Ors [2013] IESC 19, [107]. 
96 Fleming v Ireland & Ors [2013] IESC 19, [108]. 
97 Fleming v Ireland & Ors [2013] IESC 19, [108].  
98 See p100 and p95. 
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illustrate the emphasis placed on the protection of the right to life. As the law stands, 
the provision of euthanasia in this jurisdiction is likely to lead to a charge of murder. 
This is a distinct offence to assisted suicide and carries a much harsher custodial 
sentence. It was set out earlier in this Chapter that a person found guilty of assisted 
suicide would face a maximum prison sentence of fourteen years. Whereas, a person 
found guilty of murder faces a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment as set out s.2 
of the Criminal Justice Act 1990. Given the severity of this crime, the manner in which 
specialist palliative care practices are distinguished from euthanasia in criminal law 
must be discussed. However, the lack of case law on specialist palliative care practices 
means that it is necessary to extrapolate from case law more generally and this is the 
approach which will be taken in the next section.   
 
Murder: The Role of Intention  
The offence of murder is made up of three elements which are the actus reus, mens 
rea and the lack of a valid defence.99 The actus reus refers to ‘what the defendant must 
be proved to have done (or sometimes failed to do), in what circumstances, and with 
what consequences.’100 Therefore, the actus reus may be performed by an action or an 
omission.101 The circumstances in which an omission may satisfy the actus reus 
requirement will be set out in the third section of this Chapter.  
 
The mens rea is the ‘mental element of a crime.’102 The mental element for murder in 
Ireland is set out by section 4 of the Criminal Justice Act 1964.103 This section provides 
that:  
  
                                                          
99 David Lanham, ‘Larsonneur Revisited’ (1976) Criminal Law Review 276, 276 ‘made up of three 
ingredients, actus reus, mens rea and (a negative element) absence of a valid defence’; Liz Campbell, 
Shane Kilcommins and Catherine O’Sullivan, Criminal Law in Ireland: Cases and Commentary 
(Clarus Press 2010) 80 ‘The actus reus and the mens rea may be described as the “building blocks” of 
crime, in other words these elements must be proven for an act to be legally deemed a crime. Without 
the actus reus and mens rea, there is no crime and thus no criminal liability.’ 
100 Jonathan Herring, Criminal Law: Texts, Cases, and Materials (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 
2012) 85. 
101 Conor Hanly, An Introduction to Irish Criminal Law (2nd edn, Gill and Macmillan 2006) 48 ‘The 
actus reus is the action necessary for the crime to have been committed. It is often described as the 
physical element of the crime.’; Gerard Coffey, Criminal Law (Round Hall 2010) 36 ‘The actus reus is 
sometimes referred to as the external, physical or action element of criminal offences.’ 
102 Campbell (n99) 120; Hanly (n101) 73 ‘Mens rea is the mental element of the offence.’; Herring 
(n100) 85 ‘Mens rea: the mental element of the offence.’: Herring (n100) 146 ‘Mens rea is the legal 
term used to describe the element of the criminal offence that relates to the defendant’s mental state.’ 
103 Criminal Justice Act 1964. 
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(1) Where a person kills another unlawfully the killing shall not be murder 
unless the accused person intended to kill, or cause serious injury to, some 
person, whether the person actually killed or not.  
(2) The accused person shall be presumed to have intended the natural and 
probable consequences of his conduct; but this presumption may be 
rebutted.104  
 
Section 4(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 1964 establishes that the determination of 
intention is subjective.105 This is notable given that, in the context of specialist 
palliative care, it will be difficult to state with certainty what the exact intention of the 
healthcare professional was in administering the sedative drug.106 
  
Guidance on the meaning of ‘intention’ in the Criminal Justice Act 1964 can be found 
in the case of People v Murray.107 This was the first Irish case to examine the meaning 
of ‘intention’.108 Walsh J in the Supreme Court decision of People v Murray noted that 
‘To intend to murder, or to cause serious injury … is to have in mind a fixed purpose 
to reach that desired objective.’109 This means that for there to be intention there must 
be foresight as well as willing ‘the possible consequences of his conduct.’110 In his 
judgment, Walsh J also distinguished the elements of intention, foresight of 
consequences and recklessness. For example, Walsh J noted that ‘foresight of probable 
consequences must be distinguished from recklessness which imports a disregard of 
                                                          
104 Criminal Justice Act 1964, s 4. 
105 Law Reform Commission, Report on Homicide: Murder and Involuntary Manslaughter (LRC 87 – 
2008) 25. 
106 Timothy E Quill, ‘The Ambiguity of Clinical Intentions’ (1993) 329(14) The New England Journal 
of Medicine 1039; Timothy E Quill, ‘Death and dignity – a case of individualized decision making’ 
(1991) 324 New England Journal of Medicine 691. 
107 The People (DPP) v Murray [1977] IR 360. The background to People v. Murray involved an off-
duty Garda in plain clothes who pursued a number of people who had robbed a bank. The Garda gave 
chase to their car and subsequently chased them on foot. The Garda grabbed one of the bank robbers, 
Noel Murray, by the shoulders. Noel Murray’s wife was also one of the bank robbers. She shouted at 
the Garda to let go of her husband and when the Garda did not comply she shot and killed him. Husband 
and wife were found guilty of capital murder as well as a number of other charges and were sentenced 
to death. Capital murder included the murder of a member of the Garda Síochána while they were acting 
in the course of their duty. The decision was appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal with a further 
appeal to the Supreme Court on the basis that the decision related to a point of law of considerable 
public importance. The issue being that when Marie Murray shot the Garda she was not aware that he 
was a Garda and was acting in the course of his duty as a Garda. Consequently, the argument was that 
she could not have had the mens rea for capital murder.   
108 Criminal Justice Act 1964, s 4. 
109 The People (DPP) v Murray [1977] IR 360, 386. 
110 The People (DPP) v Murray [1977] IR 360, 386. 
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possible consequences.’111 The cumulative effect of this finding is to demonstrate that 
the mens rea for murder ‘is limited to a specific intention to either kill or cause really 
serious injury.’112 In a Law Reform Commission report on homicide it was noted that 
the Supreme Court in People v Murray appeared ‘to understand intention in this 
context as a “purpose” to kill or “willingness” to kill. It does not appear that foresight 
that one’s action will probably kill is the same as intention.’113 This point is central to 
the distinction between sedative drugs given for the purpose of treating a patient’s pain 
as opposed to the administration of sedative drugs with the intention of hastening the 
death of a patient. Nevertheless, in certain circumstances the healthcare professional 
may foresee the potential for hastening the patient’s death but act with the intention of 
easing the patient’s pain. This highlights the crux of this issue as people may act with 
a variety of intentions and the identification of a single intention is not a 
straightforward task.114  
  
The meaning of intention was subsequently discussed by the Court of Criminal Appeal 
in The People (DPP) v Douglas and Hayes.115 Although the discussion of ‘intention’ 
in this case was obiter, it is helpful in understanding the concept of ‘intention’. The 
Court of Criminal Appeal noted that ‘unless an accused has actually expressed an 
intent to kill, his intent can only be ascertained from a consideration of his actions and 
the surrounding circumstances.’116 In the context of specialist palliative care this may 
involve consideration of the patient’s medical history, notes made on the patients chart 
or conversations with other healthcare professionals regarding the treatment and care 
of a patient.117 The Court of Criminal Appeal held that foresight and recklessness was 
                                                          
111 The People (DPP) v Murray [1977] IR 360, 387.   
112 Law Reform Commission (n105) 31. 
113 ibid. 
114 PJ Van der Maas and others, ‘Euthanasia and Other Medical Decisions at the End of Life’ (1992) 22 
Health Policy 1 and 2 cited by Glenys Williams, ‘The Principle of Double Effect and Terminal 
Sedation’ (2001) 9 Medical Law Review 41, 48. ‘In the Netherlands, it is specifically recognised that a 
doctor acting with the intention of relieving pain, can also act partly with the intention of hastening 
death’. 
115 The People (DPP) v Douglas and Hayes [1985] ILRM 25; Law Reform Commission, Consultation 
Paper on Homicide: The Mental Element in Murder (LRC CP 17 – 2001) 18 ‘In Ireland the law would 
appear to be as set out by the Court of Criminal Appeal in People v Douglas & Hayes. Foresight of 
death as a natural and probable consequence of one’s actions does not amount to intention per se, 
although it may be evidence from which intention can be inferred.’ 
116 The People (DPP) v Douglas and Hayes [1985] ILRM 25, 27. 
117 Joseph Boyle, ‘Medical Ethics and Double Effect: The Case of Terminal Sedation’ (2004) 25 
Theoretical Medicine 51, 51-52 ‘Evidence of physician intent can be found in notations on the patient’s 
chart and in the recorded dosages and titration of analgesics.’  
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not the equivalent of intention but they could potentially be ‘evidence from which an 
inference of intention could be drawn.’118 This approach would also require the 
broader facts of the case to be considered in deciding whether the intention to kill or 
seriously injure was present.  
 
Section 4(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 1964 establishes a rebuttable presumption that 
the accused is ‘to have intended the natural and probable consequences of his 
conduct’.119 The Law Reform Commission report on homicide notes that a jury is to 
approach this presumption in two parts. The first part is to ‘decide whether the natural 
and probable consequence was to cause death or serious injury.’120 If this is answered 
in the affirmative the next step is to ‘consider whether the accused had successfully 
rebutted the presumption.’121 The doctrine of double effect and the acts and omissions 
distinction are means by which the presumption may be rebutted as ‘the requisite mens 
rea for murder will not have been established.’122 This has led to double effect being 
described as ‘an ethical cornerstone in the medical treatment of the terminally ill.’123 
This underlines the necessity of examining not only the application of the doctrine of 
double effect but also the validity of the doctrine itself. 
 
Justification for Specialist Palliative Care Practices 
The previous section highlighted the importance of intention in distinguishing between 
specialist palliative care practices and euthanasia. Unfortunately, the administration of 
sedative drugs to a patient or the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration does 
not always lend itself to the identification of a clear intention on the part of the 
                                                          
118 Law Reform Commission, Report on Homicide: Murder and Involuntary Manslaughter (LRC 87 – 
2008) 33; The People (DPP) v Douglas and Hayes [1985] ILRM 25, 28 ‘In the circumstances of any 
particular case evidence of the fact that a reasonable man would have foreseen that the natural and 
probable consequence of the acts of an accused was to cause death and evidence of the fact that the 
accused was reckless as to whether his acts would cause death or not is evidence from which an 
inference of intent to cause death may or should be drawn, but the court must consider whether either 
or both of these facts do establish beyond a reasonable doubt an actual intention to cause death’. 
119 Criminal Justice Act 1964, s 4(2).  
120 Law Reform Commission (n118) 35.   
121 ibid. 
122 Suzanne Ost, ‘Euthanasia and the defence of necessity: advocating a more appropriate legal 
response’ (2005) Criminal Law Review 355, 356.  
123 Quill (n106) 1039; Double effect has been described as ‘immense practical importance’ by Daniel P 
Sulmasy and Edmund D Pellegrino, ‘The Rule of Double Effect: Clearing-up the Double Talk’ (1999) 
159(6) Archives of Internal Medicine 545, 545 quoted by Williams (n114) 52; Double effect has been 
the subject of criticism, see RK Portenoy, ‘Morphine Infusions at the End of Life: The Pitfalls in 
Reasoning from Anecdote’ (1996) 12 Journal of Palliative Care 44; Andrew Billings (n3).  
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healthcare professional.124 The complexity of identifying the intention of healthcare 
professionals is evident in justifications such as double effect and the acts and 
omissions distinction.125 Nevertheless the doctrine of double effect has been utilised, 
albeit mainly in academic texts, to distinguish palliative sedation from euthanasia.126  
 
The legitimacy of double effect and its consistent application in practice is vital in 
supporting the distinction between euthanasia and specialist palliative care practices. 
However, the doctrine of double effect is not particularly suited to justifying the 
withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration and this is best dealt with through 
discussion of the acts and omissions distinction.127 Overall, in this section it will be 
argued that specialist palliative care practices and euthanasia can be distinguished on 
the basis of double effect and the acts and omissions distinction but that these 
justifications do not provide a sufficiently strong foundation on which to provide 
specialist palliative care.128 Therefore, it is necessary that an appropriate legal 
framework which addresses these practices in a clear manner is identified. 
 
The Doctrine of Double Effect 
It would be incorrect to speak of a single doctrine of double effect.129 Rather, there are 
differing views as to the necessary criteria for the application of the doctrine. A simple 
interpretation is that double effect is a doctrine which ‘distinguishes between the 
consequences a person intends and those that are unintended but foreseen’.130 This 
                                                          
124 Timothy E Quill, Bernard Lo and Dan W Brock, ‘Palliative Options of Last Resort: A Comparison 
of Voluntary Stopping Eating and Drinking, Terminal Sedation, Physician-Assisted Suicide, and 
Voluntary Active Euthanasia’ in Torbjőrn Tännsjő, Terminal Sedation: Euthanasia in Disguise? 
(Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004) 6. ‘The issue of intention is particularly complicated because the 
determination of what is intended by the patient or physician is often difficult to verify and because 
practices that are universally accepted may involve the intention to hasten death in some cases.’ 
125 Glenys Williams, ‘Acts and Omissions in Treatment Withdrawal: Conceptual Problems and Policy 
Decisions’ (2008) 39 Cambrian Law Review 75, 87 ‘This is precisely why the AOD (and double effect) 
are seen as justificatory “defences”’. 
126 Quill (n124) 6 ‘The doctrine of double effect has also been used to distinguish TS from PAS and 
VAE.’ 
127 Williams (n114) 52 ‘It must and should always be confined to excluding situations involving 
withdrawing artificial nutrition and hydration.’   
128 Quill (n124) 8 ‘The application and the moral importance of both the active/passive distinction and 
the doctrine of double effect are notoriously controversial and should not serve as the primary basis of 
determining the morality of these practices.’ 
129 Donald B Marquis, ‘Four Versions of Double Effect’ (1991) 16 The Journal of Medicine and 
Philosophy 515, 515 ‘There is no longer one doctrine of double effect.’ (emphasis in original). 
130 Williams (n114) 41; Lynn A Jansen and Daniel P Sulmasy, ‘Sedation, Alimentation, Hydration, and 
Equivocation: Careful Conversation about Care at the End of Life’ (2002) 136(11) American College 
of Physicians-American Society of Internal Medicine 845, 847 ‘The rule of double effect calls attention 
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reflects the distinction between intention and foresight raised by section 4 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1964. However, there is no clear reference to the doctrine in Irish 
legislation. Double effect can be called upon as a justification131 or defence where the 
actions of a medical professional appear to demonstrate some of the characteristics 
normally associated with euthanasia. In this regard, Foster et al. suggest that the focus 
placed on the doctrine by academics and practitioners ‘is best explained by its 
tremendous practical utility.’132 This utility is based on the point that practices which 
might otherwise be illegal and labelled as murder or manslaughter can be justified 
based on this doctrine.133 However, this ‘practical utility’ depends on the doctrine itself 
having a legally sound foundation.  
   
The Development of Double Effect  
The origin of the doctrine of double effect has been credited to Thomas Aquinas in his 
discussion on self-defence.134 Aquinas set out that:  
 
Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only one of which is 
intended, while the other is beside the intention. … Accordingly, the act of 
self-defence may have two effects: one, the saving of one's life; the other, 
the slaying of the aggressor.135  
 
Such acts may be justified provided there is an element of proportionality, e.g. ‘though 
proceeding from a good intention, an act may be rendered unlawful if it be out of 
proportion to the end.’136 In the context of palliative sedation, this may relate to the 
                                                          
to the moral difference between bringing about harm as merely a foreseen effect of an action aimed at 
some good end and intentionally bringing about harm as a means to that end.’; Tom L Beauchamp and 
James F Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (7th edn, Oxford University Press 2013) 164 ‘This 
rule incorporates a very influential distinction between intended effects and merely foreseen effects.’ 
131 Williams (n114) 44 ‘It is a justification (rather than an excuse) because ‘‘justification is founded on 
the law’s preference for one course of action, rather than another”’. 
132 Charles Foster and others ‘The Double Effect Effect’ (2011) 20 Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare 
Ethics 56. 
133 Vacco v Quill (1997) 138 L.Ed. 2d. 834. Professor Tribe’s argument to the Court on terminal sedation 
was that it had the effect of drugging the patient into a coma, and then starving the patient to death due 
to the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration. Professor Tribe argued that this practice was the 
equivalent of assisted suicide. Attorney-General Vacco responded that sedation in the final stages of 
life was not intended to kill and was justified by the principle of double effect. 
134 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (Fathers of the English Dominican Province tr, Benziger 
Brothers 1947) (II-II, Qu. 64, Art.7); See also Joseph T Mangan, ‘An Historical Analysis of the 
Principle of Double Effect’ (1945) Theological Studies 41.   




strength and timing of the dose administered to the patient. The actual application of 
the doctrine will be discussed later in this section. Aquinas did not set out to establish 
the basis of the doctrine of double effect but was instead concerned with intention ‘as 
a way to know God better’.137 This reflects the Catholic origins of the doctrine which 
had a considerable influence on its development. The doctrine of double effect has 
continued to be modified in various respects over the years and there is no single 
correct version or interpretation of this doctrine. 
 
The next contributor to the doctrine of double effect in the Catholic faith has been 
identified as Cardinal Cajetan.138 His interpretation of double effect can be said to 
reflect more recent interpretations of the doctrine.139 The work of the Salmanticenses 
has also been influential in the development of the doctrine of double effect.140 In 
particular, their approach to the doctrine served to expand it to ‘the whole field of 
moral theology’141 instead of restricting it to self-defence. An updated approach to 
double effect was set out in 1874 by Gury,142 and a formulation of double effect was 
set out by the Catholic scholar, Joseph Mangan, in 1949.143 Mangan suggests that the 
uncertainty around the doctrine of double effect is reflective of a broader 
inconclusiveness about the content of the morally good action.144 This reflects the fact 
that it is not possible to achieve universal agreement on what constitutes an 
exceptionless morally proper action. This will always be a challenge in any legal 
framework for an ethically sensitive subject such as specialist palliative care.  
 
                                                          
137 Foster (n132) 57.     
138 Mangan (n134) 52.   
139 ibid ‘There is no doubt in the wording of Cajetan, that he interprets II-II, q. 64, a. 7 in terms of the 
principle of the double effect as we understand it today.’ 
140 Salmanticenses, Cursus Theologicus (Brussels 1879); Mangan (n134) 57; Foster (n132) 57.  
141 Mangan (n134) 56.   
142 Joannes P Gury, Compendium Theologiae Moralis (5th edn, Ratisbon 1874) quoted in Mangan 
(n134) 57 ‘It is lawful to actuate a morally good or indifferent cause from which will follow two effects, 
one good and the other evil, if there is a proportionately serious reason, and the ultimate end of the 
agent is good, and the evil effect is not the means to the good effect. The reason for this principle is that 
such an action could be unlawful only from the intention of the evil effect, or from the very actuating 
of the cause itself, or from the foreseeing of the evil effect. But the action is not unlawful under any one 
of these headings.’  
143 Mangan (n134) 43 A formulation of double effect by Mangan explicitly requires that ‘the action in 
itself from its very object be good or at least indifferent’, ‘that the good effect and not the evil effect be 
intended’, ‘that the good effect be not produced by means of the evil effect’, and ‘that there be a 
proportionately grave reason for permitting the evil effect’. This interpretation requires that all four 
criteria be present at the same time.  
144 ibid 41. 
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The following section will consider more recent interpretations of the doctrine of 
double effect which are largely outside of Catholic theology. In particular, the 
interpretation of double effect outlined by Williams will be discussed and applied in 
the context of specialist palliative care practices.145 Moreover, case law which 
addresses the doctrine of double effect will be set out. This will demonstrate the 
difference between the religious origins of the doctrine and its application in criminal 
law. This will also clarify the legal status of the doctrine and highlight shortcomings 
in its application.  
 
The Criteria for Double Effect 
The criteria for the doctrine of double effect as outlined by Williams will be the 
primary interpretation of the doctrine discussed in this section. This interpretation has 
been selected as it reflects various formulations of the doctrine of double effect. For 
example, it resembles the criteria for the doctrine of double effect which have been 
outlined by Kuhse146 and Keown.147 Importantly, the criteria outlined by Williams also 
resemble the criteria for double effect as set out by Beauchamp and Childress who 
noted that ‘Another venerable attempt to specify the principle of nonmaleficence 
appears in the role of double effect’.148 Williams’ discussion of double effect was 
based on its application to terminal sedation and therefore offers much to draw on in 
the context of this thesis. Prior to setting out the requirements for double effect it is 
necessary to recognise the challenges which specialist palliative care practices present 
to the application of the doctrine of double effect. This will assist in discussing the 
individual requirements for the doctrine.       
 
Beauchamp and Childress recognised that palliative sedation ‘challenges the 
boundaries and use of the RDE.’149 Palliative sedation raises particular problems for 
                                                          
145 Williams (n114).  
146 Kuhse (n71).  
147 John Keown, Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy (Cambridge University Press 2002). 
148 Beauchamp (n130) 164; Beauchamp (n130) 154 ‘The act must be good, or at least morally neutral, 
independent of its consequences’, ‘The agent intends only the good effect, not the bad effect. The bad 
effect can be foreseen, tolerated, and permitted, but it must not be intended’, ‘The bad effect must not 
be a means to the good effect. If the good effect were the causal result of the bad effect, the agent would 
intend the bad effect in pursuit of the good effect’, ‘The good effect must outweigh the bad effect. That 
is, the bad effect is permissible only if a proportionate reason compensates for permitting the foreseen 
bad effect.’ 
149 ibid. RDE stands for rule of double effect. 
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the concept of double effect and has been described as being ‘unjustified’,150 
‘hypocritical’,151 and ‘sophistic’.152 In particular, ‘The precise timing of death is 
unpredictable, and verification of the relative causal contributions to that timing of 
disease, physiological and pharmacological factors is not usually measurable.’153 
Beauchamp and Childress summarised this position in stating that:  
 
Much depends on the description of terminal sedation in a particular set of 
circumstances, including the patient’s overall condition, the proximity of 
death, and the availability of alternative means to relieve pain and 
suffering, as well as the intention of the physician and other parties.154  
 
As a result, the intention of the healthcare professional in administering palliative 
sedation may be a stumbling block in the effective application of the doctrine of double 
effect in practice. It is suggested by Beauchamp and Childress that ‘[f]or an action to 
be intentional, it must correspond to the agent’s plan for its performance.’155 Reliance 
is to be placed on the physician to state his intention truthfully156 and this ‘cannot be 
easily resolved.’157 It has been suggested that the intention of the doctor can be gauged 
by asking ‘whether the doctor could have opted for less risky measures, had such 
measures existed.’158 These issues suggest that it may be difficult to adequately apply 
the doctrine of double effect if it is not possible to accurately identify the intention of 
                                                          
150 Ernlé Young, ‘Ethical Issues at the End of Life’ (1998) 9 Stanford Law and Police Review 267 cited 
by Williams (n114) 52; Timothy E Quill, Rebecca Dresser and Dan W Brock, ‘The Rule of Double 
Effect: A Critique of its Role in End-of-Life Decision-Making’ (1997) 337 New England Journal of 
Medicine 1768, 1771 ‘the rule’s absolute prohibitions, unrealistic characterization of physicians’ 
intentions, and failure to account for patients’ wishes make it problematic in many circumstances.’ 
151 Ann-Marie Begley, ‘Acts, Omissions, Intentions and Motives: A Philosophical Examination of the 
Moral Distinction between Killing and Letting Die’ (1998) 28(4) Journal of Advanced Nursing 865, 
873. 
152 Tim Helme and Nicola Padfield, ‘Setting Euthanasia on the Level’ (1993) 15 Liverpool Law Review 
75, 83. 
153 Michael Ashby, ‘Death Causation in Palliative Medicine’ in Ian Freckelton and Danuta Mendelson, 
Causation in Law and Medicine (Ashgate Dartmouth 2002) 228, 236.  
154 Beauchamp (n130) 168. 
155 ibid 166. 
156 Ost (n122) 356.   
157 ibid 358-359; Lynn A Jansen, ‘Disambiguating Clinical Intentions: The Ethics of Palliative Sedation’ 
(2010) 35 Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 19, 19 ‘It is often claimed that the intentions of 
physicians are multiple, ambiguous, and uncertain — at least with respect to end-of-life care.’; Charles 
Douglas, Ian Kerridge and Rachel Ankeny, ‘Managing Intentions: The End-of-Life Administration of 
Analgesics and Sedatives, and the Possibility of Slow Euthanasia’ (2008) 22(7) Bioethics 388.  
158 Torbjörn Tännsjö, ‘Terminal Sedation: A Substitute for Euthanasia’ Euthanasia’ in Torbjörn Tännsjö 
(ed), Terminal Sedation: Euthanasia in Disguise (Springer 2010) 24.  
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the healthcare professional.159 However, this issue has been considered by the House 
of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics which stated that ‘Some may suggest 
that intention is not readily ascertainable. But juries are asked every day to assess 
intention in all sorts of cases, and could do so in respect of double effect’.160 These 
comments were made in response to suggestions that double effect was a cloak for 
euthanasia and it demonstrates that intention, albeit complex, is possible to identify.161 
This is to be borne in mind when considering the formulation of double effect as 
advanced by Williams. 
 
Williams describes the criteria for double effect as follows:    
 
(1) The nature of the action must be morally good 
(2) The bad effect (such as death) must not be a means of achieving the 
good effect 
(3) The good effect is directly intended; the bad effect is merely foreseen 
and tolerated 
(4) Proportionally, the reasons for performing the good action must 
outweigh the unintended bad consequences162 
 
These requirements will be examined individually to understand how they contribute 
to the distinction between euthanasia and palliative sedation. It is important to 
emphasise that this Chapter is concerned with a particular application of the doctrine 
of double effect. In this respect, the focus is placed on cases where the same person 
experiences the good effect and potentially experiences the harmful effect.163 This 
ensures the analysis remains relevant to specialist palliative care as the patient may 
                                                          
159 Jansen (n157) 24 ‘Critics of the principle of double effect, at least as it is applied in the context of 
end-of-life palliative care, contend that the intentions of clinicians frequently are uncertain and 
ambiguous in this way. For this reason, they claim that the principle of double effect cannot function 
effectively as a guide for making ethical assessments of aggressive, extraordinary pain management 
techniques.’ 
160 House of Lords, Report of the House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics (Paper 21-1 of 
1993-1994) [243] ‘… They would no doubt consider the actions of the doctor, how they compared with 
usual medical practice directed towards the relief of pain and distress, and all the circumstances of the 
case.’ 
161 ibid ‘We reject that charge while acknowledging that the doctor’s intention, and evaluation of the 
pain and distress suffered by the patient, are of crucial significance in judging double effect.’   
162 Williams (n114) 45; See also Beauchamp (n130) 165. 
163 An alternative version of this is a situation where one person experiences the good effect but it is a 
second person who potentially experiences a negative effect.  
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have their pain treated but the sedative drug could potentially hasten their death. As 
such, a terminally ill patient receiving specialist palliative care has the potential to 
experience the good effect but also the harmful effect. 
  
The first criterion for double effect as set out by Williams requires that the ‘action 
must be morally good’.164 In applying this to specialist palliative care the question 
which arises is whether the administration of the sedative drug is morally good. This 
is likely to be answered in the positive as the sedative drug is administered to lessen 
the pain experienced by the terminally ill patient. This line of reasoning has also been 
followed by Williams165 and Foster166 who suggest that relieving the pain experienced 
by a person is morally good.  
 
The second criterion requires that the negative effect ‘must not be a means of 
achieving the good effect.’167 The negative effect is the potential to hasten a patient’s 
death but this is ‘not necessary to achieve the beneficial outcome’168 in specialist 
palliative care. The definition of palliative care set out in Chapter One made it clear 
that this form of care focuses on the ‘quality of life’169 and the treatment of pain rather 
than seeking to hasten the death of a patient. Those that argue that palliative sedation 
is a form of ‘slow euthanasia’ may be of the opinion that sedation relieves pain by 
hastening the death of the patient.170 In such an instance, the doctrine of double effect 
would not be applicable. However, the shortening of life due to opioids has been 
described as a ‘persistent fantasy’,171 and it was highlighted in Chapter Two that an 
                                                          
164 Williams (n114) 45.   
165 ibid 50 ‘The administration of pain-killing medication satisfies the first condition of the principle of 
double effect because the treatment is beneficial to the patient if it alleviates pain and relieves suffering.’ 
166 Foster (n132) 59 ‘For example, when applying the doctrine to giving pain relief (with the possibility 
of shortening life), the act of pain relief itself is clearly good.’ 
167 Williams (n114) 45.   
168 ibid 50. 
169 Fleming v Ireland & Ors [2013] IEHC 2 [35]; Cecilia Sepúlveda and others, ‘Palliative Care: The 
World Health Organization’s Global Perspective’ (2002) 24(2) Journal of Pain and Symptom 
Management 91, 94; Also cited by Health Service Executive, ‘Palliative Care Services – Five 
Year/Medium Term Development Framework’ (Health Service Executive 2009) 12; Mary McCarron 
and others, ‘Evaluation of the Programme to Support Palliative and Hospice Care in the Republic of 
Ireland’ (Atlantic Philanthropies 2013) 5.   
170 Williams (n114) 50 ‘Although some people may perceive terminal sedation as the deliberate 
induction of coma to relieve suffering by hastening death. If this were the case, then condition two 
would obviously not be satisfied.’; Foster (n132) 59 ‘Again note that the doctrine is only relevant if the 
first requirement is met: that the earlier death is seen in itself as a bad consequence.’ 
171 Robert Twycross, ‘Where there is hope, there is life: a view from the hospice’ in John Keown (ed), 
Euthanasia Examined (Cambridge University Press 1995) 161.  
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appropriate level of sedative drug is unlikely to hasten the death of the patient.172 On 
this basis, the second criterion could be satisfied by the administration of palliative 
sedation.  
 
The third criterion for the doctrine of double effect is that ‘The good effect is directly 
intended; the bad effect is merely foreseen and tolerated.’173 Again, the intention in 
palliative care is directed towards the relief of suffering, although the healthcare 
professional ‘may foresee death as an unavoidable outcome.’174 On this point 
Beauchamp and Childress noted that a supporter of double effect ‘must elect a 
similarly narrow conception of what is intended to avoid the conclusion that an agent 
intentionally brings about all the consequences of an action that the agent foresees.’175 
The significance of distinguishing between intention and foresight goes back to 
section 4 of the Criminal Justice Act 1964. The ability to consult patient charts and 
consider the surrounding circumstances in such cases means that intention is not solely 
based on the doctor’s stated intention. This does not mean that intention can always 
be clearly identified but does demonstrate that it is not an insurmountable challenge to 
the application of the doctrine.176  
 
The fourth criterion for double effect is based on proportionality. Proportionality will 
be influenced by a variety of factors which are not always obvious. For instance, the 
balance may vary between people who assign different values to the sanctity of life. 
A person who places a very high value on the sanctity of life will take a different 
approach to proportionality than a person who regards the sanctity of life as being of 
a lower value.177 Nevertheless, proportionality does not allow a pure utilitarian 
                                                          
172 Text to n160 in Chapter Two. 
173 Williams (n114) 45; Beauchamp (n136) 167 ‘It is more suitable in these contexts to discard the 
language of “wanting” and to say that foreseen, undesired effects are “tolerated.”’ ‘In this conception a 
physician can desire not to do what he intends to do, in the same way that one can be willing to do 
something but, at the same time, reluctant to do it or even detest doing it.’ 
174 Williams (n114) 50.  
175 Beauchamp (n130) 166; Beauchamp (n130) 167 ‘In this conception a physician can desire not to do 
what he intends to do, in the same way that one can be willing to do something but, at the same time, 
reluctant to do it or even detest doing it.’  
176 ibid 168 ‘Such facts about the physician’s motivation and character can make a decisive difference 
to a moral assessment of the action and the agent. But this moral conclusion can also be reached 
independently of the RDE.’  
177 Foster (n132) 60 ‘Thinkers differ as to the relative weight of values and the means by which to 
evaluate them. Whereas some, including Catholic theologians, will work within an ordering framework 
of prior convictions (for instance, that the sanctity of life is the highest good around which all other 
goods can be organized), others have different criteria for assessing values.’ 
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approach to be taken.178 In relation to sedation, Williams suggests that ‘“adequate 
relief of unendurable symptoms is an appropriately compelling reason to place the 
patient at risk” of the unwelcome consequences’.179 The appropriate use of sedative 
drugs would appear to also satisfy the fourth criterion for the doctrine of double effect.  
The discussion above illustrates that all four criteria for double effect as set out by 
Williams can be satisfied for the administration of palliative sedation. Nonetheless, it 
is important to recognise that these criteria could be interpreted in a manner which is 
unlikely to lead to a homogenous interpretation of the role of double effect in cases of 
palliative sedation. As such, it is necessary to look beyond theory and question whether 
the requirements for this doctrine are clearly enunciated by the courts. This will 
highlight whether the courts have followed a particular interpretation of the doctrine 
of double effect or whether they have approached it in a manner which is more 
adaptable depending on the facts before the court.  
 
Case Law on Double Effect 
It has been suggested that the role of double effect in English case law was first 
acknowledged by Devlin J in R v Adams.180 In R v Adams, the doctor was on trial for 
the murder of an elderly patient. It was alleged by the prosecution that the doctor had 
killed the patient for the purposes of inheriting property which she had left him in her 
will, and ‘that he had done so by deliberately injecting her with excessively large doses 
of morphine.’181 In discussing this case Devlin J commentated that:  
 
If the first purpose of medicine, the restoration of health, can no longer be 
achieved, there is still much for a doctor to do, and he is entitled to do all 
that is proper and necessary to relieve pain and suffering, even if the 
measures he takes may incidentally shorten life.182 
 
Devlin J also set out that if the defendant did some act which was capable of being 
murderous, if the requisite intent was present at the time, then the prosecution also 
                                                          
178 ibid 68.  
179 Williams (n114) 50. 
180 R v Adams [1957] Crim LR 773; Glenys Williams, Intention and causation in medical non-killing: 
the impact of criminal law concepts on euthanasia and assisted suicide (Routledge-Cavendish 2007) 
35; See also the United States cases of Quill v Vacco 80 F. 3d 716; 1996 US App Lexis 6216 and 
Compassion in Dying v Washington 79 F. 3d 790; 1996 US App Lexis 3944.  
181 Keown (n147) 24.  
182 Patrick Devlin, Easing the Passing (The Bodley Head 1985) 171. 
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needed to prove the intention to murder was present. This direction to the jury provided 
scope for the jury to acquit Dr. Adams if they were of the opinion that the intention of 
the doctor was to relieve the pain experienced by the patient or that the drugs had the 
effect of hastening the patient’s death due to the poor medical condition of the patient. 
However, this was a direction to the jury and ‘does not make law in itself’.183 
 
Foster et al. have argued that this case did not actually introduce the doctrine of double 
effect in English law. In support of this argument, Foster et al. highlights that the term 
‘double effect’ is not used by Devlin J.184 There are also issues in relation to the 
direction to the jury as it appears to focus on issues of causation rather than 
intention.185 In discussing this point Foster et al. stated, ‘The direction is opaque: it is 
hard to read into it anything as complex as the doctrine of double effect.’186 However, 
the case does demonstrate a judicial willingness to adopt an approach similar to double 
effect even though the criteria for double effect were not fully enunciated in this 
case.187 Nonetheless, these factors led Foster et al. to argue that ‘to see Adams as 
introducing the doctrine of double effect into English law is reading far too much into 
a rather amorphous direction to a jury.’188 Despite this, the doctor in R v Adams was 
found not guilty.189 Regardless of whether or not this case introduced the doctrine of 
double effect in to English law, there have been subsequent cases in which the doctrine 
was utilised as a defence.  
 
The doctrine of double effect was employed unsuccessfully by the defence counsel in 
R v Cox.190 Dr. Cox was charged with the murder of one of his patients as he injected 
the patient with ‘a slow-acting tranquiliser and potassium chloride.’191 The 
prosecution argued that the injection of potassium chloride did not have a therapeutic 
quality but was instead intended to hasten the death of the patient. This case centred 
around the issue of intention which was a contrast to R v Adams in which causation 
                                                          
183 Foster (n132) 60-61.    
184 ibid 62. 
185 ibid.     
186 ibid.    
187 ibid ‘Devlin J does not hint at, let alone discuss, either the second or the fourth element in Keown’s 
formulation.’ 
188 ibid.   
189 Williams (n180) 36. 
190 R v Cox (1992) 12 BMLR 38. 
191 Williams (n180) 36. 
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was to the fore.192 The direction to the jury by Ognall J did not explicitly mention the 
doctrine of double effect but instead indirectly referred to some of the requirements 
for the doctrine. The requirement that ‘[t]he bad effect must not be a means of 
achieving the good effect’193 was addressed by Ognall J when it was stated that 
‘Alleviation of suffering means the easing of it for so long as the patient survives; not 
the easing of it in the throes of, and because of, deliberate purpose killing.’194 
However, not all requirements were clearly set out as was demonstrated by the 
requirement of proportionality.195 Although this case focussed on issues of intention, 
it did not adopt a clear step-by-step approach to the doctrine of double effect. In any 
case, the injection of potassium chloride made the successful application of the 
doctrine particularly challenging for the defence counsel given its lethal nature and 
lack of pain-relieving qualities. 
 
The doctrine of double effect was also raised in the case of Moor.196 Dr. Moor was 
charged with the murder of one of his patients. Dr. Moor claimed that the death ‘was 
the result of an administration of diamorphine for the purposes of pain relief and the 
defence relied squarely on this.’197 The patient in this case was not terminally ill and 
the post mortem revealed that ‘up to six times the claimed amount of the drug was 
found in his body’.198 However, this level did not seem to be consistent with the level 
of morphine found in other parts of the patient’s body.199 Hooper J put a number of 
questions to the jury to assist in making their decision. Among the questions were 
whether ‘Dr. Moor has caused his patient’s death’,200 whether Dr. Moor had intended 
to do something other than relieve the suffering of the patient, and ‘was the jury 
satisfied that the injection he gave to his patient was intended to kill?’201 Ultimately, 
Dr. Moor was found not guilty but this case demonstrates a disconnect between the 
                                                          
192 ibid 37 ‘this is very much an intention based judgment.’   
193 Williams (n114) 45.  
194 R v Cox (1992) 12 BMLR 38. 
195 R v Cox (1992) 12 BMLR 38, 39. ‘If a doctor genuinely believes that a certain course is beneficial 
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approach to intention in case law and the criteria set out for the doctrine of double 
effect.   
 
A recent Irish case which provides a brief reference to the issues giving rise to the 
doctrine of double effect is Fleming v Ireland & Ors.202 In bringing this case, the 
plaintiff was in the final stages of the illness and did not want to avail of specialist 
palliative care but wanted physician assisted suicide instead. This resulted in a certain 
amount of discussion in the High Court about the categorisation of specialist palliative 
care practices including palliative sedation and the withdrawal of artificial nutrition 
and hydration.  
 
In the High Court, Dr. Tony O’Brien203 was of the opinion that ‘sedation does not 
hasten death.’204 This is of course based on an appropriate use of sedation where the 
sedative drug is ‘carefully titrated.’205 However, during cross examination Dr. O’Brien 
went on to reject ‘the assertion that sedatives are never administered as a primary 
purpose of shortening life’206 but accepted that ‘it is sometimes done knowing that that 
is what will happen.’207 This illustrates the complexity of specialist palliative care, and 
the role which the doctrine of double effect has for the healthcare professional and 
also the patient receiving care at the end of life. Despite this, there was little judicial 
engagement in the High Court or in the Supreme Court case with this point as the case 
focussed on assisted suicide.  
 
Overall, it has been demonstrated that double effect can be interpreted in a manner 
which provides a justification for the administration of palliative sedation but it is 
equally open to a contradictory interpretation. Furthermore, there has been little 
judicial engagement with the actual criteria for double effect. The cases cited above 
have elements of double effect reasoning and are often cited in discussion of double 
                                                          
202 Fleming v Ireland & Ors [2013] IEHC 2, [2013] IESC 19. 
203 Fleming v Ireland & Ors [2013] IEHC 2, [34]. ‘Dr. Tony O’Brien is a consultant physician in 
palliative medicine and former chair of the Council of Europe Expert Committee on Palliative Care.’ 
204 Fleming v Ireland & Ors [2013] IEHC 2, [37]. 
205 Fleming v Ireland & Ors [2013] IEHC 2, [38]; See comments of Professor Robert George at [2013] 
IEHC 2, [47] ‘Finally, he concurred with Dr. O’Brien on the correct use of opioids and said that the 
notion that “by giving opioids at the very end of life we are bringing about death simply isn’t true in 
our experience and the evidence doesn’t support it at all.”’ 
206 Fleming v Ireland & Ors [2013] IEHC 2, [38]. 
207 Fleming v Ireland & Ors [2013] IEHC 2, [38]. 
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effect but none examine the application of the doctrine in a head-on or sustained 
manner.208 Foster et al. were critical of the approach to double effect in case law and 
commented that that judges’ references to double effect have often been:  
 
in a slapdash, shorthand way, either failing to identify clearly or at all the 
constituents of the doctrine they say they are applying, or referring to 
versions of the doctrine that do not reflect the more common 
formulations.209  
 
This has been reflected in the case law set out in this Chapter.210 Lord Mustill in 
Bland211 highlighted that the doctrine of double effect has not ‘been the subject of a 
specific decision but seems to have been generally assumed to be the law by criminal 
practitioners.’212 Given the status of double effect it appears that the medical 
profession also practise under a similar belief. For example, the doctrine of double 
effect has been cited in the Irish Association of Palliative Care Discussion Paper on 
Palliative Sedation.213 The doctrine of double effect was set out under the ethical 
principles concerned in the discussion paper. Nonetheless, the cumulative effect of the 
issues highlighted in this section serve to significantly weaken the status of the 
doctrine as relied upon by healthcare professionals. Consequently, much greater legal 
and ethical clarity is needed in distinguishing specialist palliative care from euthanasia 
so healthcare professionals have a clear understanding of what care can be provided 





                                                          
208 Other cases which have discussed but not ‘applied’ the doctrine include R(Pretty) v DPP [2002] 1 
All ER 1; R(Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice [2013] HRLR 36. 
209 Foster (n132) 66.     
210 R v Adams [1957] Crim LR 773; R v Cox (1992) 12 BMLR 38; Moor, The Times, 12 May 1999. 
211 Airedale N.H.S. v Bland [1993] AC 789, [1993] 2 WLR 350. 
212 Airedale N.H.S. v Bland [1993] AC 789, 892 cited in R(Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice [2013] 
HRLR 36 [26]. 
213 Irish Association of Palliative Care, ‘Palliative Sedation’ (March 2011).     
214 Keown (n71) 319-320. ‘Lord Joffe, explaining a clause in his Bill on assisted dying for the terminally 
ill, which would have entitled a terminally ill patient to request and receive such medication as may be 
necessary to keep him or her as free as possible from pain and distress, said that it was clear that some 
doctors were frightened of prosecution for using “double effect.”’ 
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Withdrawal of Artificial Nutrition and Hydration: The Acts and Omissions 
Distinction  
It was previously highlighted that the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration 
might accompany palliative sedation.215 The withdrawal of artificial nutrition and 
hydration is best addressed by considering the acts and omissions distinction. 
Additionally, it must be questioned whether the acts and omissions distinction has 
deficiencies similar to those of double effect. The manner in which the withdrawal of 
artificial nutrition and hydration is justified is of particular importance as the failure 
to provide nutrition and hydration may amount to murder.216 The distinction between 
palliative sedation and the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration was 
highlighted in Chapter Two.217 For example, they are ‘separate decisions supported by 
different legal and ethical principles.’218 This point was repeated by Dr. O’Brien in 
Fleming v Ireland & Ors when he commented that palliative sedation does not 
necessarily involve the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration.219 In 
circumstances where artificial nutrition and hydration is withdrawn from the patient 
this raises particular legal and ethical issues. A significant issue is whether artificial 
nutrition and hydration is categorised as medical treatment or medical care. Following 
on from this, the legality of withdrawing artificial nutrition and hydration depends 
largely on whether it is categorised as an act or an omission. The importance of this 
categorisation will be outlined when examining the case law on the withdrawal of 
artificial nutrition and hydration.  
 
The elements of the offence of murder were set out in the second section of this 
Chapter. The ‘building blocks’220 of a charge are the actus reus and mens rea. The 
actus reus may be performed by an action or an omission based on the 
                                                          
215 Text to n180 in Chapter Two. 
216 R v Gibbins and Proctor (1918) 13 Cr App R 134, R v Stone and Dobinson [1977] QB 354. 
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218 Sjef Gevers, ‘Terminal Sedation: A New Legal Approach’ (2003) 10 European Journal of Health 
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219 Fleming v Ireland & Ors [2013] IEHC 2, [37]. 
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circumstances.221 An act is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as ‘[s]omething done 
or performed’.222 It has also been described as ‘events or states of affairs for which a 
person might be responsible according to the principles of responsibility that guide 
such judgments’.223 In general, liability does not attach in situations where a person 
fails to act unless a person is ‘under a legal duty to take positive action.’224 The 
withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration has been considered an omission by 
the courts, and its withdrawal could therefore meet the actus reus requirement only if 
a legal duty exists to provide artificial nutrition and hydration.225 In this regard, Mills 
set out that a duty of care does actually arise ‘between the clinician and her patient 
when she undertakes to care for the patient, whether on foot of a request for care from 
the patient himself or following a referral from a colleague.’226 As a result of this duty 
of care, a doctor or nurse might satisfy the actus reus requirement unless it could be 
shown that the withdrawal of treatment was in the patient’s best interests. This is the 
line of reasoning which was taken in Airedale N.H.S. v Bland227 and followed in Re a 
Ward of Court. 
 
Case Law on the Acts and Omissions Distinction  
In the case of Airedale N.H.S. v Bland, Tony Bland had been in a persistent vegetative 
state for three years and was reliant on life support. Healthcare professionals 
responsible for the care of Tony Bland were of the opinion that ‘no useful purpose was 
to be served by continuing that medical care and that it was appropriate to stop the 
                                                          
221 Hanly (n101) 48; Coffey (n101) 36. 
222 Bryan A Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary (9th edn, Thompson/West 2009) 27 [act]. 
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226 Simon Mills, Clinical Practice and the Law (2nd edn, Tottel Publishing 2007) 140-141; Duty of care 
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227 Airedale N.H.S. v Bland [1993] AC 789, [1993] 2 WLR 350; Rob Heywood, ‘Moving on from 
Bland: The Evolution of the Law and Minimally Conscious Patients’ (2014) 0(0) Medical Law Review 
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artificial feeding and other measures aimed at prolonging his existence.’228 In order to 
clarify the legality of terminating ventilation and withdrawing artificial nutrition and 
hydration the hospital sought clarification from the court. At first instance, the Court 
held that it was in the best interests of the patient that the medical treatment be 
withdrawn. This decision was appealed by the Official Solicitor who was acting on 
behalf of Tony Bland. The decision at first instance was affirmed by the Court of 
Appeal and was again appealed by the Official Solicitor.    
 
The general issue before the House of Lords was described as follows, ‘In what 
circumstances, if ever, can those having a duty to feed an invalid lawfully stop doing 
so?’229 In particular, can an attending physician ‘lawfully discontinue all life-
sustaining treatment and medical supportive measures designed to keep the defendant 
alive in his existing persistent vegetative state’?230 The Court questioned whether 
artificial nutrition and hydration amounted to medical treatment or medical care. The 
next step was to consider whether the removal of artificial nutrition and hydration was 
an act or an omission. As doctors and nurses owe a duty of care, an omission can 
amount to the actus reus.231 However, this situation was avoided by ‘deciding that 
although the conduct was an omission, any pre-existing duty ceased to exist when it 
became obvious that it would not be in Anthony Bland's best interests to continue 
treatment.’232 The treatment was viewed as ‘futile’,233 had no ‘affirmative benefit’,234 
and ‘no longer fulfils any therapeutic purpose.’235 Consequently, there would be no 
criminal liability incurred by withdrawing his treatment.236 This was described by 
Williams as, ‘the only method by which the doctors could be found to have acted 
lawfully.’237 Williams went on to state that the judgement ‘only relied upon the AOD 
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because it “existed” certainly there is no expression of confidence in the AOD as the 
foundation of treatment withdrawal cases.’238 In a similar manner, Jackson described 
the approach taken in this case as ‘“backwards reasoning”, in which a judge decides 
what outcome they wish to reach, and then finds a line of legal reasoning which 
enables them to secure this result.’239 Nevertheless, this approach has been relied on 
by courts in subsequent decisions on the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and 
hydration.240  
 
In Ireland, the issue of withdrawing artificial nutrition and hydration arose in the case 
of Re a Ward of Court.241 In the High Court, Lynch J held that the artificial nutrition 
and hydration could be withdrawn from the ward. This decision was appealed to the 
Supreme Court which upheld the High Court’s decision by a 4:1 majority. Among the 
issues to be determined by the Supreme Court included ‘whether the course proposed 
by the committee and family of the ward and consented to by the learned trial judge 
was in the best interests of the ward’,242 and whether there was adequate evidence to 
support the finding of the trial judge that the withdrawal of artificial nourishment was 
in the patient’s best interests.243 The focus on best interests is due to the High Court’s 
adoption of the test proposed by Lord Goff in Airedale N.H.S. v Bland.244  This test 
questioned ‘whether it is in the best interests of the patient that his life should be 
prolonged by the continuance of this form of medical treatment or care’.245 This 
approach requires a number of steps to be taken in order to justify the withdrawal of 
artificial nutrition and hydration and ensure that no liability attaches to the omission 
by the healthcare professional. In short, artificial nutrition and hydration had to be 
categorised as medical treatment rather than medical care. This categorisation allowed 
                                                          
238 ibid 78. AOD stands for acts and omissions distinction; Williams highlights that there are policy 
reasons which support the use of this line of reasoning in allowing the medical practitioner to withdraw 
artificial nutrition and hydration from the patient. 
239 Emily Jackson and John Keown, Debating Euthanasia (Hart Publishing 2012) 26. 
240 W Healthcare NHS Trust v KH, [2004] WLR 834, patient not in a persistent vegetative state; 
Frenchay Healthcare NHS Trust v S [1994] 2 All ER 403; Swindon and Marlborough NHS Trust v S 
[1995] 3 Medical Law Review 84; An NHS Trust v M [2001] 2 FLR 367; An NHS Trust v H [2001] 2 
FLR 501; In re M (Adult Patient) (Minimally Conscious State: Withdrawal of Treatment) [2011] EWHC 
2443 (Fam), [2012] 1 WLR 1653; W(by her litigation friend B) v M(by her litigation friend, the Official 
Solicitor) and S and A NHS Primary Care Trust [2011] EWHC 2443 (Fam). 
241 Ward of Court (withholding medical treatment) (No 2), Re, [1995] IESC 1, [1996] 2 IR 73, [1996] 
2 IR 79, [1995] 2 ILRM 401. 
242 Ward of Court (withholding medical treatment) (No 2), Re, [1995] IESC 1, [114]. 
243 Ward of Court (withholding medical treatment) (No 2), Re, [1995] IESC 1, [114]. 
244 Ward of Court (withholding medical treatment) (No 2), Re, [1995] IESC 1, [80], [265]. 
245 Airedale N.H.S. v Bland [1993] AC 789. 
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for the withdrawal of treatment if it was not in the best interests of the patient. On this 
basis, the omission which is the withdrawal of treatment, would not amount to a breach 
of the duty of care owed to the patient. Consequently, the actus reus for murder would 
not be present and therefore could not be established.  
 
In Re a Ward of Court artificial nutrition and hydration was administered by way of a 
nasogastric tube and this was seen as being ‘intrusive’246 and as constituting ‘an 
interference with the integrity of her body and cannot be regarded as normal means of 
nourishment.’247 This reasoning was supported by reliance on the US case Cruzan v 
Director Missouri Department of Health.248 In this case Brennan J commented that 
‘The artificial delivery of nutrition and hydration is undoubtedly medical 
treatment.’249 In Re a Ward of Court it was argued for the institution that artificial 
nutrition and hydration was merely ‘the equivalent of food and drink which everybody 
required for survival’250 and the nasogastric tube had become normal due to its 
duration.251 Separately, Mason and Laurie stated that ‘any form of feeding which 
requires some medical training and expertise can be considered medical treatment’.252 
Distinctions of such importance will attract criticism in any such case. However, there 
is no clear line between what constitutes medical treatment or medical care and it has 
been described by Beauchamp and Childress as ‘unacceptably vague’.253  
 
Both the High Court and the Supreme Court were of the opinion that artificial nutrition 
and hydration constituted a form of medical treatment rather than medical care. As 
such, once the treatment was withdrawn the patient would die from her original 
injuries rather than lack of food and water. The Supreme Court accepted the best 
                                                          
246 Ward of Court (withholding medical treatment) (No 2), Re, [1996] 2 IR 79, 124.  
247 Ward of Court (withholding medical treatment) (No 2), Re, [1996] 2 IR 79, 125.  
248 Cruzan v Director Missouri Department of Health (1990) 497 US 261. 
249 Cruzan v Director Missouri Department of Health (1990) 497 US 261, 307. 
250 Ward of Court (withholding medical treatment) (No 2), Re, [1996] 2 IR 79, 143. 
251 Ward of Court (withholding medical treatment) (No 2), Re, [1996] 2 IR 79, 143. 
252 J Kenyon Mason and Graeme Laurie, Mason & Mccall Smith’s Law & Medical Ethics (8th edn, 
Oxford University Press 2011) 576 (emphasis in original); Williams (n114) 50 Williams commented 
that the categorisation of artificial nutrition and hydration as a medical treatment is a position which 
has been taken by ‘both the legal and medical professions’. 
253 Beauchamp (n130) 162 ‘Unfortunately, neither a long history nor precedent guarantees clarity or 
adequacy. The distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means of treatment is unacceptably 
vague and morally misleading.’ 
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interests test which had been adopted by the High Court.254 For instance, O’Flaherty J 
stated that the best interests of the ward would mean that ‘nature should take its course 
in this case without artificial means of preserving what technically is life, but life 
without purpose, meaning or dignity.’255 In arriving at this decision, the Supreme 
Court not only utilised the best interests test but also considered what the ward would 
choose ‘if she could be granted a momentary lucid and articulate period’.256 The 
subjective nature of this choice renders this particularly challenging but the Court drew 
on ‘the evidence of the family on this aspect of the case’.257 This case demonstrated a 
judicial acceptance in Ireland of the permissibility of withdrawing artificial nutrition 
and hydration when it was in the best interests of the patient to do so.  
 
The wider circumstances around the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration in 
general need to be considered. For example, it is important to consider why the patient 
is not able to take nutrition and hydration naturally. If the patient has been sedated to 
the point requiring the administration of artificial nutrition and hydration then it is ‘the 
physician-created state of diminished consciousness that renders the patient unable to 
eat, not the patient’s underlying disease.’258 In such a case, if artificial nutrition and 
hydration is removed from a terminally sedated patient it may be a leap in logic to 
attribute the death to the original illness rather than the removal of treatment. 
Although, this does depend on the patient’s condition prior to beginning palliative 
sedation. This underlines the importance of an appropriate legal framework which 
provides clarity and consistency for specialist palliative care practices such as the 
decision to begin palliative sedation or the circumstances in which artificial nutrition 
and hydration should be provided or withdrawn.  
 
Chapter Two highlighted the lack of a clear position on the value of artificial nutrition 
and hydration for terminally ill patients.259 As such, the merits and demerits of this 
                                                          
254 Ward of Court (withholding medical treatment) (No 2), Re, [1995] IESC 1, [172]. In discussing the 
decision of Lynch J, Hamilton CJ stated ‘he adopted the proper test’; Accepted by O’Flaherty J at [1995] 
IESC 1, [216]; Accepted by Egan J at [1995] IESC 1, [224]; Accepted by Blayney J at [1995] IESC 1, 
[265]; Accepted by Denham J at [1995] IESC 1, [365].   
255 [1995] IESC 1, [216]. 
256 Ward of Court (withholding medical treatment) (No 2), Re, [1995] IESC 1, [82]. 
257 Ward of Court (withholding medical treatment) (No 2), Re, [1995] IESC 1, [82]. 
258 David Orentlicher, ‘The Supreme Court and Physician-Assisted Suicide: Rejecting Assisted Suicide 
but Embracing Euthanasia’ (1997) 337(17) New England Journal of Medicine 1236, 1237. 
259 Text to n188 and n189 in Chapter Two. 
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form of medical treatment are not entirely clear. On this basis, the principles of 
nonmaleficence and beneficence could be drawn on to argue in favour of providing 
artificial nutrition and hydration for the patient. Despite this, Beauchamp and 
Childress noted that such an argument ‘does not entail that it is always obligatory to 
provide the treatments.’260 In this respect, it was also noted by Beauchamp and 
Childress that ‘[f]or imminently dying patients, responsibilities are not fixed by 
obligations to provide treatments that serve only to extend the dying process; they are 
fixed by obligations to provide appropriate care in dying.’261 This may be the case 
where a broader balancing of principles and facts is taken into account. For example, 
in Re a Ward of Court, it appears that a broader value judgment was made by the court 
which included consideration of the patient’s quality of life.  
 
The distinction between acts and omissions has attracted a considerable amount of 
criticism,262 and it has been described as ‘more of a hindrance than an aid to resolving 
the legal problems in this area.’263 Hanafin recognised the problems posed by the acts 
and omissions distinction and considered it ‘a shaky foundation on which to build a 
right-to-die jurisprudence.’264 In addition to this, the President’s Commission for the 
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research set 
out that ‘the fact that the distinction is conceptually unclear and has no solid 
foundation upon which it can rest unchallenged, is problematic’.265 However, it is a 
distinction which is still being employed to support the withdrawal of artificial 
nutrition and hydration. Jackson examines the distinction between acts and omissions 
in the context of treatment withdrawal, and argues that ‘the differences between the 
two sorts of conduct, while not non-existent, are in this case insufficient to bear the 
                                                          
260 Beauchamp (n130) 169; Beauchamp (n130) 164 ‘In our judgment, caregivers may justifiably forego 
MN&H for patients in some circumstances, as holds true for other life-sustaining technologies. No 
morally relevant difference exists between the various life-sustaining technologies, and the right to 
refuse medical treatment for oneself or others is not contingent on the type of treatment. There is no 
reason to believe that MN&H is always an essential part of palliative care or that it necessarily 
constitutes beneficial medical treatment.’ 
261 Beauchamp (n130) 172. 
262 James Rachels, ‘Active and passive euthanasia’ (1975) 292 New England Journal of Medicine 78; 
See also Kuhse (n71) 38; Begley (n151) 865. 
263 Patrick Hanafin, Last Rights: Death, Dying and the Law in Ireland (Cork University Press 1997) 24. 
264 ibid 25. 
265 President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research, ‘Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment: Ethical, Medical, and Legal 
Issues in Treatment Decisions’ (1983) 61 cited by Williams (n179) 87. 
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moral weight that is placed upon them by the law.’266 All of this suggests that specialist 
palliative care requires a legal framework with a more coherent foundation in order to 
ensure that healthcare professionals and patients have certainty about the limits of care 
and the type of care which can be provided.267  
 
The absence of a clear legal framework for specialist palliative care can just as easily 
lead to overtreatment of the patient as it can undertreatment of the patient;268 neither 
of which protects the human rights of a patient or accurately reflects the goals of 
palliative care. Overall, the legal framework needs to provide greater certainty for 
healthcare professionals and a solid legal foundation on which to practise. On this 
point, the acts and omissions distinction does not provide a particularly solid 
foundation for these practices and results in an unsatisfactory situation for both 
patients and healthcare professionals.   
 
Conclusion 
The aim of this Chapter was to examine the legitimacy of the distinction between 
specialist palliative care practices and euthanasia. In achieving this, the legality of 
palliative sedation and the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration was 
discussed and contrasted against the practice of euthanasia. This approach assisted in 
further defining the legal framework for specialist palliative care in Ireland and, 
importantly, it highlighted areas of ambiguity which need to be addressed by 
professional standards and guidelines.  
 
In the first section, the legal framework for euthanasia in the Netherlands was outlined. 
This provided an example of euthanasia in practice and highlighted the importance of 
defining the type of suffering for which specialist palliative care can be provided. In 
particular, the issue of non-somatic suffering can be a challenging symptom to address 
and it may cause the distinction between specialist palliative care and euthanasia to 
                                                          
266 Jackson (n238) 30.  
267 Quill (n124) 11 ‘However, hidden, ambiguous practices, inconsistent justifications, and failure to 
acknowledge the risks of accepted practices may also undermine the quality of terminal care and put 
patients at unwarranted risk.’ 
268 Beauchamp (n130) 160 ‘Giving priority to withholding over withdrawing treatment can lead to 
overtreatment in some cases, that is, the continuation of no longer beneficial or desirable treatment for 
the patient. Less obviously, the distinction can lead to undertreatment. Patients and families worry about 
being trapped by biomedical technology that, once begun, cannot be stopped.’ 
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become blurred. As a result of this, it is important that the legal framework in Ireland 
for specialist palliative care provides guidance on the identification of refractory 
symptoms which may require sedation and that a clear decision-making framework 
exists for such practices. The lack of such guidance would serve to undermine efforts 
to distinguish specialist palliative care from euthanasia. This is a point which also 
emerged in the second and third sections of this Chapter. 
    
In the second section, the law on homicide and assisted suicide in Ireland was set out. 
This served to define the limits of medical practice in this jurisdiction and was in 
contrast to the legal position adopted in the Netherlands. The second section also 
outlined the law on intention in Ireland. This was relevant for the third section of this 
Chapter which considered justifications such as the doctrine of double effect and the 
acts and omissions distinction for specialist palliative care practices.   
 
In relation to double effect, it was shown that palliative sedation satisfied the four 
criteria for the doctrine of double effect as set out by Williams. Unfortunately, the use 
of this doctrine in case law could be described as vague and uncertain. The lack of 
judicial engagement and legislative support for the doctrine of double effect 
undermines the distinction between specialist palliative care and euthanasia. As such, 
greater clarity is needed in distinguishing these practices. In any case, the doctrine of 
double effect is of most relevance after the fact, i.e. it serves as a legal justification 
after an act has occurred. It is not appropriate for healthcare professionals to be guided 
by a justification when providing palliative care; a form of care which, if administered 
appropriately, is unlikely to hasten the death of the patient. In this regard, reliance on 
the doctrine of double effect further suggests that palliative sedation is inextricably 
linked with the hastening of death. Instead, greater guidance is needed at an earlier 
stage in patient care. This guidance should, at a minimum, be clear on indications for 
palliative sedation, the decision-making framework for palliative sedation, and the 
practice of commencing palliative sedation. Such guidance needs to be clear, 
consistent, and drafted in a manner which recognises the co-operation which takes 
place between doctors and nurses in caring for the terminally ill patient. 
 
The same conclusions can also be drawn from considering the acts and omission 
distinction. This distinction does not provide a strong or coherent foundation from 
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which to provide specialist palliative care. The complexity of the decision to withdraw 
artificial nutrition and hydration was evident in the case of Re a Ward of Court. 
Healthcare professionals will always face difficult decisions about end-of-life care but 
these decisions should be supported by a clear and consistent legal framework.  
 
Overall, the doctrine of double effect and the acts and omissions distinction serve to 
distinguish specialist palliative care practices from euthanasia but do not provide the 
certainty which is necessary for both the healthcare professional and the care of the 
patient. Consequently, it is important that other parts of the legal framework provide 
a stronger base on which to provide specialist palliative care. Chapter Four will 
examine the distinction based on human rights while also identifying the rights which 
must be met in the provision of specialist palliative care. Furthermore, professional 
standards and guidance must provide a clear foundation on which healthcare 
professionals can practise. The role and impact of professional standards will be 
examined in Chapter Five. 
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This Chapter outlines and examines the human rights framework for specialist 
palliative care in Ireland. It will be demonstrated that human rights occupy a central 
role in the legal framework in Ireland for specialist palliative care and that it is vital 
for appropriate respect to be given to these rights in practice. There are many human 
rights engaged by specialist palliative care including the right to health, the right to 
bodily integrity, protection from inhuman or degrading treatment, the right of 
autonomy, the right to equality, and the right to family life. The principle of dignity is 
also engaged by specialist palliative care. However, it is not possible within the scope 
of this thesis to examine all of these rights. As a result, the human rights which will 
be examined are rights which have been prevalent in case law relating to end-of-life 
care,1 and in reports2 and academic commentary on palliative care. These are rights 
which will also influence the specification of autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, 
and justice when advancing suggestions for reform later in this thesis.3 In addition to 
this, the previous chapters have highlighted a number of human rights issues in the 
context of specialist palliative care which need to be addressed. The issues identified 
in previous chapters include: the need to respect the dignity of the terminally ill 
patient,4 access to appropriate palliative care,5 participation in decision-making,6 
equality of palliative care provision across different institutions,7 and the lack of clarity 
                                                          
1 Ward of Court (withholding medical treatment) (No 2), Re, [1996] 2 IR 73, [1996] 2 IR 79, [1995] 2 
ILRM 401; Fleming v Ireland & Ors [2013] IEHC 2, [2013] IESC 19; D v United Kingdom (1997) 24 
EHRR 423.  
2 Eamon O’Shea and others, ‘End-of-Life Care for Older People in Acute and Long-Stay Care Settings 
in Ireland’ (Hospice Friendly Hospitals and National Council on Ageing and Older People 2008); 
Kieran McKeown, Trutz Haase and Shelagh Twomey, ‘Dying in Hospital in Ireland: Nurse and Doctor 
Perspectives, Report 2’ (Irish Hospice Foundation 2010); See also Eric Wilkes, ‘Terminal Care: Report 
of a Working Party’ (London 1980); World Health Organisation, ‘Cancer Pain Relief and Palliative 
Care: Report of a WHO Expert Committee’ (Geneva 1990); Resolution 1649 (2009) ‘Palliative care: a 
model for innovative health and social policies’ adopted by the Assembly on 28 January 2009 [14] The 
Council Of Europe considers palliative care to be a vital element of ‘appropriate health care based on a 
humane concept of human dignity, autonomy, human rights, civic rights, patient rights and a generally 
acknowledged perception of solidarity and social cohesion.’ 
3 Text to n94 in Chapter One. 
4 Text to n123 in Chapter Two. 
5 Text to n76 in Chapter Two. 
6 See p42.  
7 Text to n73 in Chapter Two. 
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in providing specialist palliative care practices.8 These concerns will further guide the 
manner in which human rights are examined in this Chapter. Overall, the discussion 
of human rights provides a measure against which to examine professional standards 
and guidance in subsequent chapters, as well as clarifying a substantial proportion of 
the legal framework in Ireland for specialist palliative care.  
 
In this Chapter, the right to bodily integrity, protection from inhuman or degrading 
treatment, the right of autonomy, and dignity, as they apply to specialist palliative care 
will be examined. This Chapter does not focus on the theoretical underpinnings of the 
rights discussed but will concentrate on the manner in which the courts have 
interpreted and applied these rights. As such, the selected rights have a significant 
body of associated jurisprudence which provides insight into the meaning of these 
rights and illustrates the consequences of failing to protect and vindicate a recognised 
human right. The adoption of this approach allows for professional standards and 
guidance to be examined from a position which concentrates on the law in practice. 
This reflects the practical focus of this thesis in examining the legal framework in 
which healthcare professionals provide care to terminally ill patients. In this context, 
rights are not to be viewed as abstract concepts but as guidance in terms of the 
minimum level of care which a healthcare professional should provide to a patient.9  
 
There are five main sections in this Chapter. This is larger than any preceding or 
subsequent Chapter in this thesis but it is necessary due to the importance and scale of 
the rights framework for specialist palliative care. The rights framework can be viewed 
as providing a foundation on which to develop other aspects of the legal framework 
for specialist palliative care. For instance, professional standards and guidance must, 
at a minimum, protect the human rights of a patient. The first section involves setting 
out the background to human rights in Ireland such as the identification of human 
rights in the Irish Constitution and the status of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [hereinafter ‘ECHR’] in this jurisdiction. The 
                                                          
8 Text to n92 in Chapter Two. 
9 Airey v Ireland App no 6289/73 (Chamber Decision, 9 October 1979) [24] ‘The Convention is 
intended to guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective’; 
Tysiąc v Poland (2007) 45 EHRR 42, [113]; Tom L Beauchamp and James F Childress, Principles of 
Biomedical Ethics (7th edn, Oxford University Press 2013) 369-370 ‘The reason that rights are special, 
and especially cherished, is that individuals hold justified claims that they can exercise. They are not 
beholden to the moral beneficence of other persons.’ 
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nature of many of the human rights discussed in this Chapter is such that their 
interpretation and application often overlap with each other. However, for the 
purposes of clarity the ensuing sections will each concentrate on an individual human 
right while recognising that a degree of overlap cannot be completely avoided. 
  
The meaning and impact of the right to bodily integrity will be examined in the second 
section of this Chapter. The interpretation of this right has been discussed by courts in 
Ireland and by the European Court of Human Rights [hereinafter ‘ECtHR’]. Although 
not expressly contained in the ECHR, a right to physical integrity has been recognised 
as part of other expressly recognised rights.  
 
The right to be protected from torture and from inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment will be discussed in the third section. This has been recognised as an 
unenumerated right in the Irish Constitution and is set out by Article 3 of the ECHR. 
For the most part, the focus will be on inhuman and degrading treatment rather than 
torture. In particular, the level of treatment or non-treatment which could result in a 
breach of this right will be discussed in this section.  
  
The right of autonomy will be examined in the fourth section of this Chapter. 
Discussion of the right of autonomy assists in identifying the limits of what a patient 
can request or refuse in terms of their medical treatment and care. The right of 
autonomy, as will be demonstrated, has a considerable impact in the area of specialist 
palliative care. On this point, the scope of the right is such that this section will also 
discuss the use of advance care directives in Ireland. It will emerge from this section 
that the legal framework for advance care directives in this jurisdiction has long been 
inadequate but forthcoming legislation may address some of the problems in this area.  
 
Dignity will be examined in the fifth section of this Chapter. The term dignity is often 
used in end-of-life care without a clear understanding of what dignity entails. For 
example, the phrase ‘death with dignity’ is regularly used in the medical and legal 
articles on end-of-life care without any great precision.10 This section will draw on 
                                                          
10 Christopher Mil Cope ‘Death with dignity’ (1997) 27(5) Hastings Center Report 37 Cope suggests 
that this term should be abandoned due to a lack of clarity as to what it means.  
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legal instruments and case law in the same way as other sections but it is especially 
important to take account of the criticism of the characterisation of dignity and 
recognise what it may mean for specialist palliative care. In this regard, questions arise 
as to whether dignity should be recognised as a right or whether it is instead a 
constitutional value.11 Cumulatively, these sections will build to demonstrate a 
significant part of the legal framework in Ireland for specialist palliative care. 
Moreover, these sections will also demonstrate a number of shortcomings in the 
existing framework which need to be addressed in order to ensure appropriate 
specialist palliative care can be consistently provided in this jurisdiction.    
 
The Protection of Human Rights in Ireland 
Human rights are set out in international and regional treaties, in the Irish Constitution, 
and in legislation. This Chapter will, for the most part, refer to sources of human rights 
which are directly enforceable as they can be drawn upon by the person in their 
individual circumstances. Despite this, reference will be made to other treaties and 
conventions which lack direct enforceability but which serve to ‘promote a culture of 
rights recognition and protection and a benchmark for assessment of rights.’12 A main 
source of directly enforceable human rights in Ireland is the Irish Constitution which 
contains both enumerated and unenumerated rights. Human rights relevant to the 
provision of palliative care are also contained in the ECHR which has a more complex 
status in Ireland; the impact of which will be outlined in the course of this section. In 
addition to the ECHR, reference will be made to sources of human rights such as the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights,13 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights14 and 
the related International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights15 and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.16  
 
The Irish Constitution 
The Irish Constitution entered into force on the 29th December 1937. The Constitution 
is superior to all legislation and other sources of law in this jurisdiction.17 It established 
                                                          
11 See p161.   
12 Ita Mangan, ‘Older People in Long Stay Care’ (The Human Rights Commission 2002) 49. 
13 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2010] OJ C83/380.  
14 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1949). 
15 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966). 
16 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966). 
17 Bunreacht na hÉireann, Article 15.4  
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the main institutions of the State such as organs of government18 and the court 
system,19 as well as setting out the fundamental rights of the citizen.20 The fundamental 
rights referred to are natural rights which an individual possesses due to the simple 
fact that they are human beings.21 However, the Irish Constitution does not set out an 
exhaustive list of the rights an individual may have. In this respect, the existence of 
unenumerated rights has been recognised by Irish courts. These are rights which, 
although not expressly set out in the Irish Constitution, can be derived from the 
Constitution. This point will be considered fully when examining unenumerated rights 
such as the right to bodily integrity later in this chapter.22     
 
The European Convention on Human Rights 
The ECHR was drafted by the Council of Europe in 1950 and entered into force in 
1953.23 The ratification of the ECHR by a State results in a legal obligation ‘to 
guarantee to individuals within their jurisdiction a select number of civil and political 
rights.’24 The ECHR was incorporated25 into Irish domestic law by way of the 
European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003 [hereinafter ‘ECHR Act 2003’]. The 
approach to incorporation in this piece of legislation is ‘indirect or interpretative 
incorporation at a sub-constitutional level.’26 This method of incorporation maintained 
the supremacy of the Irish Constitution. 
 
                                                          
1° The Oireachtas shall not enact any law which is in any respect repugnant to this Constitution or any 
provision thereof. 
2° Every law enacted by the Oireachtas which is in any respect repugnant to this Constitution or to any 
provision thereof, shall, but to the extent only of such repugnancy, be invalid. 
18 Bunreacht na hÉireann, Article 15-27. 
19 Bunreacht na hÉireann, Article 34-37. 
20 Bunreacht na hÉireann, Article 40-44. 
21 Seamus Henchy, ‘Precedent in the Irish Supreme Court’ (1962) 25 Modern Law Review 544, 557. 
This article was prior to the appointment of Henchy J to the High Court. 
22 Text to n68. 
23 Ed Bates, The Evolution of the European Convention on Human Rights: From its Inception to the 
Creation of a Permanent Court of Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2011) 1-2. 
24 ibid 2. 
25 The term ‘incorporation’ is used in this section for simplicity but the difficulty of using this term is 
recognised. Foy v An t-Ard Chlaraitheori [2007] IEHC 470, [93] per McKenchie J, ‘It is a misleading 
metaphor to say that the Convention was incorporated into domestic law. It was not. The rights 
contained in the Convention are now part of Irish law. They are so by reason of the Act of 2003. That 
is their source. Not the Convention. So it is only correct to say, as understood in this way, that the 
Convention forms part of our law.’  
26 Donncha O’Connell, ‘The ECHR Act 2003: A Critical Perspective’ in Ursula Kilkelly (ed), ECHR 
and Irish Law (Jordan Publishing 2004) 2. 
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Individuals who feel that their rights under the Convention have been violated by the 
State can ultimately bring a case to the ECtHR. States are obliged to comply with the 
decision of the ECtHR in circumstances where the Court holds there to be a violation 
of the Convention. In this regard, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe 
has responsibility for monitoring whether States have complied with the judgment of 
the ECtHR. As such, there are two sources of rights stemming from the ECHR. There 
is the ECHR itself which can be drawn on before the ECtHR, and the ECHR Act 2003 
which is applicable in the domestic sphere. Particularly relevant to the provision of 
palliative care is the recognition by the ECtHR of a right to physical integrity, albeit 
as part of several other rights. In addition to this, the ECHR also protects a right to 
privacy,27 and a right to be protected from torture and inhuman or degrading 
treatment.28 The meaning of these rights will be drawn out in this Chapter through 
discussion of ECtHR case law.   
 
Section 2 of the ECHR Act 2003 addresses the interpretative requirements of the 
courts. This requires courts to interpret and apply ‘any statutory provision or rule of 
law … in a manner compatible with the State’s obligations under the Convention 
provisions.’29 The scope of Section 2 depends on the interpretation of the term 
‘statutory provision’ as the interpretative obligation extends to ‘any statutory 
provision’. The ECHR Act 2003 defines a ‘statutory provision’ as:    
 
any provision of an Act of the Oireachtas or of any order, regulation, rule, 
licence, bye-law or other like document made, issued or otherwise created 
thereunder or any statute, order, regulation, rule, licence, bye-law or other 
like document made, issued or otherwise created under a statute which 
continued in force by virtue of Article 50 of the Constitution.30 
 
This is a broad interpretation of the term ‘statutory provision’ and demonstrates that it 
not limited to primary legislation, as seen in The Law Society of Ireland v The 
Competition Authority.31  
                                                          
27 European Convention on Human Rights, Article 8.  
28 European Convention on Human Rights, Article 3. 
29 European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003, s 2(1). 
30 European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003, s 1. 
31 The Law Society of Ireland v The Competition Authority [2006] 2 IR 262. 
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An issue in The Law Society of Ireland v The Competition Authority was whether 
Section 5 of the ECHR Act 2003 could apply to a notice published by the Competition 
Authority which related to the ‘legal representation of persons attending before the 
competition authority’.32 Section 5 of the ECHR Act 2003 addresses the possible role 
of the High Court or the Supreme Court in making a declaration of incompatibility 
which means that ‘a statutory provision or rule of law is incompatible with the State’s 
obligations under the Convention provisions.’33 It was argued by the Competition 
Authority that the notice was not a ‘statutory provision’ as defined by Section 1(1) of 
the ECHR Act 2003.34 However, O’Neill J held that ‘the prohibition on multiple 
representation contained in the notice is a “rule” within that definition and in addition 
falls comfortably within the meaning of “other like documents”, as set out in the 
definition.’35 As a result, the notice could be the subject of a declaration under Section 
5 of the ECHR Act 2003. On this basis, it can be argued that standards and guidance 
published by bodies such as the Health Information and Quality Authority, the Irish 
Medical Council, An Bord Altranais, and the Health Service Executive are capable of 
coming within the meaning of ‘statutory provision’. This would require courts to 
interpret and apply them in ‘a manner compatible with the State’s obligations under 
the Convention provisions’,36 as required by Section 3 of the ECHR Act 2003. 
 
Section 3 of the ECHR Act 2003 requires that ‘every organ of the State shall perform 
its functions in a manner compatible with the State's obligations under the Convention 
provisions.’37 Again, the scope of this section greatly depends on the interpretation of 
a term, namely ‘organ of the State’. This term was described by the ECHR Act 2003 
as including: 
 
a tribunal or any other body (other than the President or the Oireachtas or 
either House of the Oireachtas or a Committee of either such House or a 
                                                          
32 The Law Society of Ireland v The Competition Authority [2006] 2 IR 262, 262. 
33 European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003, s 5(1). 
34 The Law Society of Ireland v The Competition Authority [2006] 2 IR 262, 271 ‘It was submitted that 
the essence of the material to be published under s. 30(1)(d) would be guideline material, with the 
necessary implication that the persons to whom the notice might be addressed, were not be bound in 
law to follow the guideline and could choose an alternative way, if one was available, to achieve 
compliance with the Act.’ 
35 The Law Society of Ireland v The Competition Authority [2006] 2 IR 262, 286. 
36 European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003, s 2(1). 
37 European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003, s 3(1). 
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Joint Committee of both such Houses or a court) which is established by 
law or through which any of the legislative, executive or judicial powers 
of the State are exercised38 
 
On this basis, an organ of the State must be a body established by law or a body 
‘through which any of the legislative, executive or judicial powers of the State are 
exercised’.39 This would include bodies such as the Health Information and Quality 
Authority,40 the Irish Medical Council,41 An Bord Altranais,42 and the Health Service 
Executive.43 These bodies must therefore carry out their functions in a way which is 
compatible with the obligations placed on the State. In this respect, it is not a defence 
before the ECtHR to argue that the actions of an organ of the State were authorised by 
statute.44 In circumstances where the issue relates to domestic legislation then it is a 
declaration of incompatibility which is the solution set out by the ECHR Act 2003.45 
In any case, it has been suggested by de Londras and Kelly that organs of the State 
should not be passive but ‘should take measures to ensure compliance with the 
Convention, rather than simply waiting for a negative court decision against them.’46 
This would mean that bodies such as the Irish Medical Council and An Bord Altranais 
should take active steps to ensure their standards and guidance, including those on 
specialist palliative care, protects and vindicates the human rights contained in the 
ECHR.  
 
Section 4 of the ECHR Act 2003 outlines authorities to be considered by the courts 
when examining the Convention. This includes a wide range of decisions and opinions 
from the ECtHR, the European Commission of Human Rights, and the Committee of 
                                                          
38 European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003, s 1. 
39 European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003, s 1. 
40 Established by the Health Act 2007. 
41 Established by the Medical Practitioners Act 1978. 
42 Established by the Nurses Act 1950. 
43 Established by the Health Act 2004.  
44 Fiona de Londras and Cliona Kelly, European Convention on Human Rights Act (Round Hall 2010) 
127.   
45 European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003, s 5; de Londras (n44) 13 Such a declaration does 
not impact on the ‘“validity, continuing operation or enforcement of the statutory provision or rule of 
law in respect of which it is made’” and it will not have any impact on the proceedings before the court 
or on the legal position of the applicant who sought the declaration.’ 
46 de Londras (n44) 97 ‘At the very least these bodies would be expected to “proof” their policies, 
strategies and decision making processes so as to ensure compatibility with the Convention’. 
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Ministers.47 Courts are also required to take account of ‘the principles laid down by 
those declarations, decisions, advisory opinions, opinions and judgments.’48 This is a 
wide range of authorities on which to draw but there is also a margin of appreciation 
enjoyed by the States in applying the human rights set out in the ECHR. The basis of 
this margin of appreciation is that authorities in a State ‘are in a better position than 
an international judge when weighing competing public and individual interests.’49 
However, this is not to say that courts are provided an unrestricted margin of 
appreciation. In contrast to this, certain rights such as the right to be free from torture 
and inhuman or degrading treatment have a very narrow margin of appreciation as 
there can be no limitation placed on this right.50  
  
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
The European Union has drafted a number of treaties on human rights, including the 
European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights. This was largely a codification of 
human rights. For example, de Búrca wrote that the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
‘sets out in a single text, for the first time in the EU's history, a wide range of civil, 
political, economic and social rights of European citizens and of all persons resident 
in the EU.’51 The Charter of Fundamental Rights did not have full effect until the 
Lisbon Treaty entered into force on the 1st December 2009. The European Union is 
                                                          
47  European Convention on Human Rights Act, s 4. Judicial notice shall be taken of the Convention 
provisions and of— 
(a) any declaration, decision, advisory opinion or judgment of the European Court of Human Rights 
established under the Convention on any question in respect of which that Court has jurisdiction, 
(b) any decision or opinion of the European Commission of Human Rights so established on any 
question in respect of which it had jurisdiction, 
(c) any decision of the Committee of Ministers established under the Statute of the Council of Europe 
on any question in respect of which it has jurisdiction, 
and a court shall, when interpreting and applying the Convention provisions, take due account of the 
principles laid down by those declarations, decisions, advisory opinions, opinions and judgments. 
48 European Convention on Human Rights Act, s 4. 
49 Evana Kirrane, ‘Human Rights in the Irish Constitution and in the European Convention on Human 
Rights - A Comparative Study’ (2003) 21 Irish Law Times 7, 10; Powell and Rayner v the United 
Kingdom App No 9310/81 (ECtHR, 21 February 1990) [44] ‘It is certainly not for the Commission or 
the Court to substitute for the assessment of the national authorities any other assessment of what might 
be the best policy in this difficult social and technical sphere. This is an area where the Contracting 
States are to be recognised as enjoying a wide margin of appreciation.’; See also Hatton and Others v 
the United Kingdom App No 36022/97 (ECtHR, 8 July 2003) [100]. 
50 Gerhard Van Der Schyff, ‘Interpreting the protection guaranteed by two-stage rights in the European 
Convention on Human Rights: the case for wide interpretation’ in Eva Brems and Janneke Gerards 
(eds), Shaping Rights in the ECHR: The Role of the European Court of Human Rights in Determining 
the Scope of Human Rights (Cambridge University Press 2014) 68. 
51 Gráinne de Búrca, ‘The Domestic Impact of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2013) The Irish 
Jurist 49, 49.  
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required to act and legislate in line with the Charter. The Charter of Fundamental 
Rights is applicable to Institutions of the European Union and Member States when 
implementing EU law; it does not serve to extend the competences of the European 
Union. However, the Charter of Fundamental Rights will be referred to sparingly in 
this thesis as the Charter is not applicable to ‘the Member State’s actions in purely 
national situations’.52 Nonetheless, the Charter of Fundamental Freedoms highlights 
rights which ought to be protected and serves to encourage a culture of rights 
protection.  
 
The impact of the Charter is that it ‘strengthens the protection of fundamental rights 
by making those rights more visible and more explicit for citizens.’53 Of particular 
relevance to palliative care is the recognition in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
rights such as a right to human dignity,54 the right to the integrity of the person,55 the 
prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment,56 the respect for private 
and family life,57 the rights of the elderly,58 and the right to healthcare.59 Article 52 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights addresses the scope and interpretation of rights and 
principles. It sets out that the Charter of Fundamental Rights overlaps with and is to 
be aligned with the meaning of those rights also contained within the ECHR.60 As 
such, the Charter will be cited along with the ECHR in this Chapter but will be drawn 
on sparingly due to its limited enforceability. In addition to the Charter, reference will 
also be made to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the 
Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention 
on Human Rights and Biomedicine,61 and the European Charter of Patients’ Rights.62  
                                                          
52 ibid 52.   
53 ‘EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (European Commission, 25 July 2013) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/charter/> accessed 20 June 2014.  
54 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Preamble and Article 1. 
55 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 3. 
56 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 4. 
57 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 7. 
58 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 25. 
59 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 35. 
60 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 52(3) ‘In so far as this Charter contains 
rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by 
the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.’ 
61 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the 
Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (Oviedo 
Convention) 1997.  
62 European Charter of Patients’ Rights 2002. 
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The United Nations 
The United Nations has also addressed the protection of human rights. This is 
demonstrated by Universal Declaration of Human Rights which is the foundation for 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [hereinafter ‘ICCPR’] and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [hereinafter 
‘ICESCR’]. The ICCPR is monitored by the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee, to which States normally report every four years. A number of rights set 
out in the ICCPR overlap with those contained in the Irish Constitution and the 
ECHR63 but due to enforceability these rights will generally be examined by reference 
to Irish courts and the ECtHR. The ICESCR can be said to ‘list standards towards 
which parties to the Covenant are obliged to work.’64 It has been suggested that the 
ICESCR contains one of the most extensive articles on the right to health in human 
rights law.65 In this regard, Article 12.1 of the Covenant provides for the ‘right of 
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health.’66 The steps to be taken in protecting this right are set out in Article 12.2 of the 
ICESCR.67 However, the limited discussion of the right to health in case law means 
this Chapter will focus on more established rights, such as the right to bodily integrity. 
 
The Right to Bodily Integrity 
The right to bodily integrity has been recognised in the Irish Constitution, the 
European Convention on Human Rights, and the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of 
Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, and the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Furthermore, the right to 
bodily integrity is protected through the criminal and tort law on assault. In Ireland, 
                                                          
63 Overlapping rights include the right to life, the prohibition of torture, and the right to privacy.  
64 Mangan (n12) 56.  
65 ibid. 
66 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), Article 12.1. 
67 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), Article 12.2. 
The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full realization of this 
right shall include those necessary for: 
(a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality and for the healthy 
development of the child; 
(b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene; 
(c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases; 
(d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical attention in the 
event of sickness. 
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the right to bodily integrity was recognised in Ryan v Attorney General68 as an 
unenumerated right under Article 40.3.1˚ of the Irish Constitution.69 The plaintiff in 
this case objected to the addition of fluorine to the water supply and argued that this 
amounted to ‘an infringement of her own personal integrity.’70 The Court followed 
this in recognising a right to bodily integrity as part of the personal rights protected by 
the Constitution. In the High Court, Kenny J defined the right to bodily integrity as 
meaning:  
 
that no mutilation of the body or any of its members may be carried out on 
any citizen under authority of the law except for the good of the whole 
body and that no process which is or may, as a matter of probability, be 
dangerous or harmful to the life or health of the citizens or any of them 
may be imposed (in the sense of being made compulsory) by an Act of the 
Oireachtas.71  
 
Counsel for the plaintiff argued that this interpretation was ‘too narrow’.72 It is 
submitted that linking the right to bodily integrity to protection from ‘an Act of the 
Oireachtas’73 makes it difficult to enforce in many situations. For example, the absence 
of legislation which expressly addresses specialist palliative care would make the 
enforcement of this right particularly challenging in this area of healthcare.  
 
The Supreme Court in Ryan v Attorney General did not clarify the meaning of the 
right to bodily integrity as the Court did not consider it necessary to pronounce upon 
the definition of Kenny J. Although the Court recognised a right to bodily integrity it 
was found that there was no violation of this right.74 Subsequent case law resulted in 
the expansion of this right ‘into a more general right not to have one’s health 
endangered by the actions of the State’.75 By extension, this would mean that specialist 
palliative care should be provided in a manner which does not further endanger the 
                                                          
68 Ryan v Attorney General [1965] IR 294. 
69 Bunreacht na hÉireann Article 40.3.1˚ states that ‘[t]he State guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as 
far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen.’ 
70 Ryan v Attorney General [1965] IR 294, 296. 
71 Ryan v Attorney General [1965] IR 294, 313-314. 
72 Ryan v Attorney General [1965] IR 294, 332. 
73 Ryan v Attorney General [1965] IR 294, 313-314. 
74 Ryan v Attorney General [1965] IR 294, 295. 
75 Gerard Hogan and Gerry Whyte, Kelly: The Irish Constitution (4th edn, Butterworths 2003) 1420. 
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health of the patient. The expansion of the right to bodily integrity has been 
demonstrated in cases such as The State (C) v Frawley.76 
  
The applicant for habeas corpus in The State (C) v Frawley had a ‘severe sociopathic 
disorder which led him to commit violent acts injurious in the main to himself’.77 The 
medical attention needed was of a ‘highly specialised’78 type and was not available in 
Ireland. Finlay P held that it was not the obligation of the State ‘to build, equip and 
staff the very specialised unit’79 which would be needed in these circumstances. 
Nevertheless, Finlay P stated that ‘I see no reason why the principle … should not also 
operate to prevent an act or omission of the Executive which, without justification, 
would expose the health of a person to risk or danger’.80 As such, the right to bodily 
integrity is not limited to protection from legislation which has potentially harmful 
effects but is of broader applicability. On this basis, this right could be drawn on to 
encourage the Executive to take steps to ensure that appropriate palliative care can be 
accessed by terminally ill patients.  
 
The nature of the right to bodily integrity in relation to medical treatment was further 
clarified in the case of The State (McDonagh) v Frawley81 in which a prisoner with 
backache argued that he was not receiving appropriate treatment. The prisoner applied 
for habeas corpus on the basis of an alleged breach of the right to bodily integrity. 
Both the High Court and Supreme Court accepted that ‘lack of medical attention might 
amount to such a breach, but found that his complaint had not been substantiated’.82 
On this basis, a lack of appropriate medical treatment is capable of breaching the right 
to bodily integrity. The lack of appropriate treatment is a very real possibility in the 
context of palliative care. For example, in Chapter Two the surveys on the provision 
of palliative care conducted by O’Leary and Tiernan,83 and Hospice Friendly 
Hospitals84 were highlighted.  
                                                          
76 The State (C) v Frawley [1976] IR 365. 
77 Hogan (n75) 1420. 
78 The State (C) v Frawley [1976] IR 365, 372. 
79 The State (C) v Frawley [1976] IR 365, 372. 
80 The State (C) v Frawley [1976] IR 365, 372. 
81 The State (McDonagh) v Frawley [1978] IR 131. 
82 Hogan (n75) 1421. 
83 Norma O’Leary and Eoin Tiernan, ‘Survey of specialist palliative care services for noncancer patients 
in Ireland and perceived barriers’ (2008) Palliative Medicine 77. 
84 McKeown (n2).   
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In the survey conducted by O’Leary and Tiernan it was demonstrated that 24% of 
specialist palliative care services restricted care for noncancer patients in some 
manner.85 In a similar vein, the Hospital Friendly Hospitals report revealed 
considerable differences between doctors and nurses with regard to whether a patient 
had actually received specialist palliative care. Doctors believed 22% of patients had 
received specialist palliative care compared to the nurse’s response of 32%.86 The 
difference of 10% is a substantial figure and suggests that there is no harmonious 
understanding between these professions as to what constitutes specialist palliative 
care. This is problematic as doctors and nurses work closely in the care of the patient. 
These surveys suggest that not all patients in need of specialist palliative care can avail 
of or are provided with specialist palliative care. The cumulative effect of these 
surveys and the case law discussed is to suggest that the right to bodily integrity is 
likely to be infringed if appropriate palliative care is not provided. Although, it must 
also be shown that such care is necessary for the patient. However, it is necessary to 
recognise that a more limited interpretation of the right to bodily integrity may exist.        
 
The cases of The State (c) v Frawley and The State (McDonagh) v Frawley both 
concerned the interpretation of the right to bodily integrity in the context of prisoners. 
There is no case law which grounds an equivalent right to bodily integrity in the 
context of healthcare for the general population. This point was highlighted by Hogan 
and Whyte in stating that ‘given the very special circumstances of penal imprisonment, 
it is not the case that the right, as so stated, can be relied on in every other set of 
circumstances as well.’87 Economic concerns alongside resource implications may 
hamper a broader application of this right. There would appear to be a certain 
reluctance among the judiciary in expanding access to socio-economic rights which 
may result in significant implications for the allocation of public resources. This point 
is evidenced by the approach of the Supreme Court in TD v Minister for Education88 
and in Sinnott v Minister for Education.89  
 
                                                          
85 O’Leary (n83) 77. 
86 McKeown (n2) 33. 
87 Gerard Hogan and Gerry Whyte, Kelly: The Irish Constitution (4th edn, Butterworths 2003) 1420. 
88 TD v Minister for Education and Science [2001] 4 IR 259. 
89 Sinnott v Minister for Education [2001] 2 IR 545. 
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Consequently, the likelihood that the right to bodily integrity would be recognised by 
the courts as grounding an individual right to healthcare provision in the context of 
palliative care may come down to the associated economic cost. This is a factor to be 
aware of but does not necessarily mean that the right to bodily integrity would not be 
recognised and protected in the context of palliative care provision. Palliative care is 
not limited to a certain group in society, not limited to a particular illness, and it signals 
a shift from aiming to cure to aiming to minimise pain experienced near the end of 
life. As such, in many instances palliative care reflects a shift in the allocation of 
resources.  
 
Palliative care does not require the provision of expensive experimental drugs, and 
can be provided in the existing healthcare infrastructure. However, in order for 
appropriate palliative care to be provided it must not be hampered by an ineffective 
legal framework. In this respect, ensuring clarity in the legal framework for specialist 
palliative care cannot be said to raise the same concerns about the allocation of scare 
public resources as seen in the cases of TD v Minister for Education and in Sinnott v 
Minister for Education. On this basis, it can be argued that the courts may be more 
open to recognising circumstances in which there is a breach of the right to bodily 
integrity in the context of palliative care. However, it must be recognised that the 
definition of bodily integrity set out by Kenny J in Ryan v Attorney General speaks of 
the imposition of a process which be ‘dangerous or harmful to the life or health of the 
citizens’90 In this regard, palliative care would not amount to the imposition of such a 
process but would instead be a demand for a form of healthcare; a demand for what 
would be classed as a socio-economic right.   
 
There is no explicit recognition of a right to health in the Irish Constitution or in 
legislation in this jurisdiction. Despite this, in the Supreme Court case of Heeney v 
Dublin Corporation,91 it was stated by O’Flaherty J that ‘[i]t is beyond debate that 
there is a hierarchy of constitutional rights and at the top of the list is the right to life, 
followed by the right to health and with that the right to the integrity of one’s 
dwellinghouse.’92 In contrast to this is the case of Re Article 26 and the Health 
                                                          
90 Ryan v Attorney General [1965] IR 294, 313-314. 
91 Heeney v Dublin Corporation [1998] IESC 26. 
92 Heeney v Dublin Corporation [1998] IESC 26, [16] 
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(Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 2004 in which it was argued that a right to healthcare could 
be identified as part of ‘the right to life, the right to bodily integrity and the right to 
human dignity of the person.’93 The Supreme Court did not accept this argument and 
held that ‘a requirement to pay charges of the nature provided for prospectively in the 
Bill could not be considered as an infringement of the constitutional right to life and 
the right to bodily integrity as derived from Article 40.3 of the Constitution.’94 It is 
clear, therefore, that in Ireland the right to bodily integrity has not been interpreted by 
the courts as including socio-economic rights. There is a considerable degree of 
judicial resistance to the recognition or expansion of this type of right which would 
make it especially challenging to rely on in this context.  
 
This section has, up to this point, concentrated on Irish case law but it is necessary to 
also consider the impact of the ECHR and the approach of the ECtHR to the right to 
bodily integrity. The ECtHR has, in several cases, highlighted the importance of an 
appropriate legal framework in order to protect the right to physical integrity. In this 
respect, the ECtHR adds an enhanced recognition of positive rights as well as adding 
to constitutional jurisprudence in a substantial manner. 
 
Identifying a Right to Physical Integrity in the ECHR 
A right to physical integrity has been interpreted as being a part of Article 3 and Article 
8 of the ECHR.95 Article 3 of the ECHR establishes a prohibition on torture and 
inhuman or degrading treatment and Article 8 of the ECHR sets out the right to respect 
for private and family life. There is an overlap in the interpretation of these Articles 
but their application is distinguished based on the seriousness of the interference with 
the rights of the individual. Article 3 of the ECHR is applied for particularly grave 
interferences with an individual’s right to physical integrity while Article 8 of the 
ECHR is applied at a lower threshold. Both Article 3 and Article 8 of the ECHR place 
a positive obligation on States to protect the physical integrity of citizens.  
 
                                                          
93 Re Article 26 and the Health (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 2004 [2005] 1 IR 105, 111. 
94 Re Article 26 and the Health (Amendment) (No. 2) Bill 2004 [2005] 1 IR 105, 106; Tom L Beauchamp 
and James F Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (7th edn, Oxford University Press 2013) 272 
‘Rights to health-related resources will likely always have severe limits’. 
95 Pretty v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 1.   
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X & Y v Netherlands96 demonstrates the existence of positive obligations stemming 
from Article 8 of the ECHR. In this case the ECtHR held that the Netherlands was 
under an obligation to protect the applicant from an infringement of her Article 8 
rights. As stated in this case, the concept of a ‘private life’ under Article 8 of the ECHR 
includes the physical and psychological integrity of the individual.97 The case of X & 
Y v Netherlands was subsequently cited in Pretty v United Kingdom.98 The ECtHR in 
Pretty v United Kingdom recognised a right to physical integrity under both Article 3 
and Article 8 of the ECHR. In relation to Article 3 it was stated that it ‘obliges them 
to respect the physical and human integrity of such individuals.’99 The ECtHR in 
Pretty also set out that ‘[a]s the Court has had previous occasion to remark, the concept 
of “private life” is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition. It covers the 
physical and psychological integrity of a person’.100 This has been the approach of the 
ECtHR in several cases but this does little to actually clarify the meaning of the right 
to physical integrity under the ECHR.101 Greater guidance on the right to physical 
integrity can be found in Glass v United Kingdom,102 and Tysiąc v Poland.103 
 
In Glass v United Kingdom it was argued by the applicants that ‘certain decisions taken 
by a hospital authority and its doctors with respect to the treatment of the first applicant 
interfered with the latter's right to respect for personal integrity.’104 David Glass had 
an operation to ‘alleviate an upper respiratory tract obstruction.’105 There were a 
number of subsequent complications which led to him becoming critically ill. Hospital 
staff were of the opinion that he was dying but the patient’s family were not satisfied 
by this opinion. David’s condition fluctuated several times leading to discharge and 
readmission to the hospital. The doctors discussed the use of morphine with David’s 
                                                          
96 X & Y v Netherlands (1986) 8 EHRR 235.   
97 X & Y v Netherlands (1986) 8 EHRR 235, [22] ‘[t]here was no dispute as to the applicability of 
Article 8 (art. 8): the facts underlying the application to the Commission concern a matter of "private 
life", a concept which covers the physical and moral integrity of the person, including his or her sexual 
life.’ 
98 Pretty v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 1. 
99 Pretty v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 1, [13]. 
100 Pretty v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 1, [61]. 
101 Tysiąc v Poland (2007) 45 EHRR 42, [107]; YF v Turkey (2004) 39 EHRR 34, [33].  
102 Glass v United Kingdom (2004) 39 EHRR 15. 
103 Tysiąc v Poland (2007) 45 EHRR 42. 
104 Glass v United Kingdom (2004) 39 EHRR 15, [3]; Glass v United Kingdom (2004) 39 EHRR 15, [7] 
The first applicant is David Glass who is ‘a severely mentally and physically disabled child who requires 
twenty-four hour attention.’ The second applicant is David Glass’ mother. 
105 Glass v United Kingdom (2004) 39 EHRR 15, [9]. 
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mother during one of his readmissions.106 However, she was opposed to the 
administration of morphine. Regardless of this, diamorphine was prescribed for David 
during a subsequent readmission to the hospital. The family strongly objected to this 
treatment and so David’s care was transferred to his general practitioner. This alternate 
care proved to be much more beneficial and David’s condition improved. The 
applicants exhausted all possible legal remedies in the UK and brought the case before 
the ECtHR. 
  
It was not contested in Glass v United Kingdom that ‘the hospital was a public 
institution and that the acts and omissions of its medical staff were capable of engaging 
the responsibility of the respondent State under the Convention.’107 This demonstrates 
the applicability of the ECHR to the provision of specialist palliative care in a hospital 
in this jurisdiction. Several allegations were put before the ECtHR and the Court found 
there to be a violation of Article 8 of the ECHR. On this point, the ECtHR set out that: 
 
the decision to impose treatment on the first applicant in defiance of the 
second applicant's objections gave rise to an interference with the first 
applicant's right to respect for his private life, and in particular his right to 
physical integrity.108  
 
This demonstrates a close link between respect for the private life of the patient and 
their right to bodily integrity. In the judgment of the ECtHR it was also recognised 
that ‘the regulatory framework in the respondent State is firmly predicated on the duty 
to preserve the life of a patient, save in exceptional circumstances.’109 This point was 
considered in Chapter Three110 and will be explored further in this Chapter in the 
context of the right of autonomy.111 
  
The impact of the fragmented regulatory framework was also raised in Glass v United 
Kingdom. On this point, the ECtHR commented that ‘it does not accept the view that 
the many sources from which the rules, regulations and standards are derived only 
                                                          
106 Glass v United Kingdom (2004) 39 EHRR 15, [12].  
107 Glass v United Kingdom (2004) 39 EHRR 15, [71]. 
108 Glass v United Kingdom (2004) 39 EHRR 15, [70].  
109 Glass v United Kingdom (2004) 39 EHRR 15, [75].  
110 Text to n58 in Chapter Three.  
111 See p137.  
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contribute to unpredictability and an excess of discretion in this area at the level of 
application.’112 The focus should not be the origin of various rules but should instead 
be on whether the substance of the ‘rules, regulations and standards’113 combine to 
provide a predictable and consistent system in which healthcare professionals can 
practice, and thereby protect rights such as the right to physical integrity. In effect, this 
is the type of approach which is adopted in this thesis in relation to the legal framework 
in Ireland for specialist palliative care as it also draws from a wide range of sources.  
  
A legal framework for any area of healthcare must, by its nature, draw from a variety 
of sources to ensure it reflects and encourages best medical practice in the care of the 
patient. However, the legal framework should not be so diffuse as to ‘contribute to 
unpredictability and an excess of discretion’.114 Overall, the ECtHR held that ‘the 
decision of the authorities to override the second applicant's objection to the proposed 
treatment in the absence of authorisation by a court resulted in a breach of Article 8 of 
the Convention.’115 In short, this case demonstrates that the provision of palliative care 
clearly engages the rights set out in the ECHR, including the right to physical integrity. 
Additionally, the protection of these rights in practice often requires positive action on 
the part of the State. 
  
Positive Obligations arising from the ECHR 
Mowbray suggests that judicial recognition of positive obligations serves to ensure 
that the human rights set out by the ECHR are ‘practical and effective’.116 A positive 
right can be understood as establishing ‘a right to receive a particular good or service 
from others’117 and can be ‘grounded in principles of beneficence and justice.’118 Steps 
may need to be taken by the State or organs of the State to ensure that human rights 
are actually protected and are therefore not illusory. In this regard, the importance of 
                                                          
112 Glass v United Kingdom (2004) 39 EHRR 15, [75]. 
113 Glass v United Kingdom (2004) 39 EHRR 15, [75]. 
114 Glass v United Kingdom (2004) 39 EHRR 15, [75]. 
115 Glass v United Kingdom (2004) 39 EHRR 15, [83]. 
116 Alistair Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations Under the European Convention on 
Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights (Hart Publishing 2004) 221. 




an appropriate legal framework along with the right to physical integrity was discussed 
in Tysiąc v Poland.119 In this case the applicant alleged that:  
 
Her right to due respect for her private life and her physical and moral 
integrity had been violated both substantively, by failing to provide her 
with a legal therapeutic abortion, and as regards the State’s positive 
obligations, by the absence of a comprehensive legal framework to 
guarantee her rights.120  
 
The legal framework in Poland for abortion lacked a basic decision-making procedure. 
This served to narrowly constrain cases in which an abortion could be performed.  
 
The applicant in Tysiąc v Poland argued that ‘the process in her case had not been fair 
and had not afforded due respect for her private life and her physical and moral 
integrity.’121 The applicant in this case suffered from severe myopia. She became 
pregnant with her third child but was worried that her retina might detach due to the 
pregnancy. She was examined by three ophthalmologists who ‘concluded that, due to 
pathological changes in the applicant’s retina, the pregnancy and delivery constituted 
a risk to her eyesight.’122 Despite this, they were not willing to issue a certificate to 
allow for the pregnancy to be terminated. Further medical advice was subsequently 
sought by the applicant and a general practitioner issued a certificate stating that the 
pregnancy amounted to a threat to the health of the applicant. Nonetheless, the 
applicant’s request for an abortion was refused by the Head of the Gynaecology and 
Obstetrics Department in the State hospital. The applicant gave birth by Caesarean 
section and six weeks later her eyesight had further deteriorated.  
 
The ECtHR noted that a decision-making framework for this area should be 
‘timely’,123 ‘fair’124 and should not be framed in such a way as to limit its 
                                                          
119 Tysiąc v Poland (2007) 45 EHRR 42. 
120 Tysiąc v Poland (2007) 45 EHRR 42, [67]. 
121 Tysiąc v Poland (2007) 45 EHRR 42, [83]. 
122 Tysiąc v Poland (2007) 45 EHRR 42, [9]. 
123 Tysiąc v Poland (2007) 45 EHRR 42, [118] ‘The procedures in place should therefore ensure that 
such decisions are timely so as to limit or prevent damage to a woman’s health which might be 
occasioned by a late abortion.’ 
124 Tysiąc v Poland (2007) 45 EHRR 42, [113].  
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application.125 These points were made in the context of abortion but it can be argued 
that these principles are relevant for any area of healthcare which is especially time 
sensitive such as specialist palliative care. The Court concluded that there was a lack 
of an appropriate legal framework to assist in identifying whether a lawful abortion 
could be obtained.126 This resulted in the applicant experiencing ‘severe distress and 
anguish when contemplating the possible negative consequences of her pregnancy and 
upcoming delivery for her health.’127 The importance of a legal framework to protect 
a person’s rights under Article 8 of the ECHR was also raised in A, B, and C v 
Ireland.128 
 
There were three applicants in A, B, and C v Ireland but it is the discussion of the third 
applicant which is of most relevance to this thesis.129 This woman travelled to England 
for an abortion as she believed she would not have been able to ‘establish her right to 
an abortion in Ireland.’130 She had previously received chemotherapy over the course 
of three years and it was not clear what impact a pregnancy would have on her illness. 
Although, it was understood that ‘it would be dangerous for the foetus if she were to 
have chemotherapy during the first trimester.’131 The applicant subsequently became 
pregnant but was not aware of this when ‘she underwent a series of tests for cancer’.132 
She researched the health risks raised and due to the lack of clarity she travelled to 
England to have an abortion.133 There were complications stemming from this 
procedure such as ‘prolonged bleeding and infection.’134 These facts led the applicant 
                                                          
125 Tysiąc v Poland (2007) 45 EHRR 42, [116].  
126 Tysiąc v Poland (2007) 45 EHRR 42, [124]. 
127 Tysiąc v Poland (2007) 45 EHRR 42, [124]. 
128 A, B, and C v Ireland (2010) ECHR 2032, [167] ‘The first and second applicants complained under 
Article 8 about the restrictions on lawful abortion in Ireland which meant that they could not obtain an 
abortion for health and/or well-being reasons in Ireland and the third applicant complained under the 
same Article about the absence of any legislative implementation of Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution.’; 
Sonya Donnelly, ‘A, B and C v Ireland: A Commentary’ (2011) 11(2) Medico-Legal Journal of Ireland 
43; Sheelagh McGuinness, ‘A, B, and C Leads to D (for delegation!)’ (2011) 19(3) Medical Law 
Review 476; Jennifer Schweppe, ‘Taking Responsibility for the “Abortion Issue”: Some Thoughts on 
Legislative Reform in the Aftermath of A, B and C’ (2011) 2 Irish Journal of Family Law 50. 
129 A, B, and C v Ireland (2010) ECHR 2032, [242] ‘It concludes that there has been no violation of 
Article 8 of the Convention as regards the first and second applicants.’ 
130 A, B, and C v Ireland (2010) ECHR 2032, [22]. 
131 A, B, and C v Ireland (2010) ECHR 2032, [23]. 
132 A, B, and C v Ireland (2010) ECHR 2032, [24]. 
133 A, B, and C v Ireland (2010) ECHR 2032, [24] ‘She alleged that, as a result of the chilling effect of 
the Irish legal framework, she received insufficient information as to the impact of the pregnancy on 
her health and life and of her prior tests for cancer on the foetus.’ 
134 A, B, and C v Ireland (2010) ECHR 2032, [26]. 
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to complain on the basis of Article 8 of the ECHR and ‘the alleged failure to implement 
the constitutional right to an abortion in Ireland in the case of a risk to the life of the 
woman.’135  
 
The ECtHR recognised the lack of a suitable decision-making framework in Ireland 
for abortion and highlighted the absence of any procedure for resolving a situation 
where there are differing opinions between the parties involved.136 The use of medical 
consultation or litigation options as set out by the Irish Government was viewed as 
ineffective in such circumstances by the ECtHR.137 On this basis, the Court concluded 
that: 
 
the authorities failed to comply with their positive obligation to secure to 
the third applicant effective respect for her private life by reason of the 
absence of any implementing legislative or regulatory regime providing an 
accessible and effective procedure by which the third applicant could have 
established whether she qualified for a lawful abortion in Ireland in 
accordance with Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution.138 
 
The discussion of A, B, and C v Ireland moved the focus slightly away from the right 
to physical integrity in this section but it demonstrated the importance of complying 
with the positive obligations raised by Article 8 of the ECHR.139 In particular, the case 
of A, B, and C v Ireland further demonstrated the importance of an appropriate 
decision-making framework for the legally and ethically challenging aspects of 
healthcare.  
 
In applying this reasoning to specialist palliative care it is evident that there needs to 
be a decision-making framework in place which makes it clear for both the patient and 
                                                          
135 A, B, and C v Ireland (2010) ECHR 2032, [3]. 
136 A, B, and C v Ireland (2010) ECHR 2032, [253]. ‘Furthermore, there is no framework whereby any 
difference of opinion between the woman and her doctor or between different doctors consulted, or 
whereby an understandable hesitancy on the part of a woman or doctor, could be examined and resolved 
through a decision which would establish as a matter of law whether a particular case presented a 
qualifying risk to a woman’s life such that a lawful abortion might be performed.’ 
137 A, B, and C v Ireland (2010) ECHR 2032, [263].  
138 A, B, and C v Ireland (2010) ECHR 2032, [267]. 
139 See p170. The breadth of positive obligations under Article 8 and their role in developing the legal 
framework will be drawn on in Chapter Five when examining the professional standards and guidelines 
in Ireland for specialist palliative care.   
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the healthcare professional when palliative sedation can be administered and whether 
artificial nutrition and hydration can be withdrawn. In this regard, the ECtHR in Tysiąc 
v Poland made it clear that such a framework needs to be ‘timely’,140 ‘fair’141 and 
should not be framed in such a way as to limit its application.142 Adopting such an 
approach helps ensure that rights such as the right to bodily integrity can be effectively 
protected and vindicated. Closely related to the right to bodily integrity is the right to 
be protected from inhuman or degrading treatment.143 The precise meaning of this 
right will be explored in the next section.  
 
Protection from Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
The right to be protected from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment has been 
set out in the ECHR,144 the Charter of Fundamental Rights,145 the ICCPR,146 the 
United Nations Convention against Torture,147 and the European Convention for the 
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.148 
Protection from inhuman or degrading treatment was recognised in the State (C) v 
Frawley149 as an unenumerated right guaranteed by Article 40 of the Irish Constitution. 
In this case Finlay P set out that:  
 
If the unspecified personal rights guaranteed by Article 40 follow in part 
or in whole from the Christian and democratic nature of the State, it is 
                                                          
140 Tysiąc v Poland (2007) 45 EHRR 42, [118]. 
141 Tysiąc v Poland (2007) 45 EHRR 42, [113]. 
142 Tysiąc v Poland (2007) 45 EHRR 42, [116]. 
143 Hogan (n75) 1422 ‘An obvious corollary of the right to bodily integrity is the right to freedom from 
torture, or inhuman or degrading treatment.’; The State (C) v Frawley [1976] IR 365, 374 ‘If the 
unspecified personal rights guaranteed by Article 40 follow in part or in whole from the Christian and 
democratic nature of the State, it is surely beyond argument that they include freedom from torture, and 
from inhuman or degrading treatment and punishment.’ 
144 European Convention on Human Rights, Article 3. 
145 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 4 ‘No one shall be subjected to torture 
or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.’ 
146 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), Article 7. 
147 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(1984).   
148 European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Strasbourg, 26.XI.1987 Text amended according to the provisions of Protocols No. 1 (ETS 
No. 151) and No. 2 (ETS No. 152), which entered into force on 1 March 2002. 
149 The State (C) v Frawley [1976] IR 365. 
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surely beyond argument that they include freedom from torture, and from 
inhuman or degrading treatment and punishment.150 
 
Despite recognising an unenumerated right to protection from torture and inhuman or 
degrading treatment, the Court in Frawley held that this right had not been breached. 
Finlay P associated this right with ‘revenge, retaliation, the creation of fear or improper 
interrogation.’151 In the opinion of Finlay P, this right was not to be associated with 
the ‘discharge of a duty to prevent self-injury or self-destruction.’152 Linking this right 
to ideas of revenge and retaliation begins to demonstrate the challenge of successfully 
relying on this right, particularly in the context of specialist palliative care. However, 
it is to be questioned whether Irish courts would still take such a narrow interpretation 
of the right to be protected from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, 
particularly in light of ECtHR jurisprudence.    
 
Protection from inhuman or degrading treatment is provided by Article 3 of the ECHR 
which sets out that, ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.’153 This is an absolute right under the ECHR to which no 
derogations are permitted. Ireland v UK154 demonstrated the distinction between 
torture and inhuman or degrading treatment. In this regard, the ECtHR took the view 
that ‘this distinction derives principally from a difference in the intensity of the 
suffering inflicted.’155 Torture is a much higher threshold and the focus will be placed 
on inhuman and degrading treatment in this section. Article 3 of the ECHR imposes 
both positive156 and negative obligations157 on States. The negative obligation imposed 
by the State is absolute in that it states that ‘no one shall be subject’ to the prohibited 
forms of treatment. In contrast to this, the positive obligation is not absolute and has 
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largely ‘been developed through the Convention jurisprudence.’158 This may impose 
a variety of obligations such as   
 
an obligation on states to pass criminal laws outlawing and punishing ill-
treatment amounting to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment; an 
obligation to investigate arguable breaches of art 3; and an obligation to 
take reasonable steps to prevent real and immediate risks of torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment at the hands of non-state agents.159  
 
As stated earlier, there is a high threshold for successfully relying on Article 3 of the 
ECHR which has had the effect of limiting its use. In discussing this right it is 
necessary to consider the distinction between ‘inhuman treatment’ and ‘degrading 
treatment’ as well as what constitutes inhuman or degrading treatment. The difference 
between degrading treatment and inhuman treatment is based on the ‘degree of 
suffering caused, whether physical or mental’.160 Nonetheless, cases such as II v 
Bulgaria161 have demonstrated that the ECtHR does not always ‘draw a sharp 
distinction and use qualifications such as ‘inhuman and degrading treatment’.’162  
 
Inhuman treatment was defined in the Greek case as causing ‘severe suffering, mental 
or physical, in the particular situation’.163 Degrading treatment was also defined in that 
case as treatment which ‘grossly humiliates him before others or drives him to act 
against his will or conscience’.164 In Pretty v the United Kingdom, degrading treatment 
was described by the ECtHR as treatment which ‘humiliates or debases an individual 
showing a lack of respect for, or diminishing, his or her dignity or arouses feelings of 
fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking a person’s moral and physical 
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resistance’.165 The reference to ‘dignity’ reflects its status in the ECHR.166 It has been 
described as ‘the very essence’ of Article 3 of the ECHR and the characterisation of 
dignity will be discussed later in this Chapter.167 The above definition of degrading 
treatment is more detailed than that set out in the Greek case and demonstrates how 
the focus is on the consequences of the actions rather than the intention behind the 
action. This is in contrast to the interpretation of Finlay P in State (C) v Frawley.168 Of 
particular importance is that there must be actual bodily injury or ‘intense physical or 
mental suffering’.169 This does not need to be the result of physical violence but may 
take the form of a naturally occurring illness as demonstrated by the cases of D v 
United Kingdom,170 Keenan v United Kingdom,171 and Bensaid v United Kingdom.172  
The applicant in D v United Kingdom was found to be in possession of a quantity of 
cocaine upon arriving at Gatwick Airport in London. He served his prison sentence in 
England and was to be removed to his home country of St. Kitts upon release. While 
serving his sentence, the applicant was diagnosed as suffering from AIDS. The 
applicant sought to remain in the UK ‘on compassionate grounds since his removal to 
St Kitts would entail the loss of the medical treatment which he was currently 
receiving, thereby shortening his life expectancy’173 The Chief Immigration Officer 
                                                          
165 Pretty v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 1, [52]; See also Price v the United Kingdom, App no 
33394/96, (ECtHR, 10 July 2001); Valašinas v Lithuania, App no 44558/98, ( 24 July 2001).  
166 Christopher McCrudden, ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ (2008) 19(4) 
The European Journal of International Law 655, 687 ‘the ECtHR has increasingly resorted to the use 
of dignity language in interpreting Article 3.’  
167 Selmouni v. France App no 25803/94 (ECtHR, 28 July 1999) [99] ‘in respect of a person deprived 
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v United Kingdom (1978) ECHR 1, [27] Note the separate opinion of Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice. In 
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filth, pelted with muck, paraded naked in front of strangers, forced to eat excreta, deface the portrait of 
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168 Text to n148. 
169 Ireland v United Kingdom (1978) ECHR 1, [167]. 
170 D v United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 423. 
171 Keenan v United Kingdom (2001) EHRR 913. 
172 Bensaid v United Kingdom (2001) ECHR 82, [46] ‘Not every act or measure which adversely affects 
moral or physical integrity will interfere with the right to respect to private life guaranteed by Article 
8. However, the Court's case-law does not exclude that treatment which does not reach the severity of 
Article 3 treatment may nonetheless breach Article 8 in its private-life aspect where there are 
sufficiently adverse effects on physical and moral integrity.’; See also Stephanie Palmer, ‘AIDs, 
expulsion and Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2005) 5 European Human 
Rights Law Review 533.   
173 D v United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 423, [11]; D v United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 423, [52] 
‘The Commission also noted that it has not ‘been shown whether the applicant would be guaranteed a 
bed in either of the hospitals on the island which, according to the Government, care for AIDS patients.’ 
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refused this request. The risk to the applicant’s health was accepted by the 
Commission and ‘concluded that the removal of the applicant to St Kitts would engage 
the responsibility of the respondent State under Article 3’.174 The cumulative effect of 
these conditions led to the Commission deciding that ‘to remove him to St Kitts would 
amount to inhuman treatment by the respondent State in violation of Article 3’.175  
 
The decision in D v United Kingdom demonstrates that the potential of being denied 
appropriate medical care was sufficient in this case to engage Article 3 of the ECHR.176 
This position was summarised in L v Lithuania177 where the ECtHR stated that: 
 
Article 3 entails a positive obligation on the part of the State to protect the 
individual from acute ill-treatment, whether physical or mental, whatever 
its source. Thus if the source is a naturally occurring illness, the treatment 
for which could involve the responsibility of the State but is not 
forthcoming or is patently inadequate, an issue may arise under this 
provision.178  
 
This quote demonstrates the relevance of Article 3 of the ECHR to the provision of 
specialist palliative care as the treatment and care must be available and needs to be 
adequate for the naturally occurring illness. Nevertheless, it is to be emphasised that 
the key facts in D v United Kingdom are that the patient was already terminally ill and 
there was no real prospect of appropriate medical care if he were to be extradited. In 
effect, the case of D v United Kingdom did not serve to establish Article 3 as 
‘promoting a general social right to medical care for individuals facing expulsion from 
the state.’179 Instead it appears that a complete lack of medical care or inadequate 
medical care would be required to give rise to a breach of Article 3 of the ECHR.  
 
                                                          
174 D v United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 423, [45]. 
175 D v United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 423, [53]. 
176 See also Tanko v Finland App no 23634/94 (Commission Decision, 19 May 1994) 1 ‘The 
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177 L v Lithuania (2008) 46 EHRR 22. 
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A further way in which a person may be degraded is ‘to impose medical treatment on 
him or her without his or her consent.’180 Such treatment was at issue in the ECtHR 
case of Herczegfalvy v Austria.181 The person at the centre of this case was a 
‘compulsorily detained psychiatric patient.’182 The patient was force fed and sedated 
without his consent, isolated and restraints were used to control his movement. The 
patient complained that this amounted to a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR. The 
ECtHR identified two necessary elements for successfully invoking the protection 
offered by Article 3 of the ECHR. The first point is that ‘the treatment must reach a 
minimum level of severity in terms of degradation and humiliation.’183 This threshold 
will depend on the circumstances of the individual case.184 For example, in Kudla v 
Poland185 it was stated that, ‘the Court has consistently stressed that the suffering and 
humiliation involved must in any event go beyond that inevitable element of suffering 
or humiliation connected with a given form of legitimate treatment or punishment’186 
In deciding whether this threshold is met a number of factors must be considered.   
 
The factors to be considered include the form of treatment and its physical impact on 
the individual, the manner in which such treatment is provided, and the use of physical 
restraint.187 In Keenan v United Kingdom188 the Court recognised that factors to be 
considered include ‘the duration of the treatment, its physical and/or mental effects 
and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim.’189 The weight to be 
given to each of these factors is not clear but they demonstrate the range of factors 
                                                          
180 Feldman (n160) 693. 
181 Herczegfalvy v Austria (1992) 15 EHRR 437. 
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Yearbook 12, p. 186).’ 
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which the ECtHR can draw on to identify treatment as being inhuman or degrading. 
The second point is that there will be no breach of Article 3 if the treatment is 
demonstrated to be therapeutically necessary.190 In Herczegfalvy v Austria, the ECtHR 
held that there had been no violation of Article 3 as ‘medical necessity justified the 
treatment in issue.’191 The issue of what is therapeutically necessary is not always clear 
in specialist palliative care. This was demonstrated in Chapter Two in relation to the 
withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration along with the decision to administer 
palliative sedation.192 In circumstances where the interference with the patient does 
satisfy the criteria for Article 3 of the ECHR then the right to private life ‘comes into 
play’.193  
 
Further guidance on Article 3 of the ECHR can be found in the case of R(on the 
application of N) v Doctor M and Others.194 In R(on the application of N) v Doctor M 
and Others it was accepted by Dyson LJ that as long as the minimum severity 
threshold is met and in the absence of consent it must be shown that the treatment was 
in line with the best interests of the patient and was therapeutically necessary. 
Donnelly suggests that on this basis it appears that ‘Article 3 adds a new element to 
the decision-making process (in cases where the minimum severity threshold is 
reached).’195 However, this severity threshold may be a more fluid test. This is 
demonstrated by the case of Selmouni v France.196  
 
In Selmouni v France, the ECtHR were of the opinion that ‘the increasingly high 
standard being required in the protection of human rights and fundamental liberties 
correspondingly and inevitably requires greater firmness in assessing breaches of the 
fundamental values of democratic societies’.’197 The opinion of the ECtHR in 
Selmouni v France demonstrates that what constitutes inhuman or degrading treatment 
                                                          
190 Herczegfalvy v Austria (1992) 15 EHRR 437, [82]. 
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will change over time and a stricter standard may be seen in future. It is to be 
remembered that the rights set out in the ECHR provide ‘a floor of rights protection 
rather than a ceiling’.198 This position has been set out by Grosz, Beatson, and Duffy 
who state:   
 
There is no imperative that parties to the Convention should adopt a 
uniform approach, only that they should not fall below a irreducible 
minimum, which will be monitored by the Strasbourg institutions. It is 
therefore open to national courts to develop a domestic jurisprudence 
under the Convention which may be more generous to applicants than that 
dispensed in Strasbourg, while remaining broadly consistent with it.199 
 
On this basis, Irish courts are not prevented from applying a more stringent approach 
to human rights protection. The ECHR has always been treated as a living instrument 
and its scope has been greatly expanded by the ECtHR over the years, especially on 
moral issues. Despite this, there remains a relatively high threshold for successfully 
relying on Article 3 of the ECHR which has limited its use.  
 
Palliative care in Ireland has developed considerably in recent years but the possibility 
of insufficient care at the end-of-life remains a possibility. In Chapter Two and earlier 
in this chapter, research on the provision of palliative care conducted by O’Leary and 
Tiernan,200 and Hospice Friendly Hospitals201 was highlighted. The disparity of care 
available to people suffering from illnesses other than cancer was identified in these 
surveys.202 In addition, it was shown that there was a degree of confusion about 
whether specialist palliative care was provided or whether it would even have been 
beneficial to certain patients.203 Consequently, these surveys demonstrate that there 
are cases where terminally ill patients do not receive specialist palliative care or the 
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care provided is inadequate. In effect, these types of cases could give rise to a breach 
of Article 3 of the ECHR. 
 
The protection from inhuman or degrading treatment is an important facet of the legal 
framework for specialist palliative care and must be protected in practice. Whether 
this right is or is not provided for in professional standards and guidelines will be 
examined in Chapter Five. Although the right to be protected from inhuman or 
degrading treatment is significant in the context of specialist palliative care, it has been 
suggested that it is Article 8 of the ECHR which has resulted in ‘more helpful 
jurisprudence’.204  
 
The Right to Autonomy    
The term autonomy is derived from the Greek words ‘autos’ meaning self and ‘nomos’ 
meaning rule or law.205 The concept of autonomy is a difficult concept to adequately 
define due to the range of competing definitions.206 It can be summarised as an 
individual’s freedom to make their own decisions. Patient involvement in end-of-life 
care is particularly important. A reason for this is that ‘Pain is always subjective’.207 
In effect, it is only the patient who knows and feels their own pain. The right of 
autonomy is most at issue when the decision of an individual conflicts with that of 
another as regards what is best for the patient.208 In relation to palliative care, this 
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205 JT Pring, The Oxford Dictionary of Modern Greek: Greek-English and English-Greek (Doubleday 
1986) [self-] 281; JT Pring, The Oxford Dictionary of Modern Greek: Greek-English and English-Greek 
(Doubleday 1986) [law] 180. 
206 Beauchamp (n9) 101 ‘At a minimum, personal autonomy encompasses self-rule that is free from 
both controlling interference by others and limitations that prevent meaningful choice, such as 
inadequate understanding.’; Bryan A Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary (9th edn, Thompson/West 2009) 
154 ‘An individual’s capacity for self-determination.’; Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford 
University Press 1969) 171 Berlin’s positive liberty can be equated with autonomy – positive liberty 
focuses on ‘[w]hat, or who, is the source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, 
or be, this rather than that?’; Richard Lindley, Autonomy (MacMillan Education 1986) 6 ‘An 
autonomous person has a will of her or his own, and is able to act in pursuit of self-chosen goals.’; 
Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge University Press 1998) 6 ‘freedom 
of the will’, ‘independence’, ‘critical reflection’; Denis A Cusack, ‘Patient Autonomy: Perpetual Myth 
or Achievable Reality?’ (1999) 5(1) Medico-Legal Journal of Ireland 2, 2 ‘The very concept of 
autonomy is not one for which there is a uniform definition.’ Also defines autonomy as ‘the right to 
self-govern, or the right to partial self-government, or the right to self-determination.’; Onora O’Neill, 
Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics (Cambridge University Press 2002) 22 ‘self-mastery; choosing freely; 
choosing one’s own moral position and accepting responsibility for one’s choice’. 
207 International Association for the Study of Pain cited in World Health Organization, Cancer Pain 
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illustrates the need to carefully balance the autonomy of the patient with the autonomy 
of the healthcare professional.209 The competing rights of autonomy between the 
healthcare professional and patient should not be framed in such a way as to deprive 
a patient of care they need or force a doctor to provide care which he/she considers 
not to be in the best interests of a patient.210 This is a difficult balance to achieve but 
it must be addressed in the legal framework for specialist palliative care if the 
framework is to promote clarity, consistency, and the protection of human rights in 
this jurisdiction. 
 
Autonomy gives rise to both negative and positive obligations and the treatment of 
these obligations in case law will be outlined in this section.211 This approach has been 
favoured as it demonstrates how autonomy is actually being interpreted and applied in 
practice and therefore, facilitates the identification of the existing legal framework for 
specialist palliative care practices. 
 
The ethical concept that is autonomy has been recognised and protected in common 
law, constitutional provisions, the ECHR, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights.212 
Legal protection of such an ethical concept does not automatically ensure that 
autonomy will be protected but its value lies in the fact that ‘legal endorsement does 
provide a means for patients to make ethical principles enforceable in their individual 
situations.’213 Moreover, the importance attached to autonomy is demonstrated by 
Madden who suggests that ‘Respect for the principle of individual autonomy is now 
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regarded as central to healthcare decision-making.’214 The status attached to autonomy 
in palliative care can be said to demonstrate: 
 
the fact that dying is no longer, in many cases, a natural occurrence, but is 
heavily influenced by medical decisions and usually takes place in medical 
facilities. Medically prolonged life can be prolonged suffering, and many 
people may seek to avoid it by demanding active euthanasia or making 
living wills, in which they specifically forego treatment.215 
 
The legality of living wills will be discussed later in this Chapter but this quote 
underlines the necessity of taking account of the wishes of the patient in order to 
provide appropriate healthcare. In relation to specialist palliative care it must be asked 
what the right of autonomy actually means for the terminally ill patient, in what 
circumstances is the right of autonomy engaged, who has a duty to ensure the right of 
autonomy is protected, and does the application of this right highlight gaps or 
shortcomings in the legal framework for specialist palliative care. 
  
Common Law Recognition of Autonomy 
In Re a Ward of Court Denham J set out the importance of consent in medical 
treatment. This requires a person to be able to make an autonomous decision. Denham 
J set out that this ‘arises out of civil, criminal and constitutional law.’216 The absence 
of consent to medical treatment may result in ‘trespass against the person in civil law, 
a battery in criminal law, and a breach of the individual's constitutional rights.’217 
However, a person’s autonomous decision must be respected even if it is not 
necessarily in the patient’s best interests from a purely medical perspective. Denham 
J highlighted this point and set out that ‘medical treatment may be refused for other 
than medical reasons, or reasons most citizens would regard as rational, but the person 
of full age and capacity may make the decision for their own reasons.’218 There is 
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considerable respect given to a person’s autonomous decision even if it is not 
necessarily in the person’s best interests. Donnelly commented that the approach of 
Denham J ‘followed a well-established line of jurisprudence in both England and 
Wales and the United States where the common law right of autonomy has been held 
to allow a capable patient to refuse medical treatment even if this will lead to his or 
her death.’219  
 
One of the main cases to demonstrate the common law right of autonomy is Re T 
(Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment).220 This case involved the refusal of a blood 
transfusion by a person who was raised as a Jehovah’s Witness although she was not 
practicing her religion prior to this decision. In this case, Lord Donaldson MR 
commented that:  
 
An adult patient who, like Miss T., suffers from no mental incapacity has 
an absolute right to choose whether to consent to medical treatment, to 
refuse it or to choose one rather than another of the treatments being 
offered. This right of choice is not limited to decisions which others might 
regard as sensible. It exists notwithstanding that the reasons for making the 
choice are rational, irrational, unknown or even non-existent.221 
 
This demonstrates that the right of autonomy requires a person to have sufficient 
mental capacity and the person’s choice is limited to the treatment options proposed 
by the healthcare professional. Despite these limits, the right of autonomy does 
provide the patient with a considerable degree of control over medical decisions 
affecting them. Moreover, it is necessary that a clear test for assessing the mental 
capacity of a patient forms part of the legal framework for specialist palliative care 
and that patients are involved in decisions which impact on their medical care. The 
test for capacity and ways of giving effect to a patient’s wishes will be discussed later 
in this section. In addition to common law protection, the right of autonomy has also 
been protected by the Irish Constitution and the ECHR.      
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Constitutional Protection of the Right of Autonomy  
The right of autonomy was recognised as an unenumerated right protected by Article 
40.3.1˚ of the Irish Constitution in the Supreme Court case of Re a Ward of Court.222 
In this case autonomy was viewed as part of the right to privacy by Hamilton CJ. 
However Denham J took the view that the right of autonomy was a separate 
constitutional right.223 Despite this, the Court merely listed the relevant rights and did 
not engage in a discussion as to how these rights actually operate or how they are to 
be protected.224 This was a surprising case to recognise a constitutional right of 
autonomy as the woman at the centre of Re a Ward of Court was in a near persistent 
vegetative state and could not indicate whether she wanted treatment withdrawn. In a 
separate case the right of autonomy has been seen as distinct from privacy and was 
‘affirmed obiter by two members of the Supreme Court in North Western Health 
Board v HW and CW.’225 The case law on autonomy has continued to expand and the 
right of autonomy has been recognised as a basis for treatment refusal as seen in JM v 
Board of Management of St Vincent's Hospital.226  
 
Donnelly suggests that JM v Board of Management of St Vincent’s Hospital marked 
the ‘first significant judicial engagement with the right’ in Ireland.227 This case 
involved a refusal of a blood transfusion in advance by a Jehovah’s Witness who then 
lost consciousness. Patient autonomy was not to be the deciding factor in this case as 
the patient was admitted to wardship and it was ordered that treatment be administered. 
In making this decision the court relied on its parens patriae jurisdiction and suggested 
that if the patient were competent to refuse treatment then such a decision would be 
allowed. Finnegan P held that the patient had not made ‘a clear final decision as the 
notice party was pre-occupied with her husband and his religious beliefs rather than 
her own welfare and whether or not to have treatment.’228 As a consequence of this, 
the Court did not consider the decision of the patient to be real and was therefore not 
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an autonomous decision. This meant that the advance refusal of a blood transfusion 
was not upheld in this case. 
 
The right of autonomy was also relied on by the applicant in Fleming v Ireland & 
Ors.229 In this case it was submitted that a freedom to end a person’s own life existed 
on the basis of the right to autonomy, right to bodily integrity, and self-determination. 
However, the Court noted that ‘In the social order contemplated by the Constitution, 
and the values reflected in it, that would be the antithesis of the right rather than the 
logical consequence of it.’230 This case demonstrates that the right of autonomy does 
not extend so far as to provide for a right to assisted suicide. The effect of this is that 
a person makes decisions as part of a society and decisions are constrained by values 
contained in the Constitution and the need to ensure decisions do not negatively affect 
other people.  
 
While these cases recognised a right of autonomy they do little to demonstrate how 
the right can be utilised by the individual. As Donnelly noted, the ‘majority of patients 
who seek to exercise their right of autonomy are restricted from doing so, not because 
of any general limit but because, in their particular circumstances, the right does not 
arise.’231 For this reason, better guidance on the exercise of the right of autonomy can 
be found in ECtHR case law.   
 
Protection of the Right of Autonomy under the ECHR 
The ECHR contains provisions protecting autonomy but they do not expand past 
relevant constitutional provisions. Article 8 of the ECHR sets out that ‘Everyone has 
the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.’232 
The first step in a case which raises Article 8 of the ECHR is to consider whether the 
complaint actually comes within the remit of Article 8. Unlike Article 3 of the ECHR, 
there is no minimum severity threshold for the application of Article 8. If answered in 
the positive, the second step is to then consider whether there has been an interference 
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with Article 8, and whether such interference is in accordance with the law, whether 
it pursues a legitimate aim, or if it is necessary in a democratic society.233 
 
The right of autonomy as protected by Article 8 of the ECHR was the focus of Pretty 
v United Kingdom.234 This case further serves to identify the limits which may be 
placed on a person’s autonomy. It was alleged by the applicant in Pretty v United 
Kingdom that her rights under Articles 2, 3, 8, 9 and 14 of the ECHR were infringed 
as the Director of Public Prosecutions would not grant immunity to her husband for 
assisting in her suicide, in addition to the prohibition on assisted suicide set out in the 
Suicide Act 1961.235  
 
The House of Lords did not consider that Article 8 of the ECHR had any relevance for 
the ending of life as with Mrs Pretty. This point is demonstrated by the view that 
although Article 8 ‘offered protection to autonomy during life, it did not say anything 
about the right of individuals to autonomy over their deaths.’236 However, the 
relevance of the right of autonomy in relation to treatment refusal which would result 
in a patient’s death was subsequently accepted by the ECtHR.237  
 
The ECtHR held that the rights provided by Article 8 of the ECHR were engaged.238 
Pretty v United Kingdom demonstrates the issues to be considered in limiting a 
person’s autonomy. In particular, under Article 8(2) the necessity of an interference 
with the right of autonomy was to be examined. Article 8(2) can be said to set out a 
three step test for limiting the right to respect for private life. For instance, Article 8(2) 
sets out that: 
 
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in 
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a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or 
the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others.239 
 
This demonstrates that an interference with a person’s private life is permissible under 
Article 8 provided it is necessary in a democratic society and the interference must be 
based on a listed purpose. In deciding on whether an interference is required in a 
democratic society, the Court considers the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the 
State. This margin of appreciation ‘will vary in accordance with the nature of the issues 
and the importance of the interests at stake.’240 As such, the ECtHR set out that ‘The 
more serious the harm involved the more heavily will weigh in the balance 
considerations of public health and safety against the countervailing principle of 
personal autonomy.’241 In this regard, the ECtHR in Pretty accepted that the interference 
was necessary and Article 8 of the ECHR had not been violated. Nevertheless on the 
basis of both ECtHR and Irish case law it is difficult to see how the refusal of treatment 
by a terminally ill patient could come within Article 8(2) of the ECHR. It is 
challenging to see how limiting autonomy in situations where there is a refusal of 
treatment could be necessary in a democratic society or what a listed purpose in this 
regard might entail. For example, in the case of Re a Ward of Court, Denham J set out 
that potential limitations on a person’s autonomy arise ‘in regard to contagious 
diseases or in a medical emergency where the patient is unable to communicate.’242 
There is no suggestion to support a broader set of limits. 
 
The right to autonomy under the ECHR may give rise to positive obligations as 
demonstrated by the case of R(Burke) v General Medical Council.243 The patient in 
Burke had spino-cerebellar ataxia which would eventually lead to his death. He 
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challenged the guidance issued by the General Medical Council that artificial nutrition 
and hydration would be withdrawn from the patient in certain circumstances.244 This 
case did not establish a right to request any course of treatment but instead it 
recognised a ‘right to be protected from … a lack of treatment in such cases’.245 The 
case was heard by Munby J and was subsequently appealed by the General Medical 
Council.  
 
Munby J held that the patient had a right to have the treatment continued and that the 
guidance of the General Medical Council was incompatible with Articles 2, 3 and 8 of 
the ECHR.246 Additionally, Munby J relied on autonomy, self-determination, dignity 
and the patient’s best interests. Although it would appear that Munby J recognised a 
broad right of autonomy, the patient cannot request any treatment they want but is 
limited to choose from the possible treatment options as outlined by the doctor.247 In 
this respect, the Court of Appeal emphasised the autonomy of the medical practitioner. 
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and held that:  
 
once a patient was accepted into hospital the medical staff came under a 
positive common law duty to care for him, a fundamental aspect of which 
was a duty to take reasonable steps to keep the patient alive; … that 
deliberately to bring about the death of a competent patient by withdrawing 
life-prolonging treatment contrary to the patient's wishes would infringe 
the patient's rights under articles 2, 3 and 8 of the Convention248 
 
Based on the Irish case law on autonomy it appears that a similar approach which 
emphasises the freedom to choose from the medical options presented would be 
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followed rather than a general freedom to request any form of medical treatment. 
Nevertheless, this approach to autonomy would require a patient to be presented with 
all relevant medical options. If there is a lack of a clear decision-making framework 
for specialist palliative care then a patient may not always be presented with all 
relevant medical options. Furthermore, this is not a particularly pro-active approach to 
protecting a patient’s right to autonomy. For example, a terminally ill patient may lack 
capacity by the time decisions about the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and 
hydration are to be made. The absence of a framework for discussing specialist 
palliative care decisions with a terminally ill patient in a timely manner would render 
these rights largely ineffective and would result in an ad-hoc approach to decision-
making. Despite this, it is necessary to clarify the test for capacity in this jurisdiction 
and examine forthcoming legislation which will impact on this area. 
 
Identifying Capacity 
Due to the nature of specialist palliative care the capacity of a patient may be difficult 
to determine due to effects of the illness or the impact of sedative or pain-killing drugs. 
Donnelly highlighted the importance of capacity in stating that ‘an understanding of 
capacity is essential in order to appreciate what the principle of autonomy means at a 
conceptual level and how it operates in individual cases.’249 The role of capacity is 
demonstrated in the case of Fitzpatrick and Another v K and Another.250 The woman 
in this case was a Jehovah Witness and refused a blood transfusion after the birth of 
her child. Instead, she suggested that she should be treated with coca cola and 
tomatoes. Due to concern about the woman’s autonomy the Master of the hospital 
applied to the High Court for ‘authority to transfuse Ms. K.’251 This application was 
heard by Abbott J who ordered that the blood transfusion be administered due to the 
constitutional rights of Ms. K’s infant son and Ms. K be restrained if necessary.252 Ms. 
K subsequently recovered and argued that ‘the ex parte order should not have been 
applied for and should not have been made and should be set aside’.253 It was also 
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argued on behalf of Ms. K that due to the time at which the transfusion was 
administered it was unlawful as it was not necessary for the preservation of her life, 
that her child’s constitutional rights should not have been placed ahead of her 
autonomous decision, and that she ‘was entitled to refuse all or any medical treatment 
proposed by the plaintiffs by virtue of Article 40.1, Article 40.3.1 and Article 40.3.2 
and Article 44.2.1 of the Constitution and articles 8 and 9 of the Convention.’254 
In the High Court, Laffoy J placed considerable emphasis on the issue of capacity. 
Ultimately the Court held that Ms K lacked capacity based on a number of factors 
including the fact that she had undergone:  
 
a long labour, a difficult delivery and a massive haemorrhage; the 
communications difficulties created by the fact that Ms. K’s first language 
was not English; the fact that she was a young woman in a foreign country 
whom the Hospital personnel believed had no family members in the State 
to whom the Hospital could turn for some assurance or confirmation of her 
religion and her understanding of her need for a blood transfusion; … and 
that by her disclosure, after the haemorrhage, Ms. K told the Hospital 
personnel for the first time that she was a Jehovah's Witness and would not 
take blood, which was at variance with the Hospital’s understanding that 
she was a Roman Catholic which was based on the information she gave 
when booking.255 
 
In reaching this decision the Court utilised the reasoning in the English case of Re 
C.256 This case set out a three stage test for capacity which requires the patient to 
comprehend and grasp the treatment as well as believing it and considering such 
information in making their ultimate decision257 in order to hold that the patient has 
the requisite capacity.258 This demonstrates a functional approach to assessing the 
capacity of a patient as the focus is placed on whether the patient can understand the 
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decision at hand rather than determining their capacity in an abstract manner.259 
Nevertheless, in determining the capacity of a patient it is necessary to also take 
account of the seriousness of the decision. As such, a more rigorous analysis of 
capacity may occur when there are serious consequences attached to a decision.  
 
Laffoy J commented that treatment refusal which could potentially result in shortening 
the patient’s life must ‘reach a particularly high threshold before it can be considered 
a valid refusal.’260 The reason for establishing such criteria is that the refusal of 
treatment would amount to a patient waiving their right to life as protected by the Irish 
Constitution. However, in this decision Laffoy J did not take into consideration a 
patient with a terminal illness. A broader interpretation of the right of autonomy may 
have been applied were the patient terminally ill. Such an approach would be in line 
with the decision in Re a Ward of Court.261 
 
These cases have largely dealt with people seeking to actively have their right of 
autonomy vindicated. However, the manner in which decisions are made for those 
lacking capacity must also be discussed. The approach of the courts in this area will 
demonstrate how the wishes of a patient are addressed when they no longer have 
sufficient decision-making capacity. The optimum approach should form part of the 
regulatory framework for specialist palliative care in order to promote clarity and 
consistency.  
 
Best Interests/Substituted Judgment  
In a situation where the patient lacks capacity there are a number of approaches which 
the court may use to determine which treatment option should be selected. In this 
section the traditional approaches utilised will be discussed but this is an area which 
is currently changing due to the Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Bill 2013. 
Setting out the traditional approaches in this section allows for later comparison 
against the changes being introduced by the Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Bill 
2013.  
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The traditional approaches include the best interests approach and the substituted 
judgment approach. The best interests approach involves balancing the positive and 
negative consequences of continuing treatment in order to arrive at a decision.262 Such 
an approach does have certain shortcomings particularly its subjective nature in 
deciding what is in a patient’s best interests.263 As such, the best interests approach 
may be viewed as being paternalistic.264 It has also been described as ‘inescapably a 
quality-of-life criterion.’265 The substituted judgment approach allows the surrogate 
decision maker to select ‘the path which is more likely to be closest to the patient’s 
own wishes.’266 An advantage of this approach is that ‘it purports to give effect to the 
previous wishes, values and preferences of the incompetent patient.’267 This is 
supported by Kennedy and Grubb who argue that the substituted judgment approach 
provides greater protection for an individual’s self-determination.268 Despite this, 
Beauchamp and Childress describe it as ‘a weak standard of autonomy’.269 They 
suggest that this standard should only be used ‘if reason exists to believe that the 
surrogate decision maker can make a judgment that the patient would have made.’270 
The appropriate test to be used was discussed in Re a Ward of Court. Ultimately, the 
Supreme Court in this case ‘enshrined best interests principles in the context of 
decision-making on behalf of a person who was a Ward of Court.’271 
 
Lynch J in Re a Ward of Court was of the opinion that:  
 
the proper and most satisfactory test to be applied by the Court in this case 
is the best interests test, i.e., whether it is in the best interests of the ward 
                                                          
262 Beauchamp (n9) 228 ‘Under the best interests standard, a surrogate decision maker must then 
determine the highest probable net benefit among the available options, assigning different weights to 
interests the patient has in each option balanced against their inherent risks, burdens, or costs.’  
263 Law Reform Commission, Report on Vulnerable Adults and the Law (LRC 83-2006) 69 In the 
Commission’s view, one of the major objections to a best interests test for intervention in the life of an 
adult who has been found to lack capacity is that its application may simply equate to what the 
decisionmaker subjectively thinks is best for the person.’  
264 ibid 68. 
265 Beauchamp (n9) 228. 
266 Emma Keane, ‘Withdrawal of Life Support for Patients in PVS’ (2011) 2 Medico-Legal Journal of 
Ireland 83, 84. 
267 ibid 84. 
268 Ian M Kennedy and Andrew Grubb, Medical Law (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2000) 838. 
269 Beauchamp (n9) 227 
270 ibid 227. 
271 Law Reform Commission (n263) 68. 
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that her life, such as it is at present, should be prolonged by the continuation 
of the abnormal artificial means of nourishment, or, whether she should be 
allowed to slip away naturally by the withdrawal of such abnormal 
artificial means which would happen272 
 
In applying this approach it was evident that Lynch J recognised the challenge in 
deciding the case based on the best interests of the patient.273 However, it could be 
suggested that the test actually applied by Lynch J was a hybrid test. For example, 
Lynch J set out that:  
 
Whilst the best interests of the ward is the acid test, I think that I can take 
into account what would be her own wishes if she could be granted a 
momentary lucid and articulate period in which to express them and if, 
despite what I have already said, I can form a view on the matter.274 
 
On this basis it appears that the best interests test was to the fore in the High Court but 
was supplemented by the substituted judgment approach. Feenan described the 
approach of Lynch J as ‘novel’.275 
 
In contrast to the test applied by High Court, the Supreme Court ‘tended more to 
applying a discrete “best interests” test rather than the hybrid’ model applied by Lynch 
J.276 In considering the substituted judgment approach O’Flaherty J commented that it 
was ‘impossible to adapt the idea of a ‘substituted judgment’ to the circumstances of 
this case’.277 Despite this O’Flaherty J recognised that the substituted judgment 
approach might be relevant ‘where the person has had the foresight to provide for 
future eventualities.’278 This provision for ‘future eventualities’ could possibly take 
                                                          
272 Ward of Court (withholding medical treatment) (No 2), Re, [1995] 2 ILRM 401, 418.   
273 Ward of Court (withholding medical treatment) (No 2), Re, [1996] 2 IR 79, 98 ‘Thus it is suggested 
that it must be still more difficult for another person to decide whether a patient unable to communicate 
and dependant on artificial life support, would wish such support to be maintained or not, or to decide 
whether the maintenance or removal of the life support was in the true best interests of the patient.’ 
274 Ward of Court (withholding medical treatment) (No 2), Re, [1996] 2 IR 79, 98. 
275 Dermot Feenan, ‘Death, Dying and The Law’ (1996) 14 Irish Law Times 90, 92.  
276 Patrick Hanafin, ‘The Legal and Ethical Dimensions of End-of-Life Decision-Making in 
Contemporary Ireland’ in Stefani Negri (ed), Self-Determination, Dignity and End-of-Life Care: 
Regulating Advance Directives in International and Comparative Perspective (Martinus Nijhoff 2012) 
211. 
277 Ward of Court (withholding medical treatment) (No 2), Re, [1996] 2 IR 79, 133. 
278 Ward of Court (withholding medical treatment) (No 2), Re, [1996] 2 IR 79, 133. 
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the form of an advance care directive. In this regard, the comments of O’Flaherty J 
suggest a certain level of judicial acceptance for the concept.    
 
In adopting a similar approach Denham J was of the opinion that the court was required 
to consider ‘Any previous views that were expressed by the ward that are relevant, and 
proved as a matter of fact on the balance of probabilities.’279 As such, Denham J 
applied a broader best interests test which drew on elements of the substituted 
judgment approach. In total Denham J considered fifteen separate factors in order to 
arrive at a decision as to the patient’s best interests. Among the factors were the current 
condition of the ward, the level of bodily invasion which the medical treatment would 
require, the likely impact of the medical treatment, and input from the family, carers 
and medical practitioners.280 Hamilton CJ followed the approach of Lynch J in the 
High Court, referring to it as ‘the proper test’.281 It appears that Hamilton CJ was 
supportive of the best interests test rather than the hybrid test which could be 
identified. As such the majority of the Supreme Court ‘decided to frame their approach 
as the best interests of the Ward.’282 However, this is not a strict paternalistic 
interpretation of what is in the patient’s best interests. In practice a more flexible 
approach appears to be used when determining the appropriate medical treatment for 
a person lacking capacity.  
 
The more flexible approach is demonstrated in guidance of the Irish Medical Council. 
It was set out by the Irish Medical Council that in relation to a seriously ill patient ‘you 
should consult with any person with legal authority to make decisions on behalf of the 
patient and the patient’s family if possible.’283 The guidance of the Irish Medical 
Council will be examined fully in Chapter Five. Overall, it appears that there is room 
for a greater degree of legal clarity on the test to be applied as Re a Ward of Court 
demonstrates a more widely framed best interests approach. The introduction of the 
Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Bill 2013 may serve to provide a greater level 
                                                          
279 Ward of Court (withholding medical treatment) (No 2), Re, [1996] 2 IR 79, 167. 
280 Ward of Court (withholding medical treatment) (No 2), Re, [1996] 2 IR 79, 167. 
281 Ward of Court (withholding medical treatment) (No 2), Re, [1996] 2 IR 79, 127. 
282 Keane (n266) 85. 
283 Irish Medical Council, ‘Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics for Registered Medical 
Practitioners’ (7th edn, 2009) 40.  
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of clarity as to who should be consulted in such instances and it is likely to have a 
substantial impact on the legal framework in Ireland for specialist palliative care.   
  
Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Bill 2013 
The Irish Government set out in its Programme for Government a commitment to 
introduce a capacity bill which ‘is in line with the UN Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities.’284 On this basis, the Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) 
Bill 2013 is to satisfy Ireland’s obligations under Article 12 of the UN Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Article 12 of the Convention requires equal 
recognition before the law for people with disabilities. Consequently, the Assisted 
Decision-Making (Capacity) Bill 2013 is intended to ‘to reform the law and to provide 
a modern statutory framework that supports decision-making by adults and enables 
them to retain the greatest amount of autonomy possible in situations where they lack 
or may shortly lack capacity.’285 This Bill would allow terminally ill patients to take 
active steps to better protect their autonomy and ensure they receive the end-of-life 
care they would want. In this respect, the Bill provides for the introduction of a 
statutory framework for the appointment of a decision-making assistant or a co-
decision maker for an individual whose capacity is in question, or may soon be in 
question. Additionally, the Bill provides for the Office of the Public Guardian to be 
established. This statutory office will ‘supervise decision-making assistants, co-
decisionmakers, decision-making representatives and persons holding enduring 
powers of attorney.’286 In this section, the guiding principles of the Bill will be outlined 
and the establishment of a decision-making assistant and co-decision maker will be 
examined for how these roles could potentially impact on specialist palliative care. 
Furthermore, a Draft General Scheme for Advanced Healthcare Directives to be 
incorporated into the Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Bill 2013 has recently been 
published. The proposed legislation contained in this Draft General Scheme will also 
be examined in this section.  
 
                                                          
284 Department of the Taoiseach, ‘Programme for Government 2011-2016’ 37. 
285 Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Bill 2013, explanatory memorandum. 
286 Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Bill 2013, explanatory memorandum. 
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The guiding principles of the Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Bill 2013 set out 
that the capacity of an individual is presumed unless the contrary is shown.287 The 
term ‘guiding principles’ signals a shift away from the use of the term ‘best interests’. 
In this regard, the Bill requires all ‘practicable steps’ to be taken in helping an 
individual to make a decision.288 This demonstrates the importance this Bill places on 
the autonomy of an individual. In circumstances where an intervention does have to 
be made it should minimise ‘the restriction of the relevant person’s rights’,289 ‘the 
restriction of the relevant person’s freedom of action’290 and the intervention is to 
‘have due regard to the need to respect the right of the relevant person to his or her 
dignity, bodily integrity, privacy and autonomy.’291 The importance of these concerns 
for specialist palliative care has been demonstrated throughout this Chapter. Section 
8(7) of the Bill outlines the duties of an intervener in situations where an intervention 
is to occur. Among the factors to be considered by an intervener include the views of 
‘any person named by the relevant person as a person to be consulted on the matter 
concerned or any similar matter’292 along with ‘any decision-making assistant, co-
decision-maker, decision-making representative or attorney for the relevant person’.293 
The role of the decision-making assistant and the co-decision maker must be examined 




A decision-making assistant is a person who is appointed by a person to assist them in 
making decisions about their personal welfare, property, and affairs.294 A decision-
making assistant would be appointed by an individual whose capacity is in question, 
or may soon be in question and is appointed by way of a decision-making assistance 
agreement.295 The role and scope of authority for decision-making assistants is set out 
in Section 11 of the Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Bill 2013. This section sets 
out that a decision-making assistant is:   
                                                          
287 Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Bill 2013, s 8(2).  
288 Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Bill 2013, s 8(3). 
289 Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Bill 2013, s 8(6)(a)(i). 
290 Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Bill 2013, s 8(6)(a)(ii). 
291 Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Bill 2013, s 8(6)(b). 
292 Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Bill 2013, s 8(7)(d)(i). 
293 Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Bill 2013, s 8(7)(d)(ii). 
294 Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Bill 2013, s 9. 




(a) to advise the appointer by explaining relevant information and 
considerations relating to a relevant decision, 
(b) to ascertain the will and preferences of the appointer on a matter the 
subject or to be the subject of a relevant decision and to assist the appointer 
to communicate them,  
(c) to assist the appointer to obtain any information or personal records (in 
this section referred to as “relevant information”) that the appointer is 
entitled to and that is or are required in relation to a relevant decision, 
(d) to assist the appointer to make and express a relevant decision, and 
(e) to endeavour to ensure that the appointer’s relevant decisions are 
implemented.296 
 
In order to undertake these functions there are several criteria which need to be met 
by a potential decision-making assistant. Persons who cannot be appointed as a 
decision-making assistant include: those under the age of 18, people who have been 
convicted of an offence against the person or property of the proposed appointer or a 
child of the proposed appointer, or where there is a safety or a barring order made 
against the individual in respect of the proposed appointer or a child of the proposed 
appointer.297  
 
The introduction of decision-making assistants would have a significant impact for 
specialist palliative care in terms of the legal framework and in the manner in which 
healthcare decisions are made at a practical level. A decision-making assistant could 
assist in ensuring that the patient has an appropriate understanding of the consequences 
of their decisions. This would ensure that a patient’s autonomous decision is respected 
and implemented in practice. The professional standards and guidance will need to 
reflect this more complex approach to decision-making for vulnerable patients. The 
manner in which the current professional standards and guidance address decision-
making will be discussed in Chapter Five. In addition to decision-making assistants 
the Bill also provides for the recognition of co-decision makers.  
 
                                                          
296 Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Bill 2013, s 11. 
297 Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Bill 2013, s 12. 
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Co-Decision Making  
A co-decision maker can be appointed by a person to make decisions jointly with them 
in relation to personal welfare, property, and affairs.298 A co-decision making 
agreement has no effect except when a co-decision making order has been granted by 
the court. Such an order can be varied or discharged by the court and the order is 
subject to periodic review.299 The Bill also provides for who can be appointed as a co-
decision maker. Section 18 of the Bill sets out a co-decision maker should be ‘a 
relative or friend of the proposed appointer who has had such personal contact with 
the proposed appointer over such period of time that a relationship of trust exists 
between them’,300 and the person must be ‘capable of effectively performing the 
functions’301 of a co-decision maker.  
 
The functions of a co-decision maker are set out in Section 21 of the Bill. A co-
decision maker is to advise the appointer and explain ‘relevant information and 
considerations relating to a relevant decision.’302 In addition to this, a co-decision 
maker will ‘ascertain the will and preferences of the appointer’,303 ‘assist the appointer 
to obtain any information or personal records that the appointer is entitled to and that 
is or are required in relation to a relevant decision’,304 ‘assist the appointer to make 
and express a relevant decision’,305 and ‘endeavour to ensure that the appointer’s 
relevant decisions are implemented.’306 These functions allow a co-decision maker to 
broadly assist the appointer in not only making a decision but also ensuring that effect 
is given to these decisions.  
 
The introduction of decision-making assistants and co-decision makers is likely to 
have a substantial impact on the legal framework for specialist palliative care in 
Ireland. In particular, it will require professional standards and guidance to take 
account of these new roles as well as reflecting on the manner in which these 
professions approach and assess the capacity of terminally ill patients. These positions 
                                                          
298 Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Bill 2013, s 16. 
299 Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Bill 2013, s 17(7). 
300 Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Bill 2013, s 18(2)(a). 
301 Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Bill 2013, s 18(2)(b). 
302 Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Bill 2013, s 21(3)(a). 
303 Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Bill 2013, s 21(3)(b). 
304 Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Bill 2013, s 21(3)(c). 
305 Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Bill 2013, s 21(3)(d). 
306 Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Bill 2013, s 21(3)(e). 
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serve to augment the process of healthcare decision-making and may require more 
detailed guidance from professional bodies, if not already in place. A further point to 
consider in relation to the Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Bill 2013 is the impact 
which it may have on advance healthcare directives.     
 
Advance Healthcare Directives 
It has been proposed that the Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Bill 2013 will 
legislate for the use of advance healthcare directives in Ireland. In this regard, a Draft 
General Scheme for Advance Healthcare Directives has been published for 
incorporation into the Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Bill 2013. The advance 
healthcare directive was first proposed by Kutner in 1969.307 The advance healthcare 
directive can be defined as:  
 
a statement made by a competent adult relating to the type and extent of 
medical treatments she or he would or would not want to undergo in the 
future should he/she be unable to express consent or dissent at that time.308  
 
Madden suggests that the development of the advance care directive had three 
purposes; ‘it relieved the patient’s family of the burden of decision-making’,309 it 
enabled participation of the patient in decision-making, and it signalled a shift away 
from medical paternalism towards patient autonomy and self-determination. Despite 
these potential advantages, there is currently no legislation in Ireland for advance 
healthcare directives.310 However, it was suggested, obiter, by O’Flaherty J in Re a 
                                                          
307 Luis Kutner, ‘Due Process of Euthanasia: The Living Wills, A Proposal’ (1969) 44 Indiana Law 
Journal 539, 551 ‘The patient may not have had, however, the opportunity to give his consent at any 
point before treatment. He may have become the victim of a sudden accident or a stroke or coronary. 
Therefore, the suggested solution is that the individual, while fully in control of his faculties and his 
ability to express himself, indicate to what extent he would consent to treatment. The document 
indicating such consent may be referred to as ‘a living will,’ ‘a declaration determining the termination 
of life,’ ‘testament permitting death,’ ‘declaration for bodily autonomy,’ ‘declaration for ending 
treatment,’ ‘body trust,’ or other similar reference.’ 
308 Irish Council on Bioethics, ‘Is it time for Advance Healthcare Directives?’ (Irish Council for 
Bioethics 2007) 90; See also Alexander Morgan Capron, ‘Advance Directives’ in Helga Kuhse and 
Peter Singer, A Companion to Bioethics (Blackwell Publishing 1998) 299; Elizabeth Campbell, ‘The 
Case for Living Wills’ (2006) 12(1) Medico-Legal Journal of Ireland 5; Draft General Scheme of 
Legislative Provisions to Provide for the Making of Advance Healthcare Directives, Head 2 ‘“advance 
healthcare directive” means an advance written expression of will and preferences made by a person 
with capacity, in accordance with Heads 4 and 5, concerning treatment decisions that may arise in the 
event that the person subsequently loses capacity’ 
309 Madden (n210) 507; O’Shea (n2) 74. 
310 Law Reform Commission, Report on Bioethics: Advance Care Directives (LRC 94-2009); See also 
European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 1997, Article 9 ‘The previously expressed 
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Ward of Court that had the patient set out her treatment preferences in advance then 
the Court could have drawn guidance from it.311 This suggestion has been supported 
by subsequent cases such as JM v The Board of Management of St Vincent’s 
Hospital312 and Fitzpatrick v FK (No.2).313 As it stands, the approach in Ireland to 
advance healthcare directives has been significantly influenced by the approach taken 
in England and Wales. Therefore, the criteria set out in England and Wales for advance 
healthcare directives will be set out prior to outlining the criteria in the Draft General 
Scheme for Advanced Healthcare Directives. This will allow for the current informal 
approach in this jurisdiction to also be outlined before being contrasted against the 
proposed legislative changes.   
 
The guidelines for advance care directives in England and Wales were set out in the 
case of Re AK (Adult patient) (Medical Treatment)314 prior to the introduction of the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005.315 The patient in this case wished to have treatment 
withdrawn which would result in his death when he was no longer able to 
communicate. The requirements set out by the court in this case for a valid advance 
care directive were that; ‘doctors must be satisfied that the patient is of full 
capacity’,316 there must be a voluntary refusal of treatment, and ‘it must be clear that 
the directive must have specifically envisaged the particular situation that has now 
arisen.’317 The interpretation of the right of autonomy by Irish courts suggests that a 
similar set of criteria would be required for a valid advance care directive in Ireland. 
As such, it would require capacity at the time of drafting the directive, there should be 
no undue influence, and the directive should relate to the circumstances which arise in 
the patient’s care. This is supported by the National Council on Ageing and Older 
People who suggest that where such requirements are met it is likely that ‘our legal 
system would be supportive of such action.’318  
 
                                                          
wishes relating to medical intervention by a patient who is not, at the time of the intervention, in a state 
to express his or her wishes shall be taken into account’.  
311 Ward of Court (withholding medical treatment) (No 2), Re, [1996] 2 IR 79, 132-133.   
312 JM v The Board of Management of St Vincent’s Hospital [2002] 1 IR 321. 
313 Fitzpatrick v FK (No.2) [2008] IEHC 104, [2009] 2 IR 7. 
314 Re AK (Adult patient) (Medical Treatment) [2001] 1 FLR 129. 
315 Mental Capacity Act 2005. 
316 Madden (n210) 509. 
317 ibid. 
318 O’Shea (n2) 78.  
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The Law Reform Commission stated in its ‘Report on Bioethics: Advance Care 
Directives’319 that it was aware that many hospitals have developed guidelines and 
protocols to deal with advance care directives in line with best practice models from 
the United Kingdom. This reflects the guidance of professional medical bodies in 
Ireland. For example, the potential role of advance care directives has been 
acknowledged in the Irish Medical Council’s Guide to Professional Conduct and 
Ethics. This sets out that the doctor should respect a patient’s advance healthcare 
plan.320 The limits to the implementation of the advance care directive are also set out 
in the Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics. In particular it is recognised that the 
decision of the patient must be an informed choice, the patient should not have 
changed their mind and ‘the decision covers the situation that has arisen’.321 In 
considering the validity of advance care directives the guide states that ‘[a]n advance 
treatment plan has the same ethical status as a decision by a patient at the actual time 
of an illness and should be respected’.322 The Guide to Professional Conduct and 
Ethics also provides for situations where these criteria are not met or where there is 
uncertainty as to the existence of an advance directive. In this regard, the guidance 
states that:  
 
If there is doubt about the existence of an advance treatment plan, the 
patient’s capacity at the time of making the treatment plan or whether it 
still applies in the present circumstances, you should make treatment 
decisions based on the patient’s best interests. In making such a decision, 
you should consult with any person with legal authority to make decisions 
on behalf of the patient and the patient’s family if possible.323 
 
This reflects the role of the best interests approach although it does appear that the best 
interests are not identified in isolation as the guidance encourages wider consultation 
with the patient’s family. Based on the points set out so far it appears that while 
advance care directives have not been provided for in Irish legislation the weight of 
                                                          
319 Law Reform Commission (n310) 27. 
320 Irish Medical Council (n283) 39. 
321 ibid. 
322 ibid. 
323 ibid 40. 
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opinion suggests that they would be respected regardless.324 Consequently, the move 
towards introducing legislation in this jurisdiction for advanced healthcare directives 
is a welcome step. 
 
The Draft General Scheme for Advanced Healthcare Directives has generally followed 
the criteria set out above. In this regard, the Draft General Scheme sets out that an 
advance healthcare directive can be made by ‘Any person who has reached the age of 
18 and who has capacity within the meaning of this Act may make an advance 
healthcare directive.’325 The advance healthcare directive for a treatment refusal is to 
be followed provided that:  
 
(a) the treatment to be refused is clearly specified, and  
(b) the circumstances in which the treatment refusal is intended to apply 
are clearly outlined, and  
(c) at the time the advance healthcare directive is to be followed the person 
who made the directive lacks capacity to consent to the treatment in 
question.326 
 
The Draft General Scheme also sets out requirements in relation to the form of the 
advance healthcare plan. For example, it must be a written directive327 and must 
contain details about the person making the advance healthcare directive328 along with 
details of the person’s general practitioner329 and ‘any nominated patient-designated 
healthcare representative and/or any attorney appointed through an enduring power of 
attorney.’330 Other heads of the Draft General Scheme include sections on the validity 
                                                          
324 Irish Medical Council (n283) 22; Madden (n210) 531 ‘In terms of the likelihood of the advance 
directive or living will being legally valid in Ireland, it can be surmised from judicial statements that 
such a decision by a patient would be recognised as legally valid if the patient was competent and 
informed when the directive was made, and that it was clear and specific to the patient’s current 
situation. As long as the directive was lawful, the courts would uphold its validity.’ 
325 Draft General Scheme of Legislative Provisions to Provide for the Making of Advance Healthcare 
Directives, Head 4(1). 
326 Draft General Scheme of Legislative Provisions to Provide for the Making of Advance Healthcare 
Directives, Head 4(2). 
327 Draft General Scheme of Legislative Provisions to Provide for the Making of Advance Healthcare 
Directives, Head 4(4)(a). 
328 Draft General Scheme of Legislative Provisions to Provide for the Making of Advance Healthcare 
Directives, Head 4(4)(b)(i). 
329 Draft General Scheme of Legislative Provisions to Provide for the Making of Advance Healthcare 
Directives, Head 4(4)(b)(ii). 
330 Draft General Scheme of Legislative Provisions to Provide for the Making of Advance Healthcare 
Directives, Head 4(4)(b)(iii). 
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and effect of advance healthcare directives, the role of a patient-designated healthcare 
representative, enduring powers of attorney, and the role of the courts. As it stands, 
the Draft General Scheme for Advanced Healthcare Directives is a positive step in 
further protecting and respecting patient autonomy in healthcare.331 Nevertheless, it 
must be recognised that advance care directives are not a perfect solution to ensuring 
that a patient’s right of autonomy endures. On this point, Beauchamp and Childress 
have suggested that advance healthcare directives have the potential to ‘generate 
practical and moral problems.’332 
 
Criticism of advance care directives stem from the difference in time between the 
drafting and ultimate reliance on an advance care directive.333 This is based on the 
argument that a person cannot tell for certain what decision they would make unless 
they were in that situation at the time. Keane highlights a number of problems in 
relation to advance care directives. For instance, Keane suggests that advance care 
directives are ‘often nebulous, sometimes so much so that they are rendered 
useless.’334 However, it has also been argued that the use of an advance care directive 
would ‘facilitate easier decision-making regarding selective non-treatment’.335 An 
area of non-treatment which is of particular significance for specialist palliative care 
practices is the do not resuscitate order. This is generally made outside the advance 
care directive and it is necessary to consider the background to the making of such an 
order due to its considerable relevance for patients receiving specialist palliative care.   
 
Do Not Resuscitate Orders 
A do not resuscitate order [hereinafter ‘DNR’] can be defined as ‘a doctor’s written 
order not to attempt cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) on a particular patient.’336 
As such, other forms of treatment such as the administration of antibiotics may carry 
                                                          
331 Beauchamp (n9) 14 ‘Substantive rules. Rules of truth telling, confidentiality, privacy, forgoing 
treatment, informed consent, and rationing health care provide more specific guides to action than do 
abstract principles. An example of a rule that sharpens the requirements of the principle of respect for 
autonomy in certain contexts is “Follow an incompetent patient’s advance directive whenever it is clear 
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332 ibid 189. 
333 Eoin Tiernan, ‘Moving Points in Palliative Care – Advance Directives’ (1995) 1(1) Medico-Legal 
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334 Keane (n266) 89.   
335 Hazel Biggs, ‘Euthanasia and death with dignity: still poised on the fulcrum of homicide’ (1996) 
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on in the interim. Madden highlighted that ‘there is no legislative authority or judicial 
precedent upholding their legality.’337 The status of DNRs was examined by the Law 
Reform Commission’s Report on Advance Directives.338 The absence of a legal 
framework for DNR’s was recognised by the Law Reform Commission as was the 
lack of a clear system for doctors to address this issue. The Law Reform Commission 
recommended that the proposed Code of Practice on Advance Care Directives should:  
  
contain guidelines on the process of putting in place a DNR order. The 
Commission also recommends that the guidelines should provide that 
before a DNR order is made there is a consultative process, that this is 
documented on the patient’s chart and that it is made by the most senior 
available member of the healthcare team.339 
   
The development of such guidelines would provide increased clarity and greater 
certainty in this area. The inclusion of a clear consultative process also provides a way 
for ensuring that patient’s wishes are addressed and respected. As it stands, it appears 
that the practice is for the medical practitioner to consult with the medical and nursing 
team in addition to the patient’s family in order to ascertain whether a DNR should be 
recorded and therefore, to potentially avoid a subsequent challenge of the decision.340 
However, DNRs still do not have a legislative basis in Ireland and this complicates the 
use of DNRs to guide the work of healthcare professionals in this jurisdiction.    
   
Dignity in Palliative Care 
In this section it will be demonstrated that the status of dignity is not particularly clear 
and its precise meaning has not been clarified by Irish courts or by the ECtHR.341 
Nevertheless, it is important to draw out what is meant by dignity as well as to 
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‘Dignity Is a Useless Concept’ (2003) 327 British Medical Journal 1419, 1419 ‘dignity seems to mean 
nothing other than respect for autonomy.’; Feldman (n160); Mette Lebech, ‘What is Human Dignity?’ 
(2004) Maynooth Philosophical Papers 59; Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State 
Actors (Oxford University Press 2006); Doris Schroeder, ‘Dignity: Two Riddles and Four Concepts’ 
(2008) 17(2) Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 230; Suzy Killmister, ‘Dignity: not such a 
useless concept’ (2010) 36 Journal of Medical Ethics 160; Dignity as reducible to autonomy see Deryck 




underline the problems raised by the idea of a right of dignity. This importance is due 
to the status given to dignity in professional standards and guidance, as will be 
demonstrated in Chapter Five.342 This section will first outline the principle of dignity 
as set out in various treaties and conventions. Second, the interpretation of dignity by 
the courts will be examined.343 Dignity raises challenges for this approach due to its 
amorphous nature which defies simple categorisation. In order to demonstrate how 
such an issue will impact on the use of the term ‘dignity’ in professional standards and 
guidance it is necessary to draw on more academic commentary which examines the 
status and meaning of dignity. It will be argued in this section that the principle of 
dignity has been poorly defined by courts and is so closely linked to human rights 
which have a substantial body of jurisprudence associated with them that the use of 
the term ‘dignity’ only serves to generate confusion. In effect, using a principle such 
as ‘dignity’ which lacks a clear meaning undermines consistency and clarity in the 
professional standards and guidance in which it is used.  
 
An Underlying Principle or a Right? 
Despite the importance placed on dignity, it is a nebulous principle which defies 
simple definition.344 For example, Feldman wrote that the meaning of the right to 
dignity is problematic to ‘pin down.’345 In this vein Binchy commented that ‘Its 
meaning depends greatly on the philosophical premises of those who invoke it; the 
range of such premises is so broad that ‘dignity’ can have completely opposing 
connotations.’346 Human dignity has been described as ‘the central value underpinning 
                                                          
342 Text to n57 and n139 in Chapter Five.  
343 The focus is on the law in practice rather than the theoretical underpinnings of rights. 
344 Stephen W Smith, End-of-Life Decisions in Medical Care: Principles and Policies for Regulating 
the Dying Process (Cambridge University Press 2012) 128 ‘It can never be more than one of a number 
of values, principles and policies which pull decision-makers in different directions.’; David Feldman, 
‘Human dignity as a legal value: Part 2’ (2000) Public Law 61, 75 ‘The content of its central core is not 
clear, making it an uncertain guide.’; Macklin (n341) 1419 ‘A close inspection of leading examples 
shows that appeals to dignity are either vague restatements of other, more precise, notions or mere 
slogans that add nothing to an understanding of the topic.’; Conor O’Mahony, ‘There is no such thing 
as a right to dignity’ (2012) 10 International Journal of Constitutional Law 551. 
345 David Feldman (n160) 682.  
346 William Binchy, ‘Dignity as a Constitutional Concept’ in Eoin Carolan and Oran Doyle (eds), The 
Irish Constitution: Governance and Values (Round Hall 2008) 308; O’Mahony (n344) 551 ‘in spite of 
this voluminous and often erudite body of literature, there is little or no consensus as to what the concept 
of human dignity demands of law makers and adjudicators. Indeed, for all the importance and emphasis 
placed on human dignity in the text of international conventions, domestic constitutions, and court 
decisions, the elusive nature of the concept has led many commentators to argue that it is, at best, 




the entirety of international human rights law.’347 The term is contained in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,348 the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights,349 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights,350 the Charter of Fundamental Rights,351 and in the Preamble to the Irish 
Constitution352 as well as other treaties and conventions.353 Although it is not explicitly 
referred to in the ECHR it has been acknowledged by the ECtHR that the protection 
of dignity and human freedom is ‘the very essence of the ECHR’354 This quote from 
S.W. v the United Kingdom begins to demonstrate a significant challenge to the 
characterisation of dignity, namely that dignity may be something other than a right 
and might instead be interpreted and applied as a principle or value. As such, dignity 
may function as an overarching principle or value rather than something tangible to be 
expressly protected.  
 
The differing interpretations of dignity which exist mean that a phrase such as ‘death 
with dignity’ could be interpreted in a variety of ways. On this basis, if professional 
standards and guidance refer to the dignity of the patient it is important that a broader 
framework be in place to deliver on what professional bodies understand as ‘dignity’. 
In effect, the reference to ‘dignity’ must be expanded on to ensure specialist palliative 
care is provided in a consistent manner across healthcare providers. This demonstrates 
the importance of clarifying the position of dignity in this jurisdiction and demarcating 
its role within the legal framework for specialist palliative care.   
 
                                                          
347 O’Mahony (n344) 552. 
348 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 1, Article 25; Christopher McCrudden, ‘Human 
Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ (2008) 19 European Journal of International Law 
655, 678. McCrudden in discussing the status of dignity in the UDHR and the UN Charter of 
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349 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), Preamble, Article 10. 
350 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), Preamble. 
351 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 1. 
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good, with due observance of Prudence, Justice and Charity, so that the dignity and freedom of the 
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353 UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; UN Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; Vienna Declaration made at the World 
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In Ireland there has been a lack of clarity as to whether dignity is a right or a value to 
be recognised by the courts. It has been suggested that ‘It is possible that our late and 
incomplete recognition of the importance of dignity in the area of healthcare has 
stymied its proper acceptance as a core human right.’355 Dignity has been referred to 
in a number of Irish cases,356 most notably in Re a Ward of Court, and Fleming v 
Ireland & Ors.  
 
In Re a Ward of Court Denham J stated that ‘An unspecified right under the 
Constitution to all persons as human persons is dignity—to be treated with dignity … 
As long as a person is alive they have this right.’357 This suggests a judicial willingness 
to recognise a right to dignity but there is little explanation for what such recognition 
would entail. In contrast to this, the Supreme Court in Fleming v Ireland & Ors 
referred to dignity as being a constitutional value which is recognised and respected 
by ‘the rights protected’358 in the Irish Constitution. The Court also referred to dignity 
as a ‘principle under the Constitution’.359 This approach to dignity clearly categorises 
it as a value or principle rather than a right in this jurisdiction. In particular, the 
approach of the Supreme Court in Fleming v Ireland & Ors suggests that the dignity 
of a patient can be upheld by protecting and vindicating the constitutional rights of the 
patient which would include the right to bodily integrity, protection from inhuman or 
degrading treatment, and the right to autonomy. This understanding of dignity clearly 
                                                          
355 Shane O’Hanlon and Jennifer Schweppe, ‘Health, Dignity and Human Rights’ (2010) 11(2) Medico-
Legal Journal of Ireland 97, 97.  
356 Re Article 26 and the Offences Against the State (Amendment) Bill 1940, [1940] 1 IR 470, 478-479 
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dignity as set out in the preamble to the Irish Constitution. ‘I find it difficult to imagine an aspect of 
human experience which falls more clearly into the constitutional area of privacy, as thus defined, than 
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357 Ward of Court (withholding medical treatment) (No 2), Re, [1996] 2 IR 79, 163.  
358 Fleming v Ireland & Ors [2013] IESC 19, [110]. 
359 Fleming v Ireland & Ors [2013] IESC 19, [138]. 
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places it as a value to be achieved through the protection of enumerated and 
unenumerated rights in this jurisdiction. 
 
Feldman identifies two conceptions of dignity, namely, subjective and objective 
conceptions. The subjective conception of dignity is ‘concerned with one’s sense of 
self-worth, which is usually associated with forms of behaviour which communicate 
that sense to others.’360 Whereas the objective conception of dignity is ‘concerned with 
the state’s and other people’s attitudes to an individual or group, usually in the light 
of social norms or expectations.’361 Donnelly states that ‘People who lack the capacity 
for dignity in the subjective sense may still enjoy dignity in the objective sense.’362 
This is particularly important in the context of palliative and specialist palliative care 
practices where a patient may be heavily sedated. Such a point was also recognised by 
Feldman who suggested that: 
 
patients in a persistent vegetative state can be regarded as having intrinsic 
human dignity in this objective sense, in that responsible beings owe a 
moral, and often a legal, duty to have regard to their interests and rights 
when making decisions affecting their welfare.363  
 
This is bound up in the previous examination of the right of autonomy and reflects the 
close relationship between the right to life, right of autonomy and dignity.  
 
Regardless of an objective or subjective conception of dignity it can be noted that 
dignity is ‘not an end in itself, or even a means to an end.’364 This can be said to 
demonstrate the fundamental and inherent nature of dignity. As such the principle of 
dignity may come within the scope of a variety of rights although there are certain 
rights which have a ‘particularly prominent role in upholding human dignity’.365 On 
this point Feldman included ‘the right to be free of inhuman or degrading treatment, 
the right to respect for private and family life, the right to freedom of conscience and 
                                                          
360 Feldman (n160) 685. 
361 ibid 686. 
362 Donnelly (n183) 212-213. 
363 Feldman (n160) 686. 
364 ibid 687. 
365 ibid 690. 
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belief … and the right to be free of discriminatory treatment.’366 This wide range of 
rights demonstrates the broad relevance and impact of the principle of dignity. It 
demonstrates that in applying the right to life and right of autonomy in the context of 
specialist palliative care practices it is also necessary to consider how decisions and 
actions impact on the dignity of the patient.  
 
The principle of dignity can be said to establish certain limits. This is illustrated by 
Feldman’s comment that it is accepted by many that ‘certain things that cannot be 
done even to unconscious or dependent people without violating their dignity and 
denying them the respect that is due to them’.367 In relation to healthcare, Jacobson 
has suggested that the breach of a patient’s dignity could lead them to experience 
‘degradation, humiliation, disempowerment and loss of self-worth’368 as well as an 
overall decline in their health.369 In addition to this, a lack of respect for the dignity of 
a patient could result in adverse outcomes including ‘denial of access to appropriate 
treatment, subjection to inappropriate clinical interventions or unwarranted long-term 
institutionalisation.’370 Consequently, there must be a clear explanation of what is 
meant by dignity when this principle is referred to in the regulatory framework for 
specialist palliative care. For example, Foster sets out that dignity must have a clear 
meaning if it is to be useful and there must also exist a framework for its use.371  
 
This section has demonstrated that there is no clear meaning as to what dignity entails 
or requires. It has also been argued that it may be incorrect to categorise dignity as a 
right. As such, reference to dignity in professional standards or guidance is not capable 
of being linked with a right to dignity or case law which describes its meaning. Instead 
dignity can be viewed as a principle or value. A considerable difficulty is the multiple 
theoretical frameworks which exist for explaining and defining what this value means 
in practice. If professional bodies do not clearly define their interpretation of dignity 
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then it will be left to individual healthcare professionals to use their best judgment. 
However, as it stands dignity appears to be more of an aspiration; something which is 
easier recognised in the breach rather than in the provision. Nonetheless, dignity 
appears to be a principle which can be realised through protecting and vindicating a 
patient’s human rights. The achievement of this in specialist palliative care will depend 
to a considerable degree on the professional standards and guidance in place for 
doctors and nurses practising in Ireland.372     
 
Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to outline and examine the human rights framework for 
specialist palliative care. It is clear from the preceding analysis that human rights have 
a vital role in the provision of specialist palliative care and form a central part of the 
legal framework for this area. This chapter demonstrated that the right to bodily 
integrity and the right to be free from inhuman or degrading treatment are closely 
related and give rise to positive obligations on the State. The right to bodily integrity 
is not limited to protection from legislation but can be drawn on in a variety of 
circumstances. Ensuring that this right is adequately protected may require steps to be 
taken on the part of the State to address failings in the legal framework which hamper 
the protection of the right to bodily integrity. The cases discussed on this point had 
obvious applicability to the area of specialist palliative care due to their focus on issues 
in healthcare. The protection from inhuman or degrading treatment was also shown to 
be of significance to the provision of specialist palliative care. This right may be 
engaged in circumstances where the patient experiences severe mental or physical 
suffering. The cases discussed in this Chapter demonstrated that the possibility of 
being denied appropriate medical care was sufficient to engage Article 3 of the ECHR. 
Furthermore, reference to research by O’Leary and Tiernan, and Hospice Friendly 
Hospitals demonstrated the potential infringement of this right in Ireland in the context 
of specialist palliative care.  
 
This Chapter also highlighted how the right of autonomy provides the patient with a 
degree of control over medical decisions which impact directly on them. This right has 
been protected and recognised in common law, in the Irish Constitution, and in the 
                                                          
372 See Chapter Five. 
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ECHR. The effective protection and accessibility of this right, along with other rights 
discussed, is essential for patients who are at one of the most vulnerable stages in their 
life. The role of this right in practice will be considered in the next Chapter which 
focuses on the professional standards and guidelines in place for specialist palliative 
care. In particular, the right of autonomy needs to be protected in any decision-making 
procedure set out by professional standards or guidance. Moreover, it emerged from 
this Chapter that the status of dignity is not particularly clear. In this respect, recent 
case law in Ireland appears to have characterised dignity as a constitutional value as 
opposed to a human right. This underlines the nebulous nature of dignity; a principle 
which has many meanings, especially in end-of-life care, depending on the theoretical 
framework being employed. Nevertheless, the breach of a patient’s dignity clearly 
signals greater human rights concerns in the care of the patient due to its close links 
with well-established human rights. Consequently, the role of dignity within 
professional standards and guidance will be examined in Chapter Five. Overall, this 
Chapter demonstrated the complexity of the rights framework in Ireland for specialist 
palliative care. This is a key part in the broader legal framework for specialist palliative 
care and any suggestions for reform set out in later chapters will need to take account 
of the scope of these rights and how they interact in practice.   
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THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN IRELAND FOR  
SPECIALIST PALLIATIVE CARE  
 
Introduction 
The legal framework in Ireland for specialist palliative care is not easily delineated. 
Part of this framework was highlighted in the previous chapters which demonstrated 
the role and impact of human rights and principles which serve to promote the care of 
the terminally ill patient. These included the right to life, right to bodily integrity, 
protection from inhuman or degrading treatment, right of autonomy, and the principle 
of dignity. These must be given effect throughout the legal framework for specialist 
palliative care. In this regard, the legal framework is composed of human rights, 
professional standards and guidelines, and policies drafted at the local level. The 
absence of legislation dealing expressly with specialist palliative care practices places 
a greater burden on professional standards and local policy to protect the human rights 
of a patient while also striking a balance with the need for healthcare professionals to 
be given sufficient autonomy in caring for the patient. This requires a delicate balance 
and it highlights how a fragmented and inadequate regulatory framework has the 
potential to hamper the protection of a patient’s human rights. On this basis, the 
regulatory framework is a significant aspect of the overall legal framework for 
specialist palliative care.    
 
The aim of this Chapter is to outline and examine the regulatory framework in Ireland 
which is directly applicable to doctors and nurses. The requirements imposed by 
professional standards are particularly important due to the combination of different 
palliative care providers and the legally and ethically complex decisions which have 
to be made in specialist palliative care.1 Consequently, professional standards and 
local policy will be examined for to how they address palliative sedation, artificial 
nutrition and hydration, the decision-making framework for these practices, patient 
rights, and how they encompass the four principles of autonomy, beneficence, 
nonmaleficence, and justice set out by Beauchamp and Childress. 
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Professional standards and guidance should be clear and consistent both independently 
and across healthcare professions. In effect, healthcare professionals should have a 
clear understanding of the limits of the care which can be provided, as well as being 
supported by a comprehensive decision-making framework to assist in deciding what 
level of palliative care may be required and what steps should be taken when 
commencing certain practices. In Chapter Four it was highlighted that the decision-
making framework needs to be ‘timely’,2 ‘fair’3 and should not be framed in such a 
way as to limit its application.4 The framework should be structured in a manner which 
minimises the possibility of breaching a patient’s human rights.5 As such, it is 
necessary that legal and ethical issues are dealt with comprehensively in professional 
standards and guidance so as to ensure that patients can receive optimum care. The 
guidelines will also to be examined for consistency. The issue of consistency has 
previously been identified as a failing in the provision of palliative care in Ireland.6 
This may relate to consistency in standards within and across professions in 
healthcare. In this Chapter it will be questioned whether such criticisms are justified 
and the source of any such failing will be highlighted with the aim of identifying a 
solution in subsequent chapters.  
 
The arguments in this Chapter are advanced over the course of three main sections. 
The first section examines the standards and guidance published by the regulators of 
the medical professions in Ireland, namely the Irish Medical Council and An Bord 
Altranais. The standards and guidance of these regulatory bodies shape the manner in 
which doctors and nurses provide specialist palliative care in this jurisdiction.  
 
The second section addresses the function of the Health Information and Quality 
Authority and the standards they have set for end-of-life care in Ireland. In particular, 
the standard on end-of-life care contained in the ‘National Quality Standards for 
Residential Care Settings for Older People in Ireland’ will be considered.7 Meeting 
                                                          
2 Tysiąc v Poland (2007) 45 EHRR 42, [118]; Text to n119 in Chapter Four.  
3 Tysiąc v Poland (2007) 45 EHRR 42, [113].    
4 Tysiąc v Poland (2007) 45 EHRR 42, [116].   
5 See Chapter Four.   
6 Department of Health and Children, ‘Report of the National Advisory Committee on Palliative Care’ 
(Department of Health and Children 2001) 23. 
7 Health Information and Quality Authority, ‘National Quality Standards for Residential Care Settings 
for Older People in Ireland (February 2009). 
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this standard requires local policy to be developed which sets out how care at the end 
of life is to be provided.  
 
The third section of this Chapter considers the guidance of representative bodies and 
non-governmental organisations. In particular, the papers and recommended 
frameworks on specialist palliative care published by the Irish Association of 
Palliative Care and European Association of Palliative Care will be examined. The 
work of these bodies is not directly enforceable but serves to inform local policy and 
assist in defining best practice in this area. In short, these three sections allow for a 
substantial proportion of the regulatory framework in Ireland for specialist palliative 
care to be identified and examined for how it protects patients and for whether it 
provides a clear and consistent framework under which healthcare professionals can 
practice. Overall, it will emerge from this chapter that the current legal framework in 
Ireland for specialist palliative care is inadequate and consequently a more appropriate 
legal framework needs to be identified.  
 
Professional Conduct and Ethics in Irish Healthcare 
Doctors, nurses, and allied healthcare professionals work together in providing 
palliative care.8 However, it is the doctor and nurse who are most closely involved in 
the provision of specialist palliative care. These professions have a substantial impact 
on the care of the terminally ill patient due to their involvement in treatment decisions, 
in the provision of palliative sedation, and the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and 
hydration. This underlines the need to focus on the professional standards and 
guidance applicable to these professions. The professional standards and guidance are 
set out by the professional bodies with responsibility for regulating these professions, 
namely the Irish Medical Council [hereinafter ‘IMC’] and An Bord Altranais.  
 
The Role of the Irish Medical Council  
The IMC was established by the Medical Practitioners Act 1978.9 It is the regulator 
of the medical profession in Ireland and is currently governed by the Medical 
Practitioners Act 2007.10 Consequently, the IMC is an ‘organ of the State’ under the 
                                                          
8 See p48. 
9 Medical Practitioners Act 1978.  
10 Medical Practitioners Act 2007. 
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European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003.11 This requires the IMC to carry 
out its functions in a way which is compatible with the obligations placed on the State 
by the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The 
purpose of the IMC is set out by the Medical Practitioners Act 2007 as ‘to protect the 
public by promoting and better ensuring high standards of professional conduct and 
professional education, training and competence among registered medical 
practitioners.’12 This underlines how the protection of the public is closely tied to the 
professional conduct and competence on the part of the medical practitioner. In line 
with this, the IMC is required to set out appropriate standards of practice for doctors 
including ‘the establishment, publication, maintenance and review of appropriate 
guidance on all matters related to professional conduct and ethics for registered 
medical practitioners’.13 As such, a significant function of the IMC is to establish and 
maintain professional standards and guidance for medical practitioners in Ireland.  
 
This section will examine the standards of practice and the guidance issued by the 
IMC which are relevant to specialist palliative care. The standards of practice which 
will be examined range from the first Guide to Ethical Conduct and Behaviour and to 
Fitness to Practise,14 to the most recent edition of this guide, i.e. the Guide to 
Professional Conduct and Ethics for Registered Medical Practitioners [hereinafter 
‘Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics’].15 This is the main guidance on conduct 
and ethics published by the IMC. Examining different editions of the guide allows for 
the understanding of and attitude to palliative care over the years to be drawn out and 
it provides greater context for the examination of the current Guide to Professional 
Conduct and Ethics. The discussion of previous editions of the guide will be concise 
and will focus on highlighting the most salient points for specialist palliative care. It 
is the current, seventh edition of the Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics, which 
will be given the greatest attention and it will be examined in a broader manner than 
                                                          
11 Text to n37 in Chapter Four. 
12 Medical Practitioners Act 2007, s 6; Simon Mills, Clinical Practice and the law (Bloomsbury 
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13 Medical Practitioners Act 2007, s 7(2)(i). 
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other editions of the guide for how it impacts on the provision of specialist palliative 
care.  
 
Legal Status of the Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics 
The Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics has no ‘binding force in law’16 but is 
relevant for the ‘internal regulation of the profession and it lays down what is ethical 
medical practice in Ireland.’17 In effect, the Guide has no formal legal status in Ireland. 
However, Madden suggests that the professional standards could potentially be 
‘indirectly incorporated into law through case law’.18 The situation envisaged by 
Madden is one in which a patient argues that they ‘had a legitimate expectation that 
the guide would be adhered to by the doctor and that this formed an implied term of 
the contract with the doctor.’19 On this basis, professional standards can be seen as 
forming part of the broader legal framework in Ireland for specialist palliative care. 
Despite this, the Guide does not contain comprehensive guidelines but establishes 
principles which are to be drawn on by doctors in connection with ‘their judgment, 
experience, knowledge and skills in each situation.’20 This underlines the subjective 
nature of complying with the Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics and highlights 
the challenge of enforcing these guidelines. The failure of a doctor to comply with the 
Guide can have severe professional consequences for the doctor and this illustrates the 
significance of examining the Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics.21 
 
Guide to Ethical Conduct and Behaviour and to Fitness to Practise 
The first IMC professional standards were published in 198122 and were titled Guide 
to Ethical Conduct and Behaviour and to Fitness to Practise.23 Ethical conduct was 
addressed under four headings which were: ‘responsibility to patients’,24 
‘responsibility to colleagues’,25 ‘responsibility to the community’,26 and ‘professional 
                                                          





21 Text to n102. 
22 This followed the establishment of the Irish Medical Council by the Medical Practitioners Act 1978. 
23 Guide to Ethical Conduct and Behaviour and to Fitness to Practise (n14).  
24 ibid 11. 
25 ibid 13. 
26 ibid 14. 
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standards’.27 Guidance on end-of-life care was addressed under ‘responsibility to the 
community’ rather than being included as part of ‘responsibility to patients’ or 
‘professional standards’. This categorisation suggests that end-of-life care was not 
being considered primarily from the patient’s perspective. Moreover, the relevant 
guidance was set out under the heading of ‘euthanasia’.28  
 
The use of the term ‘euthanasia’ reflects the point made in Chapter Two that palliative 
care in Ireland was only beginning to develop in the 1980’s.29 Nevertheless, this does 
demonstrate that the primary concern of the IMC was the need to emphasise the 
illegality of euthanasia rather than addressing end-of-life care in detail. Regardless of 
the terminology used, the Guide to Ethical Conduct and Behaviour and to Fitness to 
Practise set out that ‘Where death is imminent it is the doctor’s responsibility to take 
care that a patient dies with dignity and as little suffering as possible.’30 There is no 
explanation in the ‘Guide to Ethical Conduct and Behaviour and to Fitness to Practise’ 
as to what dignity entails or requires. The effect of this is to leave the interpretation of 
dignity to the subjective interpretation of individual medical practitioners. This issue 
will be returned to when considering the current edition of the Guide to Professional 
Conduct and Ethics.31  
 
The second,32 third33 and fourth edition34 of the IMC Guide to Ethical Conduct and 
Behaviour continued to address end-of-life care under the heading of ‘euthanasia’. In 
addition to this, no change was made to the substantive content of the guidance. The 
lack of change in the third edition of the Guide to Ethical Conduct and Behaviour is 
notable as this comes after the position of consultant physician in palliative medicine 
                                                          
27 ibid 16. 
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was created35 and after the establishment of the Irish Hospice Foundation.36 The Irish 
Association of Palliative Care was established in the time between the third and fourth 
edition, yet no change was made to the Guide to Ethical Conduct and Behaviour. As 
such, there was a clear cultural and professional shift in Ireland at this time in relation 
to palliative care which was not reflected in the professional standards developed by 
the IMC. The next substantial event in the development of end-of-life care in Ireland 
was the case of Re a Ward of Court.37  
 
The IMC issued a statement after Re a Ward of Court. In this statement it was set out 
that:  
 
It is the view of the Council that access to nutrition and hydration is one of 
the basic needs of human beings. This remains so even when, from time to 
time, this need can only be fulfilled by means of long established methods 
such as naso gastric and gastrostomy tube feeding.38  
 
This statement reaffirmed the Guide to Ethical Conduct and Behaviour and to Fitness 
to Practise in place at the time and cited the Principles of Medical Ethics in Europe39 
in support of their position.  
 
Based on this statement it appears that the IMC categorised artificial nutrition and 
hydration as medical care rather than medical treatment. For example, the IMC 
statement considered nutrition and hydration to be ‘one of the basic needs of human 
beings.’40 This categorisation would have restricted the approach the courts have taken 
on this issue based on the difficulty of justifying the withdrawal of care rather than 
                                                          
35 Text to n23 in Chapter Two. 
36 Text to n24 in Chapter Two. 
37 Ward of Court (withholding medical treatment) (No 2), Re, [1996] 2 IR 73, [1996] 2 IR 79, [1995] 2 
ILRM 401. 
38 Medical Council Statement, ‘Statements of the Medical Council and An Bord Altranais on the Ward 
case’ (1995) 1(2) Medico- Legal Journal of Ireland 60. 
39 ibid Appendix J (Principles of Medical Ethics in Europe) of ‘Guide to Ethical Conduct and Behaviour 
and to Fitness to Practise’. Article 2 ‘In the course of his professional practice a doctor undertakes to 
give priority to the medical interest of the patient. The doctor may use his professional knowledge only 
to improve or maintain the health of those who place their trust in him; in no circumstances may he act 
to their detriment’. 





treatment.41 The IMC also set out that ‘The Council sees no need to alter its Ethical 
Guide.’42 No changes were made at the time of this statement but the next edition of 
the Guide to Ethical Conduct and Behaviour was updated in certain respects. Changes 
in the fifth edition of the Guide to Ethical Conduct and Behaviour demonstrate the 
evolving legal framework for palliative care in Ireland.43 
 
The fifth edition of the Guide to Ethical Conduct and Behaviour made a number of 
changes to the guidance on end-of-life care.44 For instance, the heading titled 
‘euthanasia’ was replaced with the term ‘the dying patient’.45 This move away from 
the term ‘euthanasia’ to the more ethically neutral phrase ‘the dying patient’ suggested 
a shift in the attitude of the IMC towards palliative care. It signalled a more open 
approach to caring for the patient at this point in their life. A number of small changes 
were also made to the text of this guidance. The revised section set out that: 
 
Where death is imminent, it is the responsibility of the doctor to take care 
that the sick person dies with dignity, in comfort, and with as little 
suffering as possible. Deliberately causing the death of a patient is 
professional misconduct.46  
 
Changes introduced by this edition of the Guide include the use of the term ‘sick 
person’ instead of ‘patient’, reference to the comfort of the individual, and the term 
‘euthanasia’ is completely removed from this section. This edition of the Guide also 
refers to the dignity of a person without clarifying what this means or requires from 
the doctor. The cumulative effect of these changes was to signal a more open attitude 
to end-of-life care on the part of the IMC but there was little detail on how the human 
rights of a patient were to be protected in practice.  
  
The guidance of the IMC developed further when the sixth edition of the Guide to 
Ethical Conduct and Behaviour was published in 2004. This was the first IMC Guide 
                                                          
41 See pp97-104. 
42 Medical Council Statement (n38).  
43 Madden (n16) 74 The Guide was published in 1998 which was in line with the timing between 
previous editions.   
44 Irish Medical Council, ‘A Guide to Ethical Conduct and Behaviour’ (5th edn, Dublin 1998) 38. The 





to Ethical Conduct and Behaviour to refer directly to the treatment provided to the 
person near the end of life. In this regard, the sixth edition of the Guide to Ethical 
Conduct and Behaviour added the guidance that when death is imminent ‘a doctor is 
not obliged to initiate or maintain a treatment which is futile or disproportionately 
burdensome.’47 The IMC did not expand on when treatment could be considered 
‘futile’48 or what was to be considered ‘disproportionately burdensome’.49 This clearly 
requires the doctor to make the decision based on ‘their judgment, experience, 
knowledge and skills in each situation.’50 This provides a wide ranging autonomy to 
doctors but an appropriate regulatory framework requires more than this. Such a 
framework must provide sufficient structure and clarity to ensure a consistent standard 
of healthcare across providers of palliative care and thereby consistently protect the 
right to life, right to bodily integrity, right of autonomy, and protect the patient from 
inhuman or degrading treatment. These are all relevant concerns for examining the 
seventh edition of the Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics.    
 
Seventh Edition of the Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics 
The IMC Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics is currently in its seventh edition 
and this provides the most detailed guidance on end-of-life care of any IMC Guide to 
date. Consequently, while the discussion of previous IMC Guides was narrow in focus, 
it is necessary to consider the seventh edition of the Guide to Professional Conduct 
and Ethics in a more holistic manner. Sections addressing the dignity of the patient,51 
nutrition and hydration,52 end-of-life care,53 consent to medical treatment,54 and 
advance healthcare planning55 will be examined. It is to be questioned whether the 
current Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics adequately specifies the four 
principles along with protecting the human rights of the patient. In this context, the 
first aspect of the Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics to be considered is Section 
22 on ‘End of life care’56  
                                                          
47 Irish Medical Council, ‘A Guide to Ethical Conduct and Behaviour’ (6th edn, Dublin 2004) 34. 
48 ibid. 
49 ibid.   
50 Madden (n16) 74. 
51 Irish Medical Council (n15) 14. 
52 ibid 20. 
53 ibid 22. 
54 ibid 33. 
55 ibid 39. 




Section 22 of the Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics sets out guidance on end-
of-life care over the course of several sub-sections. The guidance contained in these 
sub-sections is a considerable expansion from previous editions of the Guide and 
reflects the established role of palliative care in Ireland.  
 
Section 22.1 of the Guide underlines the importance of ensuring that the patient ‘dies 
with dignity, in comfort and with as little suffering as possible.’57 The principle of 
dignity has been a constant through all editions of the Guide to Professional Conduct 
and Ethics. However, reference to this principle is not linked to any treaty or 
convention nor is it explicitly grounded in any particular theoretical framework. This 
approach to dignity results in each medical practitioner relying on a subjective 
understanding of dignity to guide their approach to the care of the patient.  This 
undermines consistency in specialist palliative care across healthcare providers and 
does not provide clarity for the patient in terms of the type of care they are likely to 
receive.  
 
Section 22.1 is not the only section in the Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics 
which addresses the dignity of the patient. Section 5 of the Guide to Professional 
Conduct and Ethics sets out that ‘All patients must always be treated with respect for 
their dignity.’58 Unfortunately, the concept of dignity is not defined by Section 5 
either. Dignity clearly occupies a central role in the Guide to Professional Conduct 
and Ethics but the lack of a clear meaning is problematic. This reflects the challenges 
raised by dignity which were highlighted in Chapter Four59 and suggests the existence 
of a fragmented legal framework for specialist palliative care in Ireland as it is 
necessary to look beyond the Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics to understand 
what dignity may mean.60 
 
Section 22.2 of the Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics addresses the provision 
and withdrawal of treatment. This section sets out that:      
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58 ibid 14 The remainder of this section concentrates on respecting the dignity of patients with 
disabilities. 
59 Text to n341 in Chapter Four. 




There is no obligation on you to start or continue a treatment, or artificial 
nutrition and hydration, that is futile or disproportionately burdensome, 
even if such treatment may prolong life. You should carefully consider 
when to start and when to stop attempts to prolong life, while ensuring that 
patients receive appropriate pain management and relief from distress.61 
 
The use of the term ‘prolong’ rather than a term such as ‘sustain’ underlines the 
element of futility which is to be present in making the decision to withdraw artificial 
nutrition and hydration.62 As McGlade et al. wrote, ‘Advances in medical technology 
make it possible to prolong life in terminally ill patients, possibly not extending life, 
but prolonging the dying process.’63 Identifying when further treatment is futile is a 
complex decision which medical practitioners regularly have to take and is loaded 
with a range of broader concerns. These concerns include the wishes of the patient if 
they are known and the importance of identifying what constitutes an appropriate time 
for the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration. These are issues which need to 
be addressed by professional standards in order to ensure that treatment decisions are 
made in a clear and consistent fashion across providers of palliative care. On this point, 
Section 19 of the Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics does serve to highlight 
some of the issues which medical practitioners should take account of when making 
treatment decisions around the nutrition and hydration of a patient.  
 
In Section 19 it is set out that, ‘If a patient is unable to take sufficient nutrition and 
hydration orally, you should assess what alternative forms are possible and appropriate 
in the circumstances.’64 As such, this Section focuses on the factors to be considered 
in deciding on whether artificial nutrition and hydration should be commenced. In 
deciding what treatment option to pursue the medical practitioner is to consider ‘the 
                                                          
61 Irish Medical Council (n15) 22. 
62 Tom L Beauchamp and James F Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (7th edn, Oxford 
University Press 2013) 169 ‘Physicians have no obligation to provide pointless, futile, or 
contraindicated treatment.’ Although it is recognised that ‘[p]alliative interventions may still be 
continued.’; Beauchamp (n62) 170 ‘Our conclusion is that a genuinely futile medical intervention – one 
that has no chance of being efficacious in relation to accepted goals – is morally optional and in many 
cases ought not be introduced or continued.’; Airedale N.H.S. v Bland [1993] AC 789, 837; Ward of 
Court (withholding medical treatment) (No 2), Re, [1996] 2 IR 79. 
63 Ciara McGlade, William Molloy and Suzanne Timmons, ‘Decision-Making in Incompetent Older 
Adults: Clinical, Social and Legal Issues’ (2011) 2 Medico-Legal Journal of Ireland 70, 74. 
64 Irish Medical Council (n15) 20. 
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burden or risks to the patient, the patient’s wishes if known, and the overall benefit to 
be achieved.’65 These considerations engage the patient’s right of autonomy, as well 
as the right to bodily integrity, and protection from inhuman or degrading treatment. 
The factors the medical practitioner is to bear in mind will be drawn out in greater 
detail later in this Chapter when examining the decision-making framework and the 
protection of the patient’s right of autonomy in the Guide to Professional Conduct and 
Ethics.66 
 
The last line of Section 22.2 of the Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics requires 
the medical practitioner to identify what constitutes ‘appropriate pain management’.67 
This type of decision requires a substantial balancing of principles such as 
nonmaleficence and beneficence. Therefore, there is a need for these principles to be 
appropriately specified for the medical practitioner. Chapters Two and Three 
highlighted the importance of having a clear framework for decisions around pain 
management especially due to suggestions that palliative sedation closely resembles 
euthanasia.68 This Section does little to strengthen the distinction between these 
practices and allows the medical practitioner a substantial degree of autonomy in 
making decisions on appropriate pain management. Nevertheless, there are other 
sections in the Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics which might provide clarity 
on these decisions and these will be outlined in due course.  
 
Protection of the Right of Autonomy 
Chapter Four demonstrated the significant role which the right of autonomy has in 
specialist palliative care. The right of autonomy impacts on decisions to withdraw 
treatment or to request that a particular course of treatment be followed. The protection 
of this right emphasises the subjective nature of pain and that the terminally ill patient 
should be given the opportunity to be actively involved in making decisions which 
impact on their healthcare. It is positive that Section 22.3 of the Guide to Professional 
                                                          
65 ibid.  
66 See p179. 
67 Irish Medical Council (n15) 22. 
68 J Andrew Billings and Susan D Block, ‘Slow euthanasia’ (1996) 12 Journal of Palliative Care 21; B 
Mount, ‘Morphine drips, terminal sedation, and slow euthanasia: definitions and facts’ (1996) 12 
Journal of Palliative Care 31; H Brody, ‘Commentary on Billings and Blocks “Slow Euthanasia”’ 
(1996) 12 Journal of Palliative Care 38; James Gilbert, ‘Palliative medicine: a new specialty changes 
an old debate’ (1996) 52(2) British Medical Bulletin 296, 297; J Kenyon Mason and Graeme T Laurie, 
Mason & McCall Smith’s Law & Medical Ethics (9th edn, Oxford University Press 2013) 615. 
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Conduct and Ethics addresses a patient’s right of autonomy in relation to treatment 
decisions. This Section sets out that ‘You should respect the right of patients to refuse 
medical treatment or to request the withdrawal of medical treatment.’69 The refusal of 
treatment is also addressed by Section 40.1 of the Guide to Professional Conduct and 
Ethics which sets out that: 
 
Every adult with capacity is entitled to refuse medical treatment. You must 
respect a patient’s decision to refuse treatment, even if you disagree with 
that decision. In these circumstances, you should clearly explain to the 
patient the possible consequences of refusing treatment and offer the 
patient the opportunity to receive a second medical opinion if possible.70   
 
Section 40.1 demonstrates that there are a number of points to be addressed in order 
to protect and vindicate the right of autonomy. For instance, it is important that issues 
of capacity and communication be addressed appropriately both by the medical 
practitioner in practice and in the Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics. If the 
right of autonomy is not to be illusory then it is necessary that requirements for its 
protection and vindication in practice are clearly set out. 
  
Section 22.4 of the Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics outlines issues relating 
to communication with the patient and their families. Communication is vital for 
ensuring the patient is able to make informed decisions in relation to their healthcare. 
The Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics requires medical practitioners to:  
 
take care to communicate effectively and sensitively with patients and their 
families so that they have a clear understanding of what can and cannot be 
achieved. You should offer advice on other treatment or palliative care 
options that may be available to them.71  
 
This is a positive step in promoting effective palliative care and delivering on the right 
of autonomy. In communicating ‘effectively and sensitively with patients’72 the 
medical practitioner is also ensuring that the patient is sufficiently informed to make 
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decisions about their healthcare. In this regard, greater detail on respecting the right 
of autonomy and healthcare decision-making in general is set out in Section D of the 
Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics which is titled ‘Consent to Medical 
Treatment’.73  
 
Section 33 of the Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics addresses the general 
principles of Section D. The general principles set out by Section 33 emphasise the 
importance of obtaining informed consent prior to medical treatment being carried out 
and it underlines the importance of the patient’s right of autonomy.74 For instance, 
‘The ethical and legal rationale behind this is to respect the patient’s autonomy and 
their right to control their own life.’75 In order for a patient to exercise their capacity, 
the medical practitioner is to ensure that they have been given appropriate 
information,76 along with ‘appropriate help and support’.77 In circumstances where a 
patient does not have capacity the patient is ‘still entitled to the same respect for their 
human dignity and personal integrity as any person with full capacity.’78 The Guide to 
Professional Conduct and Ethics also adopts a functional approach to the assessment 
of a person’s capacity.79 If a patient does not have sufficient capacity to make a 
particular decision this does not mean that they are not capable of making other 
decisions or will not be capable of making this type of decision in the future.80    
  
                                                          
73 ibid 33. 
74 ibid 34; Beauchamp (n62) 124 Informed consent as a vital element in respecting the principle of 
autonomy.  
75 Irish Medical Council (n15) 34. 
76 ibid ‘Every adult patient is presumed to have the capacity to make decisions about their own 
healthcare. As their doctor, you have a duty to help your patients to make decisions for themselves by 
giving them information in a clear and comprehensible manner and by ensuring that they have 
appropriate help and support. The patient is also entitled to be accompanied during any such discussion 
by an advocate of their own choice.’ 
77 ibid; Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Bill 2013, s 8(3) ‘A relevant person who falls within 
paragraph (a) of the definition of “relevant person” in section 2(1) shall not be considered as unable to 
make a decision in respect of the matter concerned unless all practicable steps have been taken, without 
success, to help him or her to do so.’ 
78 Irish Medical Council (n15) 34; Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Bill 2013, s 8(6)(b) ‘have due 
regard to the need to respect the right of the relevant person to his or her dignity, bodily integrity, 
privacy and autonomy.’ 
79 Irish Medical Council (n15) 34-35 ‘A functional approach should be taken when assessing an 
individual’s capacity. This approach assesses the individual’s ability to make the relevant choice 
depending on: their level of understanding and retention on the information they have been given, and 
their ability to apply the information to their own personal circumstances and come to a decision.’; 
Fitzpatrick and Another v K and Another [2008] IEHC 104; Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Bill 
2013, s 3. 
80 ibid 35.  
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It was set out in Chapter Four that the Assisted Decision-Making Capacity Bill 2013 
provides for assisted decision making and co-decision makers where the capacity of 
the patient was in doubt. Despite the seventh edition of the Guide to Professional 
Conduct and Ethics pre-dating this Bill, it suggests that other people may have the 
‘legal authority to make decisions on the patient’s behalf.’81 However, in 
circumstances where a medical practitioner is to make a decision on behalf of a patient 
who lacks capacity they are to consider factors such as:  
  
which treatment option would provide the best clinical benefit for the 
patient, 
the patient’s past and present wishes if they are known, 
whether the patient’s capacity is likely to increase, 
the views of other people close to the patient who may be familiar with the 
patient’s preferences, beliefs and values, and  
the views of other health professionals involved in the patient’s care.82   
 
This is a broad range of factors to consider but in terms of accuracy it cannot match 
the direct reliance on patient autonomy; a significant aspect of which is informed 
consent.   
 
The importance of informed consent is recognised in Section 35 of the Guide to 
Professional Conduct and Ethics.83 As part of this, informed consent requires the 
medical practitioner to ‘explain the process in such a way as to ensure that patients do 
not feel that their consent is simply a formality or a signature on a page.’84 This 
requires the medical practitioner to provide the patient with ‘sufficient information, in 
a way that they can understand’.85 The Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics goes 
into considerable detail in relation to ensuring the patient is given the information 
necessary to exercise their right of autonomy. For instance, the Guide to Professional 
                                                          
81 ibid. 
82 ibid 35-36. 
83 ibid 36. 
84 ibid; Beauchamp (n62) 122 The first meaning of informed consent is that it is ‘an individual’s 
autonomous authorization of a medical intervention or of participation in research. In this first sense, a 
person must do more than express agreement or comply with a proposal.’ 
85 Irish Medical Council (n15) 36 ‘As part of the informed consent process, patients must receive 
sufficient information, in a way that they can understand to enable them to exercise their right to make 
informed decisions about their care. This refers to the disclosure of all significant risks or substantial 
risks of grave adverse consequences.’ 
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Conduct and Ethics sets out that ‘the medical practitioner is to ‘take appropriate steps 
to find out what patients want to know about their condition and what they ought to 
know about their condition, its investigation and treatment.’86 This demonstrates that 
the level of information to be provided may fluctuate based on a number of factors 
which the Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics also outlines.87 In addition to this, 
the medical practitioner is required to take account of a patient’s individual needs and 
priorities as well as the ‘patients’ beliefs, culture, occupation or other factors’88 which 
may impact on the ‘information they need to reach a decision.’89 The medical 
practitioner is also required to answer questions raised by the patient in an open 
manner.90  
 
Due to the nature of informed consent, these are ongoing issues for the medical 
practitioner in the care of the patient.91 Furthermore, in seeking the consent of the 
patient it is necessary that the information be communicated in adequate time, e.g. 
‘Where possible, you should explain risks well in advance of an intervention.’92 
Moreover, the effect of sedation on the patient is recognised and it is suggested that 
the medical practitioner should not ‘seek consent when a patient may be stressed, 
sedated or in pain and therefore less likely to make a calm and reasoned decision.’93 
On this basis, it should be recognised that in specialist palliative care the discussions 
need to take place at an appropriate time based on the patient’s disease trajectory. For 
example, it could be argued that decisions about artificial nutrition and hydration need 
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to be made prior to decisions about sedation so that the patient has the opportunity to 
be fully involved in the decision-making process.94 Moreover, as these standards are 
applicable to all medical practitioners it is suggested that a more structured approach 
may need to be set out in order to give full effect to these standards in a palliative care 
setting. The sections discussed so far are supported by Appendix A of the Guide to 
Professional Conduct and Ethics.  
 
Appendix A addresses the ‘Information for patients prior to giving consent’.95 
Information to be given prior to consent and which is particularly relevant to specialist 
palliative care includes: ‘details of the diagnosis, and prognosis, and the likely 
prognosis if the condition is left untreated’,96 ‘options for treatment or management of 
the condition, including the option not to treat’,97 ‘details of the procedures or 
therapies involved, including methods of pain relief’,98 ‘information about how and 
when the patient’s condition and any side effects will be monitored or re-assessed’,99 
and ‘a reminder that patients have a right to seek a second opinion’.100 Unfortunately, 
the approach to decision-making and the factors to be considered are spread out across 
the Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics. This makes it more difficult to ensure 
that care is provided in a consistent manner. Despite this, it has been shown that the 
decision-making framework in the Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics is 
relatively detailed and is supportive of patient autonomy.  
 
Overall, it is necessary that medical professionals have a clear understanding of the 
care to be provided and the standards they are to meet. The current IMC Guide to 
Professional Conduct and Ethics demonstrates a clear normative shift in the 
guidelines. In this regard, there is more detail in this Guide on standards relevant to 
specialist palliative care but certain weaknesses persist. This reflects the fact that there 
are limits in terms of what can be achieved by the Guide to Professional Conduct and 
Ethics as it does not contain comprehensive guidelines but establishes principles 
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which are to be drawn on by doctors. Despite this, the manner in which the Guide has 
developed demonstrates a move towards establishing more detailed guidance for the 
medical profession in Ireland. It may be necessary that separate guidelines be 
developed by the IMC which address the area of specialist palliative care in detail. 
This approach would still come within the role of the IMC as set out by the Medical 
Practitioners Act 2007.101 The decision-making framework set out in the Guide to 
Professional Conduct and Ethics in terms of supporting the right of autonomy is strong 
however there is no assistance in recognising when treatment is futile, when 
appropriate pain management is needed, or what conversations around palliative care 
should entail. In other respects, the Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics 
demonstrates the potential of professional standards. For example, it does not have the 
rigidity of legislation and can be updated easily to reflect advances in medical 
knowledge. The Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics has clear strengths in 
protecting the human rights of a patient but in the specific context of specialist 
palliative care it is evident that there are issues of clarity and consistency which need 
to be addressed. In order to draw out these points fully it is necessary to also examine 
the manner in which the Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics is enforced. This 
provides a view of the IMC Guide in practice and demonstrates the concerns relevant 
to the enforcement of the Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics.  
 
Enforcement of the Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics 
Medical practitioners who fail to comply with the Guide to Professional Conduct and 
Ethics may be the subject of a complaint. This is provided for by section 57 of the 
Medical Practitioners Act 2007.102 Complaints relating to treatment and care provided 
                                                          
101 Medical Practitioners Act 2007, s 6 ‘to protect the public by promoting and better ensuring high 
standards of professional conduct and professional education, training and competence among 
registered medical practitioners.’ 
102 Medical Practitioners Act 2007, s 57(1) A person (including the Council) may make a complaint to 
the Preliminary Proceedings Committee concerning a registered medical practitioner on one or more 
than one of the grounds of— 
(a) professional misconduct, 
(b) poor professional performance, 
(c) a relevant medical disability, 
(d) a failure to comply with a relevant condition, 
(e) a failure to comply with an undertaking or to take any action specified in a consent given in response 
to a request under section 67(1), 
(f) a contravention of a provision of this Act (including a provision of any regulations or rules made 
under this Act), or 
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during specialist palliative care are most likely to come within section 57(1)(a) and (b) 
of the Medical Practitioners Act 2007 which relate to professional misconduct and 
poor professional performance.  
 
The Preliminary Proceedings Committee is the first stage in the investigation of a 
complaint and is to make a decision on the appropriate action to be taken. In cases 
where the Preliminary Proceedings Committee are of the opinion that further action is 
required then the complaint may be referred to a Fitness to Practise Committee. On 
this point, it is necessary to consider how the grounds of professional misconduct and 
poor professional performance are interpreted. 
 
Professional Misconduct 
Professional misconduct is defined in the Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics 
as:  
 
Conduct which doctors of experience, competence and good repute 
consider disgraceful or dishonourable; and/or Conduct connected with his 
or her profession in which the doctor concerned has seriously fallen short 
by omission or commission of the standards of conduct expected among 
doctors.103  
 
This demonstrates that professional misconduct may occur by way of an act or 
omission of the doctor. Greater guidance on the interpretation of professional 
misconduct can be found in the case of O’Laoire v The Medical Council104 which was 
taken under the Medical Practitioners Act 1978.  
 
In O’Laoire v The Medical Council, the court described indicators of professional 
misconduct as;   
 
(a) Conduct which is ‘infamous’ or ‘disgraceful’ in a professional respect 
is professional misconduct; 
                                                          
(g) a conviction in the State for an offence triable on indictment or a conviction outside the State for an 
offence consisting of acts or omissions that, if done or made in the State, would constitute an offence 
triable on indictment. 
103 Irish Medical Council (n15) 11. 
104 O’Laoire v The Medical Council (High Court, 27 January 1995). 
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(b) Conduct which would not be ‘infamous’ or ‘disgraceful’ in any other 
person, if done by a medical practitioner in relation to his/her profession, 
may be considered as ‘infamous’ or ‘disgraceful’ in a professional respect; 
(c) ‘Infamous’ or ‘disgraceful’ conduct is conduct involving some degree 
of moral turpitude, fraud or dishonesty; 
(d) The fact that a person wrongly but honestly forms a particular opinion 
cannot of itself amount to infamous or disgraceful conduct in a professional 
sense; and 
(e) Conduct which could not be properly characterised as ‘infamous’ or 
disgraceful’ and which does not involve any degree of moral turpitude, 
fraud or dishonesty may still constitute professional misconduct, if it is 
conduct connected with the profession in which the medical practitioner 
concerned has seriously fallen short, by omission or commission, of the 
standards of conduct expected amongst medical practitioners.105 
 
According to Keane J, these tests are to be read in conjunction with the definition of 
professional misconduct as contained in the IMC Guide. Tests one to four are known 
as the ‘moral turpitude test’, while the fifth test is referred to as ‘the expected standards 
test.’106 These tests have been followed in a number of cases such as An Bord Altranais 
v O’Ceallaigh;107 Millett-Johnson v Medical Council;108 and Cahill v Dental 
Council.109 The case of O’Laoire v The Medical Council also set the standard of proof 
as the criminal standard. In effect, it is to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that there 
was professional misconduct.  
 
Poor Professional Performance 
Poor professional performance is defined by the Guide to Professional Conduct and 
Ethics as: 
 
                                                          
105 O’Laoire v The Medical Council (High Court, 27 January 1995) quoted in Madden (n16) 61-62; 
McCandless v General Medical Council (1995) 30 BMLR 53, [1995] 1 WLR 169 It was held that the 
words serious professional misconduct are intended to have the same meaning as ‘infamous conduct in 
a professional respect’. The extension of potential penalties such as suspension and the imposition of 
conditions suggested that the term is intended to cover serious instances of negligence.   
106 Madden (n16) 62. 
107 An Bord Altranais v O’Ceallaigh [2000] IR 412, [2011] IESC 50.  
108 Millett-Johnson v Medical Council (High Court, 12 January 2001). 
109 Cahill v Dental Council [2001] IEHC 97.    
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a failure by the practitioner to meet the standards of competence (whether 
in knowledge and skill or the application of knowledge and skill or both) 
that can reasonably be expected of medical practitioners practising 
medicine of the kind practised by the practitioner.110  
 
This includes ‘poor communication’ on the part of the medical practitioner.111 The 
definition of poor professional performance suggests that standards of competence in 
specialist palliative care are to be compared against the standards of other specialist 
palliative care providers.112 This is a difficult level to identify due to the lack of 
comprehensive guidelines. The term ‘poor professional performance’ involves distinct 
considerations from those which apply to misconduct allegations. This distinction may 
be based on a medical practitioner falling short of the skills and knowledge expected 
among medical practitioners.113 Although such a failing must be significant for poor 
professional performance it would not amount to a severe falling short.  
  
Section 77 of the Medical Practitioners Act 2007 provides further guidance for the 
courts in determining professional misconduct as well as poor professional 
performance as it allows the court to ‘admit and have regard to the evidence of any 
person of good standing in the medical profession as to what constitutes professional 
misconduct or poor professional performance in relation to the practice of that 
profession.’114 However, this is only of relevance if the doctor is sanctioned. The 
imposition of sanctions by the Medical Council depends on the report of the Fitness 
to Practice Committee. The sanctions are set out by section 71 of the Medical 
Practitioners Act 2007 and may include;  
 
(a) an advice or admonishment, or a censure, in writing; 
(b) a censure in writing and a fine not exceeding €5,000; 
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(c) the attachment of conditions to the practitioner’s registration, including 
restrictions on the practice of medicine that may be engaged in by the 
practitioner; 
(d) the transfer of the practitioner’s registration to another division of the 
register; 
(e) the suspension of the practitioner’s registration for a specified period; 
(f) the cancellation of the practitioner’s registration; 
(g) a prohibition from applying for a specified period for the restoration of 
the practitioner’s registration.115 
  
As such, being the subject of a sanction can have serious consequences for the medical 
practitioner. In 2010 there were 160 complaints against doctors practising in the 
general division, 212 complaints against doctors practising in the specialist division, 
and 12 practising in the trainee specialist division.116 Medical practitioners in the 
specialist division are clearly at a higher risk of complaint than their colleagues in the 
general division. This underlines the importance for both the medical practitioner and 
the patient of ensuring that appropriate standards and guidance are in place for 
specialist palliative care. The focus so far has been on the role of the medical 
practitioner but as Chapter Two highlighted, a range of professions are involved in the 
provision of specialist palliative care. On this basis, it is essential to also consider the 
guidance issued by An Bord Altranais as it is vital that nurses also have clear 
professional standards within which to work.  
 
The Role of An Bord Altranais 
An Bord Altranais was established by the Nurses Act 1950.117 It is the regulatory body 
of the nursing profession in Ireland and is currently governed by the Nurses and 
Midwives Act 2011.118 The purpose of An Bord Altranais is the ‘promotion of high 
standards of professional education, training and practice and professional conduct 
among nurses’.119 In line with this, An Bord Altranais has published ‘The Code of 
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Professional Conduct for each Nurse and Midwife’120 [hereinafter ‘Code of 
Professional Conduct’]. In addition to this, An Bord Altranais have published a revised 
draft of the Code of Professional Conduct and Ethics for Registered Nurses and 
Registered Midwives,121 guidelines for nurse prescribers,122 and guidance for nurses 
working with older people.123 These will be addressed in turn over the course of this 
section.  
 
The Code of Professional Conduct for each Nurse and Midwife 
The function of the Code of Professional Conduct is to support the nurse in making 
‘professional decisions, to carry out his/her responsibilities and to promote high 
standards of professional conduct.’124 The Code of Professional Conduct makes no 
clear reference to specialist palliative care but does mention end-of-life care. In this 
regard, the Code of Professional Conduct sets out that: 
 
The nurse must at all times maintain the principle that ever [sic] effort 
should be made to preserve human life, both born and unborn. When death 
is imminent, care should be taken to ensure that the patient dies with 
dignity.125  
 
Dignity is again a guiding concept in the care of the patient but no detail is provided 
on how it is to be interpreted. This is a failing which overlaps with the current IMC 
Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics.126 
 
The Code of Professional Conduct does not provide guidance on communication or 
specialist palliative care practices such as the provision of palliative sedation or the 
withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration. In effect, the Code of Professional 
Conduct is vague in how best to care for the terminally ill patient. However, the 
statement issued by An Bord Altranais after the case of Re a Ward of Court provides 
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insight into their attitude towards the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration. 
This is supported by the point that the An Bord Altranais Code of Professional 
Conduct at the time of Re a Ward of Court contained the same guidance on end-of-
life care as the current Code of Professional Conduct. The An Bord Altranais statement 
set out that: 
 
so long as there remains a means of nutrition and hydration of this patient 
it is the duty of the nurse to act in accordance with the Code and to provide 
nutrition and hydration. In this specific case, a nurse may not participate in 
the withdrawal and termination of the means of nutrition and hydration by 
tube. In the event of the withdrawal and termination of the means of 
nutrition and hydration by tube the nurse's role will be to provide all 
nursing care.127 
 
It is not clear from the An Bord Altranais statement whether it is the patient’s lack of 
capacity or some other factor which resulted in An Bord Altranais expressing 
reservations about the outcome of this case. Nonetheless, An Bord Altranais made 
their position clear in this statement when they commented that they saw ‘no reason 
to change the code following consideration of this judgment.’128 Despite this, the 
withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration continues to occur in this jurisdiction. 
This places nurses in a difficult legal position due to the lack of clarity from An Bord 
Altranais on the circumstances, if any, for when artificial nutrition and hydration can 
be withdrawn from the patient. Furthermore, the lack of clarity makes developing a 
harmonious understanding of specialist palliative care practices among healthcare 
professionals even more challenging and hampers consistency in the provision of 
specialist palliative care. It was only in October 2013 that An Bord Altranais published 
a new draft Code of Professional Conduct. The contents of this Code will be compared 
with the current Code of Professional Conduct for how it protects human rights and 
the guidance it provides for nurses engaged in the provision of specialist palliative 
care in Ireland.  
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Draft Code of Professional Conduct and Ethics for Registered Nurses and Registered 
Midwives 
The draft Code recognises that nurses draw on more than the Code of Professional 
Conduct in practise. For example, the draft Code sets out that ‘Professional 
accountability, competency and the quality of professional practice are based on this 
structure in tandem with other supporting guidance and standards frameworks.’129 The 
Code ‘supports ethical and clinical decision-making, on-going reflection and 
professional self-development’,130 ‘informs the general public about the professional 
care they can expect from nurses and midwives’,131 and ‘sets standards for the 
regulation, monitoring and enforcement of professional conduct.’132 These points are 
important to address for specialist palliative care and they also reflect the fact that a 
code of professional conduct sets standards which patients expect will be met. 
 
Underpinning the draft Code of Professional Conduct and Ethics are five principles, 
i.e. ‘Respect for the dignity of the person’,133 ‘Professional responsibility and 
accountability’,134 ‘Trust and confidentiality’,135 ‘Quality of practice’,136 and 
‘Collaboration with others’.137 These principles serve to guide the interaction between 
the nursing profession, patients, and other healthcare professionals.138 The draft Code 
of Professional Conduct and Ethics underlines how the Code is not only for the 
registered nurse but also the general public. For example, the draft Code of 
Professional Conduct and Ethics sets out that, ‘The standards of conduct and 
professional practice follow from the ethical values and show the attitudes and 
behaviours that members of the public have the right to expect from nurses and 
midwives.’139 This demonstrates that professional standards not only clarify practice 
for the healthcare professional but also serve to better inform the patient as to the 
standard of care and manner in which treatment decisions are to be made. Of the 
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principles which underpin the draft Code of Professional Conduct and Ethics it is the 
‘Respect for the dignity of the person’ which is of most relevance to palliative care 
due to the values and standards of conduct it requires of the nurse.  
 
Respect for the Dignity of the Person 
The draft Code of Professional Conduct and Ethics sets out the basis for dignity in the 
Code. This is a welcome step which was not taken in the previous edition of the Code 
of Professional Conduct or in the IMC Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics. The 
draft Code of Professional Conduct and Ethics sets out that the principle comes from 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Furthermore, the European Convention 
on Human Rights, the Irish Constitution, and the Equal Status Acts140 are drawn on as 
sources ‘for the values and standards established for respecting the dignity of the 
person.’141 This recognises that the care of the patient is underpinned by a broad range 
of human rights which impact on the manner in which care is to be provided to the 
patient. As such, the Code provides detail on values, standards of conduct, and 
supporting guidance in relation to respecting the dignity of the patient.   
  
Values relating to dignity include the point that nurses are to respect every person ‘as 
a unique individual’,142 and to ‘respect and defend the dignity of every stage of human 
life’.143 As part of this nurses are to ‘respect each person’s right to self-determination 
as a basic human right.’144 In relation to self-determination, the draft Code sets out 
that: 
 
It is presumed that all adults have capacity to make health care decisions. 
In respecting the right of self-determination, informed consent is key. 
Where a person does not have capacity, nurses and midwives with others, 
consider the person’s best interests when making health care decisions.145 
 
                                                          
140 Equal Status Act 2000. 




145 ibid 7. 
195 
 
This is an area which is likely to change in certain respects given the Assisted Decision 
Making (Capacity) Bill 2013. Nonetheless, the detail contained in this draft Code is a 
substantial improvement over previous standards issued by An Bord Altranais.   
 
The standards of conduct for respecting the dignity of the person also reflect the values 
set out in the draft Code of Professional Conduct and Ethics. The standards of conduct 
set out that ‘In end-of-life care, you should support the person to die with dignity and 
comfort. You should seek to understand how the person views dignity and provide 
care that tries to meet their needs.’146 There are two points which can be made in 
relation to this standard. First, it suggests that dignity is inherent in the individual and 
is not something to be provided to the patient but is instead something which is 
protected by the broader actions of the healthcare professional. For example, once the 
meaning of dignity is ascertained the nurse is to ‘provide care that tries to meet their 
needs.’147 The second point in relation to this standard is the challenge of its 
application in practice. The concept of dignity is not particularly easy to define148 but 
the nurse is to ‘seek to understand how the person views dignity’.149 In the context of 
palliative care, this is not an easy step for either the nurse or a terminally ill patient. It 
would clearly involve the nurse drawing on past experience in order to understand the 
concept of dignity. However, a broader framework for the legal and ethical issues 
arising in specialist palliative care practices could provide the nurse with greater 
structure and clarity in practice.  
 
Advance healthcare plans are also addressed as part of the standards of conduct in 
relation to dignity. For instance, ‘You should respect an individual’s advance care 
directive or plan, if known.’150 The supporting guidance on dignity further 
concentrates on advance healthcare plans. The absence of a legal framework in this 
area at present is recognised in the draft Code of Professional Conduct and Ethics.151 
However, it sets out that ‘guidance from health care regulators and others may help to 
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inform you about best practice regarding the ethical and professional issues associated 
with advance care directives or plans.’152 Similar to the IMC, An Bord Altranais sets 
out that an advance healthcare plan should be respected provided ‘the service user 
made an informed choice regarding their decisions’,153 ‘the decision covers the 
situation that has occurred’,154 and ‘there is no indication that the service user has 
changed their mind since the advanced care directive or plan was made.’155 Protecting 
the right of autonomy through advance healthcare plans serves as another way in 
which the dignity of an individual can be respected. The autonomy of a patient is also 
directly referred to as part of the standards of conduct for dignity.  
 
The nurse is required to ‘protect and promote autonomy of service users’,156 as well 
as recognising the importance of a patient’s consent.157 The draft Code sets out that 
that the level of information and discussion in each case will fluctuate and depends on 
issues such as ‘the complexity, nature and level of risk associated with the 
intervention.’158 However, a basic level of information which should be provided is 
not set out in the draft Code. On this basis, a subjective approach will be required from 
the nurse in determining the information and the nature of the discussion with the 
patient to take place. Nonetheless, the draft Code of Professional Conduct and Ethics 
is a positive step in providing greater guidance for nurses practising in Ireland. The 
draft Code addresses a number of failings in the previous Code of Professional 
Conduct and demonstrates more engagement with the broader legal framework. In 
addition to the Code of Professional Conduct, it can be noted that An Bord Altranais 
publishes further guidelines for nurses which serve to provide greater detail in caring 
for certain areas of the patient population. For instance, aspects of the ‘Professional 
Guidance for Nurses Working for Older People’ are of relevance for the provision of 
specialist palliative care. 
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Professional Guidance for Nurses Working for Older People  
The objectives of this guidance include providing ‘professional guidance and direction 
for nurses caring for older people across all healthcare settings’159 and providing ‘a 
nursing framework for end of life care that embraces living and dying as part of the 
normal care structure and processes in all care settings’.160 A significant motivating 
factor in the development of this guidance was the ‘progressive increase in the older 
population, and the intensity of quality of care required to meet their complex 
needs’.161 This point was set out in Chapter One as a main factor in the need to examine 
and identify an appropriate legal framework for specialist palliative care in this 
jurisdiction.162  
 
The ‘Professional Guidance for Nurses Working with Older People’ sets out standards 
on ‘person-centred holistic care’,163 ‘therapeutic relationship’,164 ‘care 
environment’,165 ‘quality of care’,166 ‘professional development’,167 and ‘end-of-life 
care’.168 The rationale for the standard on end-of-life care is that ‘Older people may 
feel disempowered in their decision-making at this time. In order to protect their rights, 
it is important to be guided by, and work within, a legal framework.’169 The 
importance of a clear legal framework for specialist palliative care is central to this 
thesis and has been recognised and highlighted by several stakeholders in patient 
care.170 In this respect, it is positive that An Bord Altranais recognises the role and 
impact which an appropriate legal framework can have for both the healthcare 
professional and the patient. 
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Standard 4 on end-of-life care requires that ‘The older person receives comprehensive, 
compassionate end of life care that is person-centred and responds to the older 
person’s unique needs and respect for his/her wishes.’171 The guidance also 
acknowledges the expanded role of palliative care as well as its potential for use earlier 
in the disease trajectory. On this point, the guidance sets out that ‘End of life care is a 
vital and integral part of all clinical practice, whatever the illness or its stage, informed 
by a knowledge and practice of palliative care principles.’172 This demonstrates a 
recognition of general palliative care, the palliative care approach, and specialist 
palliative care in the care of the older person. Despite this, the guidance refrains from 
addressing the complex issues of palliative sedation and the withdrawal of artificial 
nutrition and hydration. These are practices which remain without clearly defined 
professional standards for nurses and therefore lack an appropriate legal framework. 
This is especially significant due to changes in professional competencies. In 
particular, An Bord Altranais has recently established guidelines for nurses with 
prescriptive authority.  
 
Nurses with Prescriptive Authority   
It is a relatively recent development that certain nurses have taken on the responsibility 
of prescribing medication. The basis of a nurse’s prescriptive authority is based on ‘a 
dual framework of medicines legislation and professional regulation.’173 The main 
legislation providing for nurses prescriptive authority is the Irish Medicines Board 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2006,174 the Medicinal Products (Prescription and 
Control of Supply) (Amendment) Regulations 2007175 and the Misuse of Drugs 
(Amendment) Regulations 2007.176 These set out requirements for the nurse to be able 
to prescribe and the conditions for prescribing. An Bord Altranais has also issued 
guidelines for nurse prescribers, namely the ‘Practice Standards for Nurses and 
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Midwives with Prescriptive Authority’177 as well as the ‘Collaborative Practice 
Agreement for Nurses and Midwives with Prescriptive Authority’.178  
 
The ‘Practice Standards for Nurses and Midwives with Prescriptive Authority’ sets 
out standards which the nurse prescriber is to meet. These include standards on clinical 
decision-making, communication and history taking, documentation, continuing 
professional development and continued competency. The standards recognise that the 
nurse prescriber may prescribe drugs for end-of-life care but merely lists the types of 
drug suitable for palliative care and their route of administration.179 There is no 
guidance addressing specialist palliative care practices such as appropriate levels of 
sedation or the practice of withdrawing artificial nutrition and hydration. The overall 
effect is that in the specialist palliative care setting the nurse prescriber has an 
increased role which is complicated by the lack of clear guidelines.  
 
Overall, the current guidance issued by An Bord Altranais does not effectively address 
specialist palliative care practices. In addition to this, the human rights framework has 
not been adequately integrated into the current Code of Professional Conduct. The 
lack of detail in the Code of Professional Conduct and other guidelines published by 
An Bord Altranais may lead to inconsistency between nurses and doctors due to the 
subjective interpretation of these standards. Nevertheless, forthcoming guidance is 
beginning to demonstrate a shift in the way palliative care is addressed by the 
regulatory body for nurses in Ireland, and appears to acknowledge the importance of 
an appropriate legal framework to guide the nurse in their day-to-day activities. In any 
case, changes will need to be made to future professional standards and guidance in 
order to take account of measures being introduced by the Assisted Decision Making 
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Health Information and Quality Authority Standards 
The Health Information and Quality Authority [hereinafter ‘HIQA’] was established 
by the Health Act 2007.180 HIQA is an independent body whose role is ‘to promote 
quality and safety in the provision of health and personal social services for the benefit 
of the health and welfare of the public.’181 The main way in which HIQA achieves this 
is through the development of standards of care which health care institutions are 
obliged to implement through local policies.182 The standards of care are designed to: 
‘place patients at the heart of the care process’,183 ‘be a benchmark for change for 
safety’,184 ‘give patients a clear expectation of the standard of care they can expect to 
receive’,185 ‘ensure services will be clear on what is expected of them’,186 and ‘provide 
a strategic approach to improving safety, quality and reliability in our health 
service.’187 HIQA monitors compliance with these standards and undertakes 
investigations of care providers when required. Consequently, HIQA does not actually 
draft guidelines but instead sets standards for the provision of care.  
 
The standards established by HIQA are ‘applicable to services provided by or on 
behalf of the Health Service Executive (HSE) as well as services provided by a nursing 
home.’188 On this basis, hospices are not currently subject to HIQA standards or 
inspection. This is problematic given the legally sensitive nature of specialist palliative 
care. The position of HIQA on the inspection of hospices was made clear by the 
Minister for Health at the time, Mary Harney,189 in a debate of the Select Committee 
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on Health and Children. During the debate the Minister for Health stated that ‘We are 
not providing for an inspectorate of the acute and palliative care sectors for the very 
good reason that these areas require a different form of expertise.’190 This serves to 
demonstrate that palliative care is an area with its own particular challenges which 
have not yet been adequately addressed in this jurisdiction. Despite this, Chapter Two 
set out that palliative care is not only provided in the hospice but is provided in a 
variety of locations such as in acute general hospitals, ‘the patient’s own home, in a 
local community hospital, in a nursing home or any other setting in the community.’191 
Therefore, palliative care is not only a concern for hospices but is provided across the 
healthcare system in Ireland. Nonetheless, HIQA has included requirements for end-
of-life care in the standards on ‘Residential Care Settings for Older People in Ireland’. 
 
National Quality Standards for Residential Care Settings for Older People in 
Ireland 
These standards focus on the care of the patient in a residential care setting such as a 
nursing home. HIQA standards are ‘developed based on legislation, research findings 
and best practice.’192 As a result, it would be expected that the standards for end-of-
life care in a residential care setting should have a great deal of overlap with end-of-
life care requirements in other locations. The end-of-life care standard in the ‘National 
Quality Standards for Residential Care Settings for Older People in Ireland’ addresses 
a variety of issues commonly raised by palliative care such as assessment of the 
patient’s needs, documentation and review of these needs. The standard references 
autonomy in that it set out that, ‘[t]he resident’s wishes and choices regarding end of 
life care are discussed and documented’.193 Furthermore, this standard directly refers 
to ‘preferred religious, spiritual and cultural practices’194 yet neglects any mention of 
sedation or artificial nutrition and hydration. The end-of-life care standard requires the 
residential care setting to have suitable facilities in place for end-of-life care so ‘that 
the resident is not unnecessarily transferred to an acute setting except for specific 
medical reasons, and in accordance with his/her wishes.’195 Unfortunately, this 
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standard makes no reference to what these facilities may be. A clearer picture of what 
is required by this standard will largely be achieved by residential care settings failing 
to meet the standard and receiving greater instruction from HIQA. A system which 
seeks to encourage consistent high standards could avoid many failures and 
weaknesses in the first instance by simply setting out in more detail what is required.  
 
Linked to the HIQA National Quality Standards for Residential Care Settings for 
Older People in Ireland is the Health Act 2007 (Care and Welfare Of Residents in 
Designated Centres for Older People) Regulations 2009.196 The purpose of these 
regulations is to underpin HIQA National Quality Standards for Residential Care 
Settings for Older People in Ireland. Section 14(1) of the Health Act 2007 (Care And 
Welfare Of Residents In Designated Centres For Older People) Regulations 2009 
requires that ‘[t]he registered provider shall ensure that the designated centre has 
written operational policies and protocols for end of life care.’197 The effect of this is 
to continue the creation of policy at local level. Other sections in the Regulations refer 
to principles such as dignity198 and the comfort of the resident199 without providing 
guidance on how these can be achieved or can be incorporated in local policy. As a 
result of this, guidance on these points may come from publications issued by groups 
involved in the promotion of palliative care.  
 
Guidance of Representative Bodies and NGO’s 
This section examines the guidance issued by representative bodies, namely the Irish 
Association of Palliative Care [hereinafter ‘IAPC’], and the European Association of 
Palliative Care [hereinafter ‘EAPC’]. The guidance issued by these groups is drawn 
on in examining the legal framework for specialist palliative care for several reasons. 
First, the IAPC and EAPC have been selected as they have had a considerable role in 
shaping the development of palliative care in Ireland and Europe respectively. Second, 
as much of the regulatory framework is reliant on policy developed at the local level 
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it is likely that the reports and guidance issued by these bodies will have an influence 
on both the doctors and nurses providing specialist palliative care. The third reason 
for considering the publications of the IAPC and the EAPC is the fact that they have 
examined and provided guidelines and frameworks for the specialist palliative care 
practices which are the focus of this thesis. However, it is to be underlined that these 
are guidelines and frameworks published by representative bodies and therefore are 
not directly enforceable in this jurisdiction. Nevertheless, they provide a valuable 
insight into developing guidelines for specialist palliative care. 
   
The Role of the Irish Association of Palliative Care  
The IAPC was established in 1993.200 Members of the IAPC include professionals 
involved in all aspects of palliative care including ‘doctors, nurses, social workers, 
psychologists, counsellors, pharmacists, physiotherapists, pastoral carers, dieticians, 
administrators, educators, academics’.201 The purpose of the IAPC is the promotion of 
palliative care in Ireland and internationally by the use of ‘education, publications, 
representation on national bodies and opportunities for networking.’202 In addition to 
this the IAPC is involved in ‘the development of national policy for patient-centred, 
equitable and accessible palliative care for all who need it.’203 The drafting of 
guidelines on palliative care practices is not a responsibility or an aim of the IAPC but 
it has developed resources which provide an outline of how such services should be 
provided. In this respect, the IAPC has published a discussion paper on palliative 
sedation204 and a position paper on artificial hydration205 which will be discussed in 
this section.  
 
IAPC Discussion Paper on Palliative Sedation 
The IAPC Discussion Paper on Palliative Sedation was published in March 2011 and 
functioned to encourage wider discussion and feedback on this practice.206 The 
discussion paper considers the decision-making process for commencing palliative 
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sedation, the decision to provide or withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration, and it 
provides an explanation of refractory symptoms. The presence of a refractory 
symptom is often an indication that palliative sedation can be administered to the 
patient.207 Guidance on this point can greatly assist the medical practitioner and the 
patient in recognising the stage of illness and the steps to be taken in the care of the 
patient. A refractory symptom is defined in the discussion paper as, ‘symptoms that 
are uncontrolled despite aggressive efforts to identify a tolerable therapy that does not 
compromise consciousness.’208 In order to determine whether a symptom is refractory, 
the IAPC cite research which suggests that:     
 
the clinician must perceive that further invasive or non invasive 
interventions are either incapable of providing adequate relief, or that the 
therapy is associated with excessive and intolerable acute or chronic 
morbidity and is unlikely to provide relief within a tolerable time frame.209  
 
The discussion paper also identifies physical or psychological symptoms which may 
require sedation. The psychological symptoms which may require sedation include 
‘existential, spiritual, emotional or psychological distress’.210 As has been noted in 
Chapter Two, the administration of sedation for these psychological difficulties alone 
is a controversial issue and can blur the legitimacy of the distinction between specialist 
palliative care and euthanasia.211 In this respect, the IAPC recognises the difficulty 
which this poses and suggests that respite sedation be used as part of the symptom 
management. Respite sedation is a form of short term sedation as it sedates the patient 
for 24-48 hours at which point the sedative drug is reduced to bring the patient back 
to consciousness. In effect, respite sedation can be utilised to give the patient relief 
from their psychological suffering while avoiding the complicated decisions of 
treatment withdrawal often associated with palliative sedation. Adopting such an 
approach is a positive step in addressing the issues posed by existential suffering near 
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the end of life and in maintaining the distinction between specialist palliative care and 
euthanasia.   
  
The discussion paper recognises the importance of patient autonomy in making 
decisions relating to his/her medical treatment and care. Guidance is provided on 
determining the capacity of a patient to make a decision and the potential role of an 
advance care plan is also recognised. In circumstances where the patient lacks the 
necessary capacity and no advance care plan has been drafted, the IAPC suggests that 
‘doctors discuss the situation with other members of the multi-disiplinary team, as 
well as considering the wishes and concerns of the patient’s family.’212 The clear 
process set out in this paper for deciding whether sedation should be administered 
needs to be highlighted. This process recognises that decisions are to be multi-
disciplinary which is in line with the manner in which palliative care is provided. The 
discussion paper suggests reference should be made to the following as part of the 
decision-making process: 
 
the patient’s general condition, including the cause of the intolerable 
distress, treatments that have been attempted, limitations of other options 
of care 
the rationale for the decision that palliative sedation is the only method 
available for achieving symptom relief within an acceptable time frame 
(i.e., the symptoms are truly refractory) 
the aims of sedation 
the method of sedation 
the anticipated effects of sedation, including degree of reduction in 
consciousness levels, communication and oral intake 
the potential uncommon risks such as paradoxical agitation, delayed or 
inadequate relief 
medical treatments and nursing care to be maintained during sedation: 
treatments and care to maximize the patient’s comfort are continued 
the expected outcomes if palliative sedation is not performed, including 
other treatment options, degree of suffering likely to persist with each 
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option and expected survival with each option 
commitment to the patient’s well being and provision of best possible 
care213  
 
These are steps which medical practitioners may already take but by setting them out 
in such a manner it provides clarity to all people involved in the care of the patient and 
removes any ‘ad hoc’214 image of decision-making in palliative care.  
 
The categorisation of artificial nutrition and hydration was discussed in Chapter Two, 
Chapter Three, and has been referred to in this chapter in the context of the IMC 
statement after Re a Ward of Court.215 The discussion paper briefly considered this 
practice and recognised the distinction between artificial nutrition and hydration. The 
guidance of the IAPC is to make any decision on this issue ‘following consideration 
of benefits and burdens of each treatment as relative to each individual patient.’216 
Subsequently, advice is given on medication management when palliative sedation is 
commenced. This discussion paper is only two pages long but is relatively 
comprehensive in the manner in which it addresses specialist palliative care. 
Furthermore, the paper concludes by outlining the ‘Ethical Principles Involved’.217 
These principles include beneficence, nonmaleficence, and autonomy. The reference 
to these principles demonstrates the fact that it is possible to specify these principles 
for specialist palliative care and it underlines their value in guiding the work of the 
healthcare professional.218 Nevertheless, the status of this discussion paper means it 
lacks enforceability and there is no guarantee that it forms part of local policy in health 
care facilities. Although reference was made to artificial nutrition and hydration in this 
paper, the IAPC has also issued a position paper on artificial hydration.  
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IAPC Position Paper on Artificial Hydration in Terminally Ill Patients 
This position paper was published in March 2011 and considers ‘the ethical issues 
relating to the role of artificial hydration in terminally ill patients.’219 The IAPC paper 
recognises the distinction in decisions between administering sedation and the 
provision of artificial nutrition and hydration. Furthermore, it distinguishes between 
artificial nutrition and artificial hydration. The position paper focuses on the principles 
behind the removal of hydration such as a patient’s request for the withdrawal of 
artificial hydration and whether the treatment may be ‘unduly burdensome’.220 The 
position paper on artificial hydration addressed this practice in a clear and unbiased 
manner, as demonstrated in the section titled ‘Relationship Between Hydration Status 
and Patient Comfort’.221 Reference was made to a Cochrane Review on artificial 
hydration as well as the review conducted by Raijmakers et al, both of which were 
discussed in Chapter Two.222 The overall conclusion of the IAPC is that ‘artificial 
hydration in terminally ill patients who do not have a reversible cause for their clinical 
deterioration, is unlikely to confer significant benefit.’223 However, this is a position 
paper and there is no requirement that these views influence the drafting of local end-
of-life care policies. Different institutions will develop policy based on differing 
research which serves to undermine consistent provision of specialist palliative care. 
The IAPC guidance also serves to demonstrate the relative ease and clarity with which 
these practices could be addressed on a national level rather than allowing local policy 
to guide such issues.   
 
The Role of the European Association of Palliative Care 
The EAPC was established in 1988 and aims to ‘develop and promote palliative care 
in Europe through information, education and research using multi-professional 
collaboration, while engaging with stakeholders at all levels.’224 The work of the 
EAPC is often disseminated through publications which require initiatives at a 
national level to ensure they are implemented. As such, the recommendations of the 
EAPC are not directly enforceable in Ireland but may be drawn on in the development 
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of local policy on specialist palliative care. The IAPC is a member of the EAPC; as 
are 45 other associations across 26 countries. EAPC publications have examined many 
different aspects of palliative care.225 However, this section will concentrate on the 
EAPC recommended framework for the use of sedation in palliative care.226    
 
EAPC recommended framework for the use of sedation in palliative care 
The EAPC recommended framework for the use of sedation was published in 2009. 
Guidelines were described in this framework as: 
 
helpful to educate medical providers, set standards for best practice, 
promote optimal care and convey the important message to staff, patients 
and families that palliative sedation is an accepted, ethical practice when 
used in appropriate situations.227  
 
This framework is not automatically incorporated by members of the EAPC but 
instead the EAPC framework provides that recommendations contained in it ‘may be 
adopted in their current form or, preferably, modified to reflect local cultural or legal 
considerations or the specific needs of the context in which they will be used, be it in 
the home, hospital or hospice-based care.’228 Of most relevance, to this Chapter is the 
‘10-item framework that addresses the key clinical issues.’229   
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The first item in the framework is ‘pre-emptive discussion of the potential role of 
sedation in end-of-life care and contingency planning’.230 This includes suggestions 
that the doctor discusses the patient’s preferences for end-of-life care. The framework 
also recommends that explicit reference be made in certain cases to ‘CPR, ventilator 
support, pressor support, comfort care, antibiotics and artificial hydration and 
nutrition.’231 Guidance on what should be discussed can assist in ensuring that 
patient’s decisions about their healthcare can be made in a fully informed manner. In 
contrast to this, the IMC Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics set out that ‘You 
should take care to communicate effectively and sensitively with patients and their 
families so that they have a clear understanding of what can and cannot be 
achieved.’232 The lack of detail on what should be discussed may be an advantage as 
doctors can exercise discretion on a patient by patient basis. However, this lack of 
detail also serves to create inconsistency between the palliative care different patients 
receive. Setting out guidance on what should be communicated is not to take from the 
role of the doctor but should serve to set a base standard which could improve the 
overall care of the patient and ensure that communication is consistent and clear 
between the healthcare professional and patient. 
 
Further recommendations contained in the EAPC framework focus on the provision 
of sedation. Recommendations are made on the identification of symptoms requiring 
sedation as well as the ‘necessary evaluation and consultation procedures’.233 The 
issues to be evaluated are also clearly set out including ‘the patient’s medical 
history’,234 ‘all relevant investigations’235 and a ‘physical examination of the 
patient’.236 In line with other guidelines, reversible symptoms are not to form part of 
the evaluation for considering sedation.237 Nevertheless, this aspect of the guidance 
has been criticised as ‘[i]t is unclear what constitutes refractory symptoms and what 
the relationship is between refractory symptoms and intolerable suffering’.238 A 
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clearer definition would remedy such issues and would benefit the provision of 
specialist palliative care.  
 
The 10-item framework also provides guidance on the selection of an appropriate level 
of sedation and associated practices. The general guidance on the provision of sedation 
is that ‘the level of sedation should be the lowest necessary to provide adequate relief 
of suffering.’239 On this point, the titration of sedative drugs is set out as well as setting 
out the approach to beginning assessment, continuing assessment of the patient’s pain 
management needs and checks on ‘heart rate, blood pressure and oxygen 
saturation’.240 The framework clearly sets out the procedure to be followed as well as 
guidance on associated practices such as ‘hydration and nutrition and concomitant 
medications’.241 This framework underlines the independence of the decisions on 
sedation and the provision of artificial nutrition and hydration but refrains from setting 
a definitive position on the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration. Instead, 
the EAPC suggest that this is a decision for the patient while also weighing up the 
‘estimated benefits/harms in light of the treatment aim’.242  
 
The EAPC framework highlights the potential problems raised by palliative sedation. 
It not only acknowledges potential problems for the patient such as ‘hastening 
death’243 but also recognises distress which families may experience as a result of 
sedation. The potential for abuse of sedation has been recognised within the 
framework. Such abuse may not only be an excessive provision of sedation but may 
also be exhibited by an insufficient level of sedation given to a patient. By educating 
all parties involved and clarifying the role of palliative sedation this framework can 
improve the practice of palliative sedation and allow for end-of-life care to be provided 
in a much clearer manner. This type of approach serves to improve consistency and 
allows the patient greater understanding and input to their care. Nevertheless, this is 
guidance which presently can only prove effective if implemented by local policy in 
this jurisdiction. 
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A common feature of the specialist palliative care practices which have been discussed 
is the lack of clear guidance and regulation. Palliative care in Ireland grew from the 
hospice movement and lacked a central plan for its national development. In effect, 
palliative care developed independently and the regulatory framework developed in a 
similar manner. The Report of the National Advisory Committee on Palliative Care 
identified this as a potential problem in setting out that ‘[i]ssues of responsibility, 
reporting structures and funding may be of an ad-hoc nature’.244 This chapter served 
to underline the lack of clarity and consistency on specialist palliative care practices 
in the professional standards of the Irish Medical Council and An Bord Altranais. 
Nevertheless, it is these professional standards which form a majority of the regulatory 
framework for specialist palliative care in Ireland.   
 
The discussion of HIQA demonstrated the possibility of developing standards for the 
provision of health care across Ireland. Therefore, it should also be possible to develop 
clear national guidance on palliative care which could address the failings highlighted 
by this Chapter. This could detail best practice for all providers of palliative care 
including hospices, hospitals and nursing homes. In addition to HIQA, the work of the 
IAPC and the EAPC also provide potential models for development. At a minimum, 
the work of these bodies highlights the issues in specialist palliative care which need 
clarity on a national basis. In short, it is evident that the legal framework for specialist 
palliative care in Ireland is inadequate. Consequently, an alternative legal framework 
needs to be identified; a framework which takes account of the legal and ethical issues 
raised by palliative care practices as well as repeat criticism that specialist palliative 
care practices may amount to ‘slow euthanasia’.245 These are issues which have been 
addressed in the Netherlands and the approach to specialist palliative care adopted in 
that jurisdiction will be examined in Chapter Six with the aim of identifying potential 
suggestions for reform.  
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THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN THE NETHERLANDS FOR 
SPECIALIST PALLIATIVE CARE 
 
Introduction 
Herodotus set out that, ‘if one were to offer men to choose out of all the customs in 
the world such as seemed to them the best, they would examine the whole number and 
end by preferring their own’.1 Nevertheless, in Chapters Four and Five it has been 
established that there is a lack of detailed national guidance on specialist palliative 
care in Ireland. This encourages the creation of a fragmented legal framework and 
results in inconsistency across healthcare professionals and healthcare facilities. The 
existence of such a fragmented framework can also undermine the consistent 
protection of a patient’s human rights.2 In order to ensure clarity and consistency in 
the legal framework and protect patient’s human rights there is a need for reform in 
Ireland. In this regard, comparative legal research serves to provide a broader 
perspective on the ‘customs’ which exist and the possibilities for reform. This Chapter 
will consider what shape this reform may take by examining the regulation of 
specialist palliative care in the Netherlands. In short, the Netherlands has established 
detailed professional standards for the provision of palliative care. The Dutch 
standards are aimed at the medical practitioner but recognise the importance of co-
operation with nurses in providing specialist palliative care. This Chapter will address 
a central research question of this thesis, namely what alternative legal framework 
might exist for specialist palliative care. 
 
In examining the Dutch system of palliative care it is important to recognise that the 
model of regulation cannot be ‘completely disconnected from the social structure of 
Dutch society, the legal system and the cultural climate on the one hand, and the system 
of health care and insurance on the other.’3 The Dutch approach to palliative care must 
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be discussed in light of these broader issues.4 This Chapter will first outline the 
development of palliative care in the Netherlands and will highlight the types of 
healthcare facility which led the Netherlands in this regard. This gives a sense of the 
healthcare system in the Netherlands and explains why this jurisdiction is a useful 
comparator. The Dutch guidelines for palliative care will then be examined as will the 
background to these guidelines. In particular, the guidelines published by the 
Comprehensive Cancer Centre of the Netherlands and the Koninklijke Nederlandsche 
Maatschappij tot bevordering der Geneeskunst (Royal Dutch Medical Association) 
[hereinafter ‘KNMG’] will be discussed in detail. The introduction of these guidelines 
was strongly influenced by the need to distinguish specialist palliative care practices 
from euthanasia. The legitimacy of the distinction between specialist palliative care 
and euthanasia is a central research question for this thesis and has been partly 
addressed in Chapter Three. It will be examined further in this Chapter in the context 
of the Dutch guidelines. This allows for the distinction to be drawn out in professional 
standards as well as having examined the distinction in practice in Chapter Three. The 
combination of these chapters allows for a rounded approach to addressing the central 
research questions of this thesis.  
 
The Development of Palliative Care in the Netherlands 
Palliative care in the Netherlands has had a similar development trajectory to palliative 
care in Ireland. Moreover, both jurisdictions have a common understanding of what 
palliative care involves and how it is to be defined. For instance, the Dutch government 
policy paper titled ‘Palliative Care for Terminally Ill Patients in the Netherlands’5 cites 
the World Health Organization definition of palliative care.6 This is the same definition 
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which has been used by Irish reports on palliative care.7 The harmonious interpretation 
of palliative care in both jurisdictions serves to strengthen the choice of the Netherlands 
as a comparator. In addition to a common understanding of palliative care, both the 
Netherlands and Ireland began to develop palliative care services from around the same 
time.  
 
In 1975 the Antonius-IJsselmonde nursing home began to focus on the provision of 
palliative care in an attempt to ‘improve special care for the dying.’8 This was the first 
healthcare provider in the Netherlands to adopt this type of focussed approach to end-
of-life care. Aspects of care which the Antonius-IJsselmonde nursing home focused on 
developing included ‘bereavement support, specialist nursing care, psycho-social and 
spiritual aspects of care, and the need to create a homely atmosphere.’9 The time after 
1975 signalled a considerable change in how end-of-life care was viewed and provided 
in the Netherlands. For example, Gronemeyer et al. suggested that ‘After 1975, death 
and dying were decreasingly considered a taboo period and society started to 
acknowledge its duty to care for terminally ill people.’10 In a similar vein, the 
developments after 1975 were described by Biesenbeek as ‘a period of reversal; a 
period in which the dying process had been brought more into the open and in which 
society had started to acknowledge its duty to care for the terminally ill.’11 As such, a 
number of healthcare providers in the Netherlands began to focus on the development 
of palliative care practices from this time.  
  
A key point in the development of palliative care in the Netherlands was the 
establishment of a number of hospices in the early 1990’s. The Johannes hospice in 
Vleuten was founded in 1991,12 the Kuria hospice in Amsterdam was set up in 1992 
and the Rozenheuvel hospice was established in 1994.13 It has been suggested that by 
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setting up these hospices, people were attempting to ‘make a concrete statement in the 
euthanasia discussion as a counterbalance to the euthanasia movement.’14 This signals 
a demarcation between the provision of palliative care and euthanasia. Additionally, 
the impact of hospice care in the Netherlands can be illustrated by the experience of 
Rozenheuvel hospice. 571 patients were admitted to Rozenheuvel in the four years 
after it opened.15 A quarter of these patients had made a request for euthanasia should 
the pain become unbearable.16 However, there were only two people from the 571 
patients who actually went through with their request for euthanasia.17 One 
interpretation of this is that palliative care is capable of providing appropriate pain 
management along with other support necessary for the care of the patient. However, 
these figures could also be interpreted in a manner which suggests that specialist 
palliative care practices function similarly to euthanasia and therefore requests for 
euthanasia were needless in such circumstances. 
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, there is a clearly defined legal framework for 
euthanasia in the Netherlands. In contrast to this, palliative care in the Netherlands had 
no such framework until much later and was provided with fewer safeguards in place. 
The combination of these factors could be viewed as undermining the legitimacy of 
the distinction between specialist palliative care and euthanasia in the Netherlands at 
the time. The need to emphasise the distinction between specialist palliative care and 
euthanasia arose several years later and this was achieved through the development of 
professional standards. Nevertheless, hospice care continued to develop in the 
Netherlands. For example, there were 38 hospices in 1999 and this rose to 241 hospices 
in 2008.18 This expansion in the provision of palliative care was accompanied by an 
increased government focus on this form of care from 1996 onwards.19 
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A policy statement issued by the Dutch government in 1996 highlighted ‘the need to 
further develop palliative care in the Netherlands.’20 This increased focus was wound 
up with a number of other motivations. For instance, several members of the Dutch 
Parliament suggested that ‘a further proliferation of hospices was likely to lead to a 
reduction of the number of euthanasia cases’.21 This point is illustrated in a letter to the 
Dutch Parliament in which the Minister for Health set out that: 
 
It is certainly so that at times, in the context of extremely severe suffering, 
good palliative care, adequate pain treatment and a familiar surrounding 
can shift the borders for the request to have euthanasia carried out and can 
at times even prevent the request.22 
 
This quote suggests that palliative care is viewed more favourably than euthanasia and 
was regarded as a more ethically acceptable practice. In this letter the Minister for 
Health also set out that a small amount of funding was to be made available for the 
development of palliative care.23 The purpose of this funding was to develop palliative 
care ‘in the context of already existing institutions such as home care services, nursing 
homes and hospitals.’24 The reason for adopting this approach was a view that ‘the 
quality of regular health care was high.’25 On that basis there was no perceived need 
for an independent palliative care provider.26 This funding led to a number of initiatives 
aimed at promoting palliative care.27 These initiatives promoted research and 
strengthened cooperation among palliative care providers.  
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20 December 2001); Minister of Health, Welfare and Sport (Dr E Borst-Eilers), ‘Definitief standpunt 
palliatieve zorg’ [Final position on palliative care] Letter to the Chair of the Second Chamber of the 
States General (Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport, 11 March 2002); Minister of Health, Welfare 
and Sport (Dr E Borst-Eilers) ‘Palliatieve zorg’ [Palliative care] Letter to the Chair of the Second 
Chamber of the States General (Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport, 6 May 2002). 
20 Gronemeyer (n8) 231. 
21 ibid 232; Janssens (n6) 483.  
22 Gordijn (n12) 201. 
23 Gordijn (n12) 199 Minister of Health ‘promised to further develop palliative care making available 




27 ibid Six centres for the development of palliative care (COPZ’s) were established with the purpose 
of improving ‘coordination in care giving, develop educational modules and increase expertise and 
carry out research activities.’; Netherlands Programme for Palliative Care, ‘NPTN: palliative care 
comes under the spotlight in the Netherlands’ (2009) 16(3) European Journal of Palliative Care 151; 
Francke (n5) 19 ‘This project group’s most important task was to investigate possible ways to stimulate 
the integration of professionally staffed hospices, volunteer-run hospices and hospice units into regular 
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At present, palliative care in the Netherlands is provided by general practitioners,28 
nursing homes,29 care homes,30 independent and volunteer run hospices,31 and 
hospitals.32 In 2006, the final place of care for patients suffering from cancer or other 
chronic diseases in the Netherlands was the home (31%),33 hospital (28%),34 nursing 
home (25%)35 and care home (11%).36 5% of patients died in another type of healthcare 
facility including independent hospices.37 This broad range of palliative care providers 
is also reflected in Ireland.38 This underlines the importance of high quality palliative 
care in the general healthcare system. Such an approach moves palliative care from the 
margins to a more central position in the care of a patient. In these locations the doctor 
has an essential role in ensuring the patient is provided with appropriate palliative care. 
As a result of this, the legal framework for specialist palliative care in the Netherlands 
largely concentrates on the general practitioner but also takes account of other 
professions which are closely involved in providing palliative care. This approach 
appears to have been followed in the guidelines published by the Koninklijke 
                                                          
health care.’ In 1999 the Hospice Care Integration Project group was created. The primary aim of this 
group was the integration of hospice facilities into core healthcare facilities.; Gronemeyer (n8) 232. 
28 Francke (n5) 6 Research conducted by Francke demonstrated that the general practitioner ‘has contact 
a total of 26 times with a cancer patient in the palliative phase’ and this contact is normally initiated by 
the doctor.   
29 Brinkman (n14) 151 ‘[u]ntil the 1980s, most people with severe illness were treated in hospitals and 
nursing homes.’; Gronemeyer (n6) 237 ‘there are many options in the Netherlands for outpatient 
palliative care as well as inpatient care traditionally offered by nursing and care homes. This is why the 
number of Dutch citizens that die in an independent hospice is still relatively low with less than one 
percent.’   
30 Francke (n5) 9. 
31 Nederlandse vereniging voor professionele palliatieve zorg, ‘Palliative care in the Netherlands’  
<http://www.palliactief.nl/PalliatieveZorg/PalliatievezorginNederland.aspx> accessed 2 March 2014 
This type of hospice is also referred to as ‘almost-at-home-houses’ and is a form of ‘low-care hospice’. 
The first Dutch ‘almost-at-home-house’ was established in 1986 in Nieuwkoop. It is mainly for patients 
who require psycho-social care instead of medical support; Francke (n5) 10 ‘Volunteer-run hospices 
are suitable primarily for looking after terminally ill patients who can no longer be cared for at home 
for social reasons rather than exclusively medical reasons.’ 
32 Francke (n5) 11 Palliative care in a hospital is often provided as part of ‘regional palliative care 
networks.’ As such, hospitals are part of the broader system of palliative care in the Netherlands but do 
not tend to provide comprehensive palliative care facilities. While a number of nursing homes contained 
a hospice unit this rarely occurs in the hospital setting. 
33 Lud FJ van der Velden and others, ‘Dying from cancer or other chronic diseases in the Netherlands: 
ten-year trends derived from death certificate data’ (2009) 8 BMC Palliative Care 4.   
34 ibid. 
35 ibid.  
36 ibid.  
37 ibid ‘In 5% the place of death was either another place than those mentioned before or unknown. It 
may be assumed that ‘other’ includes, for instance, non-acute deaths in institutions for the mentally 
handicapped, mental healthcare institutions or one the 230 independent hospices that exists nowadays 
in the Netherlands. Ten years ago, the number of independent hospices was only some 40.’ 
38 See p43. 
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Nederlandsche Maatschappij tot bevordering der Geneeskunst (Royal Dutch Medical 
Association) [hereinafter ‘KNMG’]. 
 
Guidelines on Specialist Palliative Care in the Netherlands 
The manner in which palliative care was regulated in the Netherlands received 
particular attention in light of comments made by the Dutch Attorney General, Joan de 
Wijkerslooth in 2003. It was suggested by de Wijkerslooth that ‘if sedation goes hand 
in hand with a decision to withhold hydration, it would amount to euthanasia albeit in 
a slow manner.’39 This led de Wijkerslooth to call for ‘“terminal sedation” to be 
covered by the same legal controls as euthanasia.’40 Consequently, the regional 
commission for overseeing euthanasia and physician assisted suicide would have to be 
notified in circumstances where a patient is continuously sedated and hydration is 
withdrawn.41 Such an approach would clearly place specialist palliative care in the 
realm of euthanasia. It should be noted that the term ‘terminal sedation’ will 
occasionally be used in this Chapter in order to reflect the terminology used in relation 
to specialist palliative care in the Netherlands. This practice has the same meaning as 
‘palliative sedation’ which was defined in Chapter Two.42 
   
The impetus for the Attorney General’s suggestion was a Dutch study on end-of-life 
care which ‘suggested that between 4% and 10% of all deaths … occurred following 
terminal sedation.’43 However, these statistics do not suggest that terminal sedation 
ultimately caused the death of the patient. Nevertheless, it is understandable that the 
Attorney General began to question the categorisation of terminal sedation and its 
relationship to euthanasia based on these figures.  
 
                                                          
39 Gordijn (n12) 204 Research by Van der Wal et al. suggested that terminal sedation was administered 
in ‘6% of all deaths in the Netherlands (8,500 times a year).’  Additionally, hydration was withdrawn 
in two thirds of such cases; Gordijn (n12) 205 ‘For instance, the research study of Van der Wal et al. 
indicates that in 51% of the cases of terminal sedation, the shortening of the patient’s life was either the 
explicit goal (5%), or one of the goals next to other goals (46%). Apparently, at least in 5% of the cases 
terminal sedation does seem to be analogous to what can be called slow euthanasia.’ 
40 Tony Sheldon, ‘“Terminal sedation” different from euthanasia, Dutch ministers agree’ (2003) 
327(7413) British Medical Journal 465, 465. 
41 Gordijn (n12) 205 ‘need to be reported to the regional commission for euthanasia and PAS.’ 
42 Text to n138 in Chapter Two. 
43 Sheldon (n40) 465. 
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The potential re-categorisation of terminal sedation was criticised by providers of 
palliative care who were of the opinion that if specialist palliative practices are carried 
out correctly then it is ‘an ultimate form of pain or symptom control, a form of normal 
medical treatment about which doctors and patients decide.’44 The Dutch Health 
Minister at the time described terminal sedation and the withdrawal of artificial 
nutrition and hydration as ‘normal medical treatment’.45 In addition to this, the KNMG 
described the suggestion of the Attorney General as a ‘frightening prospect’.46 Overall, 
the suggestion of the Attorney General was not supported by the Dutch government 
and they instead believed it necessary to introduce ‘a national guideline with respect 
to terminal sedation.’47 This was also an attempt to mitigate the need to introduce 
legislation on specialist palliative care practices. A range of professional guidelines 
were introduced around this time which sought to emphasise the point that specialist 
palliative care practices are a normal aspect of medical treatment.48 In this respect, the 
professional guidelines appear to have been successful as, at the time of writing, there 
has been no legislation enacted in the Netherlands which is aimed at specialist 
palliative care practices.  
 
This Chapter will largely concentrate on the guidelines issued by the KNMG in 2005 
and in 2009 as these guidelines are closely linked to the physician’s professional 
standards in the Netherlands. In addition to this, subsequent guidelines such as those 
drafted by the Vereniging Integrale Kankercentra (Association of Comprehensive 
Cancer Centres) were aligned with the KNMG professional guideline on palliative 
sedation. Further refinements were in line with updated guidelines issued by the 
KNMG. As it is the guidance of the KNMG which appears to be a cornerstone for the 
provision of palliative sedation it is important to examine the contents and impact of 
this guideline in detail. 
 
                                                          
44 Gordijn (n12) 205. 
45 Sheldon (n40) 465. 
46 ibid. 
47 Marian Verkerk and others, ‘A National Guideline for Palliative Sedation in The Netherlands’ (2007) 
34(6) Journal of Pain and Symptom Management 666, 666-667. 
48 Rien Janssens, Johannes J M van Delden and Guy A M Widdershoven, ‘Palliative sedation: not just 
normal medical practice. Ethical reflections on the Royal Dutch Medical Association’s guideline on 
palliative sedation’ (2012) 38 Journal of Medical Ethics 664, 664 ‘The main premise of the Royal Dutch 
Medical Association’s (RDMA) guideline on palliative sedation is that palliative sedation, contrary to 
euthanasia, is normal medical practice.’ 
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The KNMG Guideline for Palliative Sedation 
The KNMG is the professional body for doctors in the Netherlands.49 Activities of the 
KNMG include the development of guidelines and policies for doctors, and the 
‘regulation of vocational training and registration of specialists.’50 The Guideline for 
Palliative Sedation was developed by a committee appointed by the KNMG. This 
allowed for a broad range of input as the committee included a Professor in the ethics 
of care, two oncologists, two nursing home physicians, an anaesthesiologist, two 
general practitioners, a medical law coordinator and a policy advisor.51 The Guideline 
which the KNMG committee developed is ‘now part of the physician’s professional 
standard(s)’52 which a physician is obliged to follow. The Guideline for Palliative 
Sedation addresses ‘Indications and preconditions for palliative sedation’,53 the 
decision to begin sedation, the provision of hydration, respite sedation as well as wider 
issues such as ‘Dealing with the patient’s family’.54 The need to distinguish specialist 
palliative care from euthanasia was recognised by the committee developing the 
Guideline.55 In line with this it was necessary to emphasise that palliative sedation was 
a normal part of medical practice. This is largely demonstrated in the Guideline through 
the prognosis of the terminally ill patient and the intention of the doctor.56 These points 
will be discussed over the course of this section. 
 
The first edition of the Guideline for Palliative Sedation was published in 200557 and 
since that time the KNMG has actively monitored the Guideline. There was criticism 
of certain aspects of the Guideline for Palliative Sedation and the KNMG attempted to 
resolve these issues by publishing a revised Guideline for Palliative Sedation in 2009.58 
                                                          
49 ‘The Royal Dutch Medical Association’ <http://knmg.artsennet.nl/Over-KNMG/About-
KNMG.htm> accessed 3 March 2014. 
50 ibid. 
51 Royal Dutch Medical Association, ‘Guideline for Palliative Sedation’ (Royal Dutch Medical 
Association 2009) 64. 
52 Verkerk (n47) 667.  
53 Royal Dutch Medical Association (n51) 22.  
54 ibid 46. 
55 Janssens (n48) 664. 
56 ibid ‘This message is founded on stipulating the following two conditions: the prognosis of the patient 
should be less than 2 weeks, and the aim of the physician should be to relieve suffering and not to 
shorten the patient’s life. A third element follows from these conditions: if palliative sedation does not 
shorten life, expert consultation, mandatory as it is in euthanasia cases, is just optional in palliative 
sedation cases.’  
57 Royal Dutch Medical Association, ‘Guideline for Palliative Sedation’ (Royal Dutch Medical 
Association 2005). 
58 Royal Dutch Medical Association (n51). 
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Aspects of the 2005 Guideline which were the subject of criticism will be highlighted 
in the course of this section. In this regard, the Guideline will be examined on a chapter 
by chapter basis with the main issues being the indications and preconditions for 
palliative sedation, the decision-making process for palliative sedation, and the 
administration of fluids and palliative sedation.  
 
Chapter two of the revised Guideline for Palliative Sedation defines palliative sedation 
and clarifies its relationship to the provision of palliative care. Chapter two also set out 
empirical data on the provision of palliative sedation in the Netherlands which ranged 
from the main symptoms leading to palliative care,59 to the frequency with which 
artificial nutrition and hydration is withdrawn.60 These figures created a picture of the 
way palliative care is provided in the Netherlands and served to set up discussion of 
the substantive guidelines on issues such as the indications and preconditions for 
palliative sedation.  
  
Indications and Preconditions for Terminal Sedation 
The third chapter of the KNMG Guideline for Palliative Sedation sets out the 
‘Indications and preconditions for palliative care’.61 A main indication is that that the 
patient should have refractory symptoms.62 A symptom can be considered refractory 
if ‘None of the conventional modes of treatment is effective or fast-acting enough, 
and/or if these modes of treatment are accompanied by unacceptable side-effects.’63 In 
Chapter Five it was highlighted that the Irish Association of Palliative Care set out a 
definition of refractory symptoms but neither the Irish Medical Council or An Bord 
Altranais provided guidance on the meaning or identification of this type of symptom. 
Nonetheless, there is a considerable subjective element in recognising a refractory 
symptom. For example, what constitutes an unacceptable side effect is likely to change 
depending on the individual patient. In light of this, the Guideline recognises the 
importance of a patient’s involvement in decisions on palliative care, e.g. ‘It will often 
                                                          
59 ibid 20 ‘The symptoms most commonly experienced by patients in the last stages or final week of 
life are fatigue (83%), dyspnoea (50%), pain (48%), confusion (36%), anxiety (31%), depression (28%) 
and nausea and vomiting (25%). Fatigue is perceived as the greatest burden, followed by pain, anxiety, 
dyspnoea, depression, nausea/vomiting and confusion, in that order’. 
60 ibid 21 ‘Continuous, deep sedation was administered together with the non-administration of food or 
fluids in 5.4% of all deaths.’ 
61 ibid 22. 




be appropriate for the physician and patient to decide together whether or not, on 
balance, a symptom is refractory.’64 The decision as to whether a symptom is 
untreatable, and therefore refractory, is based largely on two factors, namely ‘the 
expected effectiveness of the possible treatment’65 and ‘the discomfort or other side-
effects associated with the possible treatment.’66  
 
The Guideline sets out symptoms which commonly require palliative sedation but it 
must be shown ‘beyond reasonable doubt’67 that the symptoms are untreatable. In order 
to demonstrate this, it is necessary that ‘reversible causes of suffering must be 
meticulously excluded before a decision is taken to administer palliative sedation.’68 
Nevertheless, the Guideline highlights the importance of ‘the patient’s feelings 
regarding issues such as the discomfort of further diagnostic tests’.69 As such, the 
decision to label a symptom as refractory leaves a considerable degree of discretion to 
the doctor and patient but at the same time the guidance is not so broad as to be 
meaningless. For example, the Guideline includes a ‘flow diagram’ to assist in the 
identification of refractory symptoms.70 This provides a clear reference for both the 
doctor and the patient as to whether a symptom is likely to be refractory and promotes 
a degree of certainty in the provision of palliative sedation. In addition to this, chapter 
three of the Guideline also highlights symptoms which raise difficult ethical and legal 
issues, namely sedation in the case of existential suffering. 
  
Palliative Sedation for Existential Suffering 
A challenging symptom for the Guideline for Palliative Sedation has been the 
provision of palliative sedation for existential or psychological suffering.71 It is 
possible that this is ‘among the refractory symptoms that go to make up unbearable 
suffering.’72 Nonetheless, the identification of existential suffering is such that it also 




67 ibid 23. 
68 ibid. 
69 ibid. 
70 ibid 25. 
71 Non-somatic suffering has also raised challenging issues for euthanasia. Text to n40 and n45 in 
Chapter Three.   
72 Royal Dutch Medical Association (n51) 24. ‘Existential suffering may be expressed as feelings of 
pointlessness, emptiness, existential distress, a desire not to experience death or the dying process 
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requires ‘expertise in the areas of psycho-social and spiritual problems’.73 The 2005 
Guideline was criticised for not allowing palliative sedation for this type of suffering. 
This point was clarified by the 2009 Guideline which set out that if the patient was also 
experiencing refractory symptoms then sedation could be administered.74 However, 
existential suffering alone does not justify the provision of palliative sedation.75  
 
The position of the KNMG Guideline for Palliative Sedation on sedation in instances 
of existential suffering is similar to the approach set out by the Irish  Association of 
Palliative Care [hereinafter ‘IAPC’] discussion paper on palliative sedation. For 
instance, the IAPC discussion paper suggested that psychological symptoms such as 
‘existential, spiritual, emotional or psychological distress’76 could be addressed 
through the use of respite sedation rather than palliative sedation. The manner in which 
existential distress is treated is essential in distinguishing specialist palliative care 
practices from euthanasia. For example, it was highlighted in Chapter Two that 
sedation for existential distress, in the absence of a refractory symptom, furthers 
suggestions that specialist palliative care is a form of euthanasia in disguise.  
  
Requisite Prognosis for Palliative Sedation 
Chapter three of the Guideline for Palliative Sedation establishes the precondition for 
the administration of palliative sedation. This requires that in addition to the presence 
of one or more than one refractory symptom, the patient is expected to die ‘in the 
reasonably near future – that is, within one to two weeks’.77 The basis for establishing 
this prognosis as a requirement is because ‘a longer prognosis might imply that the 
patient dies as a consequence of dehydration, instead of the underlying disease.’78 In 
the Netherlands it is common practice to withdraw hydration from the sedated patient. 
                                                          
consciously, psychosocial problems, spiritual problems, or for instance the desire to preserve one’s 
dignity.’   
73 ibid. 
74 ibid 25 ‘However, there are patients who have no refractory symptoms but simply want palliative 
sedation as a way of avoiding consciously experiencing the end of life. The committee does not regard 
this as an acceptable indication.’ The guidance on existential suffering may reflect the challenging cases 
which have arisen in case law on euthanasia in the Netherlands. 
75 ibid. 
76 Irish Association of Palliative Care, ‘Palliative Sedation’ (March 2011) 2.    
77 Royal Dutch Medical Association (n51) 25. 
78 Janssens (n48) 665; Royal Dutch Medical Association (n51) 26 ‘If the patient’s life expectancy 
exceeded one to two weeks, the non-administration of fluids would cause dehydration and hasten the 
time of death.’ 
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As such, withdrawing hydration from a patient with a longer prognosis blurs the 
distinction between specialist palliative care and euthanasia.79  
 
The difficulty in determining the patient’s life expectancy was recognised in the 
Guideline for Palliative Sedation and it was suggested that the guiding factor in this 
regard should be an observation for certain signs which demonstrate the patient’s 
condition is worsening.80 These signs include the patient ceasing to eat and drink, 
tiredness, drowsiness, and disorientation.81 In this regard, the Guideline for Palliative 
Sedation recognises that there are different disease trajectories and palliative care must 
adapt for each patient’s condition. For instance, certain conditions make it difficult to 
recognise ‘whether the patient is actually in the final stages of life.’82 On this basis, the 
Guideline for Palliative Sedation makes reference to the possibility of using ‘temporary 
or intermittent sedation’83 as a way of recognising the true condition of the patient. It 
also suggests that this form of sedation gives the doctor an opportunity ‘to evaluate the 
situation with the patient and/or family and if necessary to review the management of 
the case.’84 This demonstrates that the Dutch guideline aims to provide palliative care 
appropriate to each patient’s needs. Such a patient-centred approach is further 
displayed by the fact that in these complicated situations the ‘committee considers the 
advice of a consultant, preferably a palliative specialist, to be mandatory’.85 The 
inclusion of such requirements serves to demonstrate the comprehensive nature of the 
Guideline for Palliative Sedation. It also begins to highlight the range of parties which 
                                                          
79 M Vermeulen, ‘Zachte dood komt soms te vroeg’ De Volkskrant (23 may 2007) quoted in Janssens 
(n48) 665 ‘It is unprofessional to render a person with a long life expectancy asleep and refrain from 
hydration and nutrition. That’s just euthanasia with other means, because without food and fluid 
everyone dies after a week.’   
80 Janssens (n48) 665 ‘Yet, estimating prognosis is often difficult and dependent on several 
characteristics of the dying phase.’ 
81 Royal Dutch Medical Association (n51) 26 ‘But once a number of characteristics of the phase of 
dying have been observed, it can be assumed that the patient is approaching the point at which death is 
inevitable. The most characteristic feature is that patients virtually cease to eat and drink. In addition, 
they are frequently cachectic, tired and debilitated and bedridden. They may also be drowsy and 
disoriented. Such signs that a patient is dying, combined with the worsening symptoms of disease, guide 
the decision-making process.’ 
82 ibid 27; ibid 26-27 ‘The committee is not thinking here of cancer patients, but of conditions such as 
muscular dystrophy, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), or cardiac or respiratory insufficiency. In 
some cases of this kind, it is hard to be certain whether the patient is actually in the final stages of life. 
It is important to avoid the premature initiation of continuous sedation until the time of death.’ 





may be involved in the decision-making process for the administration of palliative 
sedation.  
 
The Decision-Making Process for Palliative Sedation 
The decision-making process is set out in the fourth chapter of the KNMG Guideline 
for Palliative Sedation. There are three steps to be taken in making the decision to 
administer palliative sedation. These stages are; ‘the initial proposal’,86 ‘determining 
whether indications for palliative sedation are present’,87 and ‘consultation with the 
patient and/or his representative(s).’88 These stages are not isolated and may need to 
be repeated in certain circumstances.89 The process involved underlines the importance 
of taking account of all the parties involved in the provision of palliative care such as 
the nursing staff who have ‘regular close contact with the patient’.90 Information is also 
to be collected from the patient, other healthcare professionals and the patient’s family 
in order to ascertain the most appropriate approach to the care of the patient. The value 
of information from healthcare staff involved in the care of the patient is recognised in 
the Guideline for Palliative Sedation which sets out that:  
 
The committee would emphasise that the continuity of cooperation, 
coordination, exchange of information and communication among the 
various carers is crucial. Poor cooperation and coordination can produce 
discrepancies in the information received by the various parties involved 
and these can cause anxiety for the patient, family and indeed staff.91  
 
This decision-making process is required regardless of whether the patient is receiving 
palliative care in a hospital or whether they are being cared for in the home. It 
highlights the importance of ‘clear agreements … between all concerned’.92 This 
requires effective transfer of information between healthcare staff and means that they 
need to share a common understanding of specialist palliative care practices.93 The 
                                                          
86 ibid 28. 
87 ibid.  
88 ibid.  
89 ibid 28 ‘The committee wishes to make the general observation that these stages are not one-off 
activities or decisions. Far more frequently, they are steps in a longer journey of palliative and other 
care. Some of the steps in that journey will have to be repeated.’ 
90 ibid 29. 
91 ibid. 
92 ibid. 
93 Text to n98 in Chapter Two. 
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final decision on palliative sedation is made by the attending physician. The Guideline 
for Palliative Sedation sets out that the decision is to ‘specify the aim of sedation … , 
its nature … , the choice of drugs, and the dose to be administered.’94 The possibility 
of requiring consultation with an expert in palliative care is also addressed in the 
Guideline.  
 
Requirements for Consultation 
The KNMG Guideline attempted to distinguish palliative sedation from euthanasia and 
this required establishing a distinct decision-making process. As part of this, the 
Guideline for Palliative Sedation sets out that: 
 
given the nature and content of palliative sedation and the medical 
indications set forth in this guideline, the committee sees no need to insist 
that an expert physician be consulted at all times before deciding to 
administer palliative sedation.95  
 
Nevertheless, the Guideline suggests that if a doctor is uncertain about his own 
expertise or finds it challenging to balance the various considerations which are part 
of deciding whether to provide palliative sedation then ‘it is standard professional 
practice to consult the appropriate expert in good time.’96 As such, to seek the advice 
of a consultant in such an instance would be common practice but the Guideline does 
emphasise the serious consequences of palliative sedation and describes it as a ‘radical 
medical procedure’.97 In this regard, the Guideline strives to achieve a decision-making 
process which pays heed to the impact of palliative sedation on a patient while 
attempting to distinguish the decision-making process from that implemented under 
section 2 of the Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review 
Procedures) Act 2001.   
 
Research on the level of consultation which occurs suggests that the number of cases 
in which the opinion of an expert is sought is not high. In a 2008 study conducted by 
Rietjens et al. it was shown that ‘in 9% of the cases of palliative sedation, palliative 
                                                          






consultation was requested in the last month before death.’98 It would be harmful to 
the care of the patient if consultation is largely avoided in an effort to emphasise that 
palliative sedation is a normal medical practice. At the heart of the decision-making 
process for both palliative sedation and the termination of life on request is the care of 
the patient. On this basis, a decision to avoid a consultation should not be driven by 
the desire to distinguish the decision-making framework in palliative sedation from 
that required for euthanasia. Instead, palliative sedation and the termination of life on 
request should be distinguishable in substance rather than needing to emphasise 
distinctions in the decision-making process.  
 
The role of consultation in deciding to administer palliative sedation has also been 
demonstrated in research from de Graeff et al.99 This research revealed that ‘in 41% 
(47 out of 113) of the cases where the palliative consultation team of the Integral 
Cancer Center for Central Netherlands was consulted on palliative sedation, a negative 
advice was given.’100 The reasons for such advice included symptoms not being 
considered refractory or that life expectancy exceeded two weeks. The high percentage 
of cases where palliative sedation was deemed inappropriate suggests that consultancy 
is an important safeguard in protecting a patient’s human rights and assists in 
distinguishing palliative sedation from euthanasia. Nevertheless, these figures could 
be interpreted as suggesting that consultation was sought in complex situations which 
required the opinion of an expert in palliative care. Such an interpretation would 
suggest doctors are judicious about seeking consultation. Regardless of this, it is 
important to get the views of a range of people as part of the decision-making process. 
The views of the patient are particularly important due to the right of autonomy, and 
the discussion with the patient and/or their representative on the possibility of palliative 
sedation has been assigned guidelines detailing what issues are to be addressed over 




                                                          
98  Judith Rietjens and others, ‘Continuous deep sedation for patients nearing death in the Netherlands: 
descriptive study’ (2008) 7648(336) British Medical Journal 810 cited in Janssens (n48) 666.  
99 A de Graeff, ‘De rol van consultatie bij palliatieve sedatie in de region Middenederland’ (2008) 152 




Discussion with the Patient and/or his Representative 
The informed consent of a patient is necessary for the administration of palliative 
sedation but if the patient is not capable of making an informed decision then a 
representative of the patient must be consulted. The possible representatives of the 
patient are set out by the Medical Treatment Contracts Act in the Netherlands.101 This 
legislation serves to establish an order of eligibility for the representation of a patient. 
The Guideline for Palliative Sedation addresses the different situations which are 
likely to arise and provides guidance on the discussion which is to take place. In 
relation to discussion with the patient, the Guideline suggests that the consent of a 
patient should be ‘sought while the patient is still lucid.’102 Furthermore, discussion 
with the patient is to include an explanation of palliative sedation. This allows the 
patient to understand their prognosis and the impact which palliative sedation would 
have on them.103 The second category for discussion involves the ‘Specific wishes and 
views of the patient’.104 This allows the patient to discuss their concerns or anxieties 
about the ‘process of dying’,105 their views on organ donation, spiritual care, and 
physical care during palliative sedation.106 Discussion on these points may serve to 
ease the anxiety of the patient and lessen the need for sedation once a patient’s 
concerns are addressed. The third category to be discussed addresses issues such as 
the provision of ‘support for the patient’s family’.107 This underlines the breadth of the 
decision-making process and the clarity in communication between doctor and patient 
which is required in the Netherlands.108 These are important steps to take in respecting 
                                                          
101 In order of eligibility: the patient’s legal representative (a guardian or mentor appointed by the 
Court), if he has one; whom failing a personal representative; whom failing his spouse, partner or 
companion; whom failing a parent, child, brother or sister.; Text to n282 in Chapter Four for discussion 
of the Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Bill 2013.  
102 Royal Dutch Medical Association (n51) 31.  
103 ibid 32 The issues to be discussed include: ‘The patient’s condition, life expectancy and prospects’, 
‘The indications for and purpose of palliative sedation’, ‘The options in the case of unbearable and 
untreatable suffering’, and ‘The consequences of palliative sedation.’   
104 ibid. 
105 ibid. 
106 ibid The medical practitioner is to discuss the wishes of the patient on subjects such as ‘organ 
donation’, ‘physical care during palliative sedation’, ‘non-administration of artificial 
nutrition/hydration’, and ‘The desire of the patient to receive the support of a spiritual advisor or other 
individual in relation to religious or ethical matters.’ 
107 ibid 32-33 There is to be discussion with the family in order to help them understand the condition 
of the patient and the care to be provided. In addition to this, the medical practitioner is to properly 
inform ‘the patient’s designated representative during palliative sedation’, and to provide ‘information 
about consultations with additional experts (if applicable).’ 
108 Chapter Five demonstrated that such detail is not contained in the professional standards of the Irish 
Medical Council or An Bord Altranais. 
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the patient’s right of autonomy. For example, Beauchamp and Childress set out that 
respect for autonomy in medical care ‘requires much more than avoiding deception 
and coercion. It requires an attempt to instill relevant understanding, to avoid forms of 
manipulation, and to respect persons’ rights.’109  
 
The KNMG Guideline also provides for situations where the patient may lack the 
necessary capacity to make decisions relating to their healthcare. Depending on the 
condition of the patient it may be necessary that the discussion be had with the 
patient’s representative instead of the patient. However, in such cases it is still 
necessary that the patient ‘be involved in the decision-making process as far as 
possible.’110 This discussion is based on the same issues as set out above and 
concentrates on the interests of the patient. In any case it appears that the doctor has 
the final say in the administration of palliative sedation and it is possible that the 
opinion of a representative be ignored and palliative sedation provided without 
consent if necessary. This is a troublesome aspect of the guidance and suggests a 
paternalistic element in the decision-making process. In this regard, Beauchamp and 
Childress set out that:  
 
If shared decision making is presented as a plea merely for patients to be 
allowed to participate in decision making about diagnostic and treatment 
procedures, it continues the legacy of medical paternalism by ignoring 
patients’ rights to consent or to refuse those procedures.111 
 
Nevertheless, the Guideline for Palliative Sedation sets out that:  
 
As a rule … it is extremely important that a consensus should be reached 
between medical staff and the patient’s family about the aim of the 
treatment (to relieve suffering and not to shorten life), the procedure that 
is appropriate to achieve this, and the consequences that it is likely to have. 
Such agreement is in the interests both of the patient and his family.112 
 
                                                          
109 Tom L Beauchamp and James F Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (7th edn, Oxford 
University Press 2013) 121. 
110 Royal Dutch Medical Association (n51) 33. 
111 Beauchamp (n109) 122. 
112 Royal Dutch Medical Association (n51) 33. 
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Part of the procedure in relieving a patient’s suffering may be the withdrawal of 
artificial nutrition and hydration. The legal and ethical issues this raises have been set 
out in several chapters of this thesis so far and the manner in which the Dutch 
Guideline address the administration of fluids is especially important in recognising 
and establishing the demarcation between specialist palliative care practices and 
euthanasia.   
 
The Administration of Fluids in Palliative Care 
Chapter five of the 2009 Guideline for Palliative Sedation addresses the administration 
of fluids in palliative care. The Guideline considers situations where the patient is able 
or unable to take fluids or ‘Does not wish to take fluids or have them administered.’113 
The Guideline for Palliative Sedation sets out that for patients who are able to take 
fluids and wish to continue doing so then ‘superficial, brief or intermittent palliative 
sedation is a possible alternative.’114 This avoids the patient being deprived of 
hydration and is a step in distinguishing specialist palliative care from euthanasia. The 
Guideline set out a number of factors which are to be considered in deciding whether 
to withdraw hydration from a patient who is unable to take fluids. The general guidance 
on this issue is that when palliative sedation is being administered it is ‘futile’ to also 
provide fluids.115 Treatment is considered futile in circumstances where ‘the resources 
involved unreasonably outweigh the potential benefits of the treatment.’116 On this 
point, the Guideline suggests that the provision of artificial hydration ‘may even 
prolong suffering or exacerbate it by increasing oedema, ascites, bronchial secretions, 
urine production and incontinence.’117 In contrast to this, the literature reviews cited in 
Chapter Two did not identify such a clear position on the withdrawal of artificial 
nutrition and hydration.118 
  
The Guideline for Palliative Sedation underlines the distinction between decisions to 
provide sedation and to withdraw hydration, for example, ‘The decision-making 
                                                          
113 ibid 36. 
114 ibid. 
115 ibid 36; Jeroen GJ Hasselaar and others, ‘Changed Patterns in Dutch Palliative Sedation Practices 
After the Introduction of a National Guideline’ (2009) 169(5) Archives of Internal Medicine 430, 436 
‘The RDMA guideline does not recommend artificial hydration during sedation because parenteral 
hydration increases the risk of edema and incontinence.’ 
116 Royal Dutch Medical Association (n51) 36. 
117 ibid. 
118 Text to n198 and n199 in Chapter Two. 
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regarding fluids is in all cases a separate decision, which precedes the decision to 
initiate continuous sedation.’119 This approach seems to cloud the distinction between 
the practices which the Guideline seeks to emphasise; while they may be considered 
separate decisions they are closely linked. In effect, sedation cannot be administered 
until a decision on the withdrawal of hydration has been taken, i.e. ‘The actual 
initiation of continuous sedation will therefore only take place once the patient has 
decided to refuse fluids, has shown consistency in this respect, and exhibits a refractory 
symptom.’120 As such, the decision-making process for administering palliative 
sedation requires the question of withdrawing hydration from the patient to also be 
addressed. The KNMG appear to be distinguishing palliative sedation from euthanasia 
on very narrow ground in the Guideline. For example, the Guideline states that: 
 
The committee would emphasise that two distinct decisions are involved 
here, which are taken together, but where the key lies in the initial decision 
by the patient himself. The order in which the decisions are taken and the 
existence of an interval between the two separate decisions are crucial.121 
 
The fact that these decisions are so closely related is problematic in fully demarcating 
the role of specialist palliative care. It can be said to leave room for accusations that 
specialist palliative care is a form of euthanasia in disguise.122 However, the Guideline 
does recognise the problems these decisions raise and places a special emphasis on the 
correct decision-making process. This promotes consistency among healthcare 
professionals and among healthcare facilities which provide specialist palliative care. 
In effect, by recognising and addressing the complex decisions which doctors face on 
a day to day basis it is possible to remove the image of decisions being taken on an ad-
hoc basis. This is an important step in protecting the rights of a patient, providing 
clarity to healthcare professionals, and distinguishing specialist palliative care from 
euthanasia. In line with this, the Guideline clearly categorises artificial hydration as a 
                                                          
119 Royal Dutch Medical Association (n51) 36. 
120 ibid 37 (emphasis in original). 
121 ibid. 
122 J Andrew Billings and Susan D Block, ‘Slow euthanasia’ (1996) 12 Journal of Palliative Care 21; 
BM Mount, ‘Morphine drips, terminal sedation, and slow euthanasia: definitions and facts, not 
anecdotes’ (1996) 12 Journal of Palliative Care 31; H Brody, ‘Commentary on Billings and Block’s 
‘Slow Euthanasia’’ (1996) 12 Journal of Palliative Care 38; Sjef Gevers, ‘Terminal Sedation: A New 
Legal Approach’ (2003) 10 European Journal of Health Law 359, 360. 
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‘medical procedure’123 rather than a form of medical care. Further to the decision-
making process around artificial hydration it is essential to consider the guidance on 
the administration of palliative sedation. 
 
The Administration of Palliative Sedation 
Chapter six of the 2009 Guideline for Palliative Sedation focuses on issues relating to 
the administration of palliative sedation such as ‘the preparations to be made, the 
initiation of sedation, proportionality, the drugs to be used and the method of 
administration, morphine and sedation, and … accompanying measures.’124 The 
Guideline for Palliative Sedation goes so far as to specify the type of drug which should 
be used in palliative sedation as well as providing detail on the amount which should 
be originally administered,125 issues of timing and the approach to be taken for 
continuous sedation.126 The preparations to be made include informing ‘all the 
professionals involved in the case’, and requires the doctor to ‘establish plans for the 
initiation procedure and later stages of the treatment (including details of how, when 
and by whom sedation may be initiated or the dose increased).’127 This demonstrates 
awareness that a variety of healthcare professionals are involved in the care of the 
terminally ill patient. In order to ensure continuity of care it is vital that healthcare 
professionals share a harmonious understanding of the type of care which can and 
should be provided. This was shown to be a failing in the provision of palliative care 
in this jurisdiction. For example, it was highlighted in Chapter Two that doctors and 
nurses in Ireland did not share the same interpretation of specialist palliative care.128 
Furthermore, the ‘Practice Standards for Nurses and Midwives with Prescriptive 
Authority’ in Ireland merely listed the types of drugs suitable for palliative care and 
their route of administration.129 The juxtaposition of the Irish and Dutch guidance 
underlines the weaknesses in the Irish legal framework for specialist palliative care.  
 
                                                          
123 Royal Dutch Medical Association (n51) 37. 
124 ibid 38. 
125 ibid 39 ‘Midazolam is currently regarded as the preferred drug. Arguments in its favour are its short 
half-life, which means that treatment can be rapidly adjusted, and the considerable experience already 
gained with it in cases of palliative sedation.’ 
126 ibid 39-40. 
127 ibid 38. 
128 Text to n95 and n96 in Chapter Two. 
129 Text to n179 in Chapter Five. 
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The KNMG Guideline recognises the importance of a ‘multidisciplinary approach’130 
to palliative care and states that ‘Nursing staff can contribute important input for 
drawing up the indications, estimating whether the conditions have been met, and 
implementing palliative sedation.’131 On this basis, it is important for the care of the 
patient that there is clear and effective communication between the doctor and the 
nurse. The Guideline recognises the challenges that may occur at the beginning of 
sedation and highlights the importance of co-operation between the healthcare 
professionals involved in the care of the patient. For example, the Guideline states that: 
 
Situations may arise in the initial stage in which the physician must be able 
to intervene (for example, the patient may become delirious or sedation 
may be too superficial, or indeed too deep). After this, the administration 
of sedation can be left in large measure to nurses and other carers. They 
should then be properly informed and instructed, in particular about when 
to consult the physician.132 
 
This provides practical guidance and gives clarity to all parties involved in the care of 
the patient. Other issues dealt with in the guidelines include effective ‘[r]ecord-keeping 
and evaluation’133 and guidelines on how to deal with the patient’s family.134 
Nonetheless, the Guideline for Palliative Sedation is only effective if it is actually used 
by doctors in the Netherlands. On this basis, it is necessary to consider the actual 
impact the KNMG Guideline has had.  
 
The Impact of the KNMG Guideline for Palliative Sedation 
A comprehensive study on the impact of the 2005 Dutch national guidelines for 
palliative care was conducted by Hasselaar et al.135 In conducting this survey a baseline 
measurement was taken between the 1st February 2003 and the 1st May 2005. This 
involved 492 physicians including medical specialists, general practitioners, and 
nursing home doctors. After the national guideline for palliative sedation was 
introduced a follow-up study was conducted between the 1st January 2007 and the 30th 
                                                          
130 Royal Dutch Medical Association (n51) 38. 
131 ibid. 
132 ibid 39. 
133 ibid 42. 
134 ibid 46. 
135 Hasselaar (n115).  
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June 2007. The follow-up study was based on the 492 physicians in the baseline 
measurement. It asked these physicians to ‘report on their last case of deep and 
continuous sedation in the past 12 months.’136 It can be noted that the results in this 
study reflect the changes brought about by the original guidelines prior to the 
refinements introduced by the 2009 guidelines. As such, this research examined the 
practice of palliative sedation in the two years before and after the introduction of the 
2005 guidelines.137  
 
The results of the study by Hasselaar et al. demonstrated an ‘increase in patient 
involvement in decision making’.138 For example, patient involvement increased from 
72.3% to 82.2% between the two periods.139 Furthermore, discussion of sedation 
between patient and doctor rose from ‘40.1% in the first period to 49.3% in the second 
period’.140 Although there has been an increase in patient involvement in decision-
making there is still a considerable percentage of patients with whom no discussion 
took place. However, it appears that increased discussion may be having an impact on 
the number seeking euthanasia or physician assisted suicide. It has been suggested that 
the fear of pain often ‘leads to suicide ideation or the request for euthanasia’141 and 
encourages ‘public support for assisted-suicide and euthanasia.’142 This fear may be 
addressed through discussion with the patient so they understand the level of care they 
will receive, should they need it. For instance, since the introduction of the KNMG 
Guideline there was a decrease in patient’s requests for euthanasia.143  
 
In the first period, the figure requesting euthanasia amounted to 14.5% while in 2007 
this figure had dropped to 6.3%.144 As such, the clear guidelines and the required 
discussions on patient care may serve to ease many of the fears patients have near the 
                                                          
136 ibid 430. 
137 ibid.   
138 ibid. 
139 ibid. 
140 ibid 432; ibid 432 ‘the proportion of physicians that did not discuss sedation with the patients who 
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141 Susan Anderson Fohr, ‘The Double Effect of Pain Medication: Separating Myth from Reality’ 
(1998) 4(1) Journal of Palliative Medicine 315, 326. 
142 ibid. 
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end of life.145 Hasselaar et al. also advanced the argument that this change in figures 
might simply represent a ‘more straightforward patient preference for palliative 
sedation at the end of life.’146 Research has shown that continuous deep sedation is 
being administered more often in 2010 than it had been in 2005.147 In any case this 
underscores the importance of a clear legal framework to support the provision of 
specialist palliative care. The absence of a clear legal framework in Ireland means these 
practices are provided with less regulation and less oversight. The lack of an 
appropriate legal framework also furthers suggestions that specialist palliative care 
closely resembles the practice of euthanasia. 
 
An aspect of the guidelines which was seen as problematic was the lack of a 
requirement for explicit consent for the administration of terminal sedation. Despite 
worries about this, the research by Hasselaar et al. actually demonstrated that ‘sedation 
was initiated significantly less often without patient involvement in the decision-
making process.’148 As such, clear guidelines on palliative sedation appear to provide 
the patient with greater certainty as regards their care and allows for more open 
discussion between patient and physician of possible treatment choices in palliative 
care. In addition to this the doctor has clear guidelines within which to work and the 
system of involving specialist palliative care consultants ensures that palliative 
sedation is not administered in unsuitable cases. The research also demonstrated a 
significant increase in the use of benzodiazepines for sedation rather than use of 
morphine.149 This is in line with recommendations contained in the Dutch 
                                                          
145 The alternative interpretation of these figures is to suggest that doctors view specialist palliative care 
as being in some way more acceptable than euthanasia and that it is on this basis that specialist palliative 
care is favoured. Were such a criticism shown to be true it could have serious consequences for the 
distinction between specialist palliative care and physician assisted suicide.   
146 Hasselaar (n115) 436. 
147 Bregje D Onwuteaka-Philipsen and others, ‘Trends in end-of-life practices before and after the 
enactment of the euthanasia law in the Netherlands from 1990 to 2010: a repeated cross-sectional 
survey’ (2012) 380(9845) Lancet 908, 908 ‘Continuous deep sedation until death occurred more 
frequently in 2010 (12·3%) than in 2005 (8·2%). Of all deaths in 2010, 0·4% were the result of the 
patient’s decision to stop eating and drinking to end life; in half of these cases the patient had made a 
euthanasia request that was not granted.’ 
148 Hasselaar (n115) 435. 
149 ibid 433 ‘benzodiazepines were more often prescribed for continuous sedation after the introduction 
of the guideline than before (69.9% and 90.4%, respectively) … A similar use of benzodiazepine 
combined with morphine was prescribed before (51.9%) and after the introduction of the guideline 
(51.9%), whereas the use of benzodiazepine without morphine increased after the introduction of the 
guideline (from 30 [18.8%] to 58 [36.3%]) … However, in total, the application of symptom-directed 




guidelines.150 The reason for favouring benzodiazepines as a sedative is due to the 
‘unpredictable sedative and side effects’151 of morphine. It appears that as of 2007 these 
guidelines were already having a significant impact on the provision of palliative care 
in the Netherlands.152   
 
Further concrete evidence as to the impact of the guidelines is available in the form of 
statistics which suggest that the use of guidelines by medical practitioners in the 
Netherlands has increased in the past number of years. For example, 60.1% of doctors 
in 2007 referred to some form of guideline when sedating a patient.153 Although this 
figure may appear low, it represents a doubling in the use of guidelines since 2003.154 
Of particular importance for this thesis is the fact that 78.1% of doctors who 
administered palliative sedation were ‘familiar with the RDMA guideline’.155 It is 
likely that this figure will continue to rise when it is recognised that a number of other 
guidelines on palliative care have emerged in the period since the drafting of the 
KNMG Guideline for Palliative Sedation such as those published by the 
Comprehensive Cancer Centre the Netherlands. 
 
Oncoline Guidelines 
The Integraal Kankercentrum Nederland (Comprehensive Cancer Centre the 
Netherlands) [hereinafter ‘IKNL’] is an organisation which ‘facilitates the 
development, implementation and evaluation of guidelines for oncological and 
palliative care in the Netherlands.’156 As part of this, the IKNL operates an online 
database157 through which it is possible to consult both national and regional clinical 
practice guidelines and practice guidelines for nursing care. The oncoline.nl database 
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contains a broad range of guidelines relevant to palliative care of the patient.158 Each 
guideline has differing levels of applicability based on the organisation responsible for 
its drafting. Palliative care guidelines listed on the Oncoline site include guidelines on 
delirium,159 dyspnoea,160 nausea and vomiting,161 pain,162 and palliative sedation.163 It 
is not possible to examine each of these guidelines individually in this chapter and for 
this reason it is necessary to be selective. Although the guideline on palliative sedation 
is one of the more relevant guidelines for this thesis, the content of this guideline 
largely resembles the KNMG Guideline for Palliative Sedation. As such, this section 
will focus on the guideline on pain as the identification, measurement, and treatment 
of pain is a primary concern in the provision of specialist palliative care.   
 
Guideline on Pain 
The subject of pain was first addressed in a 1996 guideline by the Comprehensive 
Cancer Centre Middle Netherlands. A 2005 revision of the guideline formed part of 
the Vereniging Integrale Kankercentra (Association of Comprehensive Cancer 
Centres) [hereinafter ‘VIKC’] book on clinical practice guidelines.164 Further revision 
to the guideline was made in 2008 and 2010. These new versions of the guideline 
incorporated ‘recommendations from the CBO/VIKC guideline ‘Diagnosis and 
treatment of pain in cancer patients’’.165 In terms of applicability, the guideline 
recognises that ‘circumstances may arise’166 where it will not be possible to accurately 
follow the guideline. In such cases, the medical practitioner must demonstrate that 
there was a good reason for such deviation. Overall, the medical practitioner is 
‘responsible for determining the applicability of the guideline and the application of 
the guideline itself.’167 It is likely that this guideline forms a substantial part of 
                                                          
158 Guidelines exist on cancer rehabilitation, cancer survivorship care, colon cancer, constipation, 
delirium, dyspnoea, gastric carcinoma, ovarian carcinoma, prostate cancer, rectal cancer, renal cell 
carcinoma, screening for psychosocial distress, spiritual care and thyroid carcinoma.  
159 M Bannink, A de Graeff and H Monster, ‘Delirium’ (Integraal Kankercentrum Nederland 2010). 
160 AAF Baas, Z Zylicz and GM Hesselmann, ‘Dyspnoea’ (Integraal Kankercentrum Nederland 2010). 
161 A de Graeff, CM Molenkamp and GM Hesselmann, ‘Nausea and Vomiting’ (Integraal 
Kankercentrum Nederland 2010). 
162 A de Graeff, TC Besse and RJA Krol, ‘Pain’ (Integraal Kankercentrum Nederland 2010). 
163 EH Verhagen and others, ‘Palliative Sedation’ (Integraal Kankercentrum Nederland 2009). 
164 Cancer Clinical Practice Guidelines, ‘Oncoline’ <http://oncoline.nl/index.php> accessed 3 March 
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palliative care guidance in the Netherlands but unlike the KNMG guideline it does not 
automatically form part of the physician’s professional standards.  
  
The current guideline on pain is divided into a number of sections including 
introduction, epidemiology, pathophysiology, causes, diagnosis, management and 
treatment, and stepwise diagnosis and management system. The introduction to this 
guideline serves to outline and explain the nature of pain. The definition of pain as set 
out by the International Association for the Study of Pain is quoted168 as is the 
definition set out by McCaffery which states that ‘pain is what the person experiencing 
it says that it is and is present when he says that it is present’.169 The use of this 
definition serves to underline the subjective nature of pain; a point which has been 
highlighted at several points in this thesis. In effect, each patient will have differing 
experiences of pain. The guideline goes into detail on the classification and types of 
pain which exist. These are divided into categories such as nociceptive versus 
neuropathic pain,170 somatic versus visceral pain,171 breakthrough pain,172 opioid-
induced hyperalgesia173 and total pain.174 The details included serve to assist in the 
identification and classification of pain which the patient may be experiencing. Further 
background on pain is provided in the epidemiology section of this guideline. This 
provides an indication of the incidence of pain in cancer patients, with ‘[m]oderate to 
severe pain’175 occurring in 64% of cases.176 The figure is further broken down by type 
                                                          
168 International Association for the Study of Pain, ‘IASP Taxonomy’ <http://www.iasp-
pain.org/Education/Content.aspx?ItemNumber=1698&navItemNumber=576#Pain> accessed 3 March 
2014 quoted in de Graeff (n162) 2 ‘pain is an unpleasant sensory or emotional experience associated 
with real or potential tissue damage or described in terms of such damage’ 
169 Margo McCaffrey, Nursing Practice Theories Related to Cognition, Bodily Pain, and Man-
environment Interactions (UCLA Students’ Store 1968) quoted in de Graeff (n162) 2. 
170 de Graeff (n162) 57 Nociceptive pain is caused by tissue damage. Neuropathic pain may be defined 
as pain resulting from damage to the peripheral or central nervous system 
171 ibid Somatic pain is nociceptive pain that originates from the skin, connective tissue, muscle tissue 
or bone. Visceral pain is nociceptive pain that emanates from the internal organs of the thorax or 
abdomen. 
172 ibid Breakthrough pain is a suddenly occurring, temporary, often severe pain or an increase of pain 
that occurs in the presence of chronic pain. 
173 ibid 3 Opioid-induced hyperalgesia occurs when the administration of opioids results in hyperalgesia 
and increased pain. 
174 ibid Pain that is primarily somatic in nature may also be influenced to a large extent by psychosocial 
factors and/or life philosophy (see Causes). This universal concept of pain is also referred to as ‘total 
pain'. 
175 ibid 4. 
176 ibid ‘64% of patients with an advanced stage of cancer.’ 
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of cancer.177 This guideline recognises the role of palliative care beyond cancer patients 
and to that effect it also provides data on pain caused by other illnesses.178 This is 
helpful in encouraging a common understanding between healthcare professionals of 
the type of care which patients suffering from different illnesses may need.179 In effect, 
this type of guideline can foster an improved knowledge of the decisions which need 
to be taken with the patient in relation to their care and can encourage wider palliative 
care provision at an appropriate time in the disease trajectory.      
 
Under pathophysiology, the guideline examines dimensions of pain and highlights the 
impact of cultural factors on the communication of pain as well as broader social 
factors which may have a negative effect on the health of the patient. An awareness of 
such factors is vital for ‘an integral, i.e. multidimensional, approach that may lead to a 
more effective treatment of pain.’180 On this basis, the guideline is following the WHO 
definition of palliative care in that it is addressing the ‘treatment of pain and other 
problems, physical, psychosocial and spiritual.’181 Causes of pain are also addressed 
by this guideline. This facilitates the healthcare professionals understanding of the 
illness and allows for more focussed palliative care to be provided.  
 
In relation to diagnosis, the guideline suggests that the patient should be given 
sufficient time ‘to verbalise his pain, to discuss his concerns and anxieties, and to 
indicate to what extent the pain hinders him.’182 This allows the patient to exercise their 
right of autonomy and it promotes patient involvement in the decision-making process. 
However, it does not provide the level of detail found in the KNMG Guideline for 
Palliative Sedation. In addition to this, the guideline also sets out what is required to 
establish ‘a good pain history’.183 This includes patient input, consideration of the 
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‘patient’s environment’,184 as well as the need to examine each symptom of pain 
individually.185 Guidance is also provided on how to provide care for different levels 
of pain as well as how to correctly identify the severity of pain.186  
 
The measurement and treatment of pain is addressed under a number of sub-headings 
including; integral approach, treatment of the cause, non-pharmalogical symptomatic 
treatment, pharmacological symptomatic treatment, adjuvant pharmacological 
treatment and nervous system interventions. Guidance on pharmacological 
symptomatic treatment is split between basic pharmacological principles, treatment of 
nociceptive pain and neuropathic pain. In relation to basic pharmacological principles 
the guidance sets out the appropriate time frame for the provision of medication as well 
as the manner of its administration.187 It can be noted that considerable guidance is 
provided under the headings of nociceptive pain and neuropathic pain. Under 
nociceptive pain a variety of medications are discussed.188 This provides considerably 
more guidance than that contained in the KNMG Guideline for Palliative Sedation. 
The same can be said for guidance on neuropathic pain, adjuvant pharmacological 
treatment, and nervous system interventions. Although this guideline does not provide 
direct guidance on specialist palliative care it does equip the medical professional with 
the information necessary to make complicated decisions on end-of-life care due to its 
in-depth discussion on medicines used in palliative care. 
 
The IKNL guidelines are complementary and serve to develop their own framework 
for palliative care. However, it becomes apparent in looking at the suite of guidelines 
on the oncoline site that regulation and guidance for specialist palliative care practices 
is just one aspect of caring for the terminally ill patient. Specialist palliative care 
practices are not provided in isolation but form the end stages of palliative care. As 
                                                          
184 ibid. 
185 ibid. 
186 ibid The guideline suggests the use of a diary in which the patient records severity of pain twice a 
day. In assessing the score the medical practitioner is to take account of the circumstances in which the 
measurement is made. Furthermore, special observation scales are to be used when the patient does not 
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187 ibid 15 Instead of administering on an 'as required' basis a fixed schedule is used in which the time 
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for maintenance treatment of pain then the opioids prescribed (morphine, oxycodone or 
hydromorphone) should be slow-release preparations.’  
188 ibid 16-22 Drugs discussed include: paracetamol, NSAIDs, opioids, morphine, fentanyl, oxycodone, 
hydromorphone, methadone, tramadol, buprenorphine.  
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such, specialist palliative care can be most effective when broader measures are in 
place which have the aim of establishing optimum care for the patient. At a minimum, 
clear guidelines on palliative sedation appear to provide the patient with greater 
certainty as regards their care and allows for more open discussion between the patient 
and physician of possible treatment choices in palliative care. In addition to this, the 
doctor has clear guidelines within which to work and the system of involving specialist 
palliative care consultants ensures that palliative sedation is not administered in 
unsuitable cases. The Dutch guidelines are well rounded by considering patient and 
doctor concerns as well as addressing areas of potential criticism.  
 
Conclusion 
Fohr has commented that uncertainty may ultimately have the severest impact on 
patients as it could be seen as ‘directly contributing to the under treatment of suffering 
at the end of life.’189 This not only relates to the level of sedative administered but in 
other cases it may mean that treatment is not provided in order to avoid subsequent 
decisions on treatment withdrawal.190 This underlines the importance of a clear and 
consistent legal framework to support the provision of specialist palliative care. This 
chapter has highlighted an alternative legal framework for the regulation of specialist 
palliative care. In this regard it has demonstrated that the major difference between the 
Dutch and Irish system of palliative care is the existence of clear and comprehensive 
professional guidelines for specialist palliative care in the Netherlands. It was also 
established that clear guidelines can strengthen the distinction between specialist 
palliative care and euthanasia. 
  
Palliative care in Ireland can be said to have developed in an ad hoc fashion as there 
was no central plan for its development and expansion. The result of this is that the 
provision of palliative care in Ireland can be seen as fragmented. The Netherlands 
shares a similar background to the development of palliative care but steps have been 
taken to encourage a uniform level of care across healthcare facilities. Such an 
approach is necessary to promote understanding and standards of care.  
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It would not be realistic or practical to attempt to draft legislation which would have 
a comparable effect to the KNMG Guideline for Palliative Sedation or the suite of 
guidelines accessible on the oncoline website. Medical knowledge on end-of-life care 
has developed considerably in the past number of decades and guidelines need to be 
able to quickly adapt and reflect advances in medicine. Furthermore, the KNMG 
Guideline for Palliative Sedation paid attention to the ongoing cooperation between 
doctors and nurses in providing palliative care. It is not sufficient for professional 
standards to largely ignore the role of other healthcare professionals and this is a point 
which must be addressed in a more detailed manner in Ireland. Overall, the legal 
framework for specialist palliative care in the Netherlands directly tackles the 
distinction between specialist palliative care and euthanasia and demonstrates that in 
order to advance the care of the terminally ill patient there can be no unanswered 







The introduction to this thesis quoted the poet Philip Larkin who wrote that ‘[m]ost 
things may never happen: this one will’.1 Although the inevitability of death is certain 
there is no reason why pain or suffering experienced by the patient at the end of life 
should go unaddressed. In this regard, specialist palliative care has a valuable role as 
a ‘holistic and multidisciplinary approach to care’.2 In order to fully achieve this role 
it is important that there is an appropriate legal framework in place which provides 
guidance on specialist palliative care practices for both the healthcare professional and 
the patient. Medical practice should not be unnecessarily hampered or further 
complicated due to the lack of an appropriate legal framework. 
 
This thesis set out to advance the argument that the current legal framework in Ireland 
for specialist palliative care is inadequate and consequently a more appropriate legal 
framework which addresses the challenges raised in practice must be identified. This 
argument has been advanced over the course of the previous six chapters and has been 
drawn out through the three central research questions posed in this thesis. This 
concluding Chapter will first emphasise the factors around palliative care which 
illustrate the importance and necessity of this thesis. These factors include the limited 
legal analysis of specialist palliative care practices, the fragmented legal framework 
which currently exists in Ireland for specialist palliative care, and the legal concerns 
arising from the provision of palliative sedation and the withdrawal of artificial 
nutrition and hydration. Second, the central research questions which have formed the 
backbone of this research will be addressed individually. The substantive arguments 
stemming from the exploration of these central research questions will be outlined and 
the main findings, in respect of each, will be highlighted. Finally, drawing on the key 
findings of the thesis, the concluding section will suggest ways in which the legal 
framework in Ireland for specialist palliative care can develop so as to promote greater 
clarity, consistency, human rights protection, and respect for the four principles as set 
out by Beauchamp and Childress.   
                                                          
1 Philip Larkin, ‘Aubade’ in Harold Pinter, Geoffrey Godbert and Anthony Astbury (eds) 100 Poems 
by 100 Poets (Methuen 1986) 93. 
2 Irish Hospice Foundation, ‘Primary Palliative Care in Ireland’ (Dublin 2011) 3. 
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 The Importance of Examining Palliative Care 
As discussed in Chapter One and Two, the importance of examining the legal 
framework in Ireland for specialist palliative care is based on the fact that palliative 
care is an increasingly prevalent form of care provided to patients and it is likely that 
the number of patients receiving palliative care will increase in the coming years.3 
This is underlined by the expansion of palliative care providers,4 the breadth of 
illnesses which palliative care addresses5 and the development of specialist palliative 
care practices.6 Despite the increasing significance of the legal framework, there has 
been limited legal analysis and policy discussion in Ireland on issues such as the 
decision-making framework needed for specialist palliative care practices,7 or the 
controversial aspects of this form of care. Instead, the discussion of specialist palliative 
care has largely been from a medical perspective. 
  
A fundamental matter in the legal framework for specialist palliative care is the need 
to distinguish specialist palliative care practices from euthanasia. The legitimacy of 
this distinction has often been questioned and is an issue which needed to be addressed 
in a sustained and extensive manner. The main challenges identified for administering 
palliative sedation include the difficulty of recognising the symptoms which may 
require palliative sedation,8 and the difficulty in accurately judging an appropriate 
level of sedative drug which avoids toxicity and does not hasten the death of the 
patient. On the surface these appear to largely be medical concerns but there is a 
significant legal undercurrent to these decisions. This close relationship between 
medical and legal concerns persists in the decision to withdraw artificial nutrition and 
hydration from the patient. For example, questions arise in relation to the 
categorisation of artificial nutrition and hydration and the question of liability under 
the Criminal Justice Act 1964 for withdrawing artificial nutrition and hydration.  
   
The challenges stemming from the use of palliative sedation and the withdrawal of 
artificial nutrition and hydration emphasise the difficulty of identifying an appropriate 
                                                          
3 Text to n46 in Chapter One. 
4 See p43. 
5 Text to n62 in Chapter One. 
6 Text to n16 in Chapter One. 
7 See pp11-12. 
8 Text to n139 in Chapter Two. 
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legal framework for specialist palliative care in Ireland. The legal framework must 
serve to protect the human rights of a patient, avoid unnecessarily constraining the 
decision making autonomy of the healthcare professional, and reflect the four 
principles espoused by Beauchamp and Childress. It should be remembered that the 
examination of the four principles was not the primary focus of this thesis but their 
function is to assist in the creation of more precise rules. As outlined in Chapter Two, 
the legal framework for specialist palliative care must also be clear and consistent in 
order to be effective. This point is supported by De Haan who recognised the potential 
role of regulation in stating that ‘physicians are entitled to be “governed by rules which 
are fixed, knowable, and certain”.’9 On this basis, it was necessary to consider the 
legality of specialist palliative care practices under Irish law before the broader legal 
framework could be examined and any suggestions for reform be advanced. 
 
The Legitimacy of the Distinction between Specialist Palliative Care 
Practices and Euthanasia 
Specialist palliative care aims to tackle the pain experienced by the patient at the end 
of life and the manner in which this is achieved has led to suggestions that it is a form 
of euthanasia. The lack of clarity in the distinction between specialist palliative care 
practices and euthanasia was illustrated at the outset of Chapter Three which 
highlighted suggestions that ‘morphine drips in such cases are a form of “slow 
euthanasia”’10 and that ‘palliative care is an alternative to permitting euthanasia on 
grounds of compassion’.11 Despite this, the provision of palliative sedation has been 
justified by medical practitioners, ethicists, and lawyers on the basis of the doctrine of 
double effect. 
 
Chapter Three set out recent interpretations of the doctrine of double effect and applied 
the criteria for double effect set out by Williams to palliative sedation. It was illustrated 
in Chapter Three that the criteria for double effect can be satisfied in instances where 
                                                          
9 Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford University Press 1979) 214-15 quoted in Jurriaan De Haan, 
‘The new Dutch law on euthanasia’ (2002) Medical Law Review 57, 61. 
10 J Andrew Billings and Susan D Block, ‘Slow euthanasia’ (1996) 12 Journal of Palliative Care 21; B 
Mount, ‘Morphine drips, terminal sedation, and slow euthanasia: definitions and facts’ (1996) 12 
Journal of Palliative Care 31; H Brody, ‘Commentary on Billings and Blocks “Slow Euthanasia”’ 
(1996) 12 Journal of Palliative Care 38. 
11 James Gilbert, ‘Palliative medicine: a new specialty changes an old debate’ (1996) 52(2) British 
Medical Bulletin 296, 297.  
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palliative sedation is provided. In this regard, it was argued that the administration of 
the sedative drug is morally good, the bad effect of hastening the patient’s death is not 
a means of achieving the good effect, the intention in palliative care is directed towards 
the relief of suffering, and the relief of pain at the end-of-life is a sufficient reason to 
risk hastening the patient’s death. As such, all four criteria for double effect, as set out 
by Williams, can be satisfied for the administration of palliative sedation. However, 
double effect can be interpreted from a variety of perspectives which are unlikely to 
lead to a homogenous interpretation of the role of double effect in cases of palliative 
sedation. As such, it was necessary to look beyond theory and examine the manner in 
which double effect has been considered by the courts.  
 
Cases which raised the concept of double effect such as R v Adams,12 R v Cox,13 and 
Moor14 were examined in Chapter Three. It was shown that these cases did not 
examine the application of the doctrine in a head-on or sustained manner.15 In Fleming 
v Ireland, the role of double effect was indirectly referred to in evidence given by 
consultant physician in palliative medicine, Dr Tony O’Brien.16 Furthermore, the 
doctrine of double effect was cited in the Irish Association of Palliative Care 
discussion paper on palliative sedation.17 These references to double effect serve to 
demonstrate that the doctrine is recognised as part of the clinical practice of palliative 
medicine in Ireland.18 Despite this, the doctrine has not yet been fully addressed by 
case law or legislation in this jurisdiction. Consequently, healthcare professionals are 
drawing on the doctrine of double effect despite there being no clear legal position on 
the doctrine or the necessary criteria for the successful application of the doctrine in 
this jurisdiction. The lack of a clear legal framework for double effect weakens its 
effectiveness in demonstrating the legitimacy of the distinction between palliative 
sedation and euthanasia. Much greater legal clarity is needed in distinguishing these 
                                                          
12 R v Adams [1957] Crim LR 773. 
13 R v Cox (1992) 12 BMLR 38. 
14 Moor, The Times, 12 May 1999. 
15 Text to n208 in Chapter Three; Other cases which have discussed but not ‘applied’ the doctrine 
include R(Pretty) v DPP [2002] 1 All ER 1; R(Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice [2012] EWHC 2381 
(Admin). 
16 Fleming v Ireland & Ors [2013] IEHC 2, [38]. 
17 Irish Association of Palliative Care, ‘Palliative Sedation’ (March 2011).     
18 Fleming v Ireland [2013] IEHC 2, [34]. 
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practices so healthcare professionals have a clear legal framework in which to provide 
specialist palliative care.19  
 
A further weakness with the doctrine of double effect is that it is of most relevance 
after the fact, i.e. after an act has occurred. It is not appropriate for healthcare 
professionals to be guided by a justification when providing palliative care. Instead, 
greater guidance is needed at an earlier stage in patient care. This guidance should, at 
a minimum, be clear on indications for palliative sedation, the decision-making 
framework for palliative sedation, and the practice of commencing palliative sedation. 
The lack of consistency in the application of the doctrine combined with the fact that 
it is a justification means that this area is in need of significant reform. 
  
Closely tied to, albeit distinct from palliative sedation, is the practice of withdrawing 
artificial nutrition and hydration from the patient. The legality of withdrawing artificial 
nutrition and hydration is based to a substantial degree on whether it is categorised as 
a form of medical treatment or medical care. This is based on the reasoning that 
medical treatment can be withdrawn from a patient if it is futile and not in the best 
interests of the patient whereas medical care should continue to be provided. Airedale 
N.H.S. v Bland20 and Re a Ward of Court21 categorised the withdrawal of artificial 
nutrition and hydration as the withdrawal of medical treatment.22 Therefore, once the 
treatment was withdrawn a patient would die from their original injuries rather than a 
lack of food and water. The line of reasoning adopted in these cases is not a particularly 
convincing approach to the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration. In effect, 
it appears to have been employed with the pre-determined purpose of not placing 
liability on the healthcare professional. The weakness in this approach has been 
highlighted by Hanafin23 and the President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical 
                                                          
19 John Keown, The Law and Ethics of Medicine (Oxford University Press 2012) 319-320 ‘Lord Joffe, 
explaining a clause in his Bill on assisted dying for the terminally ill, which would have entitled a 
terminally ill patient to request and receive such medication as may be necessary to keep him or her as 
free as possible from pain and distress, said that it was clear that some doctors were frightened of 
prosecution for using “double effect.”’ 
20 Airedale N.H.S. v Bland [1993] A.C. 789, [1993] 2 WLR. 350. 
21 Ward of Court (withholding medical treatment) (No 2), Re, [1995] IESC 1, [1996] 2 IR 73, [1996] 2 
IR 79, [1995] 2 ILRM 401. 
22 See Chapter Three. 
23 Patrick Hanafin, Last Rights: Death, Dying and the Law in Ireland (Cork University Press 1997) 25. 
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Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research.24 All of this suggests 
that specialist palliative care requires a legal framework with a more substantial 
grounding in order to ensure that healthcare professionals and patients have certainty 
about the limits of care and the type of care which can be provided.25  
 
Overall, the doctrine of double effect and the acts and omissions distinction serve to 
distinguish specialist palliative care practices from euthanasia but do not provide the 
clarity or certainty which is necessary for both the healthcare professional and the 
patient at the end of life. As stated in Chapter Three, these distinctions will continue 
to be seen as illusory until a more precise legal framework is introduced. 
Consequently, it is important that other parts of the legal framework provide a stronger 
base on which to provide specialist palliative care.  
 
The Current Legal Framework for Specialist Palliative  
Care in Ireland 
The second question asked by this thesis is what legal framework currently exists for 
specialist palliative care in Ireland. This question was addressed over the course of 
Chapters Three, Four, and Five. These Chapters discussed constitutional provisions, 
common law, legal instruments, the European Convention on Human Rights, and 
professional standards and guidance. This approach was taken so all aspects of the 
legal framework could be drawn out. This broad examination of the existing legal 
framework also had the benefit of identifying the foundations upon which an 
appropriate legal framework can be based.  
 
Chapters Three and Four examined the right to life, right to bodily integrity, protection 
from inhuman or degrading treatment, the right of autonomy, and the concept of 
dignity in the context of palliative care. Any legal framework for specialist palliative 
                                                          
24 President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research, ‘Deciding to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment: Ethical, Medical, and Legal 
Issues in Treatment Decisions’ (1983) 61 cited by Glenys Williams, ‘Acts and Omissions in Treatment 
Withdrawal: Conceptual Problems and Policy Decisions’ (2008) 39 Cambrian Law Review 75, 87. 
25 Timothy E Quill, Bernard Lo and Dan W Brock, ‘Palliative Options of Last Resort: A Comparison 
of Voluntary Stopping Eating and Drinking, Terminal Sedation, Physician-Assisted Suicide, and 
Voluntary Active Euthanasia’ in Torbjőrn Tännsjő, Terminal Sedation: Euthanasia in Disguise? 
(Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004) 11 ‘However, hidden, ambiguous practices, inconsistent 
justifications, and failure to acknowledge the risks of accepted practices may also undermine the quality 
of terminal care and put patients at unwarranted risk.’ 
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care has to respect the status human rights occupy in this jurisdiction. The case law on 
human rights not only demonstrates the necessity of protecting these rights but also 
the importance of ensuring that an appropriate framework is in place to give effect to 
these rights.26  
  
The case of A, B, and C v Ireland27 demonstrated the importance of an appropriate 
decision-making framework for the legally and ethically challenging aspects of 
healthcare. The ECtHR concluded that the authorities had failed to protect the third 
applicant’s right to privacy due to the lack of ‘any implementing legislative or 
regulatory regime providing an accessible and effective procedure by which the third 
applicant could have established whether she qualified for a lawful abortion in 
Ireland’.28 In applying this reasoning to specialist palliative care it is evident that there 
needs to be a decision-making framework in place which makes it clear for both the 
patient and the healthcare professional when palliative sedation can be administered 
and whether artificial nutrition and hydration can be withdrawn.  
 
The ECtHR in Tysiąc v Poland set out that such a decision-making framework needs 
to be ‘timely’,29 ‘fair’30 and should not be framed in such a way as to limit its 
application.31 Adopting such an approach helps ensure that the rights of the patient can 
be effectively protected and vindicated. As such, the rights of a patient should not be 
lessened by virtue of a terminal diagnosis. The existence of a clear framework by 
which to protect patient rights substantially aids the protection of the right to bodily 
integrity, protection from inhuman or degrading treatment, and the right of autonomy 
among others.  
 
A substantial right in providing appropriate end-of-life care is the right of autonomy. 
This right has been recognised and protected in common law, constitutional 
provisions, the ECHR, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. In Re a Ward of Court 
Denham J set out the importance of consent in medical treatment. This requires a 
                                                          
26 Text to n91 in Chapter One. 
27 A, B, and C v Ireland (2010) ECHR 2032. 
28 A, B, and C v Ireland (2010) ECHR 2032, [267]. 
29 Tysiąc v Poland (2007) 45 EHRR 42, [118]. 
30 Tysiąc v Poland (2007) 45 EHRR 42, [113]. 
31 Tysiąc v Poland (2007) 45 EHRR 42, [116]. 
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person to be able to make an autonomous decision. The absence of a framework for 
discussing specialist palliative care decisions with a terminally ill patient in a ‘timely’ 
manner would render this right largely ineffective. It could also be viewed as 
symptomatic of an ad-hoc approach to communication and decision-making in 
specialist palliative care.  
 
Chapter Four also demonstrated that the status of dignity is not particularly clear and 
its precise meaning has not been clarified by Irish courts or by the ECtHR. Dignity 
has been referred to in cases such as Re a Ward of Court and Fleming v Attorney 
General. In Re a Ward of Court Denham J suggested that there was a right to dignity 
but little detail was provided as to what the recognition of this right would entail. 
Despite this, the Supreme Court in Fleming v Ireland referred to dignity as being a 
constitutional value which is recognised and respected by ‘the rights protected’32 in 
the Irish Constitution. This approach to dignity appears to categorise it as a value or 
principle rather than as a right in this jurisdiction. The approach of the Supreme Court 
in Fleming v Ireland suggests that the dignity of a patient can be upheld by protecting 
and vindicating the constitutional rights of the patient. Nevertheless, dignity is a 
problematic and challenging principle to accurately define as evidenced by discussion 
of case law and academic commentary in Chapter Four.    
 
It is clear from the preceding discussion that human rights have a vital role in the 
provision of specialist palliative care and form a central part of the legal framework 
for this area. Cases such as A, B, and C v Ireland and Tysiąc v Poland provide a 
signpost in terms of how human rights in healthcare are to be protected. Consequently, 
there needs to be clear process in place by which patients can have these rights 
protected and have their need for specialist palliative care assessed. Such a framework 
needs to be cognisant of and active in protecting human rights of particular 
significance to palliative care. Furthermore, there should be clarity as to what is meant 
in instances where the term ‘dignity’ is used.  
 
These points were to the fore when examining the professional standards and guidance 
of the Irish Medical Council [hereinafter ‘IMC’] and An Bord Altranais. The 
                                                          
32 Fleming v Ireland [2013] IESC 19, [110]. 
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professional standards of these bodies have begun to address a number of these issues 
but more work needs to be done in order to raise the professional standards to the level 
needed for healthcare professionals and patients in the area of palliative care. It was 
shown that the professional standards issued by bodies such as the IMC and An Bord 
Altranais are often vague and have a considerable subjective element. This can be 
explained by their role as guiding principles but the expansion of these professional 
standards over the years demonstrates that they have assumed a more substantial role 
in guiding medical practice in Ireland.  
  
Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics for Registered Medical Practitioners 
The IMC Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics contains sections addressing the 
dignity of the patient,33 nutrition and hydration,34 end-of-life care,35 consent to medical 
treatment,36 and advance healthcare planning.37 As such, the IMC professional 
standards address many of the issues relevant to the provision of palliative care. 
Despite the increase in detail over previous editions of the IMC Guide there are certain 
weaknesses which persist. For example, the term ‘dignity’ is used in the Guide to 
Professional Conduct and Ethics but there is no guidance on how this is to be 
interpreted. Reference to this principle is not linked to any legal instrument nor is it 
explicitly grounded in any particular theoretical framework. In addition to this, there 
is no assistance in recognising when treatment is futile, when appropriate pain 
management is needed, or what conversations around palliative care should entail.  
 
It is positive though that Section 22.3 of the IMC Guide to Professional Conduct and 
Ethics addresses a patient’s right of autonomy in relation to treatment decisions. The 
importance of informed consent is also recognised in the Guide to Professional 
Conduct and Ethics as seen in Section 3338 and Section 35.39 However, Beauchamp 
and Childress set out that ‘respect for autonomy in health care relationships requires 
more than avoiding deception and coercion. It requires an attempt to instill relevant 
                                                          
33 Irish Medical Council, ‘Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics for Registered Medical 
Practitioners’ (7th edn, Dublin 2009) 14. 
34 ibid 20. 
35 ibid 22. 
36 ibid 33. 
37 ibid 39. 
38 ibid 34. 
39 ibid 36. 
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understanding, to avoid forms of manipulation, and to respect persons’ rights.’40 On 
this basis, there needs to be greater guidance around the issues in specialist palliative 
care which should be discussed with the patient. In addition to this, it is necessary that 
discussion with the patient occurs at a time when they are capable of communicating 
their wishes. 
 
In other respects, the Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics demonstrates the 
potential of professional standards. For example, it does not have the rigidity of 
legislation and can be updated easily and regularly to reflect advances in medical 
knowledge. The Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics has clear strengths in 
protecting the human rights of a patient but in the specific context of specialist 
palliative care it is evident that there are issues of clarity and consistency which need 
to be improved. For example, much greater guidance is needed on co-operation with 
other healthcare professionals such as nurses.  
 
An Bord Altranais Code of Professional Conduct 
The Code of Professional Conduct does not provide guidance on communication or 
specialist palliative care practices such as the provision of palliative sedation or the 
withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration. In effect, the code is vague in how 
best to care for the terminally ill patient. It does little to advance the protection of 
human rights and due to the subjective nature of the Code of Professional Conduct it 
does not encourage consistency across the nursing profession.  
 
Chapter Five highlighted that the Code of Professional Conduct has been reviewed by 
An Bord Altranais and a Draft Code of Professional Conduct and Ethics for Registered 
Nurses and Registered Midwives has been published.41 In contrast to the current Code 
of Professional Conduct, this revised document defines how dignity is to be 
understood. This is a step which was not taken in the previous edition of the Code of 
Professional Conduct or by the IMC Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics. The 
draft Code of Professional Conduct and Ethics sets out that the principle comes from 
                                                          
40 Tom L Beauchamp and James F Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (7th edn, Oxford 
University Press 2013) 121. 
41 Nursing and Midwifery Board of Ireland, ‘Code of Professional Conduct and Ethics for Registered 
Nurses and Registered Midwives’ (October 2013). 
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the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Furthermore, the European Convention 
on Human Rights, the Irish Constitution, and the Equal Status Acts are drawn on as 
sources ‘for the values and standards established for respecting the dignity of the 
person.’42 As such, the Code provides detail on values, standards of conduct, and 
supporting guidance in relation to respecting the dignity of the patient. This is a 
positive step in providing clarity, consistency and protecting the human rights 
framework applicable to specialist palliative care in Ireland. It demonstrates that 
weaknesses identified in other professional standards can be addressed and that they 
can be built upon to provide greater legal and ethical certainty for both the healthcare 
professional and the patient.  
 
The professional standards issued by the IMC and An Bord Altranais, due to status 
and enforceability, provide a more solid foundation on which to improve the legal 
framework for specialist palliative care than the guidelines published by groups such 
as the Irish Association of Palliative Care [hereinafter ‘IAPC’] and the European 
Association of Palliative Care [hereinafter ‘EAPC’]. It was argued in Chapter Five 
that the reports and guidance issued by bodies such as the IAPC and the EAPC may 
have a considerable influence on doctors and nurses providing specialist palliative care 
due to the reliance on local policy. There is a level of detail in the guidance issued by 
these groups which is not seen in the standards of the IMC and An Bord Altranais. 
However, the guidance issued by the IAPC and the EAPC are not directly enforceable 
in this jurisdiction. This severely hampers their potential in terms of delivering on 
clarity, consistency, and human rights protection across the providers of specialist 
palliative care in Ireland.  
 
It has been commented that ‘Ireland is at an embryonic stage in its embrace of matters 
medico-legal/ethical at a national and organised level.’43 This thesis has demonstrated 
this point in outlining the failings in the current legal framework for specialist 
palliative care. Nonetheless, the current professional standards can provide the basis 
for further development. As a result of this it was necessary to examine a jurisdiction 
                                                          
42 Nursing and Midwifery Board of Ireland, ‘Code of Professional Conduct and Ethics for Registered 
Nurses and Registered Midwives’ (October 2013) 7. 
43 Asim Sheikh and Cliona McGovern, ‘Medicine, Medical Ethics and Law: Their Interplay and Future’ 
(2002) 8 Medico-Legal Journal of Ireland 2, 5. 
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which sought to develop their professional standards in an attempt to ameliorate the 
level of specialist palliative care being provided. This approach illustrated the reality 
of adopting a legal framework with a substantial role for professional standards.    
 
An Alternative Legal Framework for Specialist Palliative Care 
The third central research question asked what alternative legal framework for 
specialist palliative care exists. In response to this, developments in the legal 
framework for specialist palliative care in the Netherlands were examined. Chapter 
Six highlighted that the major difference between the Dutch and Irish legal 
frameworks for specialist palliative care is the existence of clear and comprehensive 
guidelines in the Netherlands which form part of the physician’s code of conduct. The 
reliance placed on professional standards in the Netherlands demonstrated a move 
away from a justification led approach to specialist palliative care and instead 
signalled a more active approach in defining this area of care and ensuring that it was 
provided in a manner which was legally and ethically sound for both the healthcare 
professional and the patient. Significant elements to emerge from the Dutch 
professional standards included the development of a clear decision-making 
framework for specialist palliative care, greater guidance in terms of clinical practice, 
and recognition of the constant co-operation between healthcare professions involved 
in delivering patient care.  
 
The ‘Guideline for Palliative Sedation’ issued by the KNMG addresses ‘[i]ndications 
and preconditions for palliative sedation’,44 the decision to begin sedation, the 
provision of hydration, respite sedation as well as wider issues such as ‘[d]ealing with 
the patient’s family’.45 The third chapter of the KNMG ‘Guideline for Palliative 
Sedation’ sets out the ‘[i]ndications and preconditions for palliative care’.46 A main 
indication is that that the patient should have ‘refractory’ symptoms.47 The Guideline 
includes a ‘flow diagram’ to assist in the identification of refractory symptoms.48 This 
provides a clear reference for both the doctor and the patient as to whether a symptom 
                                                          
44 Royal Dutch Medical Association, ‘Guideline for Palliative Sedation’ (Royal Dutch Medical 
Association 2009) 22.  
45 ibid 46. 
46 ibid 22. 
47 ibid.  
48 ibid 25. 
255 
 
is likely to be refractory and promotes a degree of certainty in the provision of 
palliative sedation. Chapter three of the ‘Guideline for Palliative Sedation’ also 
addresses symptoms which raise difficult ethical and legal issues, namely sedation in 
the case of existential suffering. It was shown in Chapter Two that non-somatic 
suffering such as existential distress is a complex symptom to treat appropriately and 
it is a symptom which needs to be adequately addressed in the legal framework in this 
jurisdiction in order to strengthen the distinction between specialist palliative care and 
euthanasia.  
  
The decision-making process is set out in the fourth chapter of the KNMG ‘Guideline 
for Palliative Sedation’. The steps in this process underline the importance of taking 
account of all the parties involved in the provision of palliative care such as the nursing 
staff who have ‘regular close contact with the patient’.49 This decision-making process 
is required regardless of whether the patient is receiving palliative care in a hospital of 
whether they are being cared for in the home. This broad applicability is positive in 
ensuring that terminally ill patients can receive the necessary care regardless of the 
location.    
 
The administration of fluids in palliative care was addressed in chapter five of the 
‘Guideline for Palliative Sedation’. It set out a number of factors which are to be 
considered in deciding whether to withdraw hydration from a patient who is unable to 
take fluids. Chapter six of the ‘Guideline for Palliative Sedation’ focused on issues 
relating to the administration of palliative sedation such as ‘the preparations to be 
made, the initiation of sedation, proportionality, the drugs to be used and the method 
of administration, morphine and sedation, and … accompanying measures.’50 There is 
considerable detail contained in the Guide and it even specifies the type of drug which 
should be used in palliative sedation as well as providing detail on the amount which 
should be originally administered,51 issues of timing and the approach to be taken for 
continuous sedation.52 In addition to this, the ‘Guideline for Palliative Sedation’ 
acknowledges the importance of a ‘multidisciplinary approach’53 to palliative care and 
                                                          
49 ibid 29. 
50 ibid 38. 
51 ibid 39. 
52 ibid 39-40. 
53 ibid 38. 
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states that ‘Nursing staff can contribute important input for drawing up the indications, 
estimating whether the conditions have been met, and implementing palliative 
sedation.’54 At present, the professional standards of the IMC and An Bord Altranais 
do not strengthen co-operation between these professions despite their close 
collaboration in practice.  
 
The manner in which the Netherlands has addressed specialist palliative care has 
brought these practices more into the open. It is an approach which demonstrates the 
practicality of using professional standards to encourage decision-making in a 
‘timely’55 and ‘fair’56 way. Importantly, it shifts the focus of the healthcare professional 
from a justification led approach to palliative care to one which promotes a ‘holistic 
and multidisciplinary approach to care’.57 The standards in the Netherlands took an 
important step in acknowledging the legal and ethical challenges which specialist 
palliative care raises and addressing these in a direct fashion. This was vital in 
distinguishing specialist palliative care from euthanasia, and promoting the care of the 
individual at a vulnerable stage in their life. 
 
CONCLUSION: THE WAY FORWARD 
Palliative care in Ireland can be said to have developed in an ad-hoc fashion as there 
was no central plan for its development and expansion.58 Regardless of its origins, the 
clinical practice of palliative care in Ireland has been recognised internationally as 
being of a very high quality.59 Developments in the legal framework for specialist 
palliative care need not stymie the progress of palliative care but should complement 
and provide a way of continuing the development and improvement of palliative care 
in this jurisdiction. 
 
                                                          
54 ibid. 
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57 Irish Hospice Foundation, ‘Primary Palliative Care in Ireland’ (Dublin 2011) 3. 
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This thesis suggests that the most appropriate mechanism for providing clarity, 
consistency, protecting human rights, and the four principles as set out by Beauchamp 
and Childress is the continued development of the professional standards published by 
the IMC and An Bord Altranais.60 The current reliance on local policy cannot 
adequately achieve what needs to be undertaken at a national level. In this regard, the 
population of the Netherlands is considerably higher than that of Ireland61 and yet it 
was demonstrated that it was possible to draft national guidelines suitable for such a 
large and diverse population. In effect, Ireland’s approach of leaving these issues 
largely to local policy only serves to create inconsistency and excessively complicates 
the provision of end-of-life care. National guidelines are not a panacea to the debates 
about end-of-life care but may assist in providing certainty to health care professionals 
working in this area as well as allowing for the voice of the patient to be clearly heard.  
 
There are several arguments in favour of relying on professional standards to assist in 
the development and improvement of palliative care provision. These arguments have 
been outlined and substantiated throughout the course of this thesis. For instance, 
professional standards are directly enforceable in a way which local policy is not. The 
enforceability of professional standards means they can have a direct impact on the 
professionals most closely associated with the provision of palliative care in this 
jurisdiction. Moreover, professional standards are sufficiently flexible in that they are 
regularly updated to reflect developments in medical practice. Professional standards 
can therefore develop alongside updates in the provision of palliative care and would 
not restrict appropriate medical practice in end-of-life care. An additional positive 
aspect in relying on standards published by the Irish Medical Council and An Bord 
Altranais is that the standards do not need to be limited to general principles but can 
instead accord with the approach taken by the Royal Dutch Medical Association in the 
Netherlands. For instance, in recent years An Bord Altranais has published detailed 
guidance and standards applicable to particular aspects of medical care provided by 
the nursing profession in Ireland. The cumulative effect of these factors is to 
demonstrate that professional standards can support the role of the healthcare 
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61 Central Statistics Office, ‘Census of Population 2011: Preliminary Results’ (Central Statistics Office 
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professional while also ensuring that the care of the patient remains of paramount 
importance regardless of the location where they are being cared for.              
 
While arguing that the most appropriate route to reform is revised and expanded 
professional standards, this is not to discount the role of legislation in respect of the 
broader healthcare system as it interacts with palliative care. For example, legislation 
is needed to formalise the status of advance care directives, do not resuscitate orders, 
and the approach to decision making for patients who lack capacity. Steps have been 
taken to address many of these issues as demonstrated by the Assisted Decision-
Making (Capacity) Bill 2013. However, specialist palliative care practices require a 
legal framework which can be easily updated to reflect advancements in medical 
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